

## NATO'NUN GELİŞEN ENERJİ GÜVENLİĞİ ROLÜ

### ÖZ

Enerjinin uluslararası ilişkilerde temel analiz unsurlarından biri olmasını takiben enerjiye bağlı olarak iki kavram “enerji güvenliği” ve “enerji jeopolitiği” kavramları sıkça kullanılmaya başlanmıştır. Her iki kavram da enerjinin politik bir unsur olarak değerini ortaya çıkarmakta ve kimi zaman birbirlerine atıfta bulunarak kullanılmaktadır. Bir kolektif savunma örgütü olması nedeniyle, NATO da enerjinin güvenlik ve jeopolitik boyutlarıyla ilgilenmektedir. NATO, 2006 Ukrayna-Rusya Federasyonu ve peşinden 2008 Gürcistan-Rusya Federasyonu krizlerinin enerji bağlantısı nedeniyle bu tarihlerden itibaren enerji konusuna olan ilgisini arttırmıştır. Bu süreç NATO’yu Doğu Avrupa ve geniş Karadeniz coğrafyasında enerji odaklı konuları da içeren bir politika sürecine yöneltmiştir. Bunun yanı sıra, Akdeniz ve Ortadoğu’daki son gelişmeler, NATO’nun güney kanadına yönelik bir enerji güvenliği rolü üstlenmesini de gerekli kılabilir. Söz konusu makale, bu süreci ele almakta ve NATO’nun enerji güvenliği konusundaki rolünü incelemektedir.

*Anahtar Kelimeler: NATO, Enerji güvenliği, Enerji-politik.*

### دور أمن الطاقة المتطور لحلف ناتو كوكنيل ارباش دوغان خلاصة :

بعد ان اوضحت الطاقة احد عناصر التحليل الرئيسية في العلاقات الدولية، بدأ مفهومان لهما علاقة بالطاقة هما ” أمن الطاقة ” و ” جيو بوليتيك الطاقة ” بالاستعمال بصورة شائعة. ويظهر كلا المفهومين اهمية الطاقة كعنصر سياسي، واضح المفهومان يستعملان في احيان كثيرة كأشارة لأحدهما الى الآخر. وبسبب كونه منظمة دفاعية تضامنية، فان حلف الناتو يهتم بدوره بالابعاد الأمنية والجوسياسية للطاقة. وبسبب علاقة الازمة الناشئة بين اوكرانيا وروسيا الاتحادية في عام 2006 ومن بعد ذلك ازمة جورجيا مع روسيا الاتحادية في عام 2008 بموضوع الطاقة، فان حلف الناتو زاد من اهتمامه بموضوع الطاقة بعد هذين التاريخين. وقد دفعت هذه الوتيرة حلف الناتو نحو اتخاذ الناتو وتيرة سياسية تحتوي فيما تحويه مواضع تكون الطاقة محورا فيها بالنسبة لمناطق اوروبا الشرقية وجغرافية البحر الاسود الواسعة. وبالإضافة الى ذلك، فان التطورات الأخيرة في منطقة البحر الابيض المتوسط والشرق الاوسط من الممكن ان تجعل من الضروري تحمل الناتو دورا في الحفاظ على امن الطاقة في جناحه الجنوبي. ويتولى هذا المقال هذه الوتيرة ودور الناتو في موضوع امن الطاقة بالبحث والتحليل.

*الكلمات الدالة : حلف الناتو، أمن الطاقة، الطاقة والسياسة.*

# NATO'S EVOLVING ENERGY SECURITY ROLE

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## ABSTRACT

As energy became one of the basic tools of analysis in international relations, two related concepts came to the forefront, which are “energy security” and “energy geopolitics”. Both concepts focus on the value of energy as a political factor and are used with reference to each other. As a collective defense organization, NATO is interested in security and geopolitical implications of energy issues. After the Russian Federation-Ukraine Crisis in 2006 and the Russian Federation-Georgia Crisis in 2008, which had implications with regard to energy, NATO increased its efforts for adopting these issues into its agenda. This process led NATO to incorporate energy into its policies and actions, particularly with regard to Eastern Europe and the broader Black Sea region resulting in the introduction of NATO as an actor in energy security and energy geopolitics. In addition, the recent developments around the Mediterranean and the Middle East are also likely to push NATO for an energy security role in its southern flank. This article investigates NATO's role in energy security as a result of its adoption of energy issues.

*Keywords: NATO, Energy Security, Energy Geopolitics*

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**Ortaođu Etütleri**  
Volume 7, No 2,  
January 2016, pp.34-47

## 1. Introduction

Energy issues started to have a decisive effect on international relations; therefore it is significantly taking part in international actors' agendas. In the first decade of the 2000s in particular, with Russia's utilization of energy as leverage in international politics, the approaches to energy issues has undergone a transformation. NATO's decision to adopt energy issues into its policies came after the Ukraine crisis in 2006. During the last decade, NATO has focused on the security implications of energy and has incorporated it into its Strategic Concept.<sup>1</sup> This development is a tangible outcome of the discussions about NATO's transformation after the Cold War. The lack of energy issues in NATO's previous Strategic Concept of 1999 showed that it did not have interest in non-conventional security issues at the initial stage. After all, it became apparent in the first decade of the 2000s that a security organization of the 21st century cannot distance itself from emerging security issues, particularly energy.

The accession of Central and Eastern European countries to NATO in 1999 and 2004 introduced a different energy security outlook into the Alliance. For most of these new NATO members in Eastern Europe, energy security concerns were immediate national security matters, since their energy supply systems, which were developed during the Soviet era, were still dependent on Russia as the sole supplier. Consequently, they regarded NATO as a legitimate forum where energy security could be discussed.<sup>2</sup> Yet, NATO's interest in energy issues remained ambiguous until the energy crisis in 2006 between Ukraine and Russia. The ambiguity in NATO's energy interest dissipated after the utilization of energy as leverage by Russia during and after the 2006 crisis.

At the present time, energy infrastructure, i.e. energy storage and transit systems and the actual regions they take place, became potential targets for terrorist attacks and conventional assaults in times of war. Therefore, the effects of the 2006 crisis moved beyond its contingency and carried energy security into international agenda. Following this crisis, the Russian attacks against Baku-Supsa and Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipelines during its intervention in South Ossetia in 2008 constituted a second clear example for the importance of energy security.<sup>3</sup> World public opinion focused on the issue of energy security as a result of Russia's energy leverage in two successive crises. Other actors, which had to deal with Russia in various platforms, had to

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1 M. Çelikpala (2013) *Enerji Güvenliği NATO'nun Yeni Tehdit Algısı*, İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, p. 26.

2 M. Rühle (2012) NATO and Energy Security: From Philosophy and Implementation, *Journal of Transatlantic Studies*, Vol. 10, N. 4, p. 389.

3 M. E. Biresselioğlu (2012) NATO'nun Değişen Enerji Güvenliği Algısı: Türkiye'nin Olası Konumu, *Uluslararası İlişkiler Dergisi*, V.9, N.34, p.242.

take great care in energy issues and how Russia will use its energy leverage. NATO is also one of these actors. It had to focus its attention on its relations with Russia, particularly in Eastern Europe. Since Russia 'suspended' its observance of the Conventional Armed Forces (CFE) Treaty in December 2007 and withdrew from the meetings of the Joint Consultative Group in March 2015<sup>4</sup>, it has become apparent that the geopolitics of the Black Sea region would be further reconfigured. Accordingly, when determining its role in the onset of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, NATO has to take into consideration the security implications of the developments mentioned above. In the light of the emerging security challenges, the energy security implications of these developments pushed NATO to clarify its outlook on energy politics at the end of the first decade of the 2000s.

Moving beyond the background mentioned above, this article will deal with the evolution of NATO's perspective on energy security. Primary sources such as official NATO documents will be investigated in order to trace the evolution of NATO's role in energy issues.

## **2. NATO's Transformation**

The first decade of the 21<sup>st</sup> century has introduced new threats and challenges in the international security environment. Actors in the international system found themselves facing various security challenges ranging from conventional to non-conventional threats. As a collective defense organization, NATO was no exception, since it had to adapt itself to evolving conditions in the security environment, even more so since the end of the Cold War. The need to evolve and transform has been the main agenda item of the Alliance's supreme decision making body, the Summit Meetings of the Heads of State and Government, for almost more than a decade.

Energy security as a topic was first included in the final communiqué of NATO's Riga Summit in 2006.<sup>5</sup> In Article 45 of the document, the Allied countries recognized that "Alliance security interests can also be affected by the disruption of the flow of vital resources". Yet, they decided that the NATO Council must consult on the immediate risks to the energy security and determine the fields that the Alliance can contribute to.

After the Riga Summit, relevant NATO bodies prepared a classified report titled "NATO's Role in Energy Security". At the Bucharest Summit of 2008<sup>6</sup>, the Allies noted that principles that will govern NATO's approach in the field

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4 NATO's role in conventional arms control <[http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\\_48896.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_48896.htm)>

5 Riga Summit Declaration, 29 November 2006. <<http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2006/p06-150e.htm>> Retrieved 10 December 2015.

6 Bucharest Summit Declaration, 3 April 2008. <[http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official\\_texts\\_8443.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_8443.htm)> Retrieved 10 December 2015.

of energy security have been identified. According to these principles, NATO's role in energy security would be defined in five points, which are<sup>7</sup>:

1. Information and intelligence fusion and sharing,
2. Projecting stability,
3. Advancing international and regional cooperation,
4. Supporting consequence management,
5. Supporting the protection of critical energy infrastructure.

These official NATO documents and related developments constituted the foundation for the incorporation of energy security into NATO's agenda and policies. It should also be pointed out that all these efforts are indeed a part of NATO's response to the changing security environment, particularly with regard to the developments in its eastern flank as mentioned above. Therefore, at the end of the first decade of the 21st century, NATO has undergone a process of transformation. Since the whole story regarding this transformation would be the subject of an entire article, this article will only focus on the aspects of this transformation with regard to energy security. The transformation was initiated at the Lisbon Summit in 2010, with the introduction of a new "Strategic Concept" for the Alliance, titled "Active Engagement Modern Defense". A 'strategic concept' for NATO is<sup>8</sup>:

[...] an official document that outlines NATO's enduring purpose and nature and its fundamental security tasks. It also identifies the central features of the new security environment, specifies the elements of the Alliance's approach to security and provides guidelines for the adaptation of its military forces.

In the following section, the introduction of the new Strategic Concept and the related developments will be explained and analyzed first. Then, the focus will be on the developments related to and the evolution of NATO's role in energy security. The decisions taken after the Chicago (2012) and Wales (2014) Summits and their implementation will be discussed.

### 3. The Lisbon Summit and NATO's New Strategic Concept

NATO's Lisbon Summit has raised the expectations and hopes for a new NATO, called "NATO 3.0" by various circles.<sup>9</sup> According to these discussions, NATO 1.0 lasted during the Cold War and NATO 2.0 was the version

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7 This report was published in 26 October 2011 on NATO's website. <[http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\\_79941.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_79941.htm)> Retrieved 12 December 2015.

8 New Strategic Concept FAQs, <<http://www.nato.int/strategic-concept/strategic-concept-faq.html>> Retrieved 11 December 2015.

9 J. Rogin (2010) Get Ready for NATO 3.0", *The Cable*, Washington.

of the Alliance from 1991 up until the transformation in 2010. The new strategic concept was adopted in the Lisbon summit as “the blueprint for the new NATO” in the then Secretary General Rasmussen’s words.<sup>10</sup> The strategic concept will serve as the Alliance’s roadmap for the next ten years. It was titled “Active Engagement and Modern Defense”, which reflects the vision of the Alliance for the next decade.

The most important outcome of the Lisbon Summit is the new Strategic Concept document.<sup>11</sup> It has been a major turning point for the Alliance as the first decade of the 21st century ended. The overarching theme of the new strategic concept is the new security challenges of the 21st century and the need to address them. Yet, according to the then Secretary General Rasmussen, the need to transform the way NATO does business is real, but at the same time NATO maintains its fundamentals, which is its commitment to collective defense and deterrence<sup>12</sup>.

The document sets three core tasks for the Alliance that are collective defense, crisis management and cooperative security. Collective defense is the defense and deterrence provided by the Article 5 of the NATO Treaty, which ensures that an attack against one member is an attack against the whole of the Alliance. Crisis management is the utilization of political and military tools in NATO’s arsenal in order to manage the crises before they devolve into conflicts that may affect the Allied countries’ security. Lastly, cooperative security means active engagement with relevant partners and other international organizations in order to enhance international security. The document states that NATO has to fulfill these three core tasks in order to ensure the security of the allied countries in the contemporary security environment. Threats against the energy security of the allied countries are evaluated in this context. The document acknowledges that the allied countries “are increasingly reliant on the vital communication, transport and transit routes on which international trade, energy security and prosperity depend” and “some NATO countries will become more dependent on foreign energy suppliers and in some cases, on foreign energy supply and distribution networks for their energy needs.”

The document highlights the fact that energy demand is growing and increasingly depends on trade and transit and remarks “As a larger share of world

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10 “The New Strategic Concept: Active Engagement, Modern Defense”, Speech by NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen, 08 October 2010. <[http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions\\_66727.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_66727.htm)> Retrieved 9 December 2015.

11 “Active Engagement, Modern Defense”, Strategic Concept for the Defense and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. <[http://www.nato.int/strategic-concept/pdf/Strat\\_Concept\\_web\\_en.pdf](http://www.nato.int/strategic-concept/pdf/Strat_Concept_web_en.pdf)> Retrieved 8 December 2015.

12 “The New Strategic Concept: Active Engagement, Modern Defense”, Speech by NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen, 08 October 2010. <[http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions\\_66727.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_66727.htm)> Retrieved 9 December 2015.

consumption is transported across the globe, energy supplies are increasingly exposed to disruption.” It is needed to point out that such threats may be caused by non-conventional means such as cyber attacks and terrorism as well as conventional means. This point proves the interconnected character of new security challenges. The concept highlights its understanding of the modern security environment by stating that

Key environmental and resource constraints, including health risks, climate change, water scarcity and increasing energy needs will further shape the future security environment in areas of concern to NATO and have the potential to significantly affect NATO planning and operations.

With regard to the energy security issue, the concept document makes the commitment that NATO will “develop the capacity to contribute to energy security, including protection of critical energy infrastructure and transit areas and lines, cooperation with partners, and consultations among Allies on the basis of strategic assessments and contingency planning.”

#### **4. The Implementation of the Concept: The Emerging Security Challenges Division and the Centre of Excellence**

As the Allied countries’ leaders have acknowledged in the Lisbon Summit<sup>13</sup>, NATO faces “emerging, and continuing, trans-national challenges such as proliferation, terrorism, maritime-, cyber- and energy security.” In accordance with the general perspective of this article, it is needed to look deeper at the Article 41 of the Final Communiqué of the Lisbon Summit, which is related to energy security. According to Article 41, the leaders have recognized that “A stable and reliable energy supply, diversification of routes, suppliers and energy resources, and the interconnectivity of energy networks, remain of critical importance.” The statement addresses the agreement in the Bucharest Summit about the areas of NATO’s contribution to energy security and remarks that further development in these areas are agreed upon. It also assures that energy security considerations will be integrated in NATO’s policies and activities. The Lisbon Summit statement’s coverage of energy security builds upon the former summit decisions, while at the same time going further beyond. It places energy security in the context of emerging transnational security challenges, which NATO will be engaging throughout the decade. Furthermore, for the first time in Summit declarations, it is clearly stated that the Allies have agreed upon integrating energy security in NATO’s actions and policies. Therefore, NATO has actively involved itself with issues related to energy security and has introduced itself as an actor in the energy security and energy geopolitics scene.

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13 Lisbon Summit Declaration, 20 November 2010. <[http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official\\_texts\\_68828.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_68828.htm)> Retrieved 07 December 2015.

In accordance with the Allies' decision to incorporate energy security into NATO's policies and actions, the foremost challenge was the organizational capacity of the Alliance that will address the new issues. In the Lisbon Summit, the Allies have decided to subject the NATO Headquarters to an organizational reform in order to enable it to perform better and more efficient for its overwhelming tasks. Besides organizational changes to the NATO Command Structure, the Emerging Security Challenges division was founded to deal with a non-conventional security threats such as terrorism, nuclear issues, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, cyber defense and energy security. This division is a part of NATO's International Staff at Brussels and works under the authority of an Assistant Secretary General. Its main task is to provide advice, guidance and administrative support to the national delegations at NATO Headquarters on the emerging security challenges mentioned above. The division is envisaged to "provide NATO with a Strategic Analysis Capability to monitor and anticipate international developments that could affect Allied security"<sup>14</sup>.

Another important milestone that highlighted the implementation of the energy security related decisions of the Lisbon Summit is the accreditation of the NATO Energy Security Centre of Excellence in Lithuania in 2012. For the nature of the emerging security challenges is increasingly interconnected, NATO requires a great deal of subject-matter expertise in order to understand the issues at hand and guide its decision-making process. This is the point that makes the centres of excellence relevant. NATO centres of excellence are nationally or multi-nationally funded international military organizations that offer training, knowledge, expertise and experience to the Allied countries in specific fields. They are not direct NATO bodies, but NATO's Command Structure accredits them in accordance to specific criteria. The NATO Centre of Excellence for Energy Security (ENSEC COE) was founded on July 10 and accredited on October 12, 2012. According to its concept document, the mission of the ENSEC COE is "to assist NATO, Nations, Partners and other bodies by supporting NATO's capability development process, mission effectiveness, and interoperability by providing comprehensive and timely expertise on aspects of energy security."<sup>15</sup>

## **5. Chicago and Wales Summits**

Consistent with the Strategic Concept, the summit meetings in Chicago (2012) and Wales (2014) affirmed the Alliance leaders' continuing interest in the emerging security challenges and energy security in particular. The statements after the both summits recognized the "critical importance" of "a stable and reliable energy supply, the diversification of routes, suppliers and energy

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14 NATO News: "New NATO division to deal with Emerging Security Challenges", 04 August 2010. <[http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news\\_65107.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_65107.htm)> Retrieved 9 December 2015.

15 "Concept of the NATO Centre of Excellence for Energy Security", <<http://www.enseccoe.org/en/resources/downloads.html>> Retrieved 6 December 2015.

resources, and the interconnectivity of energy networks”. The Wales Summit final declaration also highlights the Russia-Ukraine crisis and the instability in the Middle East and North Africa region and their implications on energy security. NATO leaders reaffirm their commitment to energy security and state:

[...] we will enhance our awareness of energy developments with security implications for Allies and the Alliance; further develop NATO’s competence in supporting the protection of critical energy infrastructure; and continue to work towards significantly improving the energy efficiency of our military forces, and in this regard we note the Green Defense Framework.<sup>16</sup>

## 6. General Assessment of NATO’s Perspective on Energy

During the discussions to determine its role and purpose in the immediate post Cold War era, NATO did not actively incorporate energy related issues to its agenda and policies. Yet, it was unable to remain aloof to the developments and changes in the Black Sea region, Russian policies and the international system from the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century onwards. Before NATO’s Lisbon Summit in 2010 that would initiate the new Strategic Concept, the international system felt the geopolitical and security related implications of recent developments. The energy crisis between Russia and Ukraine in 2006 led NATO and the EU to approach Russia more cautiously. Afterwards, the suspension of CFE Treaty obligations by Russia in 2007 and the Russian-Georgian War in 2008 had a decisive effect on the atmosphere, in which the new strategic concept was being elaborated. For these reasons, NATO had to include energy related issues to its actions and Summit decisions from 2008 onwards. Despite the fact that Michael Rühle, Head of Energy Security Section in NATO’s Emerging Security Challenges Division, said, “Energy security will not be on the agenda for the Chicago Summit of NATO in May 2012”<sup>17</sup>, the Chicago Summit Declaration included energy security issues as well.

The security implications of energy issues are primarily related to the vulnerability of energy infrastructure against a variety of threats both conventional and non-conventional. A prime example for conventional threats against energy infrastructure is Russia’s assaults against the oil pipeline systems during its intervention in South Ossetia in 2008 against Georgia. Likewise, Iran’s aggressive naval actions in Straits of Hormuz in 2011-12 heightened tensions and fueled concerns about the energy transit passing through the important route of the Gulf of Basra.<sup>18</sup> In addition, non-conventional security challenges

16 Wales Summit Declaration, 05 September 2014. <[http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official\\_texts\\_112964.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_112964.htm)> Retrieved 4 December 2015.

17 E. Dilek O. İşeri (2012) Yeni Enerji Jeopolitiğinde NATO’nun Enerji Güvenliğinde Tamamlayıcı Rolü ve Türkiye’nin Potansiyel Katkıları, *Akademik Bakış*, V.5, N.10, p.238

18 “Iran threatens to block Strait of Hormuz oil route”. BBC News. 28 December 2011. <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-16344102> Retrieved 15 December 2015.

such as terrorism and cyber attacks pose important risks for energy security. For the energy infrastructure elements such as transit pipelines extend across borders in a wider geographical extent, ensuring its safety against terrorist threats is a major challenge. Similarly, cyber attacks from hostile actors may target the electronic systems of energy facilities.

For NATO, the Bucharest Summit in 2008 had identified the five principles mentioned above for its role in energy issues. Over the following years NATO has incorporated energy issues in its strategic concept, and sought to elaborate how it can contribute to energy security of its members. According to Sorin DUCARU, NATO Assistant Secretary General for Emerging Security Challenges, “NATO’s energy security activities can be classified into three areas: raising strategic awareness, contributing to the protection of critical energy infrastructure, and enhancing energy efficiency in the military.”<sup>19</sup>

For long years, NATO has served as a platform for consultation among its members and partners on security issues; therefore it is able to carry security implications energy issues into the international agenda of its allied countries. NATO has the right tools for bringing together knowledge, expertise and experience from government officials, the academia and the industry in order to provide a comprehensive and broad perspective on the security related aspects of energy. Such a perspective enables NATO to have a clear strategic picture about how energy developments may influence the security environment. Julius Grubliauskas (2014), a political officer at NATO’s Emerging Security Challenges Division, highlights that “NATO’s political consultation process, supported by shared intelligence, provides Allies with a confidential setting in which to discuss energy developments that affect their security in the broadest sense.”

In addition, looking from the security perspective, the fact that many countries rely on international trade for vital energy resources highlights the importance of the protection of critical energy infrastructure. While NATO does not initiate activities that are directly aimed at the protection of energy infrastructure, it has focused on improving its capabilities on various fields such as crisis management, consequence management, maritime security and protection against non-conventional security challenges. Rühle and Grubliauskas suggest that it was various “international events rather than conceptual blueprints” that made NATO’s role in energy security relevant.<sup>20</sup> This perspective primarily points out the contributions of NATO’s maritime operations in ensuring freedom of navigation such as Operation Ocean Shield in the Horn of Africa and Operation Active Endeavour in the Mediterranean.<sup>21</sup> Ex-

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19 “Energy Security: Operational Highlights” No. 5, 2014. NATO Centre of Excellence for Energy Security, <<http://ensecco.eog/download/332/esoh5.pdf>> Retrieved 14 December 2015.

20 (2012; 67)

21 See NATO Maritime Command website <<http://www.mc.nato.int/Pages/home.aspx>> for detailed information about its operations.

ercises and operations provide NATO with both experience and flexibility in including energy issues in its overall activities. Therefore, NATO develops its capacity for intervening early in energy related crisis and conflicts.

While NATO is cautiously developing its capacity and capabilities in, Russia's activities and policies point out that energy related problems will require further attention in the Black Sea region, the Mediterranean, and Middle East. In this context, Frank Umbach points out the energy related dimension of Russia's annexation of Crimea:

Putin's annexation of Crimea was very much driven by undermining Ukraine's energy and gas diversification strategy. For the strategy to work, the Crimean peninsula was of strategic importance. It has vast offshore oil and gas resources in the Black Sea, estimated between 4-13 trillion cm of natural gas.

Similarly, it is possible to underscore the importance of the recent developments in the Middle East for NATO's evolving energy security role. In 1952, NATO's southern flank extended well into the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East with the accession of Turkey and Greece. With respect to energy, this region is neighboring the world's largest hydrocarbon reserves, thus constituting an efficient land and naval route to the transit of energy reserves to Europe.

The recent developments in the Middle East introduce a new geographical dimension to the discussions about NATO's role in energy security, particularly with regard to its southern flank. NATO's decision to tackle the issues of energy security brings about the protection of critical energy infrastructure in Turkey to NATO's agenda. Turkey is the final destination for the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Oil Pipeline (BTC). BTC has a capacity of 1.2 million barrels of oil per day. In the first three quarters of 2015, 198 million barrels of crude oil loaded on 275 tankers at Ceyhan. The oil terminal in Ceyhan has an annual capacity of 50 million tons of crude oil (approximately 400 million barrels). It is vital for the reach of the Caspian hydrocarbon reserves to the international markets. In addition to BTC, NATO has a pipeline system in Turkey. It is approximately 3200 kilometers long and consists of two branches. The western branch starts from Antalya and reaches Balıkesir, and the eastern branch starts from Mersin and İskenderun, and reaches Malatya and Diyarbakır. NATO pipeline system was established for providing storage and supply of fuel to Turkish Armed Forces and NATO troops.<sup>22</sup>

The most important development in the recent months in the Syrian civil war is the Russian involvement that started in Autumn 2015. On 30 Septem-

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22 See <[http://www.bp.com/en\\_az/caspian/operationsprojects/pipelines/BTC.html](http://www.bp.com/en_az/caspian/operationsprojects/pipelines/BTC.html)> for the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline and <[http://www.ant.gov.tr/?page\\_id=11](http://www.ant.gov.tr/?page_id=11)> for NATO's pipeline system in Turkey.

ber 2015, the Russian Parliament gave authorization for the deployment of air forces in Syria.<sup>23</sup> Since then, Russian airstrikes in support of the Syrian regime, under the pretext of fighting against terrorism have increased considerably. In addition, persistent violations of Turkish airspace by Russian warplanes resulted in growing tensions between the two countries. Eventually on 24 November 2015, Turkish fighter jets downed a Russian airplane violating Turkish airspace of the province of Hatay, leading to deterioration in both the rhetoric and the relations between Turkey and Russia.<sup>24</sup> This incident reverberated through media and the world public, reminiscent of the Cold War conflict. Russia has since reinforced its naval base in Latakia, deploying S-400 air defense missile systems in Syria and an air defense warship in the Mediterranean.<sup>25</sup>

The Russian involvement in Syria and the November 24 incident have deep ramifications in terms of energy security of Turkey and NATO. Russia is known to employ a variety of conventional and non-conventional instruments in order to escalate tensions with NATO allies in Eastern Europe. The use of such tactics is called “hybrid warfare” and its objective is fomenting a deep sense of political and economic insecurity and fear among the target country’s population.<sup>26</sup> As mentioned above, it involves a mix of conventional and non-conventional means of conflict in order to exploit the vulnerabilities of the adversary. In the case of Russian hostile actions in Eastern Europe, it mostly involves the use of systematic and deliberate misinformation campaigns. In the context of the recent tensions, it is observed that Russia has already started employing a similar approach against Turkey. Though, in this case, the level of hostility may go beyond the realm of information warfare. Given the proximity of Turkish critical energy infrastructure to the southern border, growing Russian military presence in both Syria and Mediterranean presents potential risks against Turkey’s energy security. Furthermore, Russian support

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23 “Russian parliament grants Vladimir Putin right to deploy military in Syria” The Guardian, 30 September 2015. <<http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/30/russian-parliament-grants-vladimir-putin-right-to-deploy-military-in-syria>> Retrieved 20 December 2015.

24 “Turkey Shoots Down Russian Military Jet”, The Wall street Journal, 24 November 2015. <<http://www.wsj.com/articles/turkey-shoots-down-jet-near-syria-border-1448356509>> Retrieved 20 December 2015.

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to the Assad regime in Syria proves to be problematic as well. It is well known that Syria provided support and safe haven to the terrorist organization PKK in the 1990s. Given the current situation in the Turkish-Syrian relations, Syria will by no means refrain from threatening Turkey either through supporting terrorist organizations or through the use of military means such as ballistic missiles. One only needs to remember the downing of Turkish reconnaissance jet in June 2012 or the accidental ballistic missile attack against Reyhanlı in March 2015 for evaluating the potential threat that Syria poses. The critical energy infrastructure mentioned above, namely the Ceyhan Oil Terminal and NATO's pipeline system's eastern branch are located several hundred kilometers from Aleppo around which most of the heavy fighting in the Syrian civil war takes place between various factions. Therefore, the risk against the energy infrastructure in the south of Turkey has never been more serious. Deteriorating security situation in Turkey's southern border poses both conventional and non-conventional challenges against energy security, which is a significant issue that NATO seeks to address or at least contribute to.

## **7. Conclusion**

After NATO's initial negligence about energy related issues during its post-Cold War transformation, NATO witnessed the geopolitical developments particularly in the Black Sea region having deep implications for energy security. Therefore, it had to incorporate energy related issues to its strategic concept and activities. This process started to take shape after the Russia-Ukraine energy crisis of 2006 and NATO's the conceptual adaptation was realized in 2009. The recent developments with significant security implications highlight the prevalence of energy issues in the Black Sea, the Mediterranean, and Middle East and may potentially keep NATO's interest alive. From the second half of the 2000s onward to the recent years, the course of regional politics in the Black Sea, the Mediterranean, and Middle East remark the importance of energy geopolitics.

At this stage, individual energy suppliers' use of energy as a political tool in European and transatlantic relations had a catalyst effect on NATO's decision. In addition, the interconnectedness between energy and the non-conventional security challenges further complicated the security implications that NATO derived. Therefore, NATO sought to adopt a role for itself in ensuring energy security of its members. While its role in energy security is evolving in accordance with its strategic concept through its various activities, NATO seeks to determine and conceptualize what more it can do in energy security through its experience and lessons learned.

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