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| Bahrain Parliamentary Elections: Solution or Crisis? |
| Nebahat Tanrıverdi O, ORSAM Middle East Research Assistant, nebahattanriverdi@ors |
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 Bahrain is preparing for new parliamentary elections on 24 September while 2010 parliamentary elections have not fulfilled the year yet. The situation in Bahrain has not been normalized also. The country will go to the ballot box in order to select new 18 PMs because of the biggest Shia opposition groups’, Al Wefaq’s, mass resigns from parliament after the protests began on 14 February 2011. The protests still goes on while the relative stability that sustained during last seven months is still fragile. The claim those 14 years old Ali Jawad was killed by police increased the tension and straightened the protests which fire up again on 31 August.
The Election Process under the Shadow of Peninsula Shield
The developments in Tunisia and Egypt became a turning point for the political atmosphere which had tensed during the 2011 Parliamentary election in Bahrain and ended with the protests major centers of island such as Pearl Square after 14 February. During the meetings between Sunni ruling family Al Khalifa and opposition groups; the gulf countries who afraid of the failure of Sunni rule in Bahrain send troops, the Peninsula Shield under the control of GCC and composed of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and United Arab Emirates to Bahrain. Peninsula Shield declared state of emergency on 17 March 2011 and more than 1000 demonstrators and important opposition leaders like Hassan Meshami and the leader of Wa’ad (The National Democratic Action Society) Ibrahim Sharif Al-Sayed were arrested. On July, King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa started the “national dialogue” and search a consensus with opposition groups. Also king declared restitution of jobs to the people who were fired on charges of attending to protests and around 1500-26000. Add to that, A Fact-Finding commission was formed to search the events after 14 February, similarly, many human rights association formed commission for the same purpose. It is expected that Fact-Finding commission is going to declare the final report at the end of October.
But all these attempts cannot put an end to political tension in the island. According to the advise resolutions of national dialogue, the power of lower assembly which consist of 40 representatives will be strengthened while the power of upper assembly that appointed by king will be conserved. Al Wefaq who found the reform proposals insufficient withdraw from National Dialogue on July. On 24 August, government declared the election to replace the seats of 18 PM of Al Wefaq and action the parliament in order to apply the advice resolutions of National Dialogue. Al Wafeq not only withdraws from National Dialogue but also declared boycott the elections on 24 September.
By the end of October, the government stated that “both sides made mistakes" but insists there was no policy of state-sanctioned abuse. This statement face with harsh response of opposition groups who indict the state for systematic discrimination, torture and inequality. The attempts of masses from the Shiite-populated areas to enter to major centers such as Pearl Square were blocked by security forces, but 14 years old boy’s death in Sitra, one of the important oil region, led to aggravation of the actions
What does opposition want?
It is undeniable that the share of demographic structure of society in Bahrain pays lot in the tension between Shiite majority population and ruling Sunni monarchy especially regarding the recent events. Adding to monarchy’s situation, security institutions of the monarchy, as well as all the key positions, being under the control of the Sunni minority is also very important factors in this tension. With the main lines, opposition groups claimed that monarchy systematically excludes the Shiite population from government institutions, the settlements and health service; applies ethnic discrimination. The opposition groups who address the exclusion of Shiites from key positions and security institutions as the most seen evidence, claims also that Shiites cannot receive equal access to the distribution of welfare and have been impoverished. On the other hand, many demonstrators participated in protests held since February were fired from their jobs, especially in owned and large companies; this move have deepened the existing economic inequality and prepare the ground for possible future protests.
Add to claims on ethnic discrimination, another important conflict is that the claim of systematic demographic change efforts by monarchy. Bahrain population is consisted of 1.2 million people and half of them are foreigners. It was argued that monarchy is trying to change demographic balance in favor of Sunnis by granting citizenship and jobs with an easy procedure to non-Bahraini Sunnis. In point of fact, these claims are not new, still on the agenda since the Bandargate Scandal blows in 2006. With Bandargate Scandal a secret state report which shows the plan of a systematic demographic change and marginalize of Shiite population of the country, leaked to public; and until that date this issue has been on the agenda of opposition groups. This scandal has increased the ethnic tension which already has existed and deepened the confidence crisis. Monarchy perceived Shiite opposition groups as Iran spies while Shiite opposition groups perceived monarchy as a direct threat for their ethnic existence and for this reason demand the restriction of monarchy. Finally, the demands of the major opposition movements such as Haqq Movement and Al Wefaq have been focused on the monarchy. Modernization period after 2002 came with constitutional monarchy increase the radius of action for Shiite opposition. Forming a new constitutions and elections helped calm Shiite discontent a decade ago. But since 2006 it was practiced in political life that the lower assembly’s powers are limited by upper Shura appointed by the king. That straightened the opposition among the youth population under 30. Additionally, the election system of representatives in lower assembly did not determined by considering the demographic structure; as a result, Shiites can elect limited representatives to lower assembly. Shiites who composed %70 of country’s population could elect 18 PM from 40 seats lower assembly. That creates a major discontent among Shiites. The demand of opposition for more right of representative should be evaluated in this content.
Conclusion
It is so hard to analyze the events happened in the last seven months with only the domino effects mantra which addressed the regime change in Tunisia. In addition to the historical tensions, the impacts of the current political problems which emerged in 2002 are quite clear. On the other hand it will not be wrong to say that the aforementioned problems has been attempted to freeze. Process before the parliamentary elections held in 2010 constitute the recent reasons in the February protests. The attempt of monarchy to resolve the problems by "National Dialogue" talks remain inconclusive and political situation reverted to the situation in 2002. Some important points can be said to be decisive in the process ahead. The decision direction of monarchy has already formed by declaring elections and declaration of certain protection of voters and representatives despite the decision of boycotting the elections. This step has a clear message that the reform process will continue even if Shiite opposition groups remain outside the parliament. At that point the statements and behaviors of important opposition groups such as Haqq and Wefaq and leading Shiite clerics such as Sheikh Issa Qassim will be effective on demonstrators.
In addition, there are still a significant potential for shifting protests from Shiite residential to the major centers of the country such as Pearl Square. There is also another important matter that if 14 years Ali Jawad transforms into a significant figure like Buazzizi and what will be the mass response to this. Also the final report of the Fact-Finding Commission and its impacts should not be avoided. Lastly the results of the elections in September can have similar impacts. |
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| 8 September 2011 |
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