FOREIGN FIGHTERS OF ISIS AND THEIR SECURITY THREAT: THE EXPERIENCE OF TURKEY (2014-2016)

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FOREIGN FIGHTERS OF ISIS AND THEIR SECURITY THREAT: THE EXPERIENCE OF TURKEY (2014-2016)

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PREFACE

The current insecurity spiral in the Middle East has unleashed multiple security threats all over the region. The lack of governance created by conflicts especially in Syria and Iraq stands as the main force that generates insecurities for the region and the international system at large. In this environment, foreign terrorist fighters who go to the war zones to take part in conflicts and undertake other functions has come to the fore in international security agenda.

The topic of foreign terrorist fighters is not new in the international security agenda. We have seen it in different times of the world history at different magnitudes. The phenomenon that took a new shape with the momentum created by terrorist organization DAESH and similar other groups carries new features. It reached to an unprecedented scale in terms of the number of people it has mobilized and the more violent and destructive tendencies it has exhibited. With no doubt, we cannot deny the existence of factors that push and pull this incident. A major driving force is created by factors such as DAESH's announcement of the so-called Caliphate and difficulties that these people suffer in their home countries. These and other similar push and pull factors have been feeding the current wave.

The determination to regulate the fight against the recent wave of foreign fighters at international level is at its highest. In this regard, in addition to regional initiatives, the topic was embraced at the United Nations and a new set of regulations was formed since 2014. International initiatives against the threat, conceptualized as foreign terrorist fighters, continue covering all of its dimensions. Although it is seen that the number in the flow of foreign fighters is decreasing with preventive measures taken in the home countries and the new direction of the conflict in Syria and Iraq, we cannot say that the threat is completely gone.

Center for Middle Eastern Strategic Studies (ORSAM) conducts a wide range of research projects on the conceptual and practical dimensions of foreign terrorist fighters and radicalization. A variety of reports have been published on the historical evolution of foreign terrorist fighters in addition to studies using social network analysis.

This study is one of the most comprehensive works prepared by ORSAM Security Studies Coordinator Assoc. Prof. Haldun Yalçınkaya on the subject, based on ORSAM's findings in this field. We express our gratitude to the International Relations Council (UİK), for their help and permission to reprint this report, which was published as an article in the last volume of the *Uluslararası İlişkiler* journal. This report enables this important study to reach to a wider population. We wish pleasant readings to the people interested in the subject.

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ABSTRACT

Foreign fighters concept that changed in nature with DAESH was seen as voluntary and altruistic fighters since the emerging of the nation state. This article argues that foreign fighters, defined and outlawed as foreign terrorist fighters by the United Nations, bring violence to a wider geography when they get back from conflict zones. In this context, this paper details conceptual approaches on foreign fighters and examines the dataset on terrorist attacks perpetrated by DAESH militants in Turkey between 2014 and 2016 in order to test its hypothesis. The findings in the case of Turkey constitute the first indication of the fact that DAESH's foreign fighters started spreading violence.

Key Words: Foreign Fighters, Foreign Terrorist Fighters, Terrorism

1. INTRODUCTION

The instability in Syria that started in 2011 when the anti-regime uprisings turned into a civil war, has initially spread into the region, and then has become a global problem due to the salafist militant extremists. The terrorist organization known as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) declared a global jihad and urged "true" Muslims all over the world for an exodus toward the newly founded Islamic state. That call resulted in the Islamic-referenced extremists perpetrating violent attacks in Iraq, Syria and various parts of the world. As of the current situation, the violence that the foreign fighters initiated is likely to spread to the rest of the world even if the fighting in Syria ends. Various studies that benefited from past experiences regarding foreign fighters indicate a high likelihood for such a prospect.

The concept of "foreign terrorist fighter" was defined in the United Nations Security Council Resolution No.2178 on 24 September 2014, which states that these fighters are illegal[1]. This political initiative asks the member states to adopt all necessary legal precautions required for fighting against these fighters.

This article focuses on the transformation of "foreign fighters", who throughout the history were deemed selfless individuals in battlefields, into terrorist culprits of our time. The main hypothesis of the article is that the foreign fighters spread violence to other regions. For the purpose of testing this hypothesis, what the concept of foreign fighter means and how it is defined will be analyzed. Then the issue will be handled in a historical perspective in accordance with the theoretical approaches dominant in the field. The theoretical approach will enable the evaluation of the threat posed by foreign fighters of ISIS. The last chapter includes a field study analyzing the wave of ISIS attacks in Turkey between 2014 and 2016. Such an approach will make it possible to emphasize the capacity of foreign fighters to spread violence to regions other than conflict areas. Finally, the outputs of the research will put forward some proposals for the hypothesis and future research projects.

Since the issue of ISIS and foreign fighters is an ongoing problem, researchers need to deal with limitations with regard to data collection, which is obstructed by the lack of access to the battlefield and the convict testaments. Current research is shaped by the limited amount of data shared by states or collected by a small number of journalists who were able to access conflict areas. In addition, social media inputs by foreign fighters in their accounts (Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, etc.) constitute another information source.

Foreign fighters or foreign terrorist fighters?

Foreign fighters lost their legitimacy during the recent conflicts in Iraq even though it was not questioned throughout history. From 2014 onwards, they were declared illegitimate by the UN Security Council due to ISIS attacks. This transformation brings about the dilemma about the question, "foreign fighters or foreign terrorist fighters?" A short answer is that foreign fighters broke out of conventional wisdom and became terrorists after the 2000s. The long answer to this question requires an inquiry into the conceptualization regarding foreign fighters. This

sub-chapter seeks to answer that question by analyzing the conceptual development of foreign fighters concerning its history, defining regulations, illegitimization and the latest phase marked by ISIS.

Recruiting foreigners for wars is not a new phenomenon, rather an old one experienced throughout history. There is a tendency in the academic literature accepting that foreign fighters emerged in the era of nation states from the 19th century onwards. The clear and simple reason for this is that citizen armies emerged in this era, therefore states started to distinguish among citizen and foreign fighters. In essence, two centuries after the emergence of the modern sovereign state reigning over a defined geographical area, nation-states who endorse a strong sense of identity and citizenship constitute a breaking point.

The examples for foreign fighters in battlefield are the Greek Rebellion (1821-1832) and the Texas War of Independence (1835-1836) in the 19th century; the Spanish civil war (1936-1939), the Arab-Israeli War (1948), the Afghanistan War (1979-1989) and the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia (1991-1995) and the Somalia crisis (2006-2009) in the 20th century.[2]

The first evaluation for conventional foreign fighters in these examples is that for ideological reasons they were seen as people of high virtue who sacrificed themselves for a just cause rather than terrorists. Well known examples are British poet Lord Byron, who joined the Greek rebellion and fought against the Ottoman Empire for saving the ancient Greek civilization; or Ernest Hemingway, who voluntarily joined the Spanish civil war. In this sense, the conventional definition for foreign fighters implies foreignness, voluntariness and a just cause.

There is no agreed-upon definition of "foreign fighter," yet whatever definition is taken; it must include the three major points above which are foreignness, vol-untariness and just cause. The major point in the definition that needs emphasize is that these fighters must not be the locals to the territory they are fighting in. The required criterion for an individual to be considered a foreign fighter is that he or she has to join an army or a group unrelated to his/her own country with motivations about ethnicity or aid/rescue mission without seeking any material gain. Foreign fighters who have a financial motivation are called mercenaries. War contractors such as Executive Outcomes or Blackwater, which were seen in post-Cold War battlefield such as Angola, Iraq and Afghanistan are private armies of the 21st century that seek financial gain.[3] These are not considered "foreign fighters" for they are not volunteers even if they are not citizens of the country they operate in.

Another important issue about the definition is the question whether foreign fighters are combatant or not. The question is that if an individual does not take active part in the fighting, yet participate in activities such as logistical or medical support, is she/he considered a foreign fighter? Latest academic debates emphasize that the individuals who participate in all kinds of military activity regardless of its combatant characteristic should be considered a foreign fighter.

Until the Iraq war, there were no question with regard to the wars that those foreign fighters join is a "just cause" or they are terrorists or not. The most important reason for that is such a question was not considered until the 2000s when foreign fighters were recruited by terrorist groups. These people were, in the final analysis, volunteers who help the relatively weak side during the wars that the international community deemed fair and just. Though in the current era, it is no longer possible to consider the conflict environment created by terrorists as such. Therefore, foreign fighters are illegalized through being "terrorized" due to the fact that the conflicts they take part are no longer considered fair and just.

The need for academic studies and theoretical perspectives in the discipline of International Relations with regard to foreign fighters has emerged in the 2000s. That is because, as mentioned above, foreign fighters were not considered terrorists before. Nonetheless, foreign fighters have been seen actively participating in the uprisings and rebellions in Iraq after 2003. The Al-Qaeda in Iraq and its recruitment drive connected the problem with Afghanistan. In this framework, there were various academic studies about foreign fighters in this period. These studies have put forward some academic definitions four of which will be covered in this article. [4]

David Malet defined those people from other countries who join insurgencies in a certain country as 'foreign fighters'[5]. Malet states that his definition does not include terrorists, foreign legionnaires and war contractors. Ian Byran's foreign fighter definition is "those people far from home who fights for a transnational cause or identity"[6]. Barak Mendelsohn who does not view foreign fighters as terrorists, underlines that the definition should include the clause that foreign fighters do not have a citizenship bond with the country they fight in.[7]

All these definition attempts above seek to differ between foreign terrorists and foreign fighters. It is probably for the reason that at that time there was no common understanding as to the illegitimacy of "foreign fighters." The definition seeks to underline the distinction between terrorists and foreign fighters for that they seek to distinguish the "selfless" foreign fighter of the past from the common terrorist of the first decade of the 21st century.

Thomas Hegghammer has a more elaborate definition that the others and he has developed his definition over time. In his first attempt, he included some elements of definition such as a "participating in an insurgency without any citizenship of the country it takes place, registering in no official military body and receiving no payment." [8] Hegghammer altered its definition after the emergence of ISIS so as to include "the person who abandoned or decided to abandon the West in order to participate in military campaigns including terrorism against any adversary" [9]. In essence, Hegghammer's dataset covered only the Western countries, thus he avoided generalization by limiting his definition to those "who abandoned the West" [10].

In the light of these evaluations, one can assume that debates about the definition of foreign fighter will continue. Considering the four definitions above, this article proposes a definition as: *a person who goes to a conflict area from a foreign country without any citizenship or kinship links with the adversaries or financial gain and joins a group or army involved in a civil conflict, insurgency or terrorism is a Foreign Fighter*. Yet, it should be underlined that the foremost concern of academic definitions is about reaching a comprehensive dataset that will conceptualize the issue at hand. Therefore, this definition includes all kinds of foreign fighters from the emergence of nation-states onwards. Nevertheless, the UN Security Council's definition in 2014 seeks to establish a body that will fight against foreign fighters of all terrorist organizations such as ISIS.

The Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF), which was developed as an initiative aimed at overcoming the rustiness of the United Nations bodies on counterterrorism, has enabled the UN Security Council Resolution numbered 2178 on 24 September 2014. The GCTF is a platform established after the lessons learned from the failed attempts of conventional international organizations after the September 11 terrorist attacks. Particularly the consensus principle of international organizations has made it impossible even reaching an agreed-upon definition of terrorism. Founded by the co-chairmanship of Turkey and the United States on 22 September 2011, GCTF is a platform that is open to all states. It enables relevant

state members to come together and debate an issue and does not take decisions through voting. Therefore it enables specifying problems, developing solution proposals and mechanisms, and even allocating resources. [11] Thanks to the work by the GCTF, the UN Security Council agreed upon a definition of foreign fighters and laid the legal groundwork for a global struggle.

In fact, the UN Security Council has mentioned the foreign terrorist fighters in the Resolution No. 2170 before giving a definition in the Resolution No. 2178. Technically, the Security Council included "terrorist" to the definition of "foreign fighters", thereby moving the issue to a legal platform and declaring it illegal. The Resolution No. 2178 was agreed upon under the authority of the Chapter VII of the UN Charter which means it is a binding resolution. A similar resolution was adopted after the al-Qaeda attacks on September 11, 2011. That resolution numbered 1373 was taken under the authority of the Chapter VII and the whole world was united behind it. Therefore, the Resolution No. 2178 is planned to have a similar spirit and promote the fight against foreign terrorist fighters through adopting legal regulations by all member states.

The Resolution No. 2178 by the UN Security Council defines foreign fighters as:

"... individuals who travel to a State other than their States of residence or nationality for the purpose of the perpetration, planning, or preparation of, or participation in, terrorist acts or the providing or receiving of terrorist training, including in connection with armed conflict..."[12]

According to this definition, terrorism is undisputedly at the focus. Therefore, it entails a narrower scope that the academic definitions, which keeps the ambiguity at the minimum and makes possible developing a legal approach towards foreign fighters on a global scale and consequently defining a set of sanctions to be applied. At the same time, the resolution declares those people who are yet at the preparatory or travel stages illegal as well. In fact, that means making people convicts before they commit crimes and deserve the attention of lawyers. Yet, this legal discussion is out of the scope of this article. It is needed to point out that these regulations makes struggle against foreign fighters possible.

The Resolution No. 2178 explains in detail the measures to be taken against foreign terrorist fighters. These measures (Chart-1) require the phases of preventing radicalization to terrorism, measures against foreign fighters, ending and resolving armed conflicts and facilitating reintegration and rehabilitation.

Table 1. Measures to be adopted against foreign fighters proposed by the UNSC Resolution No. 2178[13]

Preventing Radicalization to Terrorism	Measures against foreign terrorist fighters	Ending and resolving armed conflicts	Reintegration and rehabilitation
• Countering violent extremism • Countering incitement to terrorist acts motivated by extremism or intolerance • Promoting political and religious tolerance • Economic development, social cohesion and inclusiveness	• Stemming recruitment • Inhibiting travel • Disrupting financial support	• Military measures • Diplomatic measures	• Deradicalization • Promoting political and religious tolerance • Economic development, social cohesion and inclusiveness

The points mentioned above bring about two different concepts and definitions. Academically speaking, the concept of foreign fighters encompasses a general process and involves a longer period. At the same time, the concept and definition endorsed by the UN implies a stand against current factual developments bringing along a series of measures. In this respect, conceptualization studies use the concept of foreign fighters, while the efforts for preventing them use the concept of foreign terrorist fighters. This article endorses the concept of foreign terrorist fighters laid out in the UNSC Resolution No. 2178 for it investigates the ISIS's foreign terrorist fighters and their violence.

Understanding Foreign Fighters in the Light of the Syrian Civil War and ISIS Ordeal

The wave of protests and uprisings of people demanding democratization in the Middle Eastern and North African countries that started with demonstrations in Tunisia in 2010 is called the Arab Spring in general. The political systems in Tunisia, Libya and Egypt have undergone transformation during this wave of uprisings. The last of the Arab Spring uprisings had begun in Syria in 2011 with the Syrian people's freedom demands. The crackdown on protests by the government of Bashar al Assad turned the protests into a civil war. Syria's heterogeneous structure and the security mechanism shaped during the reign of Hafez al Assad further exacerbated the civil war. While it may seem surprising at the first glance that the Islamist radicals managed to prey on the civil war, a look into Syria's recent history shows that it is not unexpected at all.

The Syrian Baath Party prevented the rise of radical Islamist movements thanks to its basic principles such as socialism, secularism and pan-Arabism. Yet, the end of the Cold War weakened the socialism in Syria like the rest of the world. Afterwards, two wars and the consequent invasion in Iraq have negatively affected Syria as well. During these times, socio-economic hardships that people experienced triggered the rise of Islamist groups among Sunnis. Beshar al Assad, who came to power after the death of his father, Hafez al Assad, in 2000 sought to control the Islamist movement by widening the freedoms. Nonetheless, these political measures fell short of controlling the Salafist[14] movement that emerged in rural areas and suburbs at the end of the 1990s.[15]

The US-led coalition forces invaded Iraq in 2003 triggering an anti-American insurgency in this country, when the Salafist movement in Syria started to take root. The Salafist movement in Syria supported the insurgency led by the al-Qaeda in Iraq. The government in Damascus had a strong grip over the country in this period before the Arab Spring, therefore the Salafists used to pose no serious threat.[16] It should be emphasized that all foreign fighters belonging to the Iraqi Al Qaeda used to pass through Syria at that time.[17] Consequently, the foreign fighters who gained experience in Iraq spread the violence to Syria under the ISIS umbrella, when the Damascus administration could no longer control the country due to civil war.

The al-Qaeda in Iraq evolved and reorganized into the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) after the US withdrawal from Iraq and the beginning of the civil war in Syria. Its leader, Abu Bakr al Baghdadi, declared the Caliphate on 29 June 2014 and announced the founding of a new Islamic state in the territories of Iraq and Syria. Thus, al Baghdadi demonstrated a "utopia" of an Islamic state for Muslims all over the world. Also, it deems the Muslims who are against this ideological approach and the Islamic State as "near enemy". Though, al Qaeda, who is the founder of the ideology, used to target the U.S. and the West as "far enemy" while avoiding an all encompassing message towards all Muslims.[18] Its ideological difference and utopia caused

an increase in its recruitment of people into its militant Salafist ranks. As of the first quarter of 2016, ISIS controls a major portion of the Iraqi and Syrian territories, perpetrates ideological actions including summary executions and publishes them on social media in order to evoke an upheaval.

The majority of ISIS terrorists come from the Sunni communities living in Iraq and Syria. In addition, a considerable number of "foreign fighters" join ISIS as well.[19] These foreign fighters do not come only from the Muslim-majority countries. Al Baghdadi's call for "Hijra" has addressed people from all over the world including citizens of the Western countries. Therefore, ISIS and its activities have been a serious concern for the rest of the world. The local crisis in Syria as the last wave of the Arab spring has become a global terrorism problem due to ISIS and foreign fighters. The main reason for that is the foreign fighters' capacity to spread violence to the rest of the world when they return home.

A historical glance at the issue of foreign fighters from the 19th century onwards shows that those who fight for an "Islamic cause" do not form a majority. The trend changed in the last forty years from the invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 on with the "mujahideeen" who sought to defend Islam against communism. Three distinct periods (Chart 2) must be mentioned in order to make sense of such a change, i.e. the case of militant salafist foreign fighters. In the first period, foreign fighters fought in Afghanistan, Sarajevo, Chechnya and Somali. After the fighting ceased, these fighters were regarded as "selfless volunteers such as those who fought in the Spanish Civil War and met with no legal sanctions. The second period covers the foreign fighter who executed al-Qaeda linked terrorist attacks in Iraq and Afghanistan after the September 11 Attacks. The post-ISIS period is the latest period and foreign fighters of this era have been declared illegal by the UNSC Resolution No. 2178.

Table 2. Evolution of Foreign Fighter with Islamic Reference

Periods	Scope	Explanation
First Period (1979-2001)	Foreign fighters who fought in Afghanistan, Sarajevo, Chechnya and Somalia.	Selfless fighters whose legitimacy are not questioned
Second Period (2001-2011)	Al-Qaeda linked terrorists	Terrorists about whom no legal regulations on international scale were passed
Third Period (2011-)	Terrorists of ISIS and other terrorist organizations in Iraq and Syria	Terrorists who are declared illegal by the UNSC resolution no. 2178

Afghanistan had suffered from an invasion by the Soviet Union from 1979 to 1989. The ordeal of Afghanistan, which is a conservative society, evoked wide reactions in the Muslim world, traversing borders. The *fatwa* titled "Join the caravan" by Abdullah Yusuf Azzam, a Palestinian

Sheikh, which was an important cornerstone for the jihadist movement caused a surge of foreign fighters into Afghanistan. These fighters who were labeled as the Islamic referenced fighters of the first period in the chart above, fought against the invasion of Afghanistan.[20]

The second generation of foreign fighters with Islamist reference emerged after the September 11 Attacks in 201 perpetrated by al-Qaeda. Al-Qaeda was founded by Ayman al Zawahiri and Osama bin Laden, students of Abdullah Azzam, after he was assassinated in 1989. After the invasion of Afghanistan when Zawahiri and Laden urged their fellow fighters to wage global "jihad,"[21] the case took a different turn. Some of the *mujahideen* returned their homes, while others remained in Afghanistan or went to Bosnia to fight. Fighters who returned home pursued three different paths. Some of them retired for a peaceful life while others mentored a new generation of foreign fighters who would go and fight in other conflicts. While it can be claimed that these fighters serve the cause in a passive way, fighters who remained in Afghanistan continued fighting and perpetrating terrorist attacks such as the September 11 attacks launching the so-called "global jihad".

It is hard to claim that the foreign fighters who fought in Afghanistan were an effective fighting force. It was even observed that they became an actual burden for the *mujahideen*. Some Arabs among those foreign fighters were adventure seekers and were called "Gucci jihadists."[22] Nevertheless, the Afghanistan ordeal served as an important cornerstone for the evolution of contemporary foreign fighters. Firstly, the phenomenon of "global jihad" started with the founding of al-Qaeda and secondly the veterans of the Afghan jihad prepared the ground for the spread of militant salafists to the world in the 1990s and the 2000s.[23]

The first generation foreign fighters that gained experience in Afghanistan started to take to the ground for the first time in Yugoslavia which was then about to disintegrate. These fighters went to Bosnia to help the oppressed Muslims and joined the Bosnian army forming a battalion named "*Mujahid*". That actually was a different method than they had in Afghanistan. Even though the Dayton Agreement required foreign fighters to leave the conflict zone in thirty days, it is estimated that some of them remained in Bosnia. The problem in Bosnia provided the Islamist radical foreign fighters with continuity in the stage of history. Moreover, they managed to adopt a different military formation than they had in Afghanistan.[24]

The highest degree of the potential threat that foreign fighters pose when they return home countries was seen in the second period.[25] Foreign fighters with Islamic reference were initially accepted as selfless *mujahideen* protecting the oppressed in Afghanistan, Bosnia, Chechnya and Somalia. Their evolution was triggered by three factors that are the funding of al-Qaeda, transformation of its ideology into global jihad and fighters gaining combat experience.

The September 11 terrorist attacks in the U.S., the metro station terrorist attack in the Great Britain and the terrorist attacks in Istanbul are important consequences of the continuity and evolution of this movement. These attacks were bigger and more lethal than the attacks executed until then. That was primarily caused by the continuity and evolution of the movement. In the final analysis, foreign fighters with formidable fighting experience showed they have greater capacity for lethal attacks when they return from conflict zones.[26]

At this point, the question that needs answer is who foreign terrorist fighters are. In the beginning of the article, the topic of limited access to information about foreign fighters was mentioned. In this framework, profiling foreign fighters is possible to some extent. Some al-Qaeda documents and records captured by the U.S. Military in Sinjar, Iraq in 2007 help understanding a general profile of Islamic-referenced second generation foreign fighters.[27] It is possible to access information about the third generation of foreign terrorist fighters in the reports analyzing

the data shared by governments and social media.

The records captured in Sinjar were analyzed by the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point Military Academy and a report was published in 2008.[28] According to this report, most of the foreign fighters in Iraq came from Saudi Arabia and Libya and Syria played a great role in the formation of foreign fighter networks. Foreign fighters were not recruited online; rather they were recruited by local networks. In this period, foreign fighter became more efficient compared to the "Gucci jihadists", who were sidelined in the battlefield by Afghans. These findings about the second generation foreign fighters are important since it demonstrates the level their evolution reached.

ISIS, which had risen out of al-Qaeda demonstrates the third point in the evolution of foreign fighters. Foreign fighters constitute important manpower resource for ISIS. Since the invasion of Afghanistan in the 1980s, they have been developing their fighting skills and became more efficient in combat. They are generally people below 25 years old with middle to low education, belonging to lower/middle social classes living in suburbs. One can understand that these people had been suffering from a trauma before they were recruited. Such a trauma might involve losing a family member or having problems at school or at work. Right before being recruited they are reported to get detached from their social life and abstain from sharing anything with people. In fact, joining ISIS provides a purpose for their lives.[29] Internet does not actually play a role in their recruitment. Rather, personal relations in radical communities play a role.[30] Foreign fighters generally have relations with groups or people in universities who have international contacts. Their justifications for joining ISIS are threefold: "*ummah*" consciousness and responsibility, easier travel and the lack of a counter-narrative.[31]

Up to now, this article has attempted a conceptual research about foreign fighters; then touched upon the evolution of foreign fighters with Islamic reference and handled the current case of ISIS. From this point on, the article will go through the threat that ISIS's foreign fighters create and examine the case of Turkey, which suffered from its effects in an early period. Through this, the findings about the threat that ISIS's foreign fighters pose to the world even if ISIS is defeated will be reached.

Foreign Fighter's Threat and The Case of Turkey

One of the main findings about the foreign fighters is their ability to spread and proliferate violence. In this chapter, early results of this academic approach towards ISIS's foreign fighters will be analyzed. A closer look at the ISIS attacks in Turkey between 2014 and 2016 in accordance with the relevant theoretical approaches shows that the case of Turkey may provide an example for the rest of the world. In this context, the analysis will initially focus on the threats posed by the foreign fighters and then look at the situation that Turkey has faced. In addition to the theoretical approach, several practical factors about the case of Turkey is in make it a special exemplary case. Particularly until 2015, it is a fact that the foreign fighters who joined ISIS travelled to the region via Turkey.[32] Furthermore, Turkey shared a border with ISIS approximately 100 kilometers long as of the beginning of 2016. The situation is further complicated by the fact that Turkey is a member of the international coalition against ISIS.

The estimates about the number of ISIS's foreign fighters as of the beginning of 2016 are around 30,000. In comparative sense, the number of foreign fighters during the Spanish Civil War was between 30,000 and 60,000, while in Afghanistan (1979-2015) it was between 11,000 and 26,000.

In Texas (1835-1836) and Sarajevo (1991-1995), the number was around 3,000.[33]

In his research about the period between 1816 and 2000,[34] Malet determined that the one-fourth of the foreign fighters in that period is salafist-jihadists. It means that for our time the ideological trend for foreign fighters is salafism and jihadism while in other circumstances they might have different motivations. Seeking meaning for their existence through membership in ISIS, current foreign fighters have a basic motivation related to Islamic extremism. Yet, another perspective to be gained from the ISIS ordeal is that it can demonstrate the effects of foreign fighter phenomenon independent from their "cause".

The analysis of the data about the first two periods of foreign fighters provides an insight about how these people behave when conflicts end (Graph 1). Generally speaking, three different patterns await foreign fighters: death in combat, remaining in the conflict zone or leaving the conflict zone. Those who remain adopt themselves to local communities or continue their terrorist activities. Those who leave return their homes or go to another country. Some of those who return home retire for a peaceful life, while others continue terrorist activities or join other conflicts. Some fighters who go to other countries instead of home may also behave as they were in their home country.

Graph 1. Patterns of Foreign Fighters According to Historical Trends[35]

When foreign fighters leave the conflict zone for other countries or execute terrorist attacks, violence spreads to other regions. Such an effect is called the *blow-back effect*, which is the possibility for foreign fighters to execute terrorist attacks at home or other countries.[36] The experience of the past shows that in theory one out of nine foreign fighters took part in terrorist activities after going back.

The analysis of the Sinjar records (Spring 2006 – Summer 2007) has underlined years before the Syrian civil war that chances for the "blowback" of salafist-jihadist movement are very high. The most important

reason for that is the combat experience that these fighters gained.[37] Clinton Watts published another important analysis of the Sinjar records in 2008. Watts used a dataset in his research that encompasses 897 people; 563[38] from the Sinjar records, 315 people detained in Guantanamo and 19 people who are responsible for the 9/11 attacks. According to his analysis, the 84.2 percent of foreign fighters were recruited through social relations while the 6.2 percent are returned foreign fighter and the 6.2 percent were recruited by family members. The source people in Watts' "social relations" analysis are returned foreign fighters.[39] That confirms the high chances

for "the blowback effect" of returned foreign fighters regardless of their participation in current or past conflicts.

Another research that confirms the blowback effect and theorizes the magnitude of the phenomenon is prepared by Thomas Hegghammer. The analyses based on Hegghammer's dataset named "Jihadi Plots in the West 1990-2010" back the blowback hypothesis. Three points stand out according to Hegghammer's work. First, recruitment of foreign fighters increases progressively from 1990 to 2010.[40] Second, one in nine foreign fighters returns to the Western countries and commits terrorist acts. The dataset shows that 107 foreign fighters out of 945 return and perpetrate terror attacks. This finding is considered very important since it determines that each foreign fighter pose threat to some degree out of the conflict zone as well. Those foreign fighters who have combat experience constitute a bigger threat. Third is the effect of combat experience. Accordingly, foreign fighters returning from conflict zones are better equipped to execute lethal and decisive attacks. According to the dataset, chances for a lethal attack by inexperienced terrorists remains at 33 percent, while they are up to 67 percent when the experienced foreign fighters are involved.[41]

Hegghammer's work presents the finding that when one out of nine terrorist fighters return, chances for a lethal terrorist attack increases by a hundred percent. These rates confirm the blowback effect quantitatively. All in all, experienced foreign fighters are a much larger threat than inexperienced ones.

Two questions emerge at that point. The first question is "how can the problem of foreign fighters be resolved?" and the second is "is there a finding about the blowback effect?" The answer to the first question requires some steps outlined in the UNSC Resolution No. 2178 such as preventing radicalization to terrorism, adopting measures against foreign fighters, ending conflicts and facilitating reintegration. Moreover, there are quite radical proposals about the problem in the academic literature.[42] In fact, de-radicalization of the militant salafist is very difficult. Aware of this threat, states turn a blind eye to those people traveling away from their territory to conflict zones. Yet, the situation creates a security dilemma since the returnees pose a great threat. In this context, we are faced with a vicious cycle that involves the violence committed by ISIS's foreign fighters cause it to spread to the rest of the world. It is clear that the blowback effect will engulf the regions from which ISIS managed to recruit from, i.e. the rest of the world.

The answer to the second question constitutes the research of this article. The attacks that Turkey suffered between 2014 and 2016 underlines some findings that proves the spread of violence under the blowback effect.

Turkey is the first among the countries affected from the foreign fighter wave of ISIS.[43] The fact that it is neighbor to Iraq and Syria where ISIS is situated is the first cause that comes to one's mind. Yet, the actual cause is the increased vulnerability caused by Turkey's open door policy since the beginning of the civil war towards suffering civilians that made the borders more porous.

Turkey perceives a bigger threat from ISIS compared to the extra-regional countries. ISIS recruits from Turkey have the capacity to spread violence into the country as well. Foreign fighters traveling through Turkey is an additional threat. The third threat factor emerges out of the possibility that some fighters decide to leave ISIS and settle in Turkey (Graph 2). Since they cannot adapt to the society they were recruited in, ISIS fighters would likely prefer a Muslim majority country with Western values, a likelihood that cannot be overlooked. In fact, such an option might be a necessity rather than a conscious choice. That is because states adopt measures

such as abolishing passports or citizenships. In that case, these people may get stuck in Turkey when they decide to go back. All these factors are likely to trigger the spread of violence in Turkey.

Graph 2. Effects of Foreign Fighters' Fates to Turkey


Abovementioned theoretical threat that Turkey perceives has an equivalent in real life. Since 2014, many ISIS attacks were executed in Turkey. In this context, a dataset was prepared covering the terrorist attacks on Turkish soil between March 2014 and March 2016 (Appendix Chart 1). Between March 2014 and March 2016, twelve ISIS attacks took place in Turkey. While preparing the dataset, the attacks that actually happened and covered by the press are taken into account. Media sometimes reports on foiled terrorist plots, yet these attempts are not covered in the dataset since the security forces would not share all foiled plots with the media. Since there can be no concealment about the already executed attacks, the dataset at hand is assumed to cover all attacks within the specified period. Since the purpose is picturing the threat on Turkish soil by foreign fighters, the dataset included the attacks against Turkey only in Turkish territory. The kidnapping of the Turkish Consulate staff in Mosul or attacks against the Turkish troops in Bashiqa/Iraq were hence left out of the dataset. Thanks to that, making a generalization about the spread of the threat that Turkey perceives to another regions will be possible.

Among these attacks in Turkey within the specified time period, one was perpetrated at a road checkpoint; six of them were suicide attacks and five of them were cross border armed assaults (Graph 3). Therefore, the check point attack is an example for traveling foreign fighter threat, the suicide attacks are examples for returning foreign fighter threat; and the cross-border attacks exemplify the threat caused by sharing borders with ISIS.

Graph 3. ISIS attacks and casualties in Turkey

The terrorist attacks that foreign fighters perpetrated at that period claimed the lives of 158 and wounded more than 763 people. The cross-border attacks resulted in four casualties and one wounded. These border attacks were tactical acts by low level fighters rather than preplanned and comprehensive assaults.

At this point, a glance into ISIS's declared strategy would be useful. ISIS, as mentioned above, targets the "near enemy". Its priority order includes Shiites in the first, rival Sunnis in the second and non-Muslims in the third place. As of the beginning of 2016, ISIS has not yet picked Turkey as a target. Yet, the question remains as to "why did ISIS perpetrate attacks in Turkey, even though it has not picked it as a target?" In order to answer that question, one needs to look deeper into the ISIS-linked attacks in Turkey within the specified two-year period.

ISIS's attacks against Turkey can be analyzed under four categories (Chart 3). The first category is the attacks committed out of Turkish soil, which is left out of this analysis for it focuses on the effects of for-eign fighters. The second type is the tactical assaults by ISIS at the border. These attacks are committed as reciprocation for Turkey's artillery support for the opposition fighters against ISIS and inflict limited damage. Low level ISIS terrorists initiate these attacks rather than a higher echelon of command and it involves only the border area. The third category involves the attacks committed by foreign fighters who travel through Turkey and it was only committed once in Ulukışla on 20 March 2014. That exactly is not a wave of attacks but is significant for it shows that the threat which is defined on theory is actually on the ground. The fourth is the attacks carried out by returned foreign fighters. Five out of six suicide attacks are in this category. The sixth one is committed by the wife of a foreign fighter and left out due to the unclear status of the perpetrator. The average casualty is 32 people and more than 151 were wounded by the suicide attacks by foreign fighters. The high damage capacity of the attacks shows the lethality potential of experienced foreign fighters. This situation proves the actual presence of the threat which was theoretically outlined in Graph 2.

Table 3. Types of ISIS Attacks against Turkey

Type	Description
1	Attacks out of Turkish Soil
2	Tactical Assaults along the border line
3	Attacks by foreign fighters traveling through Turkey
4	Attacks by returnee foreign fighters

The comparison of ISIS attacks in Turkey and in the West uncovers an intriguing issue. According to the study by Hegghammer and Nesser that covers the attacks in the Western countries between September 2015 and July 2015, most of these attacks were perpetrated by sympathizers.[44] Sympathizers' attacks started after 22 September 2014 when Abu Muhammed al Adnani, ISIS spokesperson, urged their followers to commit attacks wherever they are.[45] According to a research, sympathiz-ers who lack combat experience committed eight of the nine attacks perpetrated after al Adnani's call.[46] It means that in-experienced sympathizers, not returnee foreign fighters, committed the terrorist attacks in the Western countries. For Turkey, it is entirely a different case. Those who want to join ISIS are able to move to the so-called Islamic state territory (*hijra*) and right into the conflict zone, therefore sympathizers do not commit attacks in Turkey. In other words, the ISIS attacks

in the West between 2014 and 2015 were committed by sympathizers whereas the attacks in Turkey were executed by returnee foreign fighters.[47]

In essence, what Turkey is going through as the country that suffers the most from the foreign fighter returnee wave constitutes an indicator for the rest of the world. The spread of returnee foreign fighters will bring about more deadly attacks in other countries than the attacks that sympathizers commit. Furthermore, even a higher degree of violence can be expected since foreign fighters evolve in capacity.

2. CONCLUSION

Foreign fighters who flock to the call by al Baghdadi and ISIS attacks do not constitute a phenomenon which is witnessed for the first time in history. Since the beginning of the nation-state era, foreign fighters have been traveling to other regions and joining conflicts with idealistic selflessness. From the 1980s onwards, a new wave formed by jihadists and extremists with Islamist references in the Afghan jihad, has reached its peak with ISIS in our time. Yet, the theoretical approach that the studies on al-Qaeda foreign fighters in the first decade of the 2000s outline the capacity of ISIS's foreign fighters to spread the violence to the rest of the world.

Foreign fighters have a metastasis effect which means the spread of cancer to other organs of the body. In other words, foreign fighters gain experience in combat and spread the violence into other regions. In addition, foreign fighters who return to their home countries are able to execute highly lethal terrorist attacks. Moreover, they evolve and develop their combat capacity. The ISIS attacks against Turkey form the first evidence for this theory and the blowback effect has begun to materialize. The ISIS attacks against France, Belgium and the U.S. in 2016 show that the spread of violence has begun. Furthermore, even if the anti-ISIS coalition annihilates the terrorist group from the territories of Iraq and Syria, states will continue to face the threat that foreign fighters spread.

The UN's conceptualization of foreign terrorist fighters enables the states to develop their legal infrastructure. That is also worth consideration by law scholars since it created a potential for changing the contemporary paradigm for law. Furthermore, another issue that deserves research is the series of measures that states, which have the perspective that "the returnee foreign fighter is more dangerous than the departed one," must consider the movement of foreign fighters through their territories. Considering the spread of violence and the extent that the problem has developed, reintegrating and rehabilitating the returnee foreign fighters count as a measure to be adopted in the last step. In this regard, problems arise when states prioritize their own interests instead of the common good. For example, the UN sanctions in our time concerns only ISIS's foreign fighters. That is a narrow perspective that only ISIS's foreign fighters are taken into consideration. Since these are not so new actors to the conflict zones, the blowback effect is not limited to ISIS and other terrorist organizations must be considered as well. In sum, since contemporary foreign fighters have increased their capacity for violence, the future foreign fighters are expected to be more lethal and prove to be a more formidable threat.

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APPENDIX

ISIS Attacks in Turkish Territory (March 2014-March 2016)

Date	Location	Event	Losses	Perpetrator	Status of the perpetrator
20 March 2014	Ulukışla, Niğde	Fighting at road checkpoint	3 deaths (1 Jandarma NCO, 1 police officer, 1 civilian) 8 wounded (1 civilian, 7 gendarmerie)	Cendrim Ramadasi (Swiss) Benyamin Xu (German) Muhammed Zakini (Macedonian)	Foreign fighter (FF) on travel
6 January 2015	Sultanahmet, İstanbul	Suicide bomber	1 police officer	Diana Ramazowa (Russian)	Sleeper cell or FF wife
5 June 2015	Diyarbakır	Suicide bomber	4 civilians were killed, 402 were wounded	Orhan G. (Turkish)	FF (returned)
20 June 2015	Suruç, Şanlıurfa	Suicide bomber	32 civilians dead, 100+ civilians wounded	Şeyh Abdurrahman Alagöz (Turkish)	FF (returned)
23 Temmuz 2015	Kilis	Fighting along the border	1 military casualty	5 ISIS terrorists	Terrorist Fighter
10 October 2015	Ankara	Suicide bomber	103 dead, 200+ wounded	Yunus Emre Alagöz (Turkish)	FF (returned)
12 January 2016	Sultanahmet, İstanbul	Suicide bomber	11 dead, 14 wounded	Nabil Fadli (Syrian)	FF
18 January 2016	Kilis, Gaziantep	Rocket attack along the border	1 dead, 1 wounded	ISIS detachment	Terrorist Fighter
28 January 016	Karkamış, Gaziantep	Fighting along the border	None	ISIS detachment	Terrorist Fighter
7 March 2016	Kilis, Gaziantep	Rocket attack along the border	2 dead, 2 wounded	ISIS detachment	Terrorist Fighter
12 March 2016	Kilis, Gaziantep	Fighting along the border	None	ISIS detachment	Terrorist Fighter
19 March 2016	Taksim, İstanbul	Suicide bomber	5 dead, 39 wounded	Mehmet Öztürk	FF (returned)

ENDNOTES

1   For the full text of the Resolution No. 2178 by the UN Security Council, see, http://www.un.org/en/sc/ctc/docs/2015/SCR%202178_2014_EN.pdf (Accessed on 30 January 2016).

2   The most striking example of foreign fighter in the modern Turkish history is Rafael de Nogales Mendez from Venezuela who fought for the Ottoman Empire during the World War 1. Nogalez Mendez also fought in several wars for Spanish, British and Mexican armies. For more information, see Mehmet Necati Kutlu, "Yeni Bilgiler Işığında 'Rafael de Nogales Mendez'", *Ankara* Üniversitesi *Osmanlı Tarihi Araştırma ve Uygulama Merkezi (OTAM) Dergisi*, Issue 16, 2004, pp.191-213.

3   Burak Tangör ve Haldun Yalçınkaya, "Güvenlik Yönetişimi Çerçevesinde Özel Askeri Şirketler", *Uluslararası* İlişkiler, Vol 7, Issue 25, Spring 2010, p.135.

4   For other foreign fighter definitions, see Cerwyn Moore and Paul Tumelty, "Foreign Fighters and the Case of Chechnya: A Critical Assessment", *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism,* Vol 31, Issue 5, 2008, pp.412–433; Kristin M. Bakke, *Copying and Learning from Outsiders? Assessing Diffusion from Transnational Insurgents in the Chechen Wars,* PRIO Working Paper, 9 November 2010; Robert A. Pape ve James K. Feldman, *Cutting the Fuse: The Explosion of Global Suicide Terrorism and How to Stop It,* The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2010, p.59; Frank Ciluffo, Jeffrey A. Cozzens ve Magnus Ranstorp, *Foreign Fighters: Trends, Trajectories, and Conflict Zones,* Homeland Security Policy Institute, Washington, DC, 1 October 2010, p.3.

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8   Thomas Hegghammer, "The Rise of Muslim Foreign Fighters: Islam and the Globalization of Jihad", *International Security*, Vol 35, Issue 3, Winter 2010, pp.58-60 ve pp. 90-91.

9   Thomas Hegghammer, "Should I Stay or Should I Go? Explaining Variation in Western Jihadists' Choice between Domestic and Foreign Fighting", *American Political Science Review,* Vol 107, Issue 1, February 2013, pp.1–15.

10 In Thomas Hegghammer's work, the term 'West' covers North America, Western Europe and Australia. He justifies his limitation by stating that he can only reach relevant data in a systematic way only in these regions.

11 Haldun Yalçınkaya, "Son Gelişmeler Işığında Terörle Mücadele Küresel Forumu ve İşlevi", *Dış Politika Analizi,* 28 September 2014, http://www.orsam.org.tr/index.php/Content/Analiz/4238?s=orsam|turkish (Accessed on 30 January 2016).

12 UN Security Council Resolution No. 2178, Article 8, http://www.un.org/en/sc/ctc/docs/2015/SCR%202178_2014_EN.pdf (Accessed on 30 January 2016).

13 Ibid., Article 13.

14 "Salaf" means predecessor. Salafism involves following the rules of the people who are accepted as "Salaf" and the period they live in. In simple terms, it necessitates returning to the way that Islam was during Prophet Muhammed's time, and rejects everything that was added afterwards. For "Salafism", see Hilmi Demir, *Selefiler Kimdir, Selefilik Nedir?*, 21.yy Türkiye Enstitüsü, Teostrateji Araştırma Merkezi Yayını, 30 June 2014, http://www.21yyte.org/tr/arastirma/teostrateji-arastirma-lari-merkezi/2014/06/30/7681/selefiler-kimdir-selefilik-nedir (Accessed on 30 January 2016).

15 Peter Neumann, "Suspects into Collaborators: Assad and the Jihadists", *London Review of Books*, Vol 36, Issue 7, 3 April 2014, pp.19-21.

16 Ibid.

17 Joseph Felter ve Brian Fishman, *Al-Qaida's Foreign Fighters in Iraq: a First Look at Sinjar Records*, Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 2007, p.20.

18 Brian Fishman, "After Zarqawi: the Dilemmas and Future of Al Qaeda in Iraq", *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol 29, Issue 4, 2006, pp.20-21; Daniel L. Byman, "Comparing Al Qaeda and ISIS: Different Goals, Different Targets", Brookings Institution, 29 April 2015, https://www.brookings.edu/testimonies/comparing-al-qaeda-and-isis-different-goals-different-targets/ (Accessed on 30 January 2016).

19 The number of foreign fighter recruits in Syria and Iraq are approximately 27,000 to 31,000. The distribution of this figure according to regions is as follows: 5,000 from Western Europe, 4,700 from the former Soviet territory, 280 from North America, 875 from the Balkans, 8,000 from North Africa, 0,240 from the Middle East, and 900 from Southest Asia. Richard Barrett, *et.al.*, *Foreign Fighters: An Updated Assessment of the Flow of Foreign Fighters into Syria and Iraq*, The Soufan Group, December 2015, p.5.

20 Abdullah Azzam, *JointheCaravan*, (Eng. ver. 1987), p.11. http://archive.org/stream/JoinTheCaravan/JoinTheCaravan_djvu.txt (Accessed on 30 January 2016).

21 The term "jihad" used here is of the context that radical Islamists use in order to legitimize their bloody terrorist attacks rather than the real meaning of the term which is "a spiritual struggle".

22 BrianGlyn Williams, "On the Trail of the 'Lions of Islam': Foreign Fighters in Afghanistan and Pakistan, 1980-2010", *Orbis*, Vol 55, Issue 2, Spring 2011, pp.218-222.

23 Jeanine de Royvan Zuijdewijn ve Edwin Bakker, *Returning Western Foreign Fighters: The Case of Afghanistan, Bosnia and Somalia*, International Centrefor Counter-Terrorism Background Note, Lahey, June 2014, pp.2-4.

24 Ibid, pp.4-7.

25 Daan Weggemans, Edwin Bakker ve Peter Grol, "Who Are They and Why Do They Go? The Radicalisation and Preparatory Processes of Dutch Jihadist Foreign Fighters," *Perspectives on Terrorism*, Vol 8, Issue 4, August 2014, p.100.

26 Hegghammer, "Should I Stay or Should I Go?", pp.10-12.

27 The Sinjar records include information prepared by the US Special Forces Command about approximately 700 Iraqi al Qaeda members. These records were given to the Combating Terrorism Center in the US West Point Military Academy. According to the analysis published by the Project "Harmony", 595 of these people are foreign fighters and all of them passed through Syria to Iraq.

28   Brian Fishman, *et.al.*, *Bombers, Bank Accounts, & Bleedout; Al-Qa'da's Road in and out of Iraq*, Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, New York, 2008, pp.5-9.

29   Weggemans, Bakker ve Grol, "Who Are They and Why Do They Go?", p.108.

30   Joseph A. Carter, Shiraz Mayer and Peter R: Neumann, *#Greenbirds: Measuring Importance and Influence in Syrian Foreign Fighter Networks,* the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence (ICSR), King's College, London, 2014, p.7.

31   Shiraz Mayer, *ICSR Insight: British Foreign Fighters in Syria*, the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence (ICSR), King's College, London, 2014.

32   Haldun Yalçınkaya, "Yabancı Terörist Savaşçılara Karşı Uluslararası İşbirliği: Türkiye Tecrübesi", *Orsam Bölgesel Gelişmeler Değerlendirmesi,* No.22, February 2015. http://www.orsam.org.tr/files/ Degerlendirmeler/22/22tr.pdf (Accessed on 30 January 2016).

33   David Malet, "Foreign Fighter Mobilization and Persistence in a Global Context", *Terrorism and Political Violence,* Vol 27, Issue 3, 2015, p.463.

34   Ibid., p.462.

35   Jeanine de Roy van Zuijdewijn and Edwin Bakker, *Returning Western Foreign Fighters: The Case of Afghanistan, Bosnia and Somalia*, International Centre for Counter-Terrorism Background Note, Lahey, June 2014, p.10.

36   Marc Sageman, *Understanding Terror Networks,* University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 2004, via Moore ve Tumelty, "Foreign Fighters and the Case of Chechnya", p.413.

37   Fishman, *et.al.*, *Bombers, Bank Accounts & Bleedout*, p.7-9.

38   Watts has gone through the transcription of the Sinjar records and included 563 non-Iraqi people out of the 595 people mentioned in the report by the Combating Terrorism Center.

39   Clinton Watts, "Foreign Fighters: How Are They Being Recruited? Two Imperfect Recruitment Models", *Small Wars Journal*, 22 June 2008, http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/foreign-fighters-how-are-they-being-recruited (Accessed on 30 January 2016).

40   Hegghammer, "Should I Stay or Should I Go?", p.6.

41   Ibid., pp.10-13.

42   For example, Watts went further by saying "Let them rot!", See Clinton Watts, "Let Them Rot: The Challenges and Opportunities of Containing rather than Countering the Islamic State", *Perpectives on Terrorism*, Vol 9, Issue 4, August 2015, pp.156-1.

43   "Implementation of Security Council Resolution 2178 (2014) by States Affected by Foreign Terrorist Fighters," United Nations Security Council Report *S/2015/338*, 14 May 2015. http://www.un.org/en/ sc/ctc/docs/2015/N1514129_EN.pdf (Accessed on 30 January 2016).

44   Thomas Hegghammer and Petter Nesser, "Assessing the Islamic State's Commitment to Attacking the West", *Perspectives on Terrorism*, (online journal) Vol 9, Issue 4, 2015, http://www.terrorismanalysts. com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/440/html (Accessed on 30 January 2016).

45 For the Turkish translation of al Adnani's 42-minute speech, See http://www.adimlardergisi.com/ seyh-adnaniden-gundeme-dair-aciklamalar-tam-tercume/ (Accessed on 30 January 2016).

46   Hegghammer ve Nesser, "Assessing the Islamic State".

47   Turkey's measures against ISIS is not an answer to what this article seeks to answer, therefore are not included. For Turkey's measures and struggle, see Murat Yeşiltaş, *et.al*., "Sınırdaki Düşman: Türkiye'nin DAİŞ ile Mücadelesi", *SETA Rapor*, Ankara, 2016. http://file.setav.org/Files/ Pdf/20160609175520_sinirdaki-dusman-turkiyenin-dais-ile-mucadelesi-pdf.pdf (Accessed on 30 June 2016)