

JAPAN AND TURKEY: HUMANITARIAN POWERS



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JAPAN AND TURKEY:
HUMANITARIAN POWERS

JAPONYA VE TÜRKİYE:
İNSANİ GÜÇLER



JAPAN AND TURKEY: HUMANITARIAN POWERS

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By:

Bahadır Pehlivanürk, *TOBB University of Economics and Technology*

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PREFACE

Center for Middle Eastern Strategic Studies (ORSAM) organised a symposium on 24 November 2016, entitled “Japan and Turkey as Humanitarian Powers” with the support of the External Relations Presidency of the Republic of Turkey, Center for Strategic Research of Ministry of Foreign Affairs (SAM), TOBB University of Economics and Technology and Japanese Embassy in Ankara.

This symposium is the continuation of an ongoing dialogue between the Turkish and Japanese think-tanks. The symposium series have started on 2014 on the occasion of the 90th anniversary of Turkey-Japan diplomatic relations. The first joint symposium was titled “*Japan and Turkey: Where did we come from? Where are we going?*” which has focused on bilateral relations. ORSAM also held a second symposium titled “*Japan-Turkey Dialogue on Global Affairs*” on 1 March 2016, with the support of the Embassy of Japan in Ankara, aiming to offer an insight into Japan-Turkey relations in a global context and the opportunities of cooperation on various regional and global issues. The third symposium that this report covers, further carries the dialogue to a higher level, focusing on “*Humanitarian Diplomacy*” of Turkey and Japan, with a special focus on applications to the continent of Africa. The results of the previous symposiums can be obtained from ORSAM website as “ORSAM Report No:193” and “ORSAM Report No:207”.

This report now you are reading is the collection speeches and the evaluation of the third symposium, and it is also available online. For the realisation of this symposium and this report, we would like to express our sincere appreciation for the endless support of the External Relations Presidency under the Prime Ministry of the Republic of Turkey, the Center for Strategic Research of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (SAM), and especially the Japanese Embassy in Ankara. *TOBB University of Economics and Technology* also generously supported our event this year. Their support and assistance has been vital for the realisation of this event, and of course, as well as the other participants, such as academics from various universities in Ankara, representatives of diplomatic missions, government institutions, research centres, Japanese citizens living in Ankara, and a large number of students from universities as well as those interested in the foreign affairs and international politics of Japan and Turkey, who have attended the symposium and showed a high degree of interest to the event, to whom I feel obliged to express my feelings of deep gratitude.

Assoc. Prof. Şaban Kardaş
ORSAM President

By: Bahadır Pehlivan Türk, TOBB University of Economics and Technology

1. INTRODUCTION

This volume contains the speeches made at the under 3rd symposium held under *Japan-Turkey Dialogue on Global Affairs* symposium series. The symposium took place at TOBB University of Economics and Technology, on 24 November 2016. The title of this symposium was “*Japan and Turkey: Humanitarian Powers*”. The first symposium that took place was on 2014 and focussed mainly on various aspects of Turkey-Japan bilateral relations. The second symposium was carried out at March 2016, and aimed to shed light on the possibilities of Turkey-Japan cooperation in the context of different regions and global issues. These regions and issues were as varied as Turkish and Japanese perspectives on developments in East Asia, such as the South China Sea Dispute and the Middle East including developments in Syria, Iraq, Iran, Caucasus, Central Asia, Russia; and the security problems such as foreign terrorist fighters and migration.

This year the Dialogue was carried on to a higher level by acquiring a specific theme, *Humanitarian Diplomacy* and a focusing on a specific region, *Africa*. The aim of the dialogue is to go beyond an analysis of historical and contemporary Turkey-Japan bilateral relations, and manage to evolve it towards a platform where experts, administrators, and researchers from both

countries can discuss and share ideas about various world issues and regions, not necessarily covered under bilateral relations. The rationale behind this is the belief that, in an era of global transformation, a robust partnership between actors such as Japan and Turkey is necessary, as these countries are important in their perspective regions and committed to play larger international roles.

What is Humanitarian Diplomacy?

Humanitarian Diplomacy, does not have a clear definition in international law. It can be defined vaguely as an effort to persuade decision makers and opinion leaders to act in the interest of populations which are vulnerable, facing serious challenges such as abject poverty, insecurity as a result of civil wars or other disputes and such, with full respect for fundamental humanitarian principles. This concept is closely related to the concept of public diplomacy which aims to increase the prestige and influence of governments through humanitarian policies. It is an emergent concept. Thanks to the increasing effectiveness of all types of media, the world public opinion is now much more informed about the plight of challenged populations of the world, and there is an expectation that governments put more resources to trans-border overseas as-

sistance activities. The governments also seem to value this concept, not simply because of the pressure of domestic societies and a quest for prestige, but because they have also started to understand security in broader terms. Insecurity in one region of the world can directly or indirectly influence other regions.

In recent years, the public's increased interest and concern for disadvantaged people of the world resulted in a civilian activism which brought about a rapid expansion of the number of humanitarian actors. These actors are either working for or with the governments at all levels. This adds another important level to the subject matter as there needs to be coordination and collaboration, not only among humanitarian actors and their related governments, but between civilian agencies and international humanitarian institutions, and between governments as well. That is why the theme of this symposium was chosen, to foster dialogue among Turkey and Japan, two important humanitarian powers, Japan a well-established and traditional actor, and Turkey as a newly emerging humanitarian actor.

Turkey and Japan as Humanitarian Actors

Humanitarian Diplomacy carries an increasing effect in both Turkey and Japan's foreign policies. Japan has been a major ODA donor for decades. It has been the number one aid donor in the world at the end of 1990s and beginning of the 21st century, and it continued to be top donor despite economic slump it has faced. It is funding hundreds of projects around the world that span billions of US dollars. Turkey's expansion of humanitarian diplomacy was recent, but rather steep. For three years in a row, between 2013 to 2015 Turkey became 3rd country to make the largest humanitarian assistance, despite its relatively limited resources, surpassing some of the developed DAC member

countries. Humanitarian assistance has always been an important tool of Japanese foreign policy, which is limited in other aspects, and it has started to become a major component of Turkish foreign policy as well. The rising importance of humanitarian diplomacy in both country's foreign policy agendas also helps to a renewed appreciation of the broader security understanding.

The history, philosophy, and priorities of both country's, humanitarian policies are summarised, using many examples, during the Keynote Speeches of this symposium. We feel blessed that both keynote speeches were given by ex-directors of the major humanitarian assistance agencies of respective countries; *Prof. Akihiko Tanaka* who presided *Japan International Cooperation Agency [JICA]*, and *Ambassador Musa Kulaklikaya*, who directed *Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency [TIKA]*, both have overseen these institutions for long years. In his very informative speech *Prof. Tanaka* explains the history of Japanese humanitarian assistance system starting from 1950s up until present, touching on the evolution of the rational and philosophical focus. He gives various examples from JICA projects around the world, from Brazil, Chile, Indonesia, Philippines, Africa, and of course, Turkey. He explains the early motivations of its policies and their transformation, the reasons for the geographical widening, and its influences in bringing about peace, stability, and prosperity to various regions of the world, as well as how these policies improved Japan's international standing. *Ambassador Kulaklikaya*, similarly explained the history and philosophy of Turkish humanitarian diplomacy in his speech. In his speech, he focused on the concept of soft-power, first on its theoretical framework and then applying it to Turkey's foreign policy. Through this concept, he explained the evolution of Turkey's humanitarian diplomacy, gave factual examples with statistics, mentioned the

role of other aid agencies of Turkey such as AFAD and others. He gave specific regional focus on Middle East and Africa. He also highlighted the fact that Turkish aid agencies are not afraid of carrying out activities in conflict prone regions without discrimination.

The first panel after the keynote speeches were on the theoretical and practical aspects of both countries humanitarian diplomacies. The first two speeches approached the subject-matter from the aspect of “middle powers”. While this concept has its controversies *Prof. Yoshihide Soeya* and *Assoc. Prof. Ozgur Ozdamar’s* speeches showed that it could be a useful tool to explain and give context to certain aspects of both countries humanitarian policies. In his interesting speech *Prof. Yoshihide Soeya* first explained the meaning of President Trump’s coming to power in USA, and how it could influence the order in East Asia, especially in terms of increased Chinese assertiveness and indirect influences of this to Japanese foreign policy. After drawing complex analogies between Japan and Turkey’s geopolitical position in the world, he argued that we will see an increased regionalisation of global politics making Japan’s and Turkey’s humanitarian diplomacies in their respective regions more important in an ‘America First’ world. In his speech, he made a distinction between the concepts of “middle powers” and “middle power diplomacy”, and argued that the second concept is useful in basing Turkey and Japan’s international assistance efforts. *Assoc. Prof. Ozgur Ozdamar’s* following speech was a summary of an ongoing quantitative research in which researched the foreign policy role conceptions of Turkey’s ruling elite and public. The preliminary results of his research show that both at the leadership level and public levels, there is an expectation that Turkey should assume traditional roles that suggest the role of a regional power, supporting, peaceful, non-interventionist, good-neighbour roles, while not relinquishing quest for

prestige in the world. This line of thinking is similar to *Prof. Soeya’s* concept of “middle power diplomacy”.

In the remaining speeches of this panel, *Assoc. Prof. Talha Kose* explained the role of conflict resolution in Turkey’s foreign policy. While aid is one aspect of humanitarian diplomacy conflict resolution is another aspect and holds a very important place in Turkish foreign policy. *Dr. Kose* explained that Turkey preferred a role of an order-instituting actor in the region and gave examples of these efforts. In the following speech, *Dr. Pinar Akpinar* gave a detailed analysis of the role of NGOs in Turkish Humanitarianism. She gave a general picture of NGO activism in Turkey’s humanitarian diplomacy supported by examples and comparisons, and after pinpointing various problems she has offered solutions.

The second Panel focused on peacebuilding and humanitarianism within the context of Turkey and Japan’s involvement in Africa. Turkey’s involvement in Africa while being surprisingly extensive, is very little studied. The Japanese involvement in Africa, on the other hand, is not known in Turkey at all. These speeches that are also published in this report can serve as very useful resources for researchers studying these. The first speech made by *Prof. Hideaki Shinoda* is very useful in many aspects. He not only introduces a relatively new concept, the “Partnership Peacekeeping” for the audience, he also makes striking comparisons between Middle East, Africa, and Asia in terms of conflicts and conflict related deaths, that helps us to understand the emergence of the Middle East as a conflict-prone zone in the world, and why it is difficult to address problems there. In his very structured and informative speech, he explains conflict resolution methods in Africa, role of UN agencies, and the typology of partnerships that Japan is also involved. He offers that the concept of “Partnership Peacekeeping” can be a useful framework for Japan and Turkey

to collaborate for peace and stability in Africa and Middle East. In the following speech *Dr. Volkan Ipek*, gives a detailed history of Turkish involvement in Africa, a very little studied topic, dating back to 1920s up until now, dividing the it into two major eras. Her argues that the real Africa involvement came with 1998 plan, which was implemented in 2000s, lifting the perception of the African Continent that Turkish public holds from the level of caricaturized images in Turkish comedy movies, to a real, tangible place populated by brotherly people to whom Turkish people have compassionate feelings. His speech shows that this compassion is also shared by the Turkish leadership, influencing its foreign policy on many levels.

These speeches were followed by last two speeches that have focused on respective country's African humanitarian involvement specifically. *Prof Sadaharu Kataoka* gave a very comprehensive and detailed

summary of Japan's involvement in Africa through the TICAD (Tokyo International Conference of African Development) process. He explained that through TICAD I to VI, Japan's relations with Africa evolved from a donor-receiver relationship to a relationship of partners. In the following complementary speech, *Mr. Serhat Orakci* explained Turkey's role as a humanitarian actor in Africa, focusing especially on Somalia, and he also gave the political dimension of Turkey-Africa relations.

All these informative speeches are contained in this report which is available online as well. We hope that these will be concise, yet detailed and accessible resources for researchers, that will not only give them a roadmap for their own studies but also produce ideas on how to develop Turkey-Japan humanitarian assistance partnerships for the future, not only for Africa but globally as well.

I. OPENING SPEECHES

1. Ambassador Hiroshi OKA (Ambassador of Japan, Ankara)

Günaydın! Good morning everyone, His Excellency Alpaslan Kavaklıoğlu, Chairman of the Turkey Japan Inter-Parliament Friendship Group, we are honoured to have your presence here, and Ambassador Ersin Elçin and Ambassador Musa Kuaklıkaya, and the distinguished guests from the presidency and the prime ministry, and Mr. Şaban Kardeş, President of ORSAM.

Ladies and gentleman, We would like to welcome you all to this symposium, which is named Japan-Turkey joint diplomatic symposium. And this is actually the 3rd round of symposiums. We first launched this symposium series in 2014. I would like to take this opportunity to thank ORSAM for organising this event and also the prime ministry for their cooperation to make this symposium. I would like to thank TOBB University and Dean Professor Ihsan Sezal for making this venue available for us. This is an excellent forum for us.

I came to Turkey 6 months ago, a rather short space of time. Since my arrival, I have witnessed very positive and good developments, which symbolise the excellent relations between Japan and Turkey. For instance, in June, in the opening of the Osman Gazi Bridge which is the longest bridge in this country was built. They are

making use of the highest state of Japanese technologies. And in June, we signed an agreement between Japan and Turkey on the joint Turkish-Japanese Science and Technology University. Hopefully and inşallah, in two years-time, we will be able to see many students learning at this Turkish-Japanese Science and Technology University, which aims to be among the top universities in the world. And in as recent as November, Toyota chose its factory in Turkey. Not in the US or Europe, but they chose Turkey as a production site for their state of the art model hybrid car to be exported to more than 50 countries, which is a winning endorsement by Japanese business on the business environment in this country. But if I start counting these memorable events, perhaps we need many hours just to explain the long history of friendship, which spans more than 130 years.

What is unique about our relations? Not simply our relations are long run but the very deep trust and confidence we placed in each other, that makes the long-lasting relations very very special. We frame this long-lasting relations based on trust and confidence as a “strategic partnership”. And the objective of this symposium is that, now given this deep trust and friendship based strategic partnership, why not considering how we can, as Japan and Tur-

key, joint forces, not only for the sake of our two countries but also for our regions of Asia and the Middle East. The question is: “How can we joint forces for the sake of the world?”

As the title and content of this symposium suggests, we address this issue of how we can join forces to respond to global challenges from the viewpoint of Japan and Turkey as global humanitarian powers. Japan has advocated the concept of “human security” as a guiding principle for addressing security and other related issues. And we also have advocated the concept of “ownership and partnership” in addition to or in place of the traditional concept of bilateral relations, especially when we talk about development and related issues. Since 1993, we have organised what we call the TICAD (Tokyo International Conference on African Development) process to put this concept “ownership and partnership” into practice as practical policies and guidelines towards Africa.

And of course, the world recognises the enormous generosity with which Turkey hosts millions of refugees who left the humanitarian disasters continuing in Syria. And we are very much aware of the emphasis that Turkey places on the humanitarian issues when they deal with international challenges. So we also contributed to the initiative of Turkey which hosted the first Humanitarian Summit in Istanbul.

So, there is ample ground for us to discuss, and perhaps to come up with, ideas on how we can join forces to address these regional and global challenges. And we are truly honoured and it is a great pleasure to have four leading scholars from Japan, Professor Tanaka, Professor Soeya, Professor Shinoda and Professor Kataoka, participating in this conference, many in presence here in this hall, joining the symposium. Thank you for your attendance, I’m looking forward to attending the discussions. Thank you very much. [Teşekkür ederim]

2. Ambassador Ersin Elcin

*(Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Director General for Asia-Pacific)*

Distinguished guests, distinguished academicians, Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen. Good morning. Ohayō Gozaimasu.

I do not dare to touch upon the substance, which is very challenging, but rather to make a few remarks about Turkish-Japanese relations, and how important this kind of events for the Turkish Foreign Ministry.

Japan has always taken the dominant place for Turkey among the Asia-Pacific countries since centuries. Although thousands of miles put us apart, there are so many similarities between two countries in terms of history, culture, language and in personal relations. Both countries have managed very well to modernise their countries while preserving their traditions, their culture and identity.

Turkish-Japanese friendship has always been exemplary which has culminated with the establishment of strategic partnership in 2013. We are happy to see the continuous development of our relations in all fields, owing to the good relations between our two people, leaders, our common culture, and our ties originating from the tragic event of Ertuğrul Frigate which has given the emotional dimension to our relations as well. I believe that this

symposium is also a good example of our joint efforts to develop and enrich the intellectual dimension of Turkish-Japanese relations.

Intellectual academic activities as well as exchanges among scholars certainly create and add a value for our bilateral relations. These activities provide the policy makers with a clearer picture, a road-map through rigorous examination covering key aspects of bilateral relations as well as exchange of views on regional and international issues. Ministry of Foreign Affairs attribute great importance to the academic studies and works of think tanks. We will continue to support and encourage doing these types of endeavours. Our country may serve as a logistic and strategic hub for Japan, considering Turkey's geographical location and capabilities in the broader neighbourhood namely Central Asia, Caucasus, Africa, and the Middle East.

And finally let me extend my thanks and appreciation to the for Center for Middle Eastern Studies (ORSAM), the Embassy of Japan, particularly Ambassador of Japan Hiroshi Oka, and of course the Strategical Research Centre (SAM) of our ministry for this successful organisation. Thank you. Arigatou Gozaimasu.

3. M.P. Alpaslan KAVAKLIOĞLU (The Grand National Assembly of Turkey, President of-Turkey-Japan Interparliamentary Friendship Group)

I would like to say that I am honoured to deliver the opening speech of the Symposium on Turkey and Japan as Humanitarian Powers.

I spent a long time in Japan as well as being the president of Turkey-Japan inter-parliamentary friendship group. I know Japanese people and their culture closely. I would like to state with pleasure that our people have great sympathy, love and respect for the Japanese people, especially due to their loyalty to their traditions.

Prince Mikasa Takahito who had great contributions to the formation of these beautiful feelings, so to say the architect of the Turkish-Japanese friendship, passed away a few days ago. On this occasion, I would like to extend once more my very sincere condolences to the precious Japanese people. Turkish-Japanese friendship started as a solid foundation with Prince Mikasa Takahito's visit to Turkey 55 years ago. He made great efforts for the rapprochement of the two countries and the formation of the perception of a friendly and brother country when we mention Japan in our country. I believe that both countries will follow the path of friendship forever for which Prince Takahito paved the way.

Talking about Prince Mikasa Takahito, I would like to touch upon the history of the Turkish-Japanese friendship and its legacy. The good relations between Turkey and Japan has been continuing and strengthening since 1924, the year when diplomatic relations were established. Turkey and Japan are not two countries which newly discovered one another. We celebrated the 90th anniversary of our diplomatic relations two years ago. The history of Turkish-Japanese relations dates to Abdülhamit II and Meiji periods

during the last quarter of the 19th century. With the influence of some tragic events in history, our relations have been based on a strong friendship. The compassion, friendship and help that the Japanese people displayed to the Ertuğrul disaster, which took place 126 years ago, have never been forgotten by our nation. A century after the Ertuğrul disaster, the release of Japanese citizens by Turkish Airlines from Tehran during the Iran-Iraq War also has a permanent place in the minds of the Japanese people. The earthquake incidents in Japan and Turkey in 2011 revealed once again the solidarity between the people of the two countries.

Thanks to the positive influence this friendship which I briefly outlined, the political relations between our countries are at a perfect level. Turkey and Japan are countries that managed to achieve modernisation while keeping their traditions. Turkish people, like the Japanese people, share common values and ideals such as peace, democracy, global prosperity and stability. These are two countries that share similar views on various international problems. Benevolence and solidarity are common features of both countries. Unlike the countries that use foreign aid as a means of advancing their political interest, the sincerity and clean record regarding the humanitarian aid of the two countries are evident. This makes this symposium very meaningful.

Turkey carries out humanitarian aid in various parts of the world by TİKA, AFAD, Turkish Red Crescent and non-governmental organisations. We are a country that believes that peace, tranquillity and prosperity are possible with a multifaceted development. Through these organisations, we try to reach all parts of the world to solve problems without lan-

guage, religion or race discriminations and endeavour to help as much as we can as Turkey.

In recent years Turkey has become a global humanitarian centre with the humanitarian aid it has provided. According to the global humanitarian aid reports 2013, 2014, and 2015, Turkey has been the third country with the highest humanitarian aid for three consecutive years. Turkey was declared the most generous country in the world. The point Turkey reached in the field of humanitarian aid brought about the fact that Istanbul hosted the World Humanitarian Summit organised by the UN for the first time this year.

It is also useful to emphasise that Turkey does not impose any political conditions when she provides foreign aid. In other words, the aid is made without intervention in the internal affairs of the countries. In this regard, Turkey has gained respect among the less developed countries by means of its humanitarian aid. This prestige is the greatest component of Turkey's soft power. Likewise, Japan stands out as a country generous in terms of humanitarian aid to various parts of the world and a country that endeavours to solve problems that threaten international peace and security. Like Turkey, the Japanese

aid programs also aim to meet basic human needs, to fight against hunger and disease. In particular, their aid activities in Africa are applaudable. Two years ago, the Japanese government provided the West Africa with significant aid with a view to combatting Ebola that caused many people to lose their lives there. The economic development aid that our country also provides to Africa has also been increasing every day. Turkey has two hospitals in Somalia and Sudan.

Before I end my speech, I would like to emphasise that the future of the Turkish-Japanese relations, especially the potential of cooperation in the sense of humanitarian assistance, allows us to be hopeful for the future. We must further strengthen the friendship bridge on the eastern and western ends of the Asian mainland. We must join our efforts for global peace.

I would like to thank everyone who has participated in the preparation of this symposium. I would like to thank especially Mr Oka, Ambassador Japan, and TOBB University. I believe that this event will pave the way for the strengthening of our bilateral relations and bring about further cooperation in humanitarian activities. I greet you all with respect.

II. KEYNOTE SPEECHES

1. Professor Akihiko Tanaka

(Tokyo University; Former President of Japan International Cooperation Agency [JICA])


Japan's Global Reach: Development Cooperation and Foreign Policy

Distinguished guests and ladies and gentlemen, it is my great pleasure to be able to participate in this symposium. It is particularly a pleasure to share the podium with Mr. Kulaklikaya, who is the former president of TIKA (Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency). As was introduced, I served as the president of Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) until September of last year, and I really enjoyed working with colleagues in TIKA and the government and people of Turkey in our joint endeavour and efforts to help the development of the global community.

Today I would like to talk mainly about the history of Japan's development cooperation, recent transformations as well as challenges for the future. Before doing that, however, let me briefly explain the organisational structure of Japan's development cooperation.

Japan started its official development system in the middle of 1950s, and since then we had various types of organisations: 1. ones dealing with technical cooperation, 2. organisations dealing with concessional loans and, 3. those dealing with grant aid. In time, these organisational structures have transformed considerably.

In the year 2008, through Japanese government's reform, virtually all the functions of extending assistance were merged into one organisation called *Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA)*. The new organisation conducts bilateral assistance consisting of grant aid, technical cooperation, and ODA loans. So, these three are the main areas in which JICA has been working. For example, a typical Japan's ODA loan is at 0.1 percent interest rate for ten-year grace period and forty-year repayment. This can be considered very concessional. Usually, we design 40 to 60 new projects annually. In total, there are about five hundred ongoing projects in operation around the world, with the disbursement of about 8-10 billion USD each year. Another element is grant aid. We make about 100 to 150 new grant aid projects annually, and 300 projects are currently ongoing. We generally spend \$2 billion each year on these. The third area, which I consider very important, is technical cooperation, sending experts and accepting professionals and engineers in training programs in Japan as well as in other countries. We create about 100 to 150 such new projects annually, with 600-700 ongoing projects throughout the world with the cost of about 1.2 billion USD each year.



I would like to start with the origin of Japan's development cooperation. The origin is in the immediate aftermath of WWII. Japan was a defeated country, and it was in need of joining again to the international community as a responsible member. According to the San Francisco Peace Treaty, Japan was obligated to pay reparations to some countries which demanded reparations. So, we engaged with Burma, Philippines, Indonesia and South Vietnam in terms of provision of reparations. This procedure of reparations was, in fact, the beginning of our efforts to join the international community. The main motivation was to be accepted as a responsible member. Also, Japan was a very poor country in the immediate aftermath of the war, so we needed to combine our efforts of international cooperation to reconstruct Japan again. In terms of ODAs, we started technical cooperation, and we provided first ODA loan to India in 1958. Also, to train young Japanese staff we started the overseas volunteer program, and until now more than 45,000 Japanese joined the program of volunteers throughout the world. As I said, the reparation was the origin of Japan's engagement in international community.

I would like to illustrate this process by one example. In Indonesia there is an island called Java, in which the capital city Jakarta is located. Toward the eastern region there is also a city called Surabaya, and a big river (called Brantas) flows into this city from a mountainous area. The Japanese started a project, a Brantas river-basin development project, firstly as a reparation project. This area was a very humid area, with volcanoes and floods used to destroy agricultural lands. Japan decided to first construct a tunnel to reduce the water flow and redirect it into the Indian Ocean. Then we constructed dams and irrigation systems. As I said, this project started as reparation but then the reparation period ended in the early 1960s and Japan decided to continue this project by extending ODA loans. The entire program continued until 1985. After the completion of this river development project, 28,000 hectares of land became cultivable and no significant flood damage has taken place since 1985. By this project there was significant reduction of malaria, 340,000 hectares of paddy field got access to irrigation, as well as 300 million metric cube water supplies per year, and a significant amount of power supply was provided. So,

this is one example of a project that started as reparation but continued as ODA.

As Japan tried to become a responsible member of the international community, the Japanese economy started to grow and by the end of the 1960s Japan had become the second largest economy after the US in the so called 'free world'. But then the 1970s really gave Japan serious challenges. A lot of crises emerged like the oil crises in 1973 and 1979. Also in 1973 the US declared its embargo of soybean exports to Japan. Although this did not continue very long, the Japanese realised that supplies of natural resources, supplies of agricultural products may be terminated by certain political situations. These have increased the Japanese sense of vulnerability even though Japan still achieved fairly high economic standards. Japan then experienced some tensions with several countries. One of which was with the US as a result of successful Japanese exports to

the US in terms of electrical appliances, textile products and automobiles. Serious economic frictions took place. And then on the other hand another shocking thing was the Japanese prime minister's visits of Thailand and Indonesia of 1974. In Thailand and in Indonesia the prime minister was welcomed by anti-Japanese riots. Some in Southeast Asia still looked at Japan in a suspicious manner. In the past, Japan had invaded Asia militarily, and now Japan was invading Asia economically, they thought. So, by the middle of the 70s there emerged a sense among the Japanese that we needed to do something about this anti-Japanese sentiment, and that we needed to make friends. We needed to create a reputation that the Japanese are reliable because we needed to reduce our vulnerabilities. We did not want to be cut off from international trade. That was the sort of motivation behind extending our ODA activities globally.

The Second Bosphorus Bridge, Turkey, 1988



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
One typical example of global activities is the bridge-making infrastructure. Through ODA loans, in the Democratic Republic of Congo the bridge called Mata-di was completed in 1982. Another one is quite familiar one for you, the Second Bosphorus Bridge, completed in 1988. And another one is the Suez Canal Bridge in Egypt, a huge bridge over the Suez. Financing important bridges like these, Japan conducted bridge making in the countries all over the world. But what Japan did was not limited to infrastructure. We engaged in technical cooperation activities in other areas, like agriculture. One example is a project in Brazil. In Brazil, south of the Amazon there was an area called Cerrado, which in Portuguese meant “the place that was closed”. It was very hard to cultivate there. The place was full of bushes, the soil was very acidic and people regarded it not suitable for agriculture. In cooperation with our Brazilian partners, we engaged

in a project to transform this area into an agricultural area. This project is called ‘the Japanese-Brazilian Cooperation Program for Cerrados Development’ (PRODECER: 1979-2001). We provided ODA loans and technical cooperation. Essentially, we started soil improvement, selection and breeding of suitable crops, and the establishment of cooperatives so that they can engage in cultivating the land. We built settlements, and provided techniques for the conservation and promotion of public private partnership. After first several years of struggle and failure, the Japanese and the Brazilian agriculture specialists found out the suited seed of soybeans, and now the place is transformed into a hyper size soybean production area. In the beginning of 1970s, Brazil virtually produced zero soybeans, and now it is one of the largest producers of soybean in the world. Sometimes Brazil’s exports of soybean exceed that of the United States.

Agricultural Development in Brazil's Cerrado



Export of Soybeans by USA and Brazil



Another example is fishery. Today Chilean salmon is sold in Japanese supermarkets. It is quite reasonably priced, 200 Yen for two pieces. Behind this there was Japanese-Chilean fishery cooperation. I am not sure if you are familiar with salmon but salmon is a fish of the northern hemisphere. Until 1970s, no salmon lived in the southern hemisphere. Chilean specialists came to Japan to collaborate with the Japanese fishery specialists and investigated if salmon can live in the southern hemisphere. And we started Japan-Chile fishery project in many phases. Again, initially, there were a lot of trials and errors, but finally in 1985 the Chilean-Japanese collaboration brought about a result of commercially producing salmon. And, as I said, salmon did not exist in Chile in 1970s. There was no export of Chilean salmon at all, but now Chile has become

the largest salmon export country in the world along with Norway. These are some examples of Japan going global to increase its friends around the world.

However, the 1970s was a period in which Japan's ODA was still more or less concentrated in Asia. The Japanese government declared to increase official developing assistance to Asia in the late 1970s. In the graph below, the red line indicates Asia and the Pacific. Blue line indicates the increase in per-capita GDP of Asia and Pacific regions. The increase of living standards in Asia, naturally, was the result of the efforts of the people there. But then, we feel that our ODA has at least played an important part in assisting the indigenous efforts for growth in Asia and the Pacific.



Another example illustrating this period, when Japan's efforts were concentrated in Asia, was the building of an industrial zone in Thailand called the Eastern Seaboard. This is the area toward the South-east of Bangkok. These areas were originally quite barren and not many things existed there. Together, the Thailand government and JICA started the building of an industrial complex there, by building a big port, a water and electricity supply as well as road construction for factory areas. In total, 27 ODA loans were provided, and the area which was under construction for the industrial park is now transformed into a quite developed industrial area. As a result, 1376 companies now locate their plants there, including 669 Japanese plants. The port which used to be a village port in a place called Laem Chabang is now turned into one of the largest ports for handling containers, more than the Tokyo port or the Bangkok port.

And in 1980s, Japan started to extend ODA loans to China. I will not go into details about what we did, but we repeated similar approaches that we did in South-


east Asia; lots of infrastructure projects as well as subway and port facilities. From 1980 to 2013 we provided 3 trillion Japanese Yen loans. Grant aids were used to build very modern infrastructures, such as in central Beijing, the China-Japan Friendship Hospital.

Those were the periods in which Japan was going global, while concentrating on Asia. And now we enter 1990s, and the 90s were an inflection point for Japan. The nominal GDP of Japan grew tremendously from 1960 to 1990s, but then after the so-called the burst of 'the bubble' in the early 1990s, Japan entered a period of almost flat economy and very low growth, which gave us some financial constraints. So, working on developing cooperation, we needed to find some way of keeping our best efforts under these fiscal constraints. As a result, the absolute amount of ODA that Japan extended to the world now does not grow very much in comparison with the other G7 countries. In the 21st century, we saw a tremendous growth in the US assistance, but the growth in Japanese ODA remained more or less flat. So, we


needed to think about how we could make the best use of this fund which does not grow remarkably. What we did was, (1) expand geographically, and (2) improve qualitatively. Geographically, as I said, Japan's ODA had been concentrated much on Asia-Pacific, despite our efforts in Brazil or Chile, or bridge making in Turkey and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Since the beginning of the 21st century, the East Asian portion had been reduced partly because some Asian countries had achieved remarkable economic growth, and the portion of Africa and the South

Asia has increased. In terms of geography, the map below indicates the distribution of Japan's ODA in 1990. As you see; the red areas cover from East Asia to South-east Asia. And although we have yellow areas dispersed throughout the world, still our concentration was in Asia by the 1990s. In 2014, the brown area increased in large parts of the world. Now the largest recipients of Japanese ODA are India and Vietnam, but still there are a quite large number of countries dispersed around the world.

Japan's Official Development Aid (ODA) 1990



Japan's Official Development Aid (ODA) 2014



From 1993 Japan started to host what is called the *Tokyo International Conference for African Development (TICAD)*. In the last meeting took place in Nairobi in August 2016 with the participation of 53 African countries and development partners, Japan declared to align its efforts with the African agenda. Japan is committed to quality and empowerment with its 10 billion USD investment for infrastructure in the coming three years.

Other examples of our efforts of innovation in order to make best use of our limited amount of money is what we call *Japan Brand ODA*. One example is spreading the efforts of Japanese companies, including Toyota, with the efforts of what is called *KAIZEN projects* for improvement of floor management. We conducted KAIZEN projects all around the world.

One of the techniques of improving floor management is the application of what we call making the floor tidier and cleaner. We try to work with our counterparts in developing countries to make the floor as clean as possible with the participation of volunteers and others. Also, we apply the KAIZEN methods to hospital management to make the hospital a much cleaner and tidier place so that nurses and doctors can work very comfortably for the benefit of patients. Below is a picture of a hospital in Tanzania. Also, we engaged in various small projects to increase productivity of small farmers. For example, *SHEP* (Small Holder Empowerment Project) is a project in Kenya working with and urging female farmers so that they can calculate the best seed for the season that could sell well in the local markets. Productivity growth according to records is quite remarkable.

Africa 15 countries : 「Clean Hospital Program」
(Technical Cooperation : Education)



Before

(Tanzania - Mbeya State Hospital)



After



We are, of course, not forgetting about quality infrastructure, which I think you are familiar with the picture below, showing the MARMARAY project.



Finally, since the beginning of the 21st century we expanded our activities to include peace-building, and this is a very hard, challenging task because we, JICA, is a civilian organisation and we cannot directly be involved in military conflicts. But

we saw that we can do a lot of things in a situation where the conflict is terminated, even if temporarily. Then if the truce continues, development corporation agencies can play a certain role.

Peace-building in Mindanao




One example is the place called Mindanao in the Philippines. Mindanao was ravaged by longstanding military conflicts from 1970s, between Muslim and Christian populations. There were several attempts of truce such as in 1996, and then again 2001, when peace talks began. But even if truce was arrived at, always certain instabilities emerged. In the middle of the first decade of the 21st century there emerged certain conditions where we can work with both the government of Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front. JICA staff was sent to work as members of the international monitoring team, and obtained the permission to work in social and economic development in both governmental and guerrilla areas. We provided necessary facilities to the people, such as the solar power for houses, water supply systems, irrigation canals, school building and vocational training centres for females. Japan provided these facilities

in both areas. We feel that we gained trust from both the government as well as from the guerrillas.

Thanks to the efforts of a Philippines President Aquino and the Chairman of MILF Murad Ebrahim, a comprehensive peace agreement was reached in 2014. We held a seminar to solidify the pace in Hiroshima in a few months after the comprehensive peace treaty with the participation of President Aquino government and chairman Murad Ebrahim. This is a limited experience that we are engaged in peace-building, but we determine to do such peace-building efforts wherever we have an opportunity. And as a result of efforts for our partners, when we conducted an opinion poll in Southeast Asian countries, generally a large number of Southeast Asian people said that they appreciate Japan's development cooperation as being useful.

Role of Japan in the development of Asia (%)



Q21. Do you think that Japan, as a part of Asian society, is playing an active role in the development of Asia?
 Base: All respondents (N=1,240); Indonesia (N=622); Malaysia (N=217); Myanmar (N=68); Philippines (N=327); Singapore (N=302); Thailand (302); Vietnam (302)
 © Ipsos 2017 (1/17)

So, in a nutshell Japanese development co-operation originated to make friends and reduce Japanese vulnerability. These may appear, to some extent, a bit self-centred motivations. But as we go through our project efforts we have realised that to be successful self-centred approach does not work. Ownership by the partnership is critical, and close consultation with the partners to find out their priorities and needs is essential. Imposing our preference does not work. And we do not simply

work with direct partners. We found out that it is important to cooperate actively with other like-minded countries and organisations. This is very useful and necessary. We feel that these cooperative activities are quite important in the current age of huge humanitarian challenges. And it is my conviction that Turkey, which is bearing the huge burden of countering against humanitarian crises, is an opportune partner Japan would like to work with. Thank you very much.

2. Ambassador Musa Kulaklikaya
*(Director General of Economic and Social Research and Training
 Centre for Islamic Countries [SESRIC]; Former President of Turkish
 Cooperation and Coordination Agency [TIKA])*

**Turkey's Soft Power: Contribution of Turkish Cooperation and
 Coordination Agency (TIKA)**

Dear President of ORSAM, Ambassador of Japan, President of Turkish Japan Friendship Group Alpaslan Kavaklıoğlu and distinguished guests, distinguished academicians, distinguished students. At the beginning of my speech, I would like to thank everyone, particularly ORSAM who organised this event, for giving me this chance. And I salute you with sincere regards.

Dear friends. As you know, countries sometimes feel obliged to use two different powers to maintain, establish and strengthen their activities in the international arena. One of these is to use the "hard power" elements although they are costly, and the other one is to use "soft power" elements which are less costly and more admissible. Yet, countries that use hard power element have realised that it is not always possible to ensure their admissibility and to extend their influence in the world by using hard power elements solely. Soft power elements which ensure increasing a country's attractiveness by bringing its economic, cultural and humanistic richness to the forefront become more important every passing day.

According to Joseph Nye who used soft power notion for the first time in literature, soft power is a method of influencing others' behaviours to get outcome one wants. In other words, it is a method of winning hearts. We can say that the instrument package used for shaping others' choices in accordance to our needs and boost our popularity is called "soft power". But for all these to work, the legitimacy of countries which use these instruments

and the confidence towards these countries are extremely important. We witness that soft power and hard power are more frequently used when there is an increase in threats and insecurity in our world. Along with many elements that affect soft power-hard power choice; the factors such as culture, conceptions of democracy, transparency in administration, economical and politic power possessed and world situation are important elements which affect these choices.

To give some examples of the usage of soft power elements in the international arena, Germany can be cited, which has given more importance to coalesce with other European countries after the WWII so as to abolish its negative image arising from the perceptions that Germany was the most important actor in the breaking out of WWII. Another example of this, according to the example that my colleague Prof. Tanaka has given who is the ex-president of JICA, is Japan, who tried to deepen its activity and reappeared in the world arena with a new image, by fixing its old image perceived as military expansionist by focusing mostly on economic cooperation with neighbouring countries.

A different example is the effort to raise its admissibility and reputation by denigrating others and taking advantage of their disadvantages. We experienced the best example of it during the Cold War. Especially in countries like Turkey that belonged to the West camp, we witnessed that the Soviet Union was presented as an enemy empire by the US. This can be given as another example in terms of

ensuring its own admissibility with the method of denigrating other's image, in this case against Russia and the Soviet Union. The strategy of creating a specific network by conveying the norms, actions and behaviours is another way to ensure admissibility and acceptability by others. The fact that French language was practically perceived as the universal language during certain times of the history while today the status of English language as the main mutual communication language all around the world is an example that we can give. Also, some countries try to extend their admissibility in the world by using their heroes and worldwide celebrities as soft power elements.

Dear friends. I, not only as the president of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation but also as an ex-ambassador and the ex-president of Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA) who has served for 7 years, will try to share with you the on Turkey uses its soft power elements, and as an example to that, how Turkey uses its soft power generally in the case of development assistance, and among these elements, I will try to explain TIKA's role among agents of development assistance, which occupies a very important place in the architecture of Turkey's development assistance.

Yet before that, I would like to briefly mention the elements that determine Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkey's soft power elements. As you know, there are some elements that determine, or more precisely, influence them. Among these, first of all there is international law, transformation of national and world public opinion, universal principles, the character of governance of specific countries, national interest, economic interests, and sometimes military threats and, most important of all, geographical position. When we observe the main principles of Turkish foreign policy, the security, national and international, is our most important priority. And independence, or to put it mildly, auton-

omy can be regarded as one of the most important dynamics of our foreign policy. Prosperity for us and for others is another priority for us. However, above all, international prestige is one of the elements for which we aim in our foreign policy.

When Turkey's geography that it is located in, its historical background and cultural identity is considered, it can be argued that it is positioned a natural sphere of influence. Its geographical location provides some advantages. If we were to account them; for instance, lately Turkey's activities of contribution to the global, regional or in a specific country humanitarian crisis or activities of peacekeeping together with international society are becoming more commonplace. This is an element for the positive perception towards Turkey by the citizens and people of the countries that Turkey has engaged. Turkey has a unique feature as it is geographically closest to both Middle East, Central Asia and Europe. On one hand, its self-worth and cultural values arising from its historical origins, on the other hand in terms of the additional values it has transferred from the Eastern societies and particularly in terms of its accumulation of Western values during the Republican Era, Turkey is a country that managed to integrate all these therefore it became a country where inter-cultural harmony can be experienced. This is an important advantage for Turkey to open up not only to its near abroad but also to the whole world. Besides, Turkey is among the rare countries capable of sharing experiences it has gained during its own development efforts, and its gains during EU membership process with the countries especially in its neighbourhood and the whole world.

Especially when we look at the global developments of 90's, Turkey was in an advantageous place with the formation of new world map after the collapse of Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. Starting with the Central Asian republics and Balkans, emergence of new countries with people

with whom Turkey shared common backgrounds of race, history and culture has played a facilitating role for Turkey to establish relations with them. Arab Spring, lately took place in the Middle East geography, is another element that has extended the admissibility of Turkey by bringing Turkey into the forefront. As you all remember, Western countries, sometimes for their own security reasons but mainly in countries that the Arab Spring took place, has shown Turkey as a model country. Turkish society; in Western terms has a modern Islamic understanding and that lives Islam divorced from radical discourse, managed to make Turkey be regarded as a modern country by the countries of Arab Spring as well. Together with these, Turkey's increased cultural activities in recent years, its proactive in foreign policy approach, and its efforts as an order instituting role are the other elements of the admissibility of Turkey especially in our near geography and on a global scale. Turkey can be regarded as a central country because of its geographical position in terms of the easiness and improvability of transportation means, and its reasonable distance to many destinations. In terms of geopolitics, its accessibility and its location as a hub at the junction of many geographies; Turkey can enjoy the relative ease to be access its near geography as well as be involved in initiatives on global scale. The fact that Turkey doesn't have a colonial background, is another element that expand the reputation of Turkey in terms of being a model for the African countries in their independence process, especially as they are highly familiar with the colonial culture.

In addition to these, the gradual rise of Turkey's visibility in international arena is related to Turkey's having more role in the efforts of maintaining peace together with international actors such as UN and NATO; and, the increase in the number of Turkish foreign representative offices. Today, if my memory fails me, please Mr. Ambassador, correct me, we can say that

we have approximately 250 foreign representative offices. Only in Africa, the number of embassies, which was 12 before, has reached to 40 today after the Africa initiative policy had started in 2008. Turkey's increased visibility relies not only to the embassies and other foreign representative offices which are the official actors of foreign policy, but also thanks to the prevalence and the increase of the activities of institutions such as AFAD (Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency), Turkish Red Crescent which is one of our important aid agencies, Yunus Emre cultural centres which play important roles in diffusing Turkish culture and history, and more important than all, TIKA which functions in the field of development assistance, as well as Turkish Airlines which became a world brand, and our business organisations and civilian nongovernmental organisations which have also started to play a very important role.

In addition to these, it is also important that Turkey has started to use its state scholarships more in recent years, and it has hosted many international events more, and the number and influence Turkish citizens in international institutions have gradually increased. (For instance, the previous general secretary of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation was a Turkish citizen). One of the deputy general secretary of UNDP (United Nations Development Programme) was an ex-minister from Turkey. As an old diplomat having worked in an international institution, I can give myself as an example. Along with these, the fact that Turkey has hosted many activities of UN institutions and the World Humanitarian Summit which has been organised for the first time, that it has started international initiatives such as the Alliance of Civilisations, that it has been a temporary member of UN Security Council are elements which extends the visibility of Turkey. Last but not the least, the Turkish diaspora, which can be found almost all around the

world, can be regarded as our soft power element as well.

Dear friends; Turkey's proactive foreign policy, especially the policy of zero problem with the neighbours, success story of its socio-economic transformation in recent years, diffusion its cultural products especially the Turkish TV series (while we were once watching Brazilian TV series, Latin America countries along with Middle East and Balkans are watching Turkish TV series now) are the elements that extend the interest and travels to Turkey.

The main element for this new foreign policy is security for everyone, political dialogue, economic commitment and cultural harmony. Turkey's history, cultural background, historical and geographical depth, democracy, dynamism of its economy, its young and educated population, policy of zero problem as part of its "Peace at Home, Peace in the World" principle are the important elements, forming its soft power element. As I stated shortly before, the fact that Turkey doesn't have a colonist background ensures Turkey to be accepted easily especially by the communities such as Africa that experienced the colonial culture.

Public diplomacy activities that Turkey place importance on, such as informatics and technology, economy, tourism, culture, art, foreign aids, and media are the elements that are used for informing the world public opinion about the potential of Turkey. Mutual removal of the visa for the neighbouring countries such as Syria, Lebanon, Egypt, Iran and many countries across the globe is another element that increases attention to Turkey. While Turkey could in general be defined as a "Hard Power" country because of the economic instability and military domination in during Cold War years and 90s, after the developments in 2000's, with its economic performance and diplomatic activities that vary from cross-cultural dialogue to its efforts for the peaceful solution of

conflicts it became a power rising on "soft power" elements.

While Turkey had received foreign aid with the Marshall Plan in 1947 and US assistance after WWII, as from 90's it has joined other donor countries after it gradually increased the level of development and after it has apprehended the role of foreign aids in foreign policy. Dear friends, Turkey's international aid and co-operation dates back to 1920's. Military and technical aids to Afghanistan during the period of Grand National Assembly of Turkey before the establishment of Republic of Turkey are regarded as the first example of this. But its first extensive development agency package has started in the early 80's with a modest initiative launched with small scaled projects budgeted \$10M in total for Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Mauritania, Senegal, Somalia and Sudan. In this respect, this can be regarded as the first move of Turkey's African expansion. Institutionalisation of Turkish development agencies has happened with the establishment of TIKA.

During the establishment of TIKA, while aid agencies of other countries were researched, JICA was taken as the main example. As my dear friend stated just now, JICA has made important progress in time, it has both changed its architecture and has developed the geography on which it has focused and has expanded its instruments. However, as a person from the field I can argue that, when their development aid policies compared, I can say that Turkey and Japan are similar, and their perception in the international arena are also similar.

I would like to say proudly that while the amount of official development aid that Turkey dispatches, as reported by OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development), was \$89M in 2003, it has reached to \$4B, and has reached \$6.4B in 2014 and \$5.1B in 2015. As our respected member of parliament has stated, Turkey has been the 3rd country to make the

largest humanitarian assistance 3 years in a row according to the global humanitarian assistance reports of 2013, 2014 and 2015. It has increased to \$3.3B which equals to 42 per thousand of its gross national product. While the amount of the humanitarian assistance of Turkey in 2014 was \$1.6B, this amount has doubled and reached to \$3.2B last year. What's more, Turkey has been declared to be the most generous country of the world as it has allocated 37 per thousand of its national income for humanitarian assistance. Turkey has been the second country on the list of international aid donor countries, right after the US, in 2015 according to the report of 16th Global Humanitarian Assistance Report published in 2015 by UK centred Development Initiatives, which makes the list of humanitarian assistances every year in the world. Turkey is followed by UK, EU institutions and Germany.

Dear friends, TIKA's place in the development architecture of Turkey is very important. It fulfils important functions such as the coordination of public institutions, ensuring the development cooperation with international institutions and other bilateral aid agencies, reporting of official development assistance by holding the inventory of development aid, as well as being the main implementing agency. The main aim of TIKA is fighting poverty on the international scale and contributing to the countries with which it cooperates on the efforts of sustainable social and economic development with the technical cooperation method thanks to the experiences and expertise that Turkey relatively has. While doing these, it has the prior principle to support the efforts of countries to reach their development goals while taking into consideration the priorities and demands of that country.

As my dear colleague stated, Turkey's development assistance actors, especially TIKA, aim to meet country demand without ignoring its priorities, never imposing anything and accepting demand-oriented

projects in general. By taking advantage of the cooperation synergy of other development actors, it gives weight to the importance of efficiency of aids. Besides, these unconditional assistances match up with the demands of the beneficiary country. With the intent of development of the capacity and human resources, a great variety of assistance instruments are used in the works of TIKA such as supply of experts or advisors, training programs, supply of scholarship, infrastructure projects, and the financing of the constructions of service buildings and humanitarian assistance. Under the light of development principles such as ownership, sustainability, transparency and accountability, we can see the following projects and programs in TIKAs efforts: Education, health, good governance, development of the private sector, agriculture and forestry, drinkable water supply and hygiene, transportation infrastructure and communication.

Just as in the example of my dear colleague, TIKA has carried out projects in some fragile countries especially during the conflicts, in post-conflict periods or sometimes while the conflicts are continuing. The most important example of this is the development assistance projects that were launched in 1994 right after the ceasefire in Bosnia and Herzegovina, especially for the victim Bosnian veteran families to help their recovery and develop job opportunities to help them carry on with their lives. Another example is, a small example, is turkey's PRT implementation which was done totally with civilian elements, while other countries implemented with military elements in Afghanistan. Another example is the civil war in early 2000's at Macedonia. Albanians, Bosnians and Macedonians conflicted with each other. While right after the end of this civil war there was a natural expectation that the works of TIKA to be prioritising Muslims such as Albanians, Turks and Bosnians initially, TIKA has chosen projects as much as it is possible to contribute to the reestablishment of peace

in the villages and neighbourhoods where all ethnic groups lived together.

Dear friends, TIKA has tried to show the traditional virtues of Turkish people to all mankind in cooperation with many actors such as state institutions, nongovernmental organisations, universities and world business organisations. The republics, that newly gained their independences with the end of the Cold War in Central Asia, Caucasus and Balkans, have been the prior target area. While this this situation that emerged in the Middle East and Balkans has been perceived as “neo- Ottomanism” by some, in fact is, this is a reconciliation and re-joining effort within the frame of Turkey’s history and geography. This priority has a very simple reason. No other actor is more suitable than Turkey, which shares common grounds as history, culture, language and religion with these newly independent countries to introduce them to the Western world and share experiences. Turkey’s ability to transfer the experiences it has gained during its own

period of development and long history of relations with the Western world to these partner countries has been a determinant factor. In the following phase, Middle East and Africa have been the new target area, and with expansion to Latin America and the Pacific Area afterwards, Turkey’s development assistances have reached a very wide geography.

It must be reminded that, the fact that a country’s borders are first determined by cultural borders rather than geographical or physical borders is shown very by the geographical expansion of Turkey’s development assistance. Turkey is intensely continuing its development centred cooperation efforts in over 140 countries and 5 continents to maintain sustainable stability and peace.

I would like to end my speech by thanking, particularly to ORSAM, and to the organisers of this event who give me this chance. I wish you a good day and all the best.

III. PANEL PRESENTATIONS

PANEL 1: HUMANITARIAN DIPLOMACY

1. *Yoshihide Soeya*

(*Keio University, Faculty of Law*)

An East Asian Order and Japan's Role Under the Trump Presidency

It is fortunate that the previous speaker talked about Turkey as a middle power. I am somewhat nervous in the presence of the ambassador from Japan because I am advocating Japan's middle power strategy. I understand that that is why I was brought here, so I have to talk about it. To make my point clear, please do not confuse the argument of 'Japan as a middle power,' which is not necessarily an argument I am raising when I talk about 'Japan's middle power strategy'. What I am making is a strategic argument, and Japan is greater than a middle power when judged by its economy etc. The sort of strategic concept where Japan should put its resources should be in the domain of a 'middle power strategy' for the lack of a better term. I hope this will naturally come out of my presentation without necessarily stressing this particular concept.

Currently, in all over the world any international meeting on foreign policy cannot be complete without making a reference to Donald Trump, and this is what I am going to do. Somebody must do it, but it is a risky business because you can be wrong in the years ahead. I feel like I am being victimised in volunteering to raise this topic. But anyway, the title for my presentation is "An East Asian Order and Japan's Role under the Trump Presidency".

Before getting into this, please allow me to compare Turkey and Japan in a broad strategic picture. I am not a specialist of Turkey, so I must confess that I may be wrong. But I am beginning to learn that the strategic positioning of Japan and Turkey are very similar. Japan is in the Far East, but also we have been known as a country residing in the *Far West*, depending on how you look at the picture. West, to us, have been European powers. But currently -and in the coming years- I think China is to replace former European powers as the most important country to the West of Japan. East, to us, is the United States, across the Pacific Ocean. Turkey could be called residing in the Far East, and west to you is US and Europe. Turkey could also called to be residing in the Far West, and East to you is the Middle East and Far East Asia. I think this sort of positioning between two strategic regions in a sense make Turkey and Japan similar, particularly in coming years under the current situation as the US enters in a new age under President Trump. In other words, the term middle power may mean something different in these shifting strategic, geopolitical landscapes. Strategically speaking we are indeed in the middle, and the structure is affecting geopolitical realities. And, in my view, middle power will be understood with those assumptions. Strate-

gic positioning will become even more explicit and important, and affect US foreign policies under President Trump.

With respect to the Trump phenomena, let me just briefly mention a couple of points. I think US's shift is driven by the 'America First' principle under Trump. America used to be 'America First' all the time. But what is unique under the Trump presidency is that this principle will be an inward moving force directed toward Trump himself. So, President Trump will continue to be the key, of course, and Trump has become a sort of centripetal point where this inward move in drives will come to. If that is the case, then the US will continue to have a very difficult time domestically, to begin with. Trump has been a source of division in the US, and this nature of president Trump in the American society and even policy making community may not change. So, there are lots of unpredictability and uncertainties for which we have to be prepared.

But one thing which I think we will see, is an *increased regionalisation of global politics*. In other words, each region will become independent in terms of talking about themselves as well as their role in changing the nature of global politics, where a single ideology or organising principle may not exist anymore. Liberal Internationalism used to be a universal organising principle for the evolution of the post-war international order where the United States, Europe and advanced democracies played an important role. But I think this trend could well be reversed or will at least become more complex. Because of this, I think each region will begin to have its own dynamics, and under these circumstances the role of the so-called great powers, Russia, China and to a lesser extent the EU as a sort of group actor, will become important in terms of the dynamism of regional politics. I am sure Russia will be really important here. In East Asia, on the other hand, China will become extremely important.

So, those are the premises on which the theme of today's talk is based, which is East Asia, Japan and Trump. The US-China relationship will continue to be critically important in East Asia, I think nobody would disagree with this. From this point of view, the concept that I am very much concerned about is a *Chinese concept of a new type of major power relations*, which Xi Jinping has been talking about a lot.

To make a complex and long story short, what this new type of major power relations would mean for China is that; the US should get out of Asia and Asia should be managed by China. If the US is out of the region, the Chinese are ready to live with the US peacefully and prosperously. They are not interested in a strategic clash with the US, either across the Pacific or on the global stage, provided they do not stick their head into Asian affairs against the intentions of the Chinese. They argue that they are not threatening anybody, and I think that they really want to mean it. Essentially, here is a very difficult question for the Asian neighbours of China: how to deal with a newly arising Chinese unilateralism of a unique Chinese nature. The question here is; how Trump is going to deal with the Chinese unilateralism with his principal of 'America First', and with the somewhat inward move, or tendency, of his foreign policy agenda.

The South China Sea is one example which I think could be discussed in this context. Chinese behaviours imply a typical Chinese unilateralism at the age of the rise of China. I think China will not damage the freedom of navigation, as they say, and I think they really mean it. But they will never give up their claims on the South China Sea islands. Their land reclamation is a result of a somewhat long term planning of the Chinese government which started in 2012, according to one China specialist whom I just happened to talk in Japan. They are expecting the time-span of this plan to end by 2020. During these eight years, they will continue to create a

fait accompli, so to speak, which would mean, to them, that they are controlling their islands. So, these behaviours may not change in these years, and how the US is going to deal with it, I think, is really the critical question. There is a chance that the Trump presidency may not challenge this, if China moves on their planned path without disturbing their external relations with the countries concerned, and if they continue to commit to the freedom of navigation principles.

The East China Sea issue is more difficult for us because it involves Senkaku Islands. Japan has been controlling Senkaku islands for over 120 years, without any disruption except the US control of these islands when Okinawa was under the administration of the United States. But the Chinese believe that these islands are theirs since ancient times, since two thousand years ago. Chinese position on this issue will also never change. So, the challenge will continue. And here the critical point is the credibility of the US-Japan alliance. I do not have any doubt that the alliance will continue to be robust because this is so essential not only for Japan but for the United States as well, even under the Trump presidency. But some aspects of this relationship may be shaken. For Japan, the defence of Senkaku Islands is one of the critical issues in its efforts to manage the alliance even under the Trump presidency.

The alliance with US is important, but this is where the middle-power strategy and the Japanese humanitarian policy arguments come in. The US-Japan alliance is important as an anchor, so to speak. But the argument around this line of concept is that Japan's diplomatic resources should more explicitly be put into areas where Japan develops cooperative security relations with East Asian countries. And the Chinese, almost for sure, would take it as ganging up against itself. However, I would argue that this is not the case, and this is where the middle-power strategy concept is important. For middle powers,

there is no such thing as playing power-politics *vis-à-vis* such a great power like China. And I think Japan's East Asian policy should be conceptualised along those lines. And this will begin to make sense because Japan has already been following a foreign policy that includes many of these in its agenda *vis a vis* the East Asian countries, such as capacity building and human security. So, these policies of capacity building and human security efforts and humanitarian assistance including infectious diseases and so forth, these are really priority areas where Japan has actually put considerable resources in conducting its East Asian diplomacy, particularly toward Southeast Asia.

Prime minister Obuchi in the late 1990s started to make human security a core concept of Japanese diplomacy. Japan's search for a permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council, also necessitated Japan's favouring human security policies in those years. Prime Minister Obuchi passed away, unfortunately, and prime minister Mori attended the UN millennium meeting in the year 2000, and he also talked about human security as a core concept of Japan's engagement in international affairs, and that is how Japan argued for a sort of a righteous request to be part of becoming a permanent member of the UN Security Council. The flip side of that was that Japanese would accept somewhat of a lesser status than the current P5, which is, being a permanent member without veto power. This is, in fact, accepting a status that is even less than that of France and the UK in the P5 group.

So, the critically important thing for Japanese diplomacy, to me, is that we should try harder to detach the China threat perception from these policy areas because these policy areas, again typically 'middle-power strategy' areas, has nothing to do with dealing with the China threat. It is about the necessity to talk among ourselves and create the East Asian order by ourselves. I think that is a critical strategic

concept in developing East Asian cooperation, and starting this within soft security as well as humanitarian areas makes a lot of sense at the initial phase. And this is actually where Japan's strength has been exerted as Prof. Tanaka's presentation clearly revealed.

My hope is, if Turkey would like to expand the domain of its middle-power strategy as the previous speaker talked about, it should recognise that middle-power agen-

da is global, not local, because it deals with universal issues. So, if Turkey comes into East Asia to work with Japan in these domains of human security and humanitarian assistance, I think this would be great in impressing people in East Asia, including the Japanese themselves, and showing how Turkey is really a Japanese partner in the years ahead.

Thank you very much.

2. Ozgur Ozdamar

(Bilkent University, Department of International Relations)

Turkey's Foreign Policy: A Middle Power's Quest for Leadership

Thank you very much. Thanks a lot for organising this great program and the invitation. I was asked by ORSAM to give an overview of the Turkish foreign policy. My name is Ozgur Ozdamar, I work at Bilkent University and I teach international relations. Before that I taught at TOBB University of Economics and Technology and I am very happy to be back in my previous university, it is always great to be back here.

The title of my presentation is "Turkey's Foreign Policy, A Middle Power's Quest for Leadership" and this is a project supported by TUBITAK, The Turkish National Science Foundation. The project was carried out between 2012 and 2015. What I did in this project was; I used the role theory, a political science theoretical approach, to depict the current and changing Turkish foreign policy roles.

What I ask here is: What are the most frequently used Turkish foreign policy roles by the Turkish foreign policymakers? Do these roles change over time? What are the attitudes of the leaders, the elite and the public on these roles? Is there any conflict, agreement or competition regarding these roles? And are the leaders' role conceptions supported by the public?

What I did here was, first of all, I used a leadership based approach and I looked at the Turkish foreign policy's top decision-makers since 1997. Those are Ismail Cem, a former foreign minister, Abdullah Gul, a former foreign minister as well, Ali Babacan, yet another foreign minister, Ahmet Davutoglu, both foreign minister and prime minister, and Recep Tayyip Erdogan as prime minister from 2003 to 2014.

Now, what are the top foreign policy roles that the Turkish leaders (Cem, Gul, Babacan, Davutoglu and Erdogan) subscribed to? There are three roles are most mentioned by the Turkish foreign policymakers. These are: 1) *defender of peace and stability globally*, 2) *global system collaborator* which is a globally good citizen role, and 3) *regional subsystem collaborator and a regional actor* that facilitates regional affairs politically and economically. The research shows that there is also another role, *active independent role*, which shows the changing nature of Turkish foreign policy; Turkey has been trying to conduct a more active, independent, autonomous foreign policy in the last ten years. Lastly, another role emerges that we have never seen before and appeared in the last five years. Mostly as a result of the Arab uprisings and the humanitarian crises by which Turkey is surrounded, Turkey defines itself as *the protector of the oppressed people and the protector of those who are under tremendous stress (by civil wars, revolutions and coup d'états)*.

The results suggest that foreign policy conceptualisation in Turkish foreign policy is shared by different leaders of different backgrounds. These roles are 'defender of peace and stability', 'global system collaborator' and 'regional subsystem collaborator'. These roles are typical middle-power, good citizen roles that Japan is also very familiar with.

After the leaders, I turned to the elites and I interviewed fifty foreign policy elites from all over Turkey. These were done both east and west and north and south, all over the country. The interviewees included bureaucrats, politicians, business people and institutions, media, academia,

trade unions and civil society. Now, what does the elite of the country think about the Turkish foreign policy? The following are the top roles that the Turkish elite think Turkey should play both regionally and globally. The first role is mentioned by a lot of people regardless of their political, ideological background; *Turkey as regional power* is a rather peaceful role, which suggests that Turkey should play a regionally important role in all the regions surrounding Turkey. There is a difference between regional power and regional leader. The Turkish elite actually subscribe to the regional power role, which is a lot more soft-power oriented, like it was described before. The *bridge-country* idea was mentioned a lot by the elite, that Turkey serves as a bridge between cultures and civilisations of the world. And many elite said that Turkey should serve as a *model country* with its advanced economic and political system. So, when you look at it, I have a lot of different things we could talk about but because of the time I will just skip them. In general, the elite prescribe regional and local roles rather than very ambitious global roles for Turkey. A bridge between civilisations and different regions of the world, regional power, a regionally important facilitator, a soft-power country model, regional collaborator and mediator roles were the roles suggested by the elite.

The important thing is that there is a domestic debate about foreign policy roles in Turkey and foreign policy is not something that everybody agrees on 100%. There is a lot of domestic debate about it and the biggest domestic disagreement comes from whether Turkey should subscribe to more ambitious roles or stay with modest roles that emphasise soft-power, the power of diplomacy and economic initiatives.

In the third stage of my project, I have researched public opinion and tried to find out Turkish people's attitude toward the role of Turkey in the world. I also asked them very general foreign policy ques-

tions. This is a very representative survey done by a good survey company, and the results are very reliable. The results are from April 2014 and it will be repeat in 2017, so we can also see the changes between 2014 and 2017. What do these results say? First of all, the Turkish public does not think that foreign policy is the most important issue for them. When you look at it, the biggest problems they see are economy and unemployment.

Actually, the only foreign policy issue that emerged from the survey ranks eighth, and that is the Syrian issue. Only six percent of the public see foreign policy as a problem. It's a very realistic picture. Anywhere in the world the public opinion is not very much interested in foreign policy. Attitudes about international organisations, UN and to some extent NATO are still considered very positively. Then there are the attitudes toward different countries, which may be found interesting by our guests here. The most popular countries in Turkey are Germany, Saudi Arabia and Japan (as of 2014). Japan is the third most popular country for the Turkish public. I guess we can see this as a success of Japanese post-WWII foreign policy. An interesting thing is that Japan is also the least known country in Turkey because when you look at the answers there's a lot of positive answers about Japan but 20% of the public said they do not have an opinion about Japan. This shows the necessity of increased public relations between Japan and Turkey. But, generally, Japan is considered to be a friendly power in world politics by the Turkish people.

In terms of the roles of Turkish foreign policy, I have asked the public what roles they think are important and what they think Turkey should pursue. It is quite similar to decision-maker roles: 'defender of peace and stability' is number one, everybody loves that one. People like the high status, Turkey as a rising power and a model country for its surroundings. Then there are the 'good neighbour' and

'economic developer' roles, which are very similar to Japanese foreign policy. These are the most approved roles by the Turkish public.

The least approved role by the public was isolationism. Turkish people don't think that Turkey should be an isolationist power. Survey results most generally suggest that pro-peace non-interventionist good neighbourly roles are approved by the public. However, they also favour a high-status role for Turkey. An inference we can make from this is that they want an influential Turkey but not in a controversial conflictual way, an important, soft-power country, but not conflictual.

Conclusion: At the leadership level Turkish leaders formulate Turkey's position as

global but regionally focused, pro-peace and pro-stability. Especially in the last years in Turkish foreign policy there is a lot of emphasis on the immediate regions and the need to focus on those regions. At the elite level, there are also similar roles but they, both the government and opposition elites, say that Turkey should subscribe to more traditional roles that suggest the role of a regional power. As to the public opinion, Turkish public generally supports peaceful, non-interventionist, good-neighbour roles, but public also wants more status without getting Turkey into too much trouble. So, it is important to consider what happens when status brings risks, and that is something that Turkey should resolve on its own. If a higher status requires military conflict, my forecast is that public will not subscribe to that.

3. *Talha Kose* (*SETA Foundation*)

The Role of Conflict Resolution in Turkey's Foreign Policy

Dear distinguished guests, I would like to thank to TOBB and ORSAM for this important conference. I am going to talk about the role of conflict resolution and humanitarian diplomacy in Turkish foreign policy. Ambassador Kulaklikaya has already portrayed a holistic picture about Turkey's humanitarian efforts in the last decade. I am going to touch on some of the political implications and changes that took place in the last decade about Turkey's efforts in the field of Conflict Resolution.

In the last two days, I was in the city of Gaziantep for a research trip. Gaziantep is hosting more than 300,000 Syrian refugees. The city has become a symbol for the integration and coexistence of Syrians and Turks. You do not see a lot of beggars in the streets of Gaziantep, they can find jobs and they contribute positively to the economy of the city. I think within this difficult context the city is a good example of Turkey's humanitarian efforts. More importantly, within this holistic effort, civil society played a strategic role. Every month the civil society in the city is increasing its capacity in many fields, it is in touch with the people, publishing newspapers, there is radio broadcast and they are even broadcasting to Aleppo and other parts of Syria. Civil society in Gaziantep is a significant pillar of Turkey's humanitarian diplomacy. Turkish people and civil society took initiatives themselves for Syrians and they work both with the Turkish officials as well as the influential figures among the Syrian immigrants. Although it is a new area Turkish NGO's and civil society organisations are working very good and in tandem with the Turkish government and organisations like TIKA, AFAD, Red Crescent and the Turkish Immigration Association. This partnership is a manifestation of Turkey's success in humanitarian diplomacy and conflict resolu-

tion efforts. It is also epitomises some of the key dimensions of Turkey's approach to the humanitarian crises in Syria and Iraq. We need to think more systematically about this partnership.

Definitely Turkey has high level of involvement and a background in humanitarian diplomacy. Turkey has been hosting immigrants from the Balkans, Middle East, Caucasus and other places within more than a century. Red Crescent, for instance, was established before the Turkish Republic (1868) and the Turkish Red Crescent played important roles along all those humanitarian catastrophes. The main objective of this organisation was to help the Muslims living on Ottoman soil, which also had a transnational role at that time. If you look at the history of humanitarian intervention and humanitarianism, I think it does not have a positive legacy for Turkey and for the Ottoman Empire. Beginning the early 19th century, humanitarian intervention and the discourse of humanitarianism had been used to legitimise the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, especially for the mission of "saving" the Christians of the Empire. So, when we hear about humanitarian values and humanitarian intervention, its historical legacy tells us that it has a bit questionable background. "Humanitarianism" was unable to save the Muslims of the Ottoman Empire. So, we need to at least have an idea about this legacy within Turkish diplomacy.

During the early years of the Turkish Republic Turkey's humanitarian activities continued to a certain extent. But the first time it became a central issue was related to the independence of Turkic republics after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Turkey tried to play roles in order to help build their state capacity as well as their economy. TIKA was established in 1990s,

and it was very active in post-Soviet Turkic republics. TIKA gained a lot of experience in that area and continued to expand its efforts to increase state building and capacity building efforts of the Turkic republics. It was a very important and meaningful role for Turkey's humanitarian diplomacy but Turkey was unable to expand this role and its experience to the regions further. An important problem of Turkish humanitarian diplomacy in 1990s was the weakness of the civilian pillar of this diplomacy. There were almost no significant civil society actors that were helping those countries. There were some religious NGOs focused for the most part on religion, but their activities were very limited in terms of content and scope.

When we come to the AK Party era, starting with 2002, humanitarian diplomacy became a central pillar of Turkey's foreign policy. In terms of humanitarian diplomacy, we can divide this period into three: 2002-2005 (I), 2005-2013 (II) and lastly 2013-present (III). In the earlier periods of AK Party administration, the main challenge was the problems related to the post 9/11 era. There were military interventions to Iraq and Afghanistan and American occupation of both countries. At that time, Turkey's main diplomatic focus was towards the EU integration. There were serious security challenges in Turkey's neighbourhood, and Turkey felt threatened in this context. Rather than sealing its border and keeping itself distant from the actors in Iraq, Turkey decided to play more active roles. After Iraq was occupied it was clear that Iraq of the Saddam period would no more continue. So rather than focusing completely on central actors in Baghdad, Turkey decided to develop positive relations with the local actors in the region. This policy returned positive outcomes in the coming years. During its first years, main issue for the AK Party administration was EU integration. Stability in Iraq and Afghanistan were important for Turkey, but this was not a central element of Turkey's foreign policy agenda.

There was a continuation as well as an expansion of TIKA and other civil society actors, but the real change came after 2005. Conflict resolution, humanitarian diplomacy, soft power and economic diplomacy became the fundamental pillars of Turkey's foreign policy after 2005. Turkey decided to boost its humanitarian capacity to try to become a soft power hub in the region as well as increase its economic diplomacy. Increasing human contact through increasing economic ties, supporting civil society organisations and humanitarian organisations in the domain of civil society, supporting and expanding official institutions like TIKA were elements of same policy. The messages of political leaders including President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Abdullah Gül and Ahmet Davutoğlu about the global injustices and problems were very important and followed by many people in the Muslim World. So, the overall idea of making Turkey a central power, a central country and getting constructively involved in all the conflicts and problems in the neighbouring regions and beyond became a general policy. This constructive engagement was supported by economic diplomacy. Also at that time, there were some challenges in the region such as the expansion of the Salafi ideology and other extremist political views. Turkey's improving democratisation helped economic development, empowering the people of the region as well as creating more opportunities for positive exchange. Struggling against these extremist ideologies and views through endorsing moderate views was also another consistent policy.

Turkey preferred a role of an order-instituting actor in the region. Turkey's explanation of the sources of the conflicts in the region was the following: the peoples of the region who are engaged in conflicts are psychologically, politically, ideologically and economically fragmented. They do not have capacity to resolve their differences and problems by themselves because of these unnatural divisions im-

posed by outsiders. Considering integration between these actors included improving their relations, and helping them to build positive ties between them was a priority mission for an 'order instituting actor'. For sure, Turkey's aim was very ambitious, which needed long-term commitment. Turkish policy makers thought that throughout the MENA region all the ethnic, sectarian, political and economic conflicts were somehow interconnected. They tried to develop a holistic policy in that regard to overcome those challenges. Empowerment of disenfranchised people as well stimulation of economic growth was proposed as important policy items. The "Arab Spring" was considered as an important turning point that would facilitate some positive change in the MENA regions. Turkey tried to expand and broaden economic and political ties and increased horizontal interactions with many local actors in the region.

So, what did Turkey do in this era? There was a wide scale investment in peace-building. Both official institutions and civil society organisations have increased their capacity in this field. Turkey became an important mediator in regional conflicts. In all the conflicts in the MENA region and beyond (Africa and some other parts of the world) Turkey played important third party roles. In Syria and Iraq, in Lebanon, in the nuclear deal with Iran, between some tribes in Iraq, between the Iraqi central government and the Kurdish regional government, etc., in all these tensions Turkey played mediator roles, and this really increased Turkey's capacity and diplomatic visibility. Also, Turkey played an important role in crisis management. Turkey tried to include some resistance groups in Iraq, Syria and Palestine in the political process to sooth their insurgent struggle. In the international institutions, Turkey tried to bring humanitarian subjects and policies to the agenda. Turkey also tried to play important leadership roles in these areas, emphasising the dis-

course of 'security for all, peace for all'; "inclusive security and peace".

The Syrian Civil War and its expansion into Iraq was an important turning point for Turkey's constructive foreign policy, which focuses on conflict resolution and humanitarian diplomacy. Turkey never stepped back in its humanitarian objectives yet there was a more pressing issue. More than three million Syrians and more than half a million Iraqis took shelter in Turkey. Turkey continued to increase its investments in humanitarian area yet these investments tried to satisfy the basic needs of more than 3,5 million refugees within its territories. So, the crisis in Syria and Iraq became an important turning point for Turkey. Of course, the security concerns became important in Turkey's policy and investing solely in soft-power and non-coercive instruments were not sufficient to pursue a consistent foreign policy in the region during this period. In addition to non-coercive instruments Turkey increasing invested on its military capacity and expanded its coercive instruments to fight against the terrorist organisations in the region.

I would like to conclude by briefly talking about Turkey's advantages and limitations in Conflict Resolution and humanitarian diplomacy. One of Turkey's important problems is that Turkey ambitiously targeted transforming the entire region through constructive means. Without the support of other regional actors or global actors to this constructive transformation, this aim was very difficult to accomplish. Another thing is that between 2002 and 2013, the economic boom in Turkey facilitated its humanitarian policies. With the slowing down of this economic boom Turkey may encounter some economic challenges to maintain this costly humanitarian agenda. Besides, the cost of hosting more than 3,5 million Syrian and Iraqi immigrants has already turned into an economic burden, which is being criticised by some Turkish citizens.

Turkey has some advantages, which may continue to facilitate its humanitarian efforts. As Mr. Kulaklikaya mentioned, Turkey does not have a colonial legacy in Africa and elsewhere. It is quite positive that the actors in Africa do not consider Turkey's efforts as containing expansionist political and economic objectives. Turkey has already gained a lot of experience in its humanitarian efforts in the last decade. Aid organisations, for instance, specialise on education and food aid. Also, Turkey's historical ties with the neighbouring countries play a significant role that facilitates its humanitarian diplomacy and conflict resolution efforts. Civil society actors can easily adjust to the region, and they

can work very well with regional actors. Overall, contents and the scope of Turkey's humanitarian activities since 2013 did not decline, but it is more directed to Syria and Iraq. Cooperation with actors like Japan or EU may positively affect humanitarian activities. Turkey's immediate security concerns may limit its regional conflict resolution efforts in the short run but a sustainable order and peace can hardly be instituted without the constructive contributions of Turkey in this region. I hope our friends and allies also support us in our efforts.

Thank You.

4. *Pınar Akpınar* (*Istanbul Policy Center, Sabanci University*)

Turkish Humanitarianism and the Role of NGOs

Thank you very much. I would firstly like to thank ORSAM, TOBB University, the Turkish Foreign Ministry and the Japanese Embassy for organising this event. It is a pleasure to be here. I was actually in Japan a week ago, and it is a very nice country. I was very impressed with the hospitality of the Japanese. Today, I will talk about Turkish humanitarian diplomacy and the role of NGOs in Turkey's humanitarian diplomacy model.

Let me briefly state the outline of my presentation. I will briefly talk about the Turkish model of humanitarian diplomacy and then a brief background of Turkish NGOs, the state-NGO interaction in Turkey's peace-building, activities of Turkish NGOs, the key features of these NGOs and their sustainability as well as the sustainability of the Turkish model.

Let me first briefly explain what humanitarian diplomacy is. When we look at the literature, you come across as many as 89 definitions of humanitarian diplomacy. But it was first coined by International Red Cross, and when you look at the definitions, you see two clusters: one of them emphasises only the role of non-governmental organisations as agents of humanitarian diplomacy, and others emphasises both the role of the state and NGOs as actors of humanitarian diplomacy. When you look at the Turkish model, as is also evident from a speech of Ahmet Davutoğlu from 2013, who is Turkey's former foreign minister and prime minister, Turkish model emphasises a multi-track approach, which includes the state, the NGOs, the businesses etc. So, there are various actors in the Turkish model.

If we look at the Turkish NGOs, we see that they have been mainly active in the last 10-15 years. But if we look at their

emergence in the international arena, we see that it goes back to Afghan resistance in 1980s or the Bosnian and Kosovo Wars, the Chechen wars, the Palestinian cause so on and so forth. So, they have been around for quite a while, but in the last, let's say, 15 years, they have become more structured and maybe more professional and so on. So, they have been more visible in the international arena. And if you look at the domestic triggers with respect to their emergence, we see the 1980 military coup period. After the coup, there was more room for the involvement of NGOs. The 1990 earthquake in Turkey also played a huge role in the emergence of Turkish humanitarian NGOs. Many NGOs emerged in Turkey during this period, and in time they started to carry out activities outside Turkey as well. The EU accession process also opened more room for the involvement of civil society actors. Increasing level of prosperity in Turkey in the last decade have further accelerated charitable activities. Also, globalisation plays a huge role. People have been more aware of what is going on outside Turkey. And the role of internet is also important. Today, you can just go online and make a donation with your credit card with just one click. So, you can donate money to a family in Myanmar or in Palestine instead of just looking at your neighbourhood for a needy one. And, the Syrian crisis has played a very important role as well.

When we look at state-NGO interaction in the Turkish model, we see that the state plays a role in high-level peace-building. So, the state's role is more official. The Turkish state also has important activities in terms of official development aid. It is one of the top donating countries in the world. It offers humanitarian assistance, mediation, and advocacy role as well. For example, when we look at Turkey's in-

volvement in Somalia, we see that Turkey defended and promoted Somalia on the international platform a lot.

When we look at Turkey's low-level peace building, we see the role of NGOs. They are very active, and so far, they constitute only 10% of all Turkish aid, but their role is growing. They focus on grassroots. There is also increased interaction between the two levels, which is a little different from some other rising powers like China or India. In their models of humanitarianism there isn't much role for NGO involvement. The Chinese humanitarian model, as you may be aware, has almost no room for NGOs. In the Indian model, too, there are only a few NGOs that deliver aid outside India, and there is a lot of suspicion over NGO role in the state especially in terms of international money transfer. So, they are not really free in terms of their operations outside India. But in the Turkish model the state itself promotes the NGOs because they can be more flexible and they can reach places sometimes the state doesn't have the capacity to reach out to. We see a growing collaboration between the states and NGOs as well.

If you look at the activities of Turkish humanitarian NGOs we can see three major clusters: emergency assistance and medical relief, building infrastructure, and investing in social and human capital.

Emergency assistance and medical relief, basically, takes place during the initial phase of a crisis: search and rescue operations, for example, during a disaster, providing medical relief, food, clothing these all can be parts of emergency assistance. And it increases public visibility. So, it plays an important role in terms of increasing visibility. Especially when there is a crisis we all know that media attention is at its peak in the initial phase of the crisis, so these activities play an important role in terms of publicity as well.

When you look at building infrastructure, it basically constitutes mid-term operations. Development plays an important role here. We have interviewed many NGOs during our research. Many of them underlined development as a prerequisite for peace, which is in line with Turkey's official policy as well. And when we look at Turkey's official development aid we see that construction plays an important role. This is also in line with Turkey's domestic development model. And in terms of building infrastructure, we can see some collaboration between NGOs and Turkey's official development agency TIKA as well. Construction projects are also tangible and increase visibility.

Investing in social and human capital is another cluster. Basically, it constitutes investing in education, vocational training, opening schools, among others, and helps create a sense of affiliation with Turkey. So, it is important in that sense as well. It also promotes employment of local capacity.

When we look at the key features of Turkish NGOs, we can see that they are more flexible compared to the state. They rely on private donations mostly. So, unlike some European models, for example if you look at the Norwegian model, you see that most of the NGOs rely significantly on government grants. But in the Turkish model, there is almost no such thing. The NGOs rely mainly on private donations. There is also absence of conditionality in the sense that when the aid is delivered there are almost no conditions attached. But in terms of operations NGOs look out for more secure places to operate, especially for mid-term and long term operations.

Also, religion plays an important role. Their target population is usually the Muslim populations in target countries. Pursuing advocacy is also an important feature. For example, with the Palestinian cause we see that many Turkish NGOs defend this cause, which is also a little bit in

line with Turkey's state approach as well. Culture and religion play important roles. As I have said, the Muslim communities are mainly targeted. The justification given for this by Turkish NGOs is that firstly they underline charity obligations of Muslims to deliver aid to their counter brothers. There is also the issue of donor sensitivities attached here. When people donate money, usually there is a peak during religious holidays; for example, during Ramadan people tend to donate more. Also, there is the vulnerability of the Muslim populations. The NGOs contend that Muslim communities are usually the most vulnerable and disadvantaged communities. This is also another justification that they give.

Another feature is their perceived responsibility to represent Turkey abroad. Many of the NGO representatives are quite patriotic. When we interviewed them many of them underlined that it is important for them to promote Turkey, to promote the Turkish flag and they are proud of promoting Turkey.

If you look at the sustainability of the Turkish model, especially the sustainability of the role of NGOs, we can say that when we look at their activities they're active in too many fields. One NGO can be active in medical aid, or education, all sorts of activities. Given their size, because many of them are small compared to their Western counterparts, they have too many engagements. They have their fingers in too many pies, which can affect their sustainability. There is also lack of coordination and collaboration among NGOs. Many of them operate alone when they go to a country. This has started to change during the Syrian crisis. During the crisis, we have witnessed a lot of collaboration between NGOs and the state or between different NGOs. But if you look

at Africa, for example, we see that some NGOs are not even aware of each other's existence in a given country. There is also over-reliance on volunteerism and a lack of sufficient professionalism and expertise. Many of their members are volunteers. They may not be really trained or lack language skills. They may lack knowledge of English or local languages, which creates problems in the field. And finally, there is the issue of funding. Since they rely heavily on private donations, sometimes it can be difficult for them to find funding.

We can simply conclude that there is a growing role for Turkish NGOs within a more pluralistic environment. Although there are certain challenges awaiting them, we can see a growing role for them, especially after the Syrian crisis. Despite all the misery, the crisis has inter alia been an opportunity for Turkish NGOs to gain experience and improve themselves. When we look at their activities they do not deviate much from the mainstream line. If we compare them with more traditional, Western NGOs we do not see a lot of deviation from the mainstream line. Despite being independent, the level of conformity with the official line raises some concerns. We can see that their discourse is very much in line with the official line. So, although they are independent in terms of funding, in terms of their discourse or their ideological approach, they are mainly in line with the official line. Their success is dependent on building a comprehensive strategy. Institutionalisation is very important for them, they need to invest on that, and professionalism and expertise. Also, coordination and collaboration between different NGOs plays an important role in terms of their sustainability.

Thank you very much.

PANEL 2 PEACEBUILDING AND AFRICA

1. Hideaki Shinoda

(Tokyo University of Foreign Studies, Graduate School of Global Studies; Director of Hiroshima Peacebuilders Center [HPC])

Japan's Involvement in Africa in the Age of "Partnership Peacekeeping"

In my speech, I would like to talk about the concept of *Partnership Peacekeeping*, in the context of Japan's involvement in Africa. Since my background and the main area of expertise are peace operations and peacebuilding, I will be focusing on peacekeeping, hoping that this area of understanding could be applicable to some other areas like developmental aid, which prof. Kataoka is going to address, as well as other humanitarian issues and so on.

To show the very clear example of how we understand partnership in the context of peace building and peace operations in Africa I would like to quote a very historic, epoch-making report of the UN Security General issued last year:

"We have thus entered an era of partnership peacekeeping where close corporation among multiple multilateral actors throughout every phase of a crisis is becoming a norm - and an essential component of each organisation."

I hope that you understand that this is the phrase I picked up when I submitted my presentation title contained in your program.

What do they mean by *partnership*? There are some specific understandings. A similar phrase is used in a very well-known and very authoritative report issued also last year on UN peace-making architecture, by which we mean peace building

commission, peace building fund and so on. Out of several key important agendas they highlighted *Partnering for Sustainable Peace*. HIPPO (High-Level Panel on Peace Operations), issued a report last year uniting our efforts in peace, politics, partnership and people. HIPPO's report highlighted what they called four essential shifts. Out of these four, one of them calls for a *more inclusive peace and security partnership* for the future.

So, *partnership* is a key word, a very much fashionable word within the UN system and in the industry of peace operations, peace building practitioners, and so on. Although there are some other specific phrases in the industry of the department of peacekeeping operations and the department of field support of the UN system, there are some more connotations for the word "partnership" in terms of peace building and peace operations.

In order for us to a little bit more contextualise, allow me to spend few minutes to briefly discuss the overall background of partnership issues. There are many armed conflicts that took place in the year 2015. A zone covering an area starting from the Atlantic, through Africa, Middle East, Afghanistan and South Asia, up until Myanmar can be called the conflict zone. These are areas where armed conflicts took place on 2015 and most of them are still taking place in the year 2016.

What is notable for us, the experts of peace operations, is that now there are a couple

of issues. Looking at the southern part of Africa, there were so many awful conflicts during the 1990s or during the Cold War. We looked this area as a conflict prone area but this is not the case anymore. That means we cease to call which were the most volatile areas in sub-Saharan Africa during the 1990 as conflict areas anymore. That is no longer the case today.

Looking at Southeast Asia, which was one of the most volatile areas during the Cold War, exemplified with Vietnam War and Pol Pot genocide in Cambodia among other, is no longer a conflict prone area. However, there are some specific conflict areas in the world stretching from Great Lakes and the Sahara region of Africa through the Middle East to South Asia. I am afraid to say; the Middle East is now emerging as a really central conflict zone. This was not the case in the 1990s or the last decade. This has become a very peculiar phenomenon since the aftermath of the Arab Spring, quite frankly.

If we look at the quantitative research on armed conflicts classified by region, we see that Asia still constitutes a certain portion because these statistics include Afghanistan and South Asia. But it is in a diminishing trend. The numbers for Africa still constitutes the major conflict in the world. But what is particularly notable is the Middle East, which is dramatically increasing. The number of casualties is also at its historic ceiling. The number of armed conflicts has also surpassed the historic record of 1991, last year. The casualty number was also the historic record, at its peak in 2014. The year 2016 was not so high, but still higher than the record immediately after the Cold War.

If we look at battle-related death by region, the Middle East, after a very dramatic surge, became the top. In terms of the number of conflicts by region: Africa still constitute the majority, but the Middle East, again, makes a very dramatic surge. If we break it down further in terms of

total number of battle-related deaths, and the Middle East marked a very significant surge in the last five years. While Africa constitutes a somewhat constant portion of battle-related deaths, compared to the Middle East now it begins to look somewhat modest. The same patterns can be observed in terms of one-sided violent deaths as well. Same pattern can also be observed in worldwide global terrorism trends. South Africa is comparatively stable. Southeast Asia despite some issues it is comparatively better. South Asia, the Middle East and the Sahara region, covering the Great Lakes region, are the most volatile, active areas in terms of terrorist incidents.

So, what these tell us is that; we might have to respond to these areas very intensively. The geographical spread of UN peacekeeping operations is very representative, showing a similar pattern. They are concentrating on the war-front area, very much intensively. SPM (Special Political Missions) designed by UN Department of Political Affairs, also display same pattern. What is significant, however, is that, since the year 2000 the number of peacekeepers has been increasing constantly, and it hit the historical record of 100,000 personnel in the year 2010. From that time, this number has been maintained because many feel that this is a ceiling. Although we cannot reduce the number, we cannot dramatically increase it as well. As a result, while the UN is responding to the worldwide conflict zones, they are not able at this moment to respond to latest armed conflict areas, like the emergence of the Middle East as a conflict-prone zone after the year 2010 or Arab Spring.

As a result, what is a little bit nuanced tendency is this: most of the UN PKOs are in Africa. All substantial missions are all in Africa. 9 out of current 16 missions are in Africa. All large missions with over 10,000 personnel are in Africa. Around 80% of PKO (Peace Keeping Operations) person-

nel are in Africa. And most of the budget is spent in Africa.

This means that they, the UN, are not able to respond to the Middle East while Turkey is responding to it with utmost effort. The UN is a little bit desperate in responding to the Middle East. That is a reality. However, they are trying to make their best efforts in Africa to make a difference where they can do, and they may be able to do so. Still, however, in Africa they see the limit. They are trying to make their best to enlarge and maximise their efforts by organising partnership structures. While we make all the latest and largest missions in Africa, we also have some kind of partnership structures with the African Union, ECOWAS, IGAD, southern countries and so on in many ways. For instance, in the case of Somalia many peacekeepers are from the African Union while the UN only supports logistical missions.

I make a typology of partnerships: 'Integrated' manner of partnership is in the case of Darfur, Sudan, etc. Then there is 'chronological' partnership in regional or sub regional development, swift deployment of missions followed by the UN's deployment of a larger mission in succession. In "functional" partnership a regional or sub regional organisation takes responsibility of very robust international force while the UN may maintain the overall structure of peacekeeping and so on. Even a reverse relationship, as in the case of Somalia, could be observed.

Looking at this background of what kind of partnership Japan and Turkey can imagine? From our side, Japan does not belong to very much operational, regional organisations. We are not the member of any African organisation, so that is a number one issue. Japan is not part of any operational, regional organisations as in the case of EU countries. If we are a member of the EU, we could deploy our troops, our civilians through EU's channels, but we

do not have such a channel. The EU has many channels to assist. Turkey, on the other hand, has organisations such as the Organisation of Islamic Corporation and NATO. You also have a nuanced relationship with the EU. Still, however, you could be 'external' to the African continent while you have a very intensive engagement with the Middle East.

So, these form the basic context. Turkey is very much engaged with the Middle East, and Japan would like to assist Turkey in the Middle East. However, there are some limits for Japan to do this. Even if we are able to do something more in the surrounding areas of the most volatile regions of Africa, still there are limits and can make only a modest effort, as the best possibility. What can, or should, we do if regional organisations and EU are making partnership collaborations? Now, perhaps, we do not have to make the most robust and substantive operations by ourselves. However, logistical affairs, human development, capacity development affairs and any kind of additional support ought to be highly welcome. How can we, Japan and Turkey, collaborate? With these conditions, we can collaborate in a very flexible manner by assisting the UN and assisting regional and sub regional organisations.

Some interesting case scenarios in the past that can be given, such as Japan-Turkey collaboration for capacity development of Afghan female national police. The government of Japan is assisting PKO training centres in Africa and spending some amount of money on them such as CCC-PA in Egypt, the Kofi Annan Centre in Ghana, Defence College in Nigeria, Strategic Training Centre in Mali, etc. So, we could collaborate in this manner, strategically by assisting already existing efforts in the region through UN and through regional and sub regional organisations.

Personally I have been engaged in a program for human resource development on

behalf of Ministry of Foreign Affairs and government of Japan. Actually, we started ten years ago and have been running the program for ten years. There are many graduates working in the UN. When the government of Japan assists a PKO in Africa, they do so through UNDP, believing that this is a much more effective that way.

High level of flexible cooperation between the UN and the regional and sub regional

organisations, Japan bilateral aid host countries as well as other donor and assistance countries are highly welcome. It is a bit complex, but that is the feeling of our age. We do not mind complexity of partnership. We are more concerned about the effectiveness, flexibility and maximisation of our combined effort.

Thank you very much. I hope these were food for thought.

2. Volkan Ipek

(Yeditepe University, Department of International Relations)

The Evolution of Turkey's Africa Engagement

When we talk about Africa, we see that Turkey wanted to set up diplomacy in a region from which no threat can come to it. This was the main idea behind Turkey's Africa opening.

Now let's start by looking at what kind of foreign policy adjustments were made between 1923 and 1998 by Turkey. When we look at the actors both in close and far neighbourhoods, we first see some attempts to drift Turkey into WWII. Then we see the attempts to influence Turkey during the Cold War, which was a threat to and violation of the Turkish interests. This was done by both the United States and the Soviet Union. For example, both Stalin's aggression and Johnson's notorious letter were attempts to direct Turkey's national interests. Then, in 1970s, we saw attacks by the terrorist organisation PKK to the south-eastern regions of Turkey. These attacks primarily came from Syria and Iraq. Then there came the Armenian genocide propaganda of Armenian diaspora. Then there were attempts to gain control of the Aegean Sea by the Greeks. Lastly, we saw the Luxembourg Summit in 1997, where the EU told Turkey "if you want to be a member we have to have some extra conditions besides the main ones".

In terms of this kind of foreign policy, what did Turkey want to do? Turkey wanted to cheer the Turkish state and Turkish foreign policy in a cocktail party. Why I use this 'cocktail party' metaphor is because Africa was a continent where Turkey would not get any threat to its national interests, unlike the old actors in its far and close neighbourhood. That is why I saw in Africa a kind of rehabilitation of Turkish foreign policy.

My presentation has five chapters. First, I am going to very briefly talk about African engagement in the Ottoman Era, then in the Republican Era between 1923 and 1998, and then again in the Republican Era, between 1998 and 2016. After that, I will give a conclusion followed by a 'what to do for a better engagement' section.

When we look at the Ottoman Era, we see that we had some relations with the Kanem State in Middle Africa in the 16th century. Then, of course, we have Mehmed Ali Pasha in Egypt. We have some fortresses in the horn of Africa, in Somalia and in Djibouti. Then of course there comes the Ottoman Rule in Africa, in Libya, Tunisia and Algeria. Then we have two important figures who were called from South Africa to teach South Africans Islam in the 19th century. By the way, there is only one book written by an Ottoman in 1911. And of course, the Turkish-African relations during the Ottoman Era did not include any assimilation; we should talk about this. And then also, we see African slaves in Ottoman harems. So, this was the basic Africa perception in the Ottoman Era, as you can see, it was quite limited, and it was without an assimilation dimension.

Let us now see what happened between 1923 and 1998 in the African engagement. The first African embassy of Turkey was opened in Ethiopia in 1927. Then we see some plague prevention officers in Madagascar in 1945. These are the basic, important points in Turkey's African engagement. During the Suez crisis in 1956, Turkey sided with the British, which of course harmed Turkish-Africa relations. Then Turkey abstained in the UN General Assembly for Algerian independence in 1966. These two events hampered and harmed Turkish African relations. But

then Turkey recovered and started to open embassies in the continent. The first consulate was opened in Nigeria in 1956. Then an embassy was opened in Ghana in 1957. Then we gave some economic assistance to the Sahara region in 1958. Then we see the opening of another embassy in Algeria in 1960, Senegal in '62 and Kenya in '68. The emperor of Ethiopia visited Turkey in 1967 and 1971. Cevdet Sunay, the Turkish president, paid a visit to Ethiopia in 1968. And then in 1974 a plan for Africa was drafted but it failed due to lack of officers. Then, again, we see some activities. We see the opening of an embassy in the Democratic Republic of Congo in 1976 and an aid package that was sent to Zimbabwe in 1978. A trade and technical operation agreement was signed with Sierra Leone in 1979. Then there was a closure of the Akra embassy in Turkey in 1981 due to lack of finances. Then the Sudan president visited Turkey in 1981, and the first academic African studies centre opened in Gazi University in 1982. Then \$10 million aid was sent to Africa in 1985. Jacques Foccart of Cameroon visited Turkey in 1991. There were some trade and technical and economic operation agreements signed with Gambia, Chad, Djibouti and Zambia in 1989. Necmettin Erbakan visited Nigeria in 1993, and then Turgut Ozal visited Senegal in 1996.

The Turkish perception of Africa was quite far from 'state and people' between 1923 and 1999. The first perceptions of Africa always came from comedy movies. For instance, "Turist Omer Yamyamlar Arasinda" was a movie about Africa. There we could see a far-fetched image of Africa in Turkish cinema. And then we have the "Hababam Sinifi" movie, a very important one, which said: "Open the door Veysel Efendi we are going to meet the Ugandan president." Again, it was a comedy movie. In those days, Africa was always a part of comedy movies. "Hababam Sinifi Sinifta Kaldi", another movie from 1977, asked who the current president of Zaire was to the students. In 1966, we have the movie

"Tarzan Rifki", which said: "If Rifki bites you, you will find yourself in Africa". Then we have the movie "Sabaniye". It says, "we are not in a position to go to Libya to find her". What we see from these examples is that there was a serious lack of understanding of the continent by the Turkish public and very tenuous interest that shows a sense of remoteness.

So, what happened after 1998? A plan for opening to Africa was drafted by the government. Africa was the first region in the world where Turkey drafted a plan for its foreign policy. This is very important. There are some diplomatic, political and cultural components of this plan. The implementation of the 1998 plan started in 2002 with the Justice and Development Party coming to power. Let us see very briefly what these components are.

The diplomatic component was to increase the number of Turkish embassies. In 1926, we only have one embassy, in 1960 we again have only one embassy, and in 1974 we still have one embassy. After 2002, we see that the number of embassies increases. By 2012, eight Turkish embassies were opened in Africa. Five sub-Saharan African embassies were in Ankara in 2008, and this number became a staggering 32 in 2015.

The other component is the political component. The idea was to increase the bilateral official visits. In Until 1998, two presidents, one prime minister and one foreign minister visits were made to Africa. So, in total there were four visits. Between 1998 and 2003 there were no visits. But then between 2003 and 2006 the number visits became 30. This is also very important because it shows how well the plan was implemented.

In the economic component, the trade figures are demonstrative. In 1998, the import level was \$265 million. If you look at the 2015 figures it is \$6 billion. There was a huge increase in trade volume, which

shows that this component was also implemented very successfully.

Then there is the cultural component. I think this is one of the most important components of the African Opening. There are some African centres within Turkish universities. Economy University, Istanbul Aydin University, Ankara University, Kırklareli University, Yasar University have African study centres. Some African students are granted scholarships. In 1998-1999 students from 25 different countries came to Turkey for their education and this number became 34, 36, 39, 43 and 45. So, in 2014-2015, 45 sub-Saharan African countries sent their students to Turkey. Even in this component we can say that there is a huge success.

Briefly, in conclusion, a transition from comedy movies to strong diplomacy was witnessed with the Turkish opening. This wasn't only from state to state but also from state to people. The Turkish state managed to address African people besides African states. Then there was intensification of sub-Saharan Africa foreign policy beginning with 2002. The aim was to restore the state and foreign policy mechanism. For instance, the vote for 2009-2010 UN Security Council came directly from Africa. Then, of course, we have Somalia. I see Somalia as Turkey's second 'Yavru Vatan' after Cyprus. Why, because in 2011 the organisation of African Unity, a total of 52 countries, sent \$350 million for the draught crisis in East Africa. Turkey alone gave \$200 million for the East African famine. This shows how much Turkey considers Africa. President Erdogan's initiatives are very important in Africa and for the Turkish African opening. The Somalia visit in 2011 was important. President Erdogan was the first Western statesman who visited Somalia in the last 20 years. Then he paid a visit to Guinea in 2016. This is also very important. In the middle of the Ebola crisis president Erdogan had the courage to go there. And as I said, Erdogan's vision for

Africa was not state to state but state to people. He addressed the Fenerbahce player Moussa Sow and the Caykur Rize player Leonard Kweuke personally. Then in the Senegal parliament he said to the Senegalese that he talked to Moussa Sow and that he told him not to forget Senegal besides France. So, President Erdogan also has some post-colonial approach in his African opening. In the last Turkey-Africa Economic Forum he also referred to Frantz Fanon's "The Wretched of the Earth" when he was defending Turkey's position in Africa, when he was trying to emphasise the non-colonialist attitude of Turkey in Africa.

Also, there are some persuasion attempts to close the Turkish schools in sub-Saharan Africa, which is a very important issue. Then the Turkish African Summit in Equatorial Guinea was held in 2016. The more Turkey has the support of Africa, the more it feels good and the better it challenges the West, the US and the EU. If you look at the past declarations of president Erdogan, you can see this attitude. The 1998 plan, all in all, was successful. As I said, Africa was touched upon in Turkish comedy movies, but the Mission Impossible V movie was made in 2015 and we see that the Malawian president was assassinated in Istanbul, which shows, to me, that Turkish-African opening became so well known that even the American movies are talking about it. The foreign policy development from Turkey to sub-Saharan Africa was also an important asset for foreign policy.

The last chapter is what to do for a better one. The Turkish Africa opening is good and successful. I think, however, that there should be some improvement. I think that President Erdogan is very alone in his endeavours for Africa. He cannot get the necessary support from the NGOs, or other actors. The NGOs and economic actors must have more responsibility for Africa that is the first thing. The second thing is Turkish Airlines. Although it

opens new channels to Africa, the tickets are quite expensive. As an academic, for instance, I may not afford Turkish Airlines plane tickets to Africa whenever I want to conduct a field research and that is why I had to pay for alternative flights. But if you take the Emirates planes you have to wait for 20 hours in Dubai. This is a big problem for us. And then the presidential tours to Africa shall be open for us the academics as well. President Erdogan always invites businessmen to his visits, but I think academics should also be included since they can provide academic information to

him about the countries he visits. This is yet another issue. African centres in Turkish universities unfortunately have almost no production. Also, African studies are generally limited to Turkish-African relations. I think they should be broader and focus on local African problems. Plus, the knowledge of Turkish businessmen about Africa are too weak compared to the Chinese and the Indian businesses functioning on the continent.

Thank you for listening.

3. *Sadaharu Kataoka*

*(Waseda University, School of International Liberal Studies;
President of Waseda Institute of International Strategy)*

Japan and Africa Through TICAD (Tokyo International Conference of African Development) Process

Thank you very much for inviting me to this prestigious and great program, an important bilateral meeting between Japan and Turkey.

Please let me just briefly explain to you the history of TICAD (Tokyo International Conference on African Development), the role of TICAD and the contribution that TICAD brought to the formulation of Japanese policy toward Africa.

First of all, we have, even now, a very important distance between Japan and Africa. Of course, there is the geographical distance, but it is specifically and primarily a psychological distance. When we are speaking of Africa, Japanese people think that Africa is 'far'. Now there are direct flights between Tokyo and Addis Ababa. But, in fact, this flight is also stopping in Hong Kong and there is no direct flight. But this is normal. It takes twenty hours from Narita to Addis Ababa through Hong Kong.

The main role of TICAD is how to reduce this psychological distance between Japan and Africa. There are 54 countries in Africa. Japan has launched TICAD by advocating three main concepts: African ownership, Africa's self-reliance, and partnership. This means that Japan had to give a helping hand to African self-reliance efforts as the most important concept of TICAD's efforts.

In the early 1990s, especially after the East-West confrontation during the Cold War, the Westerners, including the Russian Federation, began decreasing the amount of official development assistance especially to Africa, and in that era Japan

has launched TICAD, in 1993. But before 1993, Japan had already begun preparations for TICAD, starting in 1989. The comparative advantage of TICAD unlike the previous China-Africa and France-Africa meetings was that it was a multinational meeting including principal international donors and international organisations as well as other Asian countries. That meant that it was not a Japan-Africa meeting, but an international meeting.

One telegram (cable) coming from the Japanese delegation to the UN, in New York, suggested the organisation of a very important conference in favour of the African development and to obtain the support from the developing countries. At that time, UN has launched the famous UN-NADAF. So, of course, Tokyo (GoJ) accepted this proposal from Japanese delegation to UN, and we began preparing for this important summit.

I must underline the importance of Tokyo G7 summit because at the time Prime Minister Miyazawa was hosting it, and he mentioned the importance of development issues, and TICAD was organised that autumn in the same year. The early history of the summit concentrated on monetary and economic issues. So, Japan mentioned the development issues within the G7 for the first time. After this Tokyo summit, there was an administrative change in Japan when the long-time ruling LDP (Liberal Democratic Party of Japan) lost power. But the new Prime minister Hosokawa still organised the Tokyo International Conference on African development in October. That meant civil servants and bureaucrats were now leading the Japanese policy to Africa. In fact, all

51 African countries were invited. At that time, two former colonial masters, France and Britain were a little bit sceptical of and concerned about Japanese policy and were wondering why Japan was so interested in Africa.

But five African countries, Benin (Soglo), Botswana (Masire), Ghana (Rawlings), Burkina Faso (Compaore) and Uganda (Museveni) among 51 African countries dispatched their heads of state. This number increased to 15 in TICAD II and then to 24 in TICAD III. That increased again to 41 for TICAD IV and 39 for TICAD V, and 26 for TICAD VI. From TICAD IV, however, this number became a bit ambiguous. For example, not all 41 countries who attended TICAD IV were represented by heads of state or governments level.

Between TICAD I and II, in accordance with the new development strategy in OECD, Japan made a very important diplomatic initiative in the adoption of this development strategy. In fact, the contents of this new development strategy were quite identical with, or similar to MDGs (Millennium Development Goals), another initiative within UN, a holistic development initiative, and also CDF (Comprehensive Development Framework) of World Bank.

The year 1998, the year of TICAD II, also marks the highest amount of Japan's ODA (Official Development Assistance). Since 1998, there is a decrease in the amount of ODA. TICAD II was a much more concrete, much more result oriented meeting. That is why only 15 heads of state attended, and Mr. Kofi Annan, UNSG attended that meeting too.

In the context of "partnership", Japan is trying to do three major things. First, Japan has been trying to bring Africa to the attention of the international community and to revive the interest of the international community through the TICAD

process. Japan has also been trying to serve as a bridge for cooperation between Asia and Africa through the promotion of South-South cooperation. With these in mind Japan has been promoting engagement between Asian countries with Africa. In addition to these, Japan has also been trying to put Africa on the agenda of the G8 (G7) Summit.

The year 2000 is another important year within the history of the summit. For the first time in Summit's history, representatives from developing countries, including three African leaders, were invited to the Kyushu-Okinawa Summit in Japan in 2000. Mr. Bouteflika (Algeria), Mr. Mbeki (South Africa) and Mr. Obasanjo (Nigeria) attended this side event of G8. Since, the invitation of the leaders of developing world became the custom and the tradition of G8. That meant that the Japan paved the way for a new framework within the G8.

In 2001 APF (African Partnership Forum) was established during the G8 meeting in Genoa. In 2001 the incumbent prime minister of Japan visited Africa for the first time, South Africa, Nigeria and Kenya. He organised multilateral meetings with leaders of Western Africa, especially with the leaders of Francophone Africa in Nigeria. And the meanwhile African leaders have launched the NEPAD (New Partnership for Africa's Development) as the first African-owned development program in 2001. And the OAU was transformed as AU (African Union) in 2002. The 2003 TICAD III was also very important, as for the first time Japan became a first donor making an announcement for the support to the NEPAD. Japan also established a three-pillar mechanism of TICAD: 1) Human-centered Development, 2) Poverty Reduction Through Economic Growth and 3) Consolidation of Peace.

TICAD IV took place five years later, and with the increased number of participants

we changed the place of the conference from Tokyo to Yokohama. The Japanese government was used to utilise a splendid hotel in Tokyo, but when the capacity of the hotel was no longer sufficient, they decided to change the place of TICAD. This, of course, is a logistical change, but TICAD IV, I think, was a turning point in the history of TICAD. Before, TICAD only discussed development of Africa in terms of ODA (Official Development Assistance), but for the first time in TICAD IV, business and investment issues were also present.

TICAD V, five years later in 2013, was a confirmation of TICAD IV. Since 2005, African countries marked much better economic performance. TICAD V was also the twentieth-year anniversary of the beginning of this process (1993) and 50 years' anniversary of the establishment of OAU (1963). After TICAD IV, we had made a policy recommendation to involve the African Union with TICAD and maybe we could organise the conference alternately. Then the African Union became one of the core organisers of TICAD.

From TICAD IV and V, TICAD became a more result oriented meeting. Before, the Japanese government considered Africa only as an aid recipient, but not as a partner. In TICAD IV and V, however, Japan was viewing Africa more as a partner, as an economic as well as a political partner. TICAD V also declared the pillars of TICAD process: to bring about a robust and sustainable economy, an inclusive and resilient society, peace and stability, and trade and investment in Africa. After the TICAD V, Prime Minister Abe visited Africa twice (Djibouti in 2013 and Mozambique, Cote d'Ivoire and Ethiopia in 2014).

He made a very important political speech in favour of Africa in the AU building in Addis Ababa. He underlined the importance of the Japanese business philosophy.

The last meeting in Nairobi, TICAD VI, and today's main concern was about our latest strategy in Africa. That was a third visit of PM Abe to the continent. Until TICAD VI, TICAD was organised once in every five years in Japan. TICA VI became the beginning of a new cycle: once in every three years alternating between Africa and Japan. TICAD VII will be held in 2019 maybe in Yokohama. In TICAD VI the NAIROBI Plan of Action was adopted. The vision of Japan for Africa will now on be as: Quality Africa, Resilient Africa, and Stable Africa as new three pillars.

Through TICAD there has taken place a paradigmatic change. TICAD IV was a turning point, and V was confirmation of this. TICAD VI started a new cycle and also business community attended. For the first time they were free to discuss business with African leaders. This marks a new form of Japanese African policy, where trade as well as aid came into the picture, as a new paradigm. Lastly, before TICAD Japan had only 24 embassies including ones in North Africa. Now it has 34 and next year this number will be 35 embassies. This is a quite astonishing number. On the other hand, China has the real embassies to 51 African countries, and three countries are friends of Taiwan (as of the end of November 2016 and Sao Tome Principe has broken her diplomatic relationship with Taipei in the beginning of 2017). Also, the Chinese are constructing a new embassy in Gambia.

Thank you very much.

4. Serhat Orakçı (Humanitarian and Social Research Center [INSAMER])

Turkey as a Humanitarian Actor in Africa

For the Western powers, Africa has been a land of exploitation for centuries. During the colonial period, the continent suffered too much. All types of sources, including humans, have been taken and millions of Africans were forced to work in terrible conditions. This was a total darkness for humanity. Violence became one of the characteristics of Africa as a result of brutal colonial policies. The continent not only became fully dependent on colonial powers but also Africa's economic and cultural ties with the rest of the world was blocked. This resulted in a long-time isolation for the continent. For instance, communities, especially in the East Africa, trading with the Arab world, India and China lost their contacts and became totally dependent on European markets during the whole colonial period.

This dark period finally ended after the World War II, but then again Africa became playground for the Cold War superpowers, US and the Soviet Union. Each superpower used their capacity to gain allies and they never hesitated assisting military coups for the sake of their national interests. During the Cold War era Africa's destiny remained same. Proxy wars of superpowers and dictatorial regimes backed by superpowers left millions of Africans in poverty and despair.

The post-Cold War era opened up a new page. Instead of bipolar system, a new multi-polar world started emerging. Today, the West is not the only player in Africa. There are several nations desiring to establish new relations with the continent. Turkey, China, India, Japan, South Korea, Brazil and even Iran are expanding their area of influence effectively on Africa. This new period obviously put an important challenge for the Western pow-

ers. New actors in Africa break the Western monopoly in the continent. African countries have now more ambition to shift their foreign policies towards alternative actors. Nowadays, Africa's perception of the West is on change. Africa is discovering the world and establishing trade, business, diplomatic and cultural ties again that once disappeared during the colonial times.

Although Turkey has a long history in Africa, contemporary Turkey-Africa relations might be considered a new phenomenon. Since the declaration of "Year of Africa" in 2005, Turkey opened up various channels reaching the continent. For that, Turkey's involvement into the continent has more dimensions than that related to trade. From the beginning, Turkey never ignored socio-economic obstacles of the African people. 47% of Sub-Sahara population live on the extreme poverty line. More than 500 million people have no electricity and more than 250 million people have no access to clean drinking water. For that reason, humanitarian and developmental aid projects have been one of the main pillars of Turkey-Africa relations.

So far, Turkey's Africa policy gained some momentum. Humanitarian and development projects funded by either Turkish civil society or Turkish government institutions provide safe drinking water, education, health service, vocational training and scholarships for millions of Africans. Turkey's supportive face might be seen well in Somalia, I think.

Turkish support, combined with development and peace building policies towards Somalia, made Turkey one of the important actors in the Horn of Africa. Turkish

organisations have fully involved in a wide range of projects including clearing Mogadishu streets, collecting garbage, providing food and safe drinking water, building schools, hospitals and mosques, even airport terminals and sea ports. Due to Somalia's on going security condition, Turkish aid organisations freely showed up on streets of Mogadishu, while their Western counterparts only operate throughout Nairobi/Kenya.

Turkish aid model has worked effectively in Somalia. Any outsider visiting Mogadishu today could recognise it easily. The largest Turkish embassy complex was recently opened. Despite the country's security challenges Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan visited Somalia three times. Interestingly, Erdoğan name ranks among the most popular baby names nowadays. Some street names were replaced by Turkish names as well.

Small contribution of Turkey started a new phase for Somalia. And, I think, this is a warning call for the Western aid organisations based in Nairobi. Funds collected for Somalia have been generously spent by UN agencies, without making much difference.

On the other hand, Turkish approach to 2011 humanitarian crisis in Somalia was quite constructive. Turkey invested in stability of Somalia. Turkey's effective humanitarian efforts in various African countries are potentially opening trade and business channels for Turkey. For instance, Turkish Airlines is still the only international carrier reaching to Mogadi-

shu. Airport terminal and sea port in the capital are all run by Turkish companies. 200-bed Recep Tayyip Erdoğan Hospital complex is also currently run by Turkish authorities in Mogadishu.

Turkey's humanitarian operations, of course, go beyond Somalia. TIKA, AFAD, KIZILAY, DIYANET and civil society organisations like IHH are all operating across the continent. Like Somalia, Turkey run 140-bed regional hospital in Darfur/Sudan as well. Construction of the largest mosque complex was funded by a Turkish civil society group in Ghana.

Turkey became an important actor in Africa in the last decade. Especially on the humanitarian field Turkey became very active and Somalia take place in a unique position. Some internal and external affairs negatively affect Turkey's humanitarian efforts in Africa. Some certain threats against Turkey are coming from terrorist armed groups, you might remember Turkish embassy attack in Mogadishu. Especially after the 15th of July, FETO affiliated charter schools became a problematic issue between Turkey and African countries. However, countries like Somalia, Sudan and Guinea immediately expelled FETÖ members and handed over some schools to Turkish government. As a strategy, Turkey is now promoting government institutions and FETO schools are being replaced with government-sponsored ones. In a short term, Turkey has ability and capacity to solve this problem, I think, although this terrorist group has a strong presence in Africa with close to 110 charter schools.

IV. CONCLUSION

Concluding Remarks

Amitav Acharya, in his study *The End of American World Order* uses the term “multiplex” to define the new world order. The role of the traditional great powers, or hegemonic powers for that matter, in single-handedly influencing global outcomes are diminishing. The world is becoming an arena of a multiplicity of different types of powers, -great powers and regional powers- ever more closely interdependent. Each of these have varying degrees of influence in different types of niche issues, and they are not necessarily influential in all contexts. In a sense, there are now several different shows to choose from, each of them under the clout of a different set of actors -states, societies, groups, and individuals- who have different ways of understanding the world.

No matter how one chooses to see the world and no matter their claims for exclusiveness in their perceptions, all would agree that in this multiplex world the important characteristics of the changing international order is the diffusion of power, from states to states and from states to other actors. Powerful is still powerful, however there are other actors in the theatre and novel issues continue to rise in the agenda. No one actor can shape world affairs and the development of world order to a significant degree. This diffusion of power breeds increasingly complex problems and complicates the efforts for a concerted response to these problems, re-

sulting an increase in the number of conflicts and resulting suffering in the world. In a sense, this is a problem of leadership and accord.

This symposium series between Japan and Turkey emerged from a necessity, that in a multiplex and a more dangerous world, close partnership between actors such as Japan and Turkey is critical to facilitate cooperation for regional and global peace and stability. These countries are important in their perspective regions and committed to play larger international roles. The conflicts in the world are directly influencing their security interests as well as economic interests. There is need for sustained dialogue on how they can cooperate to contribute toward peace and prosperity in their respective regional environments and globally.

Japan and Turkey cannot afford to keep the level of their relations within limited framework of bilateral issues. They have to start taking leadership, assume a global focus, and cooperate with other regional and global actors to tackle world problems. For this reason, they need to support platforms such as this, so that they can make intellectual exchange on world issues that are beyond immediate bilateral concerns. This is the main goal and motivation for these symposium series which we hope will continue to flourish in the future.