

Leaders and Egyptian Foreign Policy: Individual Factors During Nasser and Morsi Periods

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Abstract: Egypt has witnessed two political revolutions in 1952 and 2011. Following the revolutions, while Nasser came to power after the overthrow of the Egyptian monarchy, Morsi took the lead after the fall of Mubarak’s 30-year rule in Egypt. Given leader-centric foreign policies in authoritarian/developing countries, both leaders with divergent agendas were expected to change Egypt’s existing foreign policy to a great extent. Nasser satisfied this expectation, whereas Morsi failed to make radical foreign policy changes in Egypt. This study aims firstly to present individual-level factors that play substantial roles in whether leaders become effective and influential in foreign policy and then tries to show how these factors paved the way for the difference between the impacts of Nasser and Morsi on Egypt’s foreign policy.

Key Words: Egypt, Nasser, Morsi, Foreign Policy, Individual Level of Analysis

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Liderler ve Mısır Dış Politikası: Nasır ve Mursi Dönemlerinde Bireysel Etkenler

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Öz: Mısır, 1952’de ve 2011’de olmak üzere iki siyasi devrime şahitlik etmiştir. Devrimleri takiben, Nasır, Mısır’daki monarşi yönetimin, Mursi ise 30 yıllık Mübarek rejiminin yerine iktidara gelmiştir. Otoriter/gelişmekte olan ülkelerdeki lider merkezli dış politika göz önünde tutulduğunda, farklı gündemlere sahip iki liderin de Mısır’ın mevcut dış politikasını büyük oranda değiştirmesi beklenmiştir. Nasır beklentileri karşılansa da, Mursi Mısır dış politikasında köklü değişiklikler yapma noktasında başarısız olmuştur. Bu çalışma ilk olarak liderlerin dış siyasetteki etkisini ve nüfuzunu etkileyen bireysel, seviyedeki etkenleri sunmayı, ardından bu etkenlerin Nasır ve Mursi’nin Mısır dış politikasına olan etkilerini nasıl farklılaştırdığını açıklamayı hedeflemektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Mısır, Nasır, Mursi, Dış Politika, Bireysel Analiz Düzeyi

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الزعماء والسياسة الخارجية المصرية: العوامل الفردية في عهدي عبد الناصر ومرسي

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ملخص

شهدت مصر ثورتين سياسيتين في العامين ٢٥٩١ و ١١٠٢. بعد الثورة الأولى، جاء عبد الناصر إلى السلطة بدلاً من الإدارة الملكية في مصر، بينما بعد الثانية، جاء مرسي إلى الحكم بدلاً من نظام مبارك الذي استمر ٠٣ عامًا. وبالنظر إلى السياسة الخارجية التي تتمحور حول الزعيم في البلدان الاستبدادية/النامية، كان من المتوقع أن يقوم كلا من الزعيمين اللذين لهما أجنداث مختلفة بتغيير السياسة الخارجية الموجودة في مصر بشكل كبير. وفي الوقت الذي حقق فيه عبد الناصر التوقعات المنتظرة، فشل مرسي في إجراء تغييرات جذرية في السياسة الخارجية المصرية. هذه الدراسة تهدف أولاً إلى عرض العوامل على المستوى الفردي التي تؤثر في نفوذ وتأثير الزعماء في السياسة الخارجية، ثم توضيح كيف جعلت هذه العوامل تأثيرات عبد الناصر ومرسي تختلف في السياسة الخارجية المصرية.

الكلمات المفتاحية: مصر، عبد الناصر، مرسي، السياسة الخارجية، مستوى التحليل الفردي

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Introduction

It has been a prevalent assumption that leaders of developing and authoritarian countries play the main role in the making of foreign policy. Parallel to this assumption, this article will explore the periods of President Gamal Abdel Nasser and President Mohamed Morsi in Egyptian political history as those two leaders have similarities and essential differences: both came to power after the revolution; both tried to change existing Egyptian foreign policy (EFP) according to their own set of values that are not in line with the previous ones. However, while Nasser had been generally considered as successful in bringing a change to EFP orientation, Morsi has been considered as failing to achieve comparable success. Although a comparison between Nasser's fourteen years in power with Morsi's one-year presidential term based on individual-level factors may be seen as inadequate or misleading, this article tries to provide an answer to the question of 'what are the factors which differentiate Nasser from Morsi regarding their impacts on foreign policy?'

The article hypothesizes that, although individual, domestic, and systemic factors together play key roles, individual-level independent variables, to a great extent, may explain the varying effectiveness of Nasser and Morsi on foreign policy as a dependent variable.

I. A Theoretical Framework

At the individual level of analysis, it can be said that variables that shape the effectiveness of different leaders in foreign policy formulation and implementation process are leaders' values, images, information processing, personality characteristics, and their abilities in choosing an appropriate style of leadership and strategy.

As for values as abstract but directive principles,¹ it can be said that leaders keep their effectiveness in the foreign policy decision making process to the degree that their values play a functional and efficient role in transferring the responsibility of foreign policy failures, reducing complex issues to readily comprehensible and acceptable explanations, and thus increasing their legitimacy.²

Image as the main component of psychological milieu, it generally refers to a set of beliefs that a leader may hold about an environment. Kenneth Boulding, specifically, shows us its relevance to foreign policy.³ He defines the image as a "subjective knowledge"⁴, which means the evaluation of a foreign state by decision-makers is not based on what it is but their image of a state concerning its positions, capabilities, and culture.

Against the backdrop of the image, leaders' evaluation of objective facts depends on how they process information. It can be argued that leaders as political actors face a necessity of making decisions from among different choices, planning and conducting diverse actions, and utilizing their knowledge to look after their goals.⁵ But at the same time, they are victims of some cognitive constraints such as bounded rationality,⁶ the

1 George J. Graham, *Methodological Foundation for Political Analysis* (Massachusetts: Xerox College Publishing, 1971), 72.

2 A. I. Dawisha, *Egypt in the Arab World: The Elements of Foreign Policy* (New York: Halsted Press, 1976), 124.

3 Kenneth E. Boulding, *The Image: Knowledge in Life and Society* (Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 1956).

4 *Ibid.*, 6.

5 Donald a Sylvan, Ashok Goel, and B Chandrasekaran, "Analyzing Political Decision Making from an Information-Processing Perspective: JESSE," *American Journal of Political Science* 34, no. 1 (February 1990): 75.

6 Herbert A Simon, "Human Nature in Politics: The Dialogue of Psychology with Political Science," *American Political Science Review* 79, no. 2 (June 1, 1985): 293-304.

availability fallacy,⁷ and fundamental attribution errors.⁸ So, cognitive constraints may entail “discongruities between the perceived and the real operational environments [and thereby] leading to less than satisfactory choices in foreign policy”⁹ and thus influence the effectiveness of leaders in foreign policy.

The personality characteristics of leaders are also important for foreign policy, because “everybody is a product of an age, a nation, and an environment.”¹⁰ Their family background, welfare level, adolescent life, education, mentors, and embeddedness in specific organizations and interpersonal networks should be analyzed for understanding the factors that shape their personalities.¹¹

Also, “motivation” undoubtedly shapes a leader’s personality traits that have an impact on his/her position in foreign policy. Winter identifies three motivational needs within the realm of political leadership, that have broad influences on personality: achievement, power, or affiliation. While the need for power is a concern for having an impact on the others, the need for achievement is a concern for excellence, the need for affiliation is a concern for cooperativeness.¹² Winter singles out the will to power by claiming that “[t]he likelihood that a leader will play a decisive role in foreign policymaking is ... a function of his or her will to power.”¹³

Another factor that affects a leader’s effectiveness in foreign policy is his precision in choosing an appropriate style of leadership. Leadership styles mainly concern with whether they delegate decisions and tasks or not. While leaders with ‘open styles’ tend to act to build a consensus by taking situational constraints, external validations, and recommendations from various information sources into consideration; leaders with ‘closed styles’ are more directly engaged in the decision making process and rely on their policy preferences.¹⁴ Hudson claims that unlike more open and responsive leaders, leaders having closed decision-making styles are crusaders for a cause. Such leaders prevent members of the government from explicitly expressing doubts and reinforce subtle constraints over them.¹⁵ So, it may be argued that leaders with ‘closed styles’ bolster their effectiveness in foreign policy despite any domestic and international constraints; while leaders with ‘open styles’ have only an indirect effect on foreign policy in pursuance of compromises between choices.

In addition to leadership styles, there are certain strategies that leaders employ to secure their effectiveness in the foreign policy process. The first strategy is ‘buying off’, that is to provide material rewards or promises to opponent agents to co-opt them.¹⁶ However, if a leader rewards wrong agents with positions of authority, this tactic can be counterproductive in the medium or long term. Therefore, pursuing a “buying off” strategy can both reduce and enhance leaders’ effectiveness in foreign policy.

7 Valerie M. Hudson, *Foreign Policy Analysis: Classic and Contemporary Theory*, 2nd ed. (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Pub, 2014), 45.

8 Ibid., 55; Juliet Kaarbo and James Ray, *Global Politics*, 10th ed. (Boston, MA: Cengage Learning, 2011), 174.

9 Valerie M. Hudson, “Foreign Policy Analysis: Actor-Specific Theory and the Ground of International Relations,” *Foreign Policy Analysis* 1, no. 1 (2005) 6.

10 Henry Kissinger, “The Meaning of History : Reflections on Spengler, Tonybee and Kant” (Harvard University, 1951), 127.

11 Hudson, *Foreign Policy Analysis: Classic and Contemporary Theory*, 60.

12 David G. Winter, “The Motivational Dimensions of Leadership: Power, Achievement, and Affiliation,” in *Multiple Intelligences and Leadership*, ed. Ronald E. Riggio, Susan E. Murphy, and Francis J. Pirozzolo (New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2002), 119–138.

13 Douglas T. Stuart, “ Foreign-Policy Decision-Making,” in *The Oxford Handbook of International Relations*, ed. Christian Reus-Smit and Duncan Snidal (Oxford University Press, 2008), 585.

14 Kaarbo and Ray, *Global Politics*, 175.

15 Hudson, *Foreign Policy Analysis: Classic and Contemporary Theory*, 76.

16 Andrea K. Grove, *Political Leadership in Foreign Policy: Manipulating Support across Borders* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan US, 2007), 6; Hudson, *Foreign Policy Analysis: Classic and Contemporary Theory*, 151.

The second leadership strategy is ‘broadening audience’ through which a leader gets the citizens involved in foreign policy while supporting “a message of shared identity (“we are all in this together”).”¹⁷ However, if a leader diverges sharply from the core values of the public related to foreign policy orientation particularly at a time when the national security is at stake¹⁸ or presented as at stake by domestic opposition groups, the severe costs - that he/she may face from voters or autonomous institutions having jurisdiction in democratic regimes and from kingmakers, such as military and business elites in non-democratic regimes - are likely to reduce his/her impact on foreign policy.

The third leadership strategy is called ‘framing’¹⁹ and it involves a political act by making the public adopt one’s framing of threats and proposals. By using this strategy, as it is assumed by the “rally round the flag”²⁰ effect, a leader may reach and enjoy a great national consensus in favor of his/her foreign policy preferences.

The fourth strategy is the use of “diversionary tactics”. Although it is well known as a strategy to divert attention away from harsh problems at home, particularly from economic ones, by initiating a war or a foreign conflict,²¹ reversely, a leader may also utilize this tactic to divert the people’s attention away from external setbacks to domestic politics by finding an internal enemy. Thus, by using this strategy a leader can implement his foreign policy agenda without constraints of and reactions from domestic groups.

2. Gamal Abdel Nasser and Egyptian Foreign Policy

Gamal Abdel Nasser was born in Alexandria and educated at Egypt’s military academy. He led the Free Officers movement (1949-1952) which was formed following Egypt’s humiliating defeat in the 1948 Arab-Israeli war. He considered King Farouk to be an inefficient and corrupt leader and blamed him for Egypt’s foreign policy failures. With the widespread discontent in Egypt and general distrust of the Farouk regime by officers,²² the Free Officers Movement plotted the Egyptian revolution of 1952 that toppled Farouk. Following the revolution, Nasser, serving as a new president from 1956 to 1970, tried to base Egypt’s foreign policy on “the destruction of colonialism and its Egyptian collaborators; ... the construction of “a strong national army.”²³ This section tries to find out individual-level variables during the Nasser period and to show how they led Nasser to have a revolutionary impact on Egypt’s foreign policy.

The first component of Nasser’s psychological milieu is about values he upholds as an individual. For Nasser, Dawisha identified four main values affecting his foreign policy decisions and actions: “anti-imperialism, Arabism, leadership, and prestige.”²⁴

As for anti-imperialism, Nasser declared his anti-imperialist values many times from the beginning of the Egyptian revolution to his last years.²⁵ Nasser’s anti-imperialist values showed themselves firstly in his

17 Grove, *Political Leadership in Foreign Policy: Manipulating Support across Borders*, 5.

18 Norrin M. Ripsman, “Neoclassical Realism and Domestic Interest Groups,” in *Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy*, ed. Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman, and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 191.

19 Alex Mintz and Karl R. DeRouen, *Understanding Foreign Policy Decision Making* (Cambridge University Press, 2010), 149-166.

20 Hudson, *Foreign Policy Analysis: Classic and Contemporary Theory*, 155.

21 Jack S. Levy, “The Diversionary Theory of War: A Critique,” in *Handbook of War Studies*, ed. Manus I. Midlarsky (Boston, MA: Unwin Hyman, 1989), 259-288.

22 Panayiotis J. Vatikiotis, “Nasser and His Generation” (London: Croom Helm, 1978), 104,106.

23 Ibid., 107.

24 Dawisha, *Egypt in the Arab World: The Elements of Foreign Policy*, 125.

25 Gamal Abdel Nasser, *The Philosophy of the Revolution* (Cairo: Mondiale Press, 1958), 1-72; Kenneth Love, *Suez: The Twice-Fought War* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1969), 88.

negative response to Dulles's plan to create the Baghdad Pact which was a Western controlled defense alliance against the communist Soviet threat to the Middle East. Nasser considered this military pact as a new reflection of the imperialist goals of the Western powers in the Middle East region.

Nasser's anti-imperialist values had been reinforced by the United States and Great Britain's refusal of the Nasser's demands for advanced weapons. Hereupon, Nasser could break the Western weapons monopoly and embargo by making a weapon deal with Czechoslovakia in 1955.²⁶ Hinnebusch claims that this deal consolidated Nasser's anti-imperialist and independency oriented values by endorsing the availability of other power centers rather than western ones in international affairs and by eliminating Egypt's dependence on imperialist forces.²⁷

Also, the project of Aswan High Dam in 1956 cemented Nasser's anti-imperialist values as the technical and financial assistance offered by the US to Egypt for its construction was conditioned upon the western supervision of the Egyptian economy.²⁸ This foreign control was rejected by Nasser and his response was to "nationalize the Suez Canal and claim the transit dues to finance the Dam."²⁹ Thus the Suez Crisis and subsequently the announcement of the Eisenhower Doctrine by the US in 1957 to form an anti-Nasser block in the region and to implement the western plans of the Baghdad Pact³⁰ consolidated Nasser's anti-imperialist value as a growing variable in making anti-West Egyptian foreign policy (EFP).

While shaping EFP, more importantly, Nasser's anti-imperialism served to transfer responsibility for his foreign policy failures. For instance, the failure of Nasser's foreign policy in the inconclusive Yemen war with Saudi Arabia and accordingly his choice of the withdrawal of the Egyptian army from Yemen in 1967 was transferred to British evacuation from Saudi Arabia in 1967. This means that there was no need for Egypt to be present at Yemen against British colonialism. Also, the failure of Nasser's attempts to form a unity of the Arab States was transferred to the efforts of the Western states and their regional Arab allies to disturb any possible unity in the Middle East. Also, the inability of Nasser's Egypt to defeat Israel and to liberate Palestine in the 1950s and the 1960s was transferred to Israel's determination to carry out an imperialist activity in the region under the protection of the imperialist and colonialist world system.³¹ Thus, anti-imperialism, as a value, had increased Nasser's effectiveness in foreign policy as it transferred the responsibility of failures in EFP to imperialist powers and had legitimated his regime during the 1950s and 1960s.

Concerning Arab nationalism, while the Baghdad Pact was a turning point for Nasser to identify EFP with Arabism,³² it reached its peak point in Nasser's foreign policy following the establishment of the United Arab Republic (UAR) in 1958.

Arabism as value contributed to Nasser's legitimacy at a certain level and became an important tool for Nasser to reduce complex issues to readily comprehensible and acceptable justified explanations. For instance, over Egypt's disputes with some Arab countries such as Iraq, Nasser put forward a pretext that they failed to keep their Arabism and were no longer to be considered as Arabs. However, while Nasser's

26 Dawisha, *Egypt in the Arab World: The Elements of Foreign Policy*, 13.

27 Raymond A. Hinnebusch, *The International Politics of the Middle East* (Manchester University Press, 2003), 24.

28 Dawisha, *Egypt in the Arab World: The Elements of Foreign Policy*, 15.

29 Hinnebusch, *The International Politics of the Middle East*, 24.

30 Patrick Tyler, *A World of Trouble: The White House and the Middle East—from the Cold War to the War on Terror* (Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2010), 53.

31 Dawisha, *Egypt in the Arab World: The Elements of Foreign Policy*, 127–128.

32 R. Hrair Dekmejian, *Egypt Under Nasir: A Study in Political Dynamics* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1971).

Arab nationalist argument contributed his leading role both in Egyptian and regional politics; at the same time, this argument had imposed constraints over Nasser's freedom of maneuverability in choosing various foreign policies as it can be seen in the case of the formation of the UAR. Although Nasser did not want an immediate union with Syria, the Syrian delegations compelled him to establish UAR because Syria was under the threat of communist infiltration. The failure of the ill-fated union caused Nasser to lose his credibility in foreign policy. Thus, it can be argued that Nasser's use of Arab nationalism as a value had both positive and negative effects on his effectiveness in shaping EFP.³³

Regarding leadership, Nasser emphasized the importance of Egypt's leading role in the region in his book, *The Philosophy of the Revolution*, by arguing that “[h]istory is ... charged with great heroic roles which do not find actors to play them on the stage ... We and only we, are impelled by our environment and are capable of performing this role.”³⁴ In this sense, Nasser's claim to the leadership led Egypt to be a vanguard of Arab revolutionary struggles. He significantly benefited from such revolutionary actions in that he increased his legitimacy by identifying radical Egyptian foreign policies with “[securing] liberty ... and unity for the Arab nation.”³⁵ For example, Egypt's military intervention in Yemen was legitimated on the grounds of the importance of a free Yemeni will under the highly inconstant and uncertain international situation.³⁶

However, his leadership value also had imposed costs for Nasser by reducing his credibility in foreign policy. For instance, his obstinate claim to leadership produced a negative perspective on the side of Syria against Egyptian hegemony and resulted in the rupture of UAR.³⁷ Also, the deteriorating economic consequences of the Yemen war for Egypt and the consequent economic dependency of Egypt on foreign states originated in Nasser's obsession with leadership value. So, it can be argued that the use of leadership value had both positive and negative effects on Nasser's effectiveness in EFP.

Concerning prestige, Nasser held it as a value firmly after long periods of various foreign dominations over Egypt. He aimed to design EFP to promote its “prestige” or “dignity” and could justify his policy decisions as seen in the declaration of Nasser, concerning the nationalization of the Suez Canal, that “[w]e are not prepared to sell our dependence for thirty, forty or fifty million pounds. ... We are a people whose dignity cannot be sacrificed, not even for a thousand million pounds.”³⁸ Within this context, it may be said that prestige as a value played a role in preserving Nasser's effectiveness in the foreign policy starting with the Suez Crisis.

As seen, both anti-imperialism and prestige served to consolidate Nasser's legitimacy, whereas Arabism and leadership had both positive and negative impacts on Nasser's position in EFP.

Together with values, Nasser's images of the regional and international environment affected his effectiveness in EFP making process. The images Nasser had can be traced to his personality characteristics and his way of information processing.

His character formation was affected by his societal background at the personal level and by the general political situation in Egypt at the national level. Dekmejian argues that at the personal level Nasser suffered

33 Dawisha, *Egypt in the Arab World: The Elements of Foreign Policy*, 132–133.

34 Nasser, *The Philosophy of the Revolution*, 55,72.

35 UAR, *The Charter*, Cairo: Information Department, 1962, 15, cited in Dawisha, 1976, 134

36 *Al-Ahram*, October 19, 1962, cited in Dawisha, 1976, 135.

37 Robert Stephens, *Nasser: A Political Biography* (London: Allen Lane: Penguin Press, 1971), 343.

38 *Khutab*, vol.5, 104, cited in Dawisha, 1976, 137.

from a social inferiority complex due to his family's position as poor and un-sophisticated Egyptians beside the non-Egyptian upper class, while at the national level Nasser had to face the existing miserable political situation in Egypt during the 1930s and 1940s under British hegemony.³⁹ Humiliation at both levels laid the groundwork of his personality and motivated him to achieve the rehabilitation of societal self-confidence. This motivation combined with his belief in the great man having the capacity of recreating Egypt in which Egyptians can live freely and independently.⁴⁰ Nasser's will to power reflected itself in his centralization of policymaking structure which did not delegate authority to members of his cabinet.⁴¹ Nasser's closed decision-making style only allowed people to have accessibility to Nasser himself to express their opinions about foreign affairs. Muhammed Heikal, the influential editor of al-Ahram, was one of them and had influences on Nasser's decisions. Nevertheless, according to Stephens, "there was no free discussion on any debate of broad ideas among the ministers. Nasser was the first in everything, in foreign and home policy and in economic and social policies."⁴² So, it can be argued that Nasser's personality characteristics shaped by both personal and national levels enabled him to mobilize feeble Egyptians and personalize EFP with his closed decision-making style.

However, as for Nasser's information processing, Ferris argues that his miscalculation of the Yemen War (1962-1970) "eroded the foundations of his power by destabilizing Egypt's relations" with the US as a great power upon which Egypt's economy depended.⁴³ Dawisha claims that Nasser's fundamental attribution error led him to build a relationship with Saudi Arabia based on black and white,⁴⁴ to consider it "as a hostile conspirator with the West against Egypt,"⁴⁵ and thus not to expect to engage in a long-standing proxy war with Saudi Arabia. Nasser's fallacy of overconfidence in the power of Egyptian military "led him to believe that only a small number of Egyptian troops would be sufficient to defeat the Imam's forces and safeguard the infant republic."⁴⁶ In other words, his "overestimation of Saudi hostility (expressed in the belief that Saud would intervene if Nasser did not) and an underestimation of Saudi power"⁴⁷ led Nasser to fall into the heuristic errors in the Yemen War.⁴⁸ As for the 1967 Six Days War, Nasser fell into the availability fallacy with the political victory of the Suez Crisis in mind, and "he miscalculated that the US would restrain Israel for fear a war would inflame Arab opinion against the West or bring confrontation with the USSR."⁴⁹ Therefore, it can be said that his defects in information processing weakened his position in the EFP decision making process.

Although there are some negative individual factors for Nasser, it can be argued that several strategies helped him to maintain his impact on the foreign policy formulation process to a certain degree. Firstly,

39 Dekmejian, *Egypt Under Nasir: A Study in Political Dynamics*; Dawisha, *Egypt in the Arab World: The Elements of Foreign Policy*, 80.

40 Dawisha, *Egypt in the Arab World: The Elements of Foreign Policy*, 109.

41 Michael N. Barnett, *Confronting the Costs of War: Military Power, State, and Society in Egypt and Israel* (Princeton University Press, 1992); Vatikiotis, "Nasser and His Generation," 166–173.

42 Stephens, *Nasser: A Political Biography*, 342.

43 Jesse Ferris, *Nasser's Gamble: How Intervention in Yemen Caused the Six-Day War and the Decline of Egyptian Power* (Princeton University Press, 2013), 295.

44 Dawisha, *Egypt in the Arab World: The Elements of Foreign Policy*, 51.

45 Laura M. James, "Nasser at War: Arab Images of the Enemy," *Nasser at War: Arab Images of the Enemy* (2006): 173.

46 A. I. Dawisha, "Perceptions, Decisions and Consequences in Foreign Policy: The Egyptian Intervention in the Yemen," *Political Studies* 25, no. 2 (1977): 214.

47 James, "Nasser War Arab Images Enemy," 173.

48 Ferris, *Nasser's Gamble: How Intervention in Yemen Caused the Six-Day War and the Decline of Egyptian Power*, 206–214.

49 Hinnebusch, *The International Politics of the Middle East*, 169.

Nasser tried to broaden his audiences with the Egyptian news media to create legitimacy. With the advent of the transistor radio, broadcasts of ‘Radio Cairo’ and ‘The Voice of the Arabs’ allowed Nasser to broaden his audience easily by delivering the message of shared identity and “letting the masses feel that they shared with him the most closely-guarded secrets of state.”⁵⁰ Thus, it can be said that people were reinforced to take an attitude that should not divert from any conviction declared by Nasser under the phases that “everyone knows ..., you all believe ..., all people share ...”⁵¹

Secondly, Nasser utilized the *framing* strategy to make the public approve his decisions by associating one policy or state with another. Utilizing the established negative views of the Egyptians towards imperialist policies, Nasser framed imperialism itself as a threat and identified his political enemies as ‘the agents of imperialism’. With this identification, he could easily propose his agenda having radical foreign policies such as the nationalization of the Suez Canal and revolutionist initiatives in Arab states having existing ties with the imperialist powers.⁵² Besides, Nasser framed Israel as the embodiment of the Zionist danger to the Arab region and created “rally round the flag effects” on the Egyptian public by utilizing their negatively charged emotions against Israel.⁵³ Thus, he could enjoy a great national consensus in favor of his foreign policy preferences during times of crisis with Israel.

Thirdly, Nasser used the diversionary tactic reversely. Nasser utilized this tactic to divert his population’s attention away from his (domestically unpopular) foreign policy implementations or his foreign policy failures to domestic politics by confrontation with internal enemies. For example, in 1965, after Nasser came from Saudi Arabia where he tried to stop Egyptian economic and human losses in the Yemen war, Nasser inflicted a heavy blow on the Muslim Brotherhood (the MB) by accusing it of “plotting to assassinate many top political leaders and other personalities.”⁵⁴ Here, Ferris argues that “Nasser chose to inflate the threat from the MB at this time to justify coming to terms with Faisal at the probable expense of the Yemeni Republic.”⁵⁵ In other words, Nasser’s desire to eliminate the strong opposition of some domestic groups, particularly the military, against the terms of peace with Saudi Arabia, led himself to divert attention “from the external setback by turning inward to meet the enemy from within.”⁵⁶ Thus, he could keep his impact over EFP by deflecting the attention of his policy’s opposition into internal crises.

3. Mohamed Morsi And Egyptian Foreign Policy

Following the 2011 revolution in Egypt, newly elected president Mohamed Morsi, who was affiliated with the MB movement, was expected to base the Egyptian foreign policy (EFP) on the Islamist orientation in the sense of abolition of the Camp David agreements, dissolution of tensions by pursuing a rapprochement with Iran, and the opening of the Rafah gate to lift the embargo on Gaza.⁵⁷ However, as many academic writings on Morsi’s Egypt have agreed upon, Egypt during the Morsi era seemed to keep the foreign

50 Dawisha, *Egypt in the Arab World: The Elements of Foreign Policy*, 112.

51 *Ibid.*, 170.

52 *Ibid.*, 166.

53 James, “Nasser War Arab Images Enemy,” 117.

54 Dekmejian, *Egypt Under Nasir: A Study in Political Dynamics*, 228.

55 Ferris, *Nasser’s Gamble: How Intervention in Yemen Caused the Six-Day War and the Decline of Egyptian Power*, 213.

56 *Ibid.*

57 For one of these possibilities, see; Shadi Hamid and Tamara Wittes, “Camp David Collapse,” in *Big Bets & Black Swans: A Presidential Briefing Book*, ed. Martin Indyk, Tanvi Madan, and Thomas Wright (Brookings Institution, 2013), 80–84.

policy legacy of Mubarak by exhibiting behavior for cooperation and balance.⁵⁸ In pursuance of this widespread argument, this section tries to find out individual-level variables affecting the continuity in EFP although his short tenure was the main constraint for Morsi to have an ideological impact on the foreign policymaking process.

The individual-level of analysis aims to show the importance of the components of Morsi's psychological milieu on his weak impact on the EFP. Morsi's ideological values related to the foreign policy were supposed to entail reshaping the EFP but some other individual variables could not facilitate the total implementation of those values mentioned below.

Towards the democratic elections after the overthrow of Mubarak's regime, from the electoral platform of Morsi's party, Freedom and Justice Party (FJP), it can be extracted that Morsi has two main values for his foreign policy agenda: "Regional Leadership for Egypt" and "Anti-Imperialism".⁵⁹

Firstly, Morsi's foreign policy agenda emphasized Egypt's leadership as the platform outlined that "we must re-formulate Egypt's foreign policy on new bases that establish an active role for Egypt,"⁶⁰ and to halt "the humiliating decline in Egypt's status and its role regionally and internationally."⁶¹ Indeed, according to Amr Darrag, who served as the chairman of FJP's foreign relations committee,⁶² "Egypt completely lost its cultural, religious, and political leadership positions during ... [the Mubarak] period, and our country was limited to marginal mediator roles or to following other countries' policies."⁶³

Morsi's efforts to restore Egypt's leadership role appeared in the Palestinian and Syrian issues.⁶⁴ For the former one, Morsi stated in the UN General Assembly that "the first issue which the world must exert all its efforts in resolving, based on justice and dignity, is the Palestinian cause."⁶⁵ Morsi, under the indoctrination of the Brotherhood, took an assertive role in the Palestinian cause and supported the resistance against Zionists, "bloodsuckers, warmongers, and descendants of apes and pigs,"⁶⁶ as he called them. Abandoning Egypt's previous policy of siege to resistance, freedom-fighters, and revolutionaries,⁶⁷ Morsi's FJP affirmed the right of "the Palestinian resistance against the Zionist usurpers of their homeland."⁶⁸

After coming into power, the Morsi government underwent a test which was the Israeli attack on Gaza in November 2012. Following the attacks, Morsi showed his sensitiveness to the Palestinian cause by calling "its ambassador back to Cairo for consultation,"⁶⁹ "dispatching of the Egyptian prime minister to Gaza,"⁷⁰ and mo-

58 Raymond A. Hinnebusch, *The International Politics of the Middle East*, Second ed. (Manchester University Press, 2015), 285; Joshua Haber and Helia. Ighani, *A Delicate Balancing Act: Egyptian Foreign Policy after the Revolution*, IMES Capstone Paper Series, 2013, 27-37; Ahmed Morsy, "Morsi's Un-Revolutionary Foreign Policy," *Middle East Institute*, April 14, 2013.

59 *Foreign Policy in Morsi's Presidential Election Platform*, *Ikhwan Web*, 2012; see also Daniel Wagner and Giorgio Cafiero, "Is the United States Losing Egypt to China?," *Huffington Post*, January 28, 2013.

60 *Foreign Policy in Morsi's Presidential Election Platform*.

61 "Election Program: 2011 Parliamentary Elections," *Freedom and Justice Party*, 4.

62 The committee assisted former Islamist President Mohammed Morsi in foreign affairs.

63 Amr Darrag, "A Revolutionary Foreign Policy: The Muslim Brotherhood's Political Party Promises to Transform Egypt's Place in the World," *Foreign Policy*, October 16, 2012.

64 Haber and Ighani, *A Delicate Balancing Act: Egyptian Foreign Policy after the Revolution*, 24,55; Azzurra Meringolo, "From Morsi to Al-Sisi: Foreign Policy at the Service of Domestic Policy," *Insight Egypt*, no. 8 (2015): 3.

65 "Statement of H.E. Dr. Mohamed Morsy President of the Arab Republic of Egypt," *The Permanent Mission of Egypt to the United Nations in New York*, September 26, 2012.

66 Roi Kais, "Morsi in 2010: Zionists Are Descendants of Apes," *Ynetnews*, May 1, 2013.

67 "Election Program: 2011 Parliamentary Elections," 35.

68 *Ibid.*, 36.

69 Mehmet Özkan, "Egypt's Foreign Policy under Mohamed Morsi," *Ortadoğu Analiz* 51, no. 5 (2013): 16.

70 H.A. Hellyer, "From Tahrir To Tel Aviv," *Brookings Institution*, November 19, 2012.

bilizing anti-Israeli protests.⁷¹ He contacted Hamas leaders and kept the Rafah crossing between Egypt and the Gaza Strip open.⁷² Also, he played a leading role in achieving a “diplomatic success in brokering a ceasefire between Hamas and Israel.”⁷³ Indeed, confirming Egypt’s leadership role, while Hamas leaders asserted that “Egypt did not sell out the resistance”⁷⁴, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton praised Morsi for the de-escalation of the violent situations in Gaza.⁷⁵

As for the Syrian issue, Morsi desired to make progress to solve the Syria crisis. Reflecting his assertiveness in regional issues, he sought to “coordinate the efforts of the relevant regional parties to end this bloodshed as soon as possible.”⁷⁶ Abandoning the anti-Iran stance taken by former Egyptian presidents, “Morsi ... launched an “Islamic” peace initiative to resolve the Syria conflict, involving Iran alongside Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Egypt.”⁷⁷ That initiative enhanced Egypt’s claim to regional leadership by building a bridge between the Sunni and Shi’a alliances.⁷⁸

The second foreign policy value that Morsi embraced was anti-imperialism. Seeking independence from Western powers, he preferred to diversify Egypt’s international and regional partners.⁷⁹ In this sense, it can be said that Morsi’s first step was to participate in the Non-Aligned Movement summit in Tehran. It was a milestone in the EFP because Morsi was the first Egyptian President to come to the Islamic Republic of Iran since 1979.⁸⁰ Rather than any socialist understanding, his “ideological affinity for the Islamic Republic’s defiant posture toward Zionism, imperialism, and the West,”⁸¹ might have made Morsi intend to establish historical relations again with Iran. Indeed, according to Khalaji, it should be kept in mind that “Islamists in Iran and Egypt have a strong ideological connection [and] ... share anti-Israel sentiment... Committed to governance under Sharia (Islamic law), they both view Western culture as a threat.”⁸² Thus, setting aside highly potential criticisms of the GCC states and the US,⁸³ Morsi’s visit to Iran was to prove he could pursue foreign policies other than ones dictated by extra-regional Western forces and their regional imperialist tool, Israel.⁸⁴

Morsi’s second step was to improve relations with China, a rising global power. Although he has not displayed an affinity to China’s political ideology, it might be argued that Morsi’s Islamist world view, which includes anti-imperialism as a principle, entailed considerable economic contacts with China, like Iran after the Islamic revolution did.⁸⁵ Given Egypt’s goal of the “enrichments along the Suez Canal”⁸⁶ and its

71 Hinnebusch, *The International Politics of the Middle East*, 283.

72 Beverley Milton-Edwards, *The Muslim Brotherhood: The Arab Spring and Its Future Face* (London: Routledge, 2016), 73.

73 Housam Darwisheh, “Regime Survival Strategies and the Conduct of Foreign Policy in Egypt,” *IDE ME Review* 2 (2015): 54.

74 David D. Kirkpatrick and Jodi Rudoren, “Israel and Hamas Agree to a Cease-Fire, After a U.S.-Egypt Push,” *The New York Times*, November 21, 2012.

75 Edmund Blair, “Analysis: Egypt Proves Peace Role Can Survive Arab Spring,” *Reuters*, November 22, 2012.

76 *Opening Statement by H.E. Mohamed Morsy President of the Arab Republic of Egypt (Opening Session of the XVI Summit of the Non-Aligned Movement)*, *Ikhwan Web*, 2012.

77 Jannis Grimm and Stephan Roll, “Egyptian Foreign Policy under Mohamed Morsi: Domestic Considerations and Economic Constraints,” *SWP Comments* 35 (2012): 1–2.

78 Haber and Ighani, *A Delicate Balancing Act: Egyptian Foreign Policy after the Revolution*, 51.

79 David Schenker and Christina Lin, “Egypt’s Outreach to China and Iran Is Troubling for U.S. Policy,” *The Washington Institute for Near East Policy*, August 24, 2012; Grimm and Roll, “Egyptian Foreign Policy under Mohamed Morsi: Domestic Considerations and Economic Constraints,” 3.

80 Darwisheh, “Regime Survival Strategies and the Conduct of Foreign Policy in Egypt,” 53.

81 Haber and Ighani, *A Delicate Balancing Act: Egyptian Foreign Policy after the Revolution*, 44.

82 Mehdi Khalaji, “The Enduring Egypt-Iran Divide,” *Washington Institute for Near East Policy*, December 31, 2012.

83 Noor-ul-Ain Khawaja, “Egypt’s Foreign Policy Analysis: From Nasser to Morsi,” *Pakistan Horizon* 12, no. 2 (2013): 60.

84 Stefanie Felsberger, “The Future of Egyptian Foreign Policy – To What Extent Will Egypt’s Foreign Policy Change under President Morsi?,” *AIES Fokus* 4 (2012): 3; Khawaja, “Egypt’s Foreign Policy Analysis: From Nasser to Morsi,” 60.

85 Schenker and Lin, “Egypt’s Outreach to China and Iran Is Troubling for U.S. Policy.”

86 “Egypt: Interview with Mohamed Morsi,” *Wilson Center*, January 14, 2013.

large population with the cheap labor force,⁸⁷ China, as Morsi called, could be a “good brother, friend, and [beneficial] partner.”⁸⁸ In this sense, Morsi made his first official visit outside the region to China and declared his intention to look for Chinese investment.⁸⁹ Morsi’s efforts aiming to achieve autonomy in foreign policy and to decrease Egypt’s dependency on the US were also parallel to the opinion held by the Egyptian public more favorable of China than the US: in 2012, 79 percent of the public had an unfavorable view of the US foreign policy,⁹⁰ compared with 52 percent of Egyptians who had a favorable opinion of China.⁹¹ Thus, the anti-western beliefs of Egyptians and Morsi overlapped in the national position, facilitating Morsi’s foreign policy formulation in his desired direction.

However, although Morsi’s foreign policy preferences might have created political support and increased his legitimacy to a certain degree,⁹² Morsi’s involvement in the Syrian issue ultimately failed and the initiative started by the quartet went nowhere. Morsi’s foreign policy towards the Palestinian issue was more symbolic rather than revolutionary. Likewise, although Morsi developed ties with China and Iran “to boost Egypt’s diplomatic position to negotiate with the US, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and other forums [and states],”⁹³ some individual-level variables would necessitate Morsi to keep the status quo towards the West, as will be mentioned below.

It can be argued that Morsi’s personality character, leadership style, and the strategies he employed did not facilitate the formulation and implementation of his values decisively. First of all, it is necessary to describe Morsi’s social background. He was born in 1951 and graduated from Cairo University by earning an Engineering degree. Then, he went to the US to study for a PhD in engineering and the University of Southern California offered an opportunity for him to get a Ph.D. degree from its Engineering Department. He succeeded there and became a doctor in 1982. After working at the University of North Ridge as a faculty member between 1982 and 1985, Morsi returned to Egypt and worked at Zagazig University as a Professor until 2010.⁹⁴

It might be argued that Morsi’s presence in the US and his engineering mindset led him to abstain from making emotional calculations in foreign policy.⁹⁵ Özdamar and Canbolat claim that Morsi eschewed decisive foreign policy preferences after assessing potential risks and threats of Egypt’s ideologically driven foreign policy.⁹⁶ In this direction, he declared that the new Egyptian government would adhere to international treaties former Egyptian leaders signed,⁹⁷ and specifically approved the requirements of the Camp David treaty. Although Morsi was under the indoctrination of the historical anti-Zionist values of the MB, highly possible risks of nullifying the treaty forced him to accept the treaty tentatively and to build a balanced (not hostile) relationship with Israel.

87 Wagner and Caferio, “Is the United States Losing Egypt to China?”

88 “Hu Jintao Holds Talks with Egyptian President Morsi,” *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China*, August 28, 2012.

89 “Egypt: Interview with Mohamed Morsi.”

90 *Views of the U.S. and American Foreign Policy*, Pew Research Center, June 13, 2012.

91 “Egypt: Opinion of China,” *Pew Research Center*.

92 Grimm and Roll, “Egyptian Foreign Policy under Mohamed Morsi: Domestic Considerations and Economic Constraints,” 3; Hellyer, “From Tahrir To Tel Aviv”; Haber and Ighani, *A Delicate Balancing Act: Egyptian Foreign Policy after the Revolution*, 55.

93 Khawaja, “Egypt’s Foreign Policy Analysis: From Nasser to Morsi,” 56–57.

94 “Dr. Mohamed Morsi – A Brief Biography,” *Ikhwan Web*, 2012.

95 For Obama’s sense of Morsi’s engineering precision with little ideology, see; Peter Baker and David D. Kirkpatrick, “Egyptian President and Obama Forge Link in Gaza Deal,” *The New York Times*, November 21, 2012.

96 Özgür Özdamar and Sercan Canbolat, “Understanding New Middle Eastern Leadership: An Operational Code Approach,” *Political Research Quarterly* (2017): 9–10.

97 “Statement of H.E. Dr. Mohamed Morsi President of the Arab Republic of Egypt,” 5; see also “Election Program: 2011 Parliamentary Elections,” 35.

Indeed, Morsi's ideological foreign policy would cause a rupture of relations with Israel and rising mutual enemy images would precipitate both states to war⁹⁸ as had happened in the 1967 war. Also, the cancellation of the Camp David agreements would antagonize the US⁹⁹ as the treaty has maintained the core interests of the US: the utility of the Suez Canal for the US trade as well as for the free flow of Gulf oil.¹⁰⁰ As Egypt's traditional strategic ally, the US has provided Egypt with large amounts of economic aid since 1987.¹⁰¹ It was argued that "without this aid, Egypt could not possibly have met its consumption requirement."¹⁰² Thus, knowing such risks might have led Morsi to make orthodox foreign policy decisions devoid of his values mentioned above and given him a motivation for the cooperation with the US,¹⁰³ as he stated:

"the most important thing for me is to have real friendship between Egyptians and Americans. ... Now, I need the technology transferred. I need scientific research. I need expertise in different directions to help. I have resources. So, there is -- a lot of things that I want to transfer from the United States to Egypt."¹⁰⁴

Together with Morsi's personality character, his leadership style can be a reason for his ineffectiveness in the EFP after the 2011 revolution. He rather showed an open-leadership style by considering various actors' opinions and by pursuing compromises between choices. According to a report by the International Crisis Group, it was likely that Morsi was caught between the Brotherhood and the established powerful state institutions.¹⁰⁵ Indeed, particularly, the military was not going to allow Morsi to put his Islamist version of leadership and anti-imperialism values into practice. In the Palestinian issue, the military members who were responsible for Egypt's international security preferred to pursue a status-quo policy. They viewed that the cancellation of the Camp David treaty and an ideological Gaza policy would pose national security threats:

"instability and chaos in the Palestinian territory, they fear, will spill over into Egypt, with particularly dangerous repercussions in the Sinai. As it sees matters, Hamas has long been a problem, Gaza is a headache, and free movement between Gaza and Sinai would promote lawlessness and the back-and-forth smuggling of militants and weapons."¹⁰⁶

Morsi had to encompass such views of the military in order not to alienate it in a domestically unstable Egypt. Deferring the pursuit of the foreign policy agenda of the Brotherhood, Morsi kept the siege over Gaza by blocking its tunnels which have been used to smuggle weapons that can pose a threat to Egyptian security.¹⁰⁷

Morsi could bypass the state organizations while visiting the Islamic Republic of Iran to attend the summit of the Non-Aligned Movement in Tehran and attempting to launch the Syrian quartet including Iran,¹⁰⁸ however, it can be said that the dramatic failure of his quartet initiative prevented him from having a revolutionary impact on EFP.

98 Eric Trager, *Conflict in Gaza: The Egyptian President Plots a Dangerous Course*, *The Atlantic*, November 16, 2012.

99 Özdamar and Canbolat, "Understanding New Middle Eastern Leadership: An Operational Code Approach," 10.

100 Sergio Fabbrini and Amr Youssef, "Obama's Wavering: US Foreign Policy on the Egyptian Crisis, 2011–13," *Contemporary Arab Affairs* 8, no. 1 (January 2, 2015): 74.

101 Jeremy M. Sharp, *Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations*, *Congressional Research Service*, 2017, 23–30.

102 Marvin G. Weinbaum, "Politics and Development in Foreign Aid: US Economic Assistance to Egypt, 1975-82," *The Middle East Journal* 37, no. 4 (1983): 653.

103 Sercan Canbolat, "Understanding The New Middle Eastern Leaders: An Operational Code Approach" (İhsan Doğramacı Bilkent University, 2014), 139; Hinnebusch, *The International Politics of the Middle East*, 283.

104 "Egypt: Interview with Mohamed Morsi."

105 *Israel and Hamas: Fire and Ceasefire in the New Middle East*, *Middle East Report*, 2012, 15.

106 Ibid.

107 Paul Taylor and Yasmine Saleh, "Egypt Flooded Tunnels to Cut Gaza Arms Flow: Aide," *Reuters*, February 18, 2013.

108 Haber and Ighani, *A Delicate Balancing Act: Egyptian Foreign Policy after the Revolution*, 21.

Concerning the leadership strategies, it seems that Morsi employed the method of broadening audiences. Appreciating the importance of “the support of ... [his] citizens and the productive cooperation of both society and the country’s institutions”¹⁰⁹ to make revolutionary attempts in Egyptian politics, Morsi promised to be “a president for all Egyptians”¹¹⁰ without alienating any segment of the Egyptians. In this direction, Morsi and his team aimed to plan legitimate foreign policies that would consolidate society. In consideration of traditional anti-Israel and anti-American sentiment of the public, they initiated making active foreign policies towards the Palestinian and Syrian issues¹¹¹ and to build up anti-Western alliances with Iran¹¹² and China.

Also, there were efforts to broaden his audiences and to justify his actions through the increasingly Islamist dominated media. In Egypt, there are many state-owned media institutions, including Al-Akhabar, Al-Gomhuriya, and Al-Ahram, and the Shura Council are responsible to appoint their editors. Under Morsi’s rule, it was claimed that the Council controlled by the Brotherhood was involved in the Brotherhoodization of the media by appointing new editors loyal to the presidency.¹¹³ However, there were still many journalists within the media sector who “took highly critical positions and engaged in a hysterical anti-Brotherhood media campaign.”¹¹⁴ Even, Al-Ahram, traditionally a government-led newspaper, “seemed to abandon – to a considerable extent – the government mouthpiece role it maintained during the Mubarak era.”¹¹⁵ The propaganda war against him could succeed that Morsi was removed by the military with public consent.¹¹⁶ It is claimed that the fact that he has been socialized by the MB might have mattered much to non-Islamists in Egypt.¹¹⁷ His expression that “the Quran is our constitution, and Shariah is our guide”¹¹⁸ might have alienated secular segments of the public and thus led to fundamental divisions as it had become apparent in protests against him just before his removal from power.¹¹⁹ The statement of Sisi before his military coup was that “there is a state of division in society and the continuation of it is a danger to the Egyptian state and there must be a consensus among all.”¹²⁰ In this sense, although Morsi’s innovative and assertive initiatives broadened his audiences to a certain extent, it can be argued that, despite the Brotherhoodization thesis, he could not create a message of shared identity and his efforts to get the Egyptian society involved in his revolutionary foreign policy attempts could not bear fruit.

Taking all these developments into consideration, it might be said that, although Morsi’s active foreign policy initiatives were aimed at consolidating the society, increasing the legitimacy and popularity of his government, and thus facilitating the formulation and implementation of his revolutionary foreign policies based on the values with Islamist tendencies, his risk assessments, open leadership style, motivation for

109 *The Report: Egypt 2012*, 2012, 22.

110 David D. Kirkpatrick, “Named Egypt’s Winner, Islamist Makes History,” *The New York Times*, June 24, 2012.

111 *Foreign Policy in Morsi’s Presidential Election Platform*.

112 Meringolo, “From Morsi to Al-Sisi: Foreign Policy at the Service of Domestic Policy,” 3.

113 Mirette F. Mabrouk, “Bad News for the Brotherhood,” *Foreign Policy*, August 13, 2012; Robert Springborg, “Egypt’s Cobra and Mongoose Become Lion and Lamb?,” *Foreign Policy*, August 14, 2012.

114 Mohamad Elmasry, “Myth or Reality?: The Discursive Construction of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt,” in *Egypt and the Contradictions of Liberalism: Illiberal Intelligentsia and the Future of Egyptian Democracy*, ed. Dalia F. Fahmy and Daanish Faruqi (London: Oneworld, 2017), 196; see also Mohamad Elmasry, “Unpacking Anti-Muslim Brotherhood Discourse,” *Jadaliyya*, June 28, 2013.

115 Mohamad Hamas Elmasry and Mohammed El-Nawawy, “One Country, Two Eras: How Three Egyptian Newspapers Framed Two Presidents,” *Global Media Journal: Mediterranean Edition* 9, no. 1 (2014): 36.

116 Nervana Mahmoud, “Here’s Why Egyptians Are Glad the Military Ousted Their President,” *The Globe and Mail*, July 4, 2013.

117 Daniel Brumberg, “Can Egypt Unite?,” in *Arab Uprisings: Morsi’s Egypt*, ed. Marc Lynch (POMEPS Briefings, 2012), 17–20.

118 David D. Kirkpatrick, “In Egypt Race, Battle Is Joined on Islam’s Role,” *The New York Times*, April 23, 2012, <https://www.deccanherald.com/content/245366/in-egypt-race-battle-joined.html>.

119 Patrick Kingsley and Martin Chulov, “Mohamed Morsi Ousted in Egypt’s Second Revolution in Two Years,” *The Guardian*, July 4, 2013, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/03/mohamed-morsi-egypt-second-revolution>.

120 Patrick Kingsley, “Egypt’s Army to Step in If Anti-Morsi Rallies Become Violent,” *The Guardian*, June 23, 2013, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/23/egypt-army-demonstrations-mohamed-morsi>.

cooperation, and fruitless strategy to expand his audience caused him to subordinate his revisionism to the status quo to a great extent.

Here, although this article focuses on individual variables, it needs to remind the reader of the importance of structural factors during Morsi's presidential term. The unwillingness of the security structure of the Middle East to confront a rising locally democratic and Islamist regime in Egypt should be kept in mind while evaluating Morsi's incomplete foreign policy initiatives. The fact that Egypt sits on the route for oil, shipped out of Saudi Arabia through pipelines up to the Red Sea and the Suez Canal to the Mediterranean, has important military bases such as Ras Banas and keeps its moderator role between Israel and the Arab side have motivated global counter-revolutionary powers to suppress real changes and to keep the status quo in Egypt in favor of their strategic self-interest. Therefore, the democratization of Egypt's increasingly turbulent period turned from an end into a mean to keep the order in the Middle East and Morsi was not allowed to make independent Egyptian foreign policy decisions.

Additionally, Egypt had the difficulty of escaping from the structural realities of the Middle East not only because of the significance of the stability and order against the threat of regional anarchy but also because "democratic transformation of Egypt into a radical Islamic regime would shift the balance of power in the region wildly."¹²¹ Morsi of the Muslim Brotherhood targeted basing the foreign policy on Islamic identities and in this direction, his administration restored the relations with Iran by paying the first official visit to Tehran since the Iranian revolution. This drastic change of Egyptian foreign policy behavior was the source of concern for the existing balance in the Middle East. Thus, the global concern of losing the balance of power in the region ended with a military coup against the first democratically elected government of Egypt in 2013 two years after the Egyptian revolution.

All in all, it seemed that individual factors together with structural ones caused Morsi to eschew decisive choices and therefore he could not have a revolutionary impact on EFP during his short tenure.

Conclusion

In conclusion, this article employs the individual level of analysis approach and emphasizes the importance of remarkable variables influencing the position of Nasser and Morsi on Egypt's foreign policy.

Concerning Nasser, he could take the helm of Egypt's foreign policy to a great extent after the Egyptian revolution of 1952. On the one hand, the anti-imperialism and prestige values that Nasser embraced led him to make certain justified foreign policy choices and thus enhanced his credibility in the foreign policy decision making process. His Arabism and leadership values had both positive and negative impacts on his position in the conduct of Egypt's foreign policy. Together with values, his inferior societal background, and Egypt's miserable political situation under British hegemony during the 1930s and 1940s shaped Nasser's personality character. He was motivated for power and to be a "great man" with a closed and centralized decision-making structure in mobilizing feeble Egyptians and restoring Egypt's dignity in the international area. However, his bounded rationality or flawed processing of information, including fundamental attribution error, the fallacy of overconfidence, over- and underestimation, and availability fallacy that caused a long exhausting Yemen proxy war with Saudi Arabia and the Six-Day War ending with Egypt's devastating

121 George Friedman, "Egypt and the Idealist-Realist Debate in U.S. Foreign Policy," *Stratfor*, December 6, 2011.

defeat, might have decreased his impact on shaping Egypt's foreign policy, especially under the unfavorable Arab-Israeli power balance after 1967. Nevertheless, through audience broadening and framing strategies and diversionary tactics, Nasser could popularize his foreign policy goals, create "rally round the flag" effects on the public, benefit from a great national consensus, and thus keep his impact over EFP.

As for Morsi's period after the Egyptian revolution of 2011, it can be asserted that generally, he continued Mubarak's legacy on Egypt's foreign policy. Apart from his short tenure as the main constraint on him from having a great impact on the policy process, some individual factors played a key role in restricting Morsi from redirecting Egypt's foreign policy decisively. Although the anti-imperialism and regional leadership values that Morsi embraced motivated him to start certain foreign policy initiatives as seen in the Palestinian and Syrian Issues and the relations with Iran and China; his personality character, his leadership style, and his strategies did not facilitate the implementation of his values decisively and thus had negative impacts on his position in the conduct of Egypt's foreign policy. Morsi's engineering mind and presence in the US might have given him a risk-averse character and thus made him refrain from emotional calculations in foreign policy. Also, Morsi's open leadership style and motivation for cooperation prevented him from having a revolutionary impact on EFP and entailed taking divergent values and pieces of advice into consideration as seen in his failed Gaza and Iran policies. In fact, Morsi pursued decisive legitimate foreign policies that would consolidate the society through traditional anti-Israel and anti-American sentiments of the public. However, he could not succeed in broadening his audience and creating a message of shared identity. Although he aimed to be a president for all Egyptians without alienating any segment, it seemed that his Islamist tendency and affiliation with the MB, lack of charisma and political experience, and failure to effectively utilize the mass media caused him not to be a pioneer, not to persuade most of Egyptians and domestic groups, and thus to eschew decisive foreign policy choices.

Overall, in addition to all individual factors mentioned above, it should not be forgotten that structural factors played key roles in Morsi's lesser effectiveness on foreign policy than Nasser's. Indeed, because Nasser's Egypt experienced the cold war rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union in the Middle East, he could pursue radical anti-imperialist foreign policy initiatives in the presence of imminent threats to Egypt's survival from the Western Camp. On the other hand, because Morsi of the Brotherhood in power was exposed to the post-9/11 war on terror, he was not allowed to implement his Islamist foreign policies independently in a so-called unclear and unpredictable Middle Eastern system.

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