

DAVID CAMERON AND THE EU: CROSSING THE RUBICON

DAVID CAMERON VE AB:
DÖNÜŞÜ OLMAYAN KARAR

ديفيد كامرون والاتحاد الأوروبي: القرار الذي لا رجعة فيه

CENTER FOR MIDDLE EASTERN STRATEGIC STUDIES
ORTADOĞU STRATEJİK ARAŞTIRMALAR MERKEZİ

مركز الشرق الأوسط للدراسات الاستراتيجية



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STRATEGIC INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND INDEPENDENT THOUGHT PRODUCTION

CENTER FOR MIDDLE EASTERN STRATEGIC STUDIES

History

In Turkey, the shortage of research on the Middle East grew more conspicuous than ever during the early 90's. Center for Middle Eastern Strategic Studies (ORSAM) was established in January 1, 2009 in order to provide relevant information to the general public and to the foreign policy community. The institute underwent an intensive structuring process, beginning to concentrate exclusively on Middle affairs.

Outlook on the Middle Eastern World

It is certain that the Middle East harbors a variety of interconnected problems. However, neither the Middle East nor its people ought to be stigmatized by images with negative connotations. Given the strength of their populations, Middle Eastern states possess the potential to activate their inner dynamics in order to begin peaceful mobilizations for development. Respect for people's willingness to live together, respect for the sovereign right of states and respect for basic human rights and individual freedoms are the prerequisites for assuring peace and tranquility, both domestically and internationally. In this context, Turkey must continue to make constructive contributions to the establishment of regional stability and prosperity in its vicinity.

ORSAM's Think-Tank Research

ORSAM, provides the general public and decision-making organizations with enlightening information about international politics in order to promote a healthier understanding of international policy issues and to help them to adopt appropriate positions. In order to present effective solutions, ORSAM supports high quality research by intellectuals and researchers that are competent in a variety of disciplines. ORSAM's strong publishing capacity transmits meticulous analyses of regional developments and trends to the interested parties. With its web site, its books, reports, and periodicals, ORSAM supports the development of Middle Eastern literature on a national and international scale. ORSAM supports the development of Middle Eastern literature on a national and international scale. ORSAM facilitates the sharing of knowledge and ideas with the Turkish and international communities by inviting statesmen, bureaucrats, academics, strategists, businessmen, journalists, and NGO representatives to Turkey.

Dr. Süreyya Yiğit

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PRESENTATION

The European Union is an important entity. Whether viewed from Moscow, Beijing or Washington, the EU is a major political actor on the international stage. Operating as a single market, the EU is also a major world trading power with a combined GDP - that of its output of goods and services - it is bigger than the United States.

Despite the fact that it possesses only 7% of the world's population, the EU's trade with the rest of the world accounts for around one fifth of global exports and imports. The EU is the world's biggest exporter and the second-biggest importer. Member states are economically densely tied to each other as approximately two thirds of their total trade is carried out with other EU partner countries.

Just as the EU is significant in the world, so is the United Kingdom within the EU. Perhaps due to not being one of the six founding member states, the UK has found it difficult to find its rightful place in this supranational organisation. Throughout its membership it has had a complex and problematic relationship with Brussels. It has prevaricated over whether it is in its national interest to remain or withdraw from Europe. The search for this answer has been going on for four decades or so, with no consensus yet in sight.

The recent pledge by the British prime Minister to hold a referendum on EU membership has raised global questions over possible outcomes and repercussions. Non-EU countries such as Norway and Turkey, trading partners such as Russia and China, as well as strategic partners such as the United States and Japan are concerned about the future turn of events in the EU.

ORSAM is delighted to recommend this remarkable research by its Eurasian Advisor, Dr. Süreyya Yiğit, who has brought his forty years of living and researching in England to shed light onto the UK-EU relationship. His eloquent report provides a concise background to Britain's chequered relationship with Europe as well as analysing the current British political climate.

Dr. Yiğit is an established expert in the field and this particular piece of research advances the knowledge in this key area of international relations. He is an academic who lives, breathes, and when he isn't lecturing on the EU, someone who prowls the hallways of libraries, the archives of research centres to produce accessible analyses such as this.

To the casual reader, this research will be impressive because of its sheer simplicity, but practitioners of political science and history will be astounded by the work's depth of detail and complexity. Dr. Yiğit has once again brought his dispassionate research tools to bear and after dissecting both the EU and the UK, sided with those that believe withdrawing from the EU would be highly detrimental for the British.

ORSAM is pleased to provide cutting-edge analysis of contemporary European developments to our readers and reaffirms its commitment to continue disseminating further research results in the future.

Hasan Kanbolat
ORSAM Director

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By: Süreyya Yiğit

DAVID CAMERON AND THE EU: CROSSING THE RUBICON

Executive Summary

Britain entered the 20th Century as a unipolar power, only to be reduced to second-rank in less than fifty years. In the immediate years following the ending of the Second World War, Britain stood aloof from attempts at European Integration. For Churchill especially, the Empire - quickly transforming into the Commonwealth – took centre stage alongside the most amicable relations possible with the western superpower: the United States. Europe was a distant third in foreign policy equations.

The British did realise their fault quite early on and tried to make amends by joining the integration train, persevering despite two rejections. After becoming a member, Britain immediately had doubts, which have continued unto this day.

Whether Labour or Conservative, governments have not been able to fully create nor maintain party unity with regard to support or rejection of the European idea. This report provides a brief sketch of the post-war British relationship with Europe, whilst concentrating on Prime Minister Cameron's pledge to hold a referendum on continued EU membership after the next general election pencilled in for 2015, paying specific attention to the political dynamics at play.

Britain is a divided country at present. There are those in all political parties that desire a return to 'Splendid Isolation,' some who hope for an 'Anglosphere' and others who firmly believe that Britain's logical place is in Europe. Come what may, the next general election will certainly be the most significant for a generation.

David Cameron faces the triple challenge of persuasion. Firstly, convincing his Conservative Party, secondly the British electorate and finally, his European counterparts of his vision for the European Union being the ideal for all three. This research evaluates whether the British Prime Minister can indeed place himself in the intersection of his reinvented 'three circles,' as well as calculating the potential economic and political effects of EU withdrawal.

1- Introduction

In order to understand the present one must have a clear idea of the past. If the hope is of predicting future British relations with the European Union, then one must begin with the foundations of British foreign policy. This was conceptualised in the late 1940s as the “Three Circles” by Winston Churchill:

“The first circle for us is naturally the British Commonwealth and Empire, with all that that comprises. Then there is also the English-speaking world in which we, Canada, and the other British Dominions and the United States play so important a part. And finally there is United Europe. These three majestic circles are co-existent and if they are linked together there is no force or combination which could overthrow them or even challenge them. Now if you think of the three inter-linked circles you will see that we are the only country which has a great part in every one of them. We stand, in fact, at the very point of junction, and here in this Island at the centre of the seaways and perhaps of the airways also, we have the opportunity of joining them all together. If we rise to the occasion in the years that are to come it may be found that once again we hold the key to opening a safe and happy future to humanity, and will gain for ourselves gratitude and fame”¹

Churchill considered Britain to be a separate, great power which had to remain situated at the intersection of the three circles, each of which represented a vital national interest. According to Churchill the first circle in priority of the three, was his mother’s country of birth - the United States. With the wartime alliance looming large and Churchill intent to defend the British Empire and her interests, he considered the U.S. as not only a liberal democracy but the only power that could come to the assistance of Britain in times of need. Therefore, it was essential to maintain a close relationship with the Americans as it was the only other liberal, English-speaking democracy in the world.²

The second circle identified was the British Empire, itself transforming into the Commonwealth at the time. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s the Commonwealth was considered to be vitally important for Britain - almost on a par with the U.S.³ The historic ties certainly bound the decision-makers as well as the economy: the Commonwealth remained an important market for British industry and commerce. Domestically, some even considered the Commonwealth as being Britain’s contribution to global progress and liberal civilization.

The third circle - by some distance - was Europe. Quite different from the prior two circles, Britain’s involvement with Europe centred on fears rather than hopes. Trade with the continent was important, though it was security that was the vital factor as the two world wars had bloodily demonstrated that Britain was inseparable from the European continent.

Churchill believed Britain’s role to be one of actively supporting the reconciliation of post-war Western Europe, going as far as encouraging political union, whilst aspiring to become the junior partner of the U.S. in providing security and opposing the communist superpower: The USSR.⁴ Therefore, Britain could not enter into closer relations with Europe as it would jeopardise its commitments to its priority circles, namely the U.S. and the Commonwealth.

2- Britain’s Relations with Europe

Post-war Britain has a chequered past with regard to Europe. Whilst London looked favourably towards closer military ties with continental Europe immediately after the Second World War, it was rather more hesitant when it came to closer economic relations. Britain became a founding member of NATO and the Council of Europe in 1949, therefore supporting Europe politically and militarily.

When John Monnet was preparing the Schuman Plan in 1950 the Labour government of Clement Attlee was informed and invited to participate, but declined. With the establishment and success of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) deeper integration was sought after. After the failure of defence cooperation, attention focused on expanding from coal and steel to the rest of the economy. To explore this possibility, the Messina conference⁵ took place in which Britain participated, though decided that:

- membership would weaken the United Kingdom's economic and consequently political relationship with the Commonwealth;
- the United Kingdom's economic and political interests were global and a Common Market based in Europe would be contrary to the approach of freer trade and payments;
- participation would in practice lead gradually to deeper integration, perhaps even political federation, which was not acceptable to British public opinion;
- membership would involve the removal of protection for British industry against European competition

Bearing all of these in mind, the British decided that the European Economic Community (EEC) was not for them, therefore did not join the six original members. In the early 1960s, trade with the EEC accounted for far more than the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), which had been established as its rival. With Harold Macmillan as Conservative Prime Minister, Britain decided that it was worthwhile after all, to be a part of Europe, hence Britain applied to join in 1961 only to be vetoed by French President De Gaulle.

His reasons for rejecting the British application centred on the fact that Britain had

stronger ties to the first couple of circles (the United States and the Commonwealth) which he believed would weaken and water down their dedication to the third circle: the EEC. It was in 1962 that former US secretary of state Dean Acheson made the brilliant observation that "Great Britain has lost an empire and not yet found a role"⁶. Nothing could have been closer to the truth, as Britain was uncertain of which direction to turn to.

When Labour, led by Harold Wilson, returned to power another application to the EU was filed; only to be rejected once more by De Gaulle. After the resignation of the French President in April 1969, the UK applied later on that same year for what was the third time to join the EEC.

2.1 Entry to the EEC

With the French veto lifted Edward Heath had the privilege of being the prime minister in office when Britain eventually joined in 1973. Heath asserted his firm belief in Europe at the conclusion of arduous negotiations that had stretched more than ten years that "as the enlargement of the Community makes clear beyond doubt, we have all come to recognize our common European heritage, our mutual interests and our European destiny"⁷.

The Labour Party in opposition had campaigned that Heath had been weak and unsuccessful in negotiating the entry terms for Britain and pledged to hold a referendum should they be elected. When they were in 1974, Prime Minister Wilson kept his promise and a year later asked the British electorate if they wished to remain part of the EEC. The electorate voted two-to-one in favour of Europe. That settled the question of Europe for the time being, despite the fact that both the main political parties were split on the issue. There were members of both the Labour and Conservative parties that had campaigned together against their fellow MPs during the referendum campaign. Prominent

left-wingers stood side-by-side with extreme right-wingers in objecting to British membership of the EEC. Nevertheless, after the result of the referendum, this issue was put to rest for the best part of a decade.

2.2 Euroskepticism

With the election of Mrs Thatcher in 1979, the topic of Europe once again reared its head. The Labour Party shifted much further to the left and advocated Britain should withdraw. Mrs Thatcher was equally disappointed with Europe due to the fact that a large percentage of the European budget was spent on the common agricultural policy. Since farming did not represent a major sector in the British economy, Mrs Thatcher felt that this benefited EU member states much more than it did Britain. Therefore, she demanded and successfully negotiated a rebate on British financial contributions.

She made her animosity towards Europe publicly very clear with her Bruges speech of 1988 in which she declared that “to try to suppress nationhood and concentrate power at the centre of the European conglomerate would be highly damaging and would jeopardise the objectives we seek to achieve....Working more closely together does not require power to be centralised in Brussels or decisions to be taken by an appointed bureaucracy.... We have not successfully rolled back the frontiers of the state in Britain, only to see them re-imposed at a European level with a European super-state exercising a new dominance from Brussels.”⁸

Her successor, John Major fulfilled the daunting task of ratifying the Maastricht Treaty in 1993, although he was able to secure an opt out with regard to the proposed economic and monetary union as well as rejecting participation in the social chapter - a part of the treaty which was eventually adopted as a protocol and which covered issues such as workers’ pay and health and safety. One can certainly argue that the British were fairly iso-

lated throughout the 1980s and 90s when the Conservative Party was in power. This prolonged period of political isolation certainly had a negative impact on the British electorate’s perception of Europe.

2.3 Pro-European Labour

The return of Labour to power under Tony Blair led to a warming of relations between London and Brussels with the Labour government immediately reversing the Conservative government’s decision to stay out of the social chapter. Blair also promised that a referendum would be held on joining the euro although this never did take place. He emphasised his strong pro-European credentials by declaring in his speech to the European Parliament in 2005 that “I am a passionate pro-European. I always have been.....In fact I am the only British leader that has ever said I would put the rebate on the table....I believe in Europe as a political project. I believe in Europe with a strong and caring social dimension. I would never accept a Europe that was simply an economic market..... The broad sweep of history is on the side of the EU”⁹

3. Cameron’s Speech

As demonstrated, Britain’s relationship with Europe has never been easy. This uneasiness was confirmed and reiterated by the British prime minister in a major speech concentrating on the European Union.¹⁰ David Cameron identified the major challenges facing the European Union (EU) and signalled that the United Kingdom could withdraw from the EU.

The seeds of David Cameron’s referendum pledge made on January 23, 2013 were planted more than a year earlier in October 2011, when a motion was put forward in the House of Commons calling for a referendum on Britain’s EU membership. Despite the fact

that the Conservative Party urged all its MPs to vote against; 81 Conservative MPs rejected this call and voted for holding a referendum. This act was the largest Conservative rebellion over the issue of Europe that had ever been mounted in Parliament.

3.1 Background

The background to the speech stretches back to June 2012 when Cameron ruled out a referendum on continued membership during a press conference at the end of an EU summit in Brussels. This decision was unwelcomed by quite a few Conservative MPs and the largely Eurosceptic press. Hoping to stem this tide, two days later, Cameron wrote an article for a Sunday newspaper where he declared: "I am not against referendums in our parliamentary democracy ... I am also not against referendums on Europe ... As I have said, for me the two words "Europe" and "referendum" can go together, particularly if we really are proposing a change in how our country is governed, but let us get the people a real choice first".¹¹

At the Conservative Party conference in October, Cameron was determined that Europe would not dominate the week, though he did hint that he would commit the party to a referendum by admitting "We've always said that when we've achieved that fresh settlement, it needs consent, either at a referendum or a general election. Frankly, a referendum is obviously the cleanest, neatest and simplest, most sensible way of doing that".¹²

In a statement to the Commons in mid- December, the prime minister disclosed that he would deliver a speech on the EU in January. Downing Street originally planned for the speech to be given on January 18th in Amsterdam. On January 17th, after the terrorist attack on a gas plant in Algeria where Britons were among the workers held hostage, Cameron announced that the speech would not take place as planned and had to be delayed.

Whilst as leader of the Conservative Party, David Cameron had on several occasions - such as the previous party conference - warned his party that they should stop being obsessed by Europe. He had emphasised that there were other more pressing issues, fully understanding that the party would pay a very heavy political price if it were hijacked by the European issue. Given the fact that he has now pledged a referendum on continued British membership of the European Union, he must be wondering how he personally fell into the trap that he was warning others about.

In his speech on January 23rd Cameron made mention of a dozen or so problems that were at the heart of the European project. He referred to three issues that he believed were dragging Europe down: "First, the problems in the eurozone are driving fundamental change in Europe. Second, there is a crisis of European competitiveness, as other nations across the world soar ahead. And third, there is a gap between the EU and its citizens which has grown dramatically in recent years. And which represents a lack of democratic accountability and consent that is - yes - felt particularly acutely in Britain. If we don't address these challenges, the danger is that Europe will fail and the British people will drift towards the exit. I do not want that to happen".¹³

Therefore, these issues can be ordered as:¹⁴

- I- Problems in the Eurozone
- II- Crisis of European competitiveness
- III-Gap between the EU and its citizens

Furthermore, he outlined his own vision for a new EU which ought to be built on five principles:

- 1- Competitiveness
- 2- Flexibility
- 3- Power flowing back to as well as away from Member States
- 4- Democratic accountability
- 5- Fairness

3.2 Problems in the Eurozone

The British prime minister is correct to point to the ongoing financial difficulties facing the union. The debt crisis has exposed chinks in the armour of monetary union. The turbulent last few years have suggested that perhaps fundamental changes need to be considered. Should treaty changes be required they will take several years of negotiating and when a compromise has been achieved, require quite possibly another few years to be implemented through consulting member states' electorates via referendums.

The European Commission is happy to extend its powers and exercise tighter control over national budgets in order to prevent any more debt crises as witnessed in Spain and Greece. Furthermore, the European Central Bank may well challenge the City of London in terms of being the first port of call for financial matters as it requires greater supervisory powers. The Eurozone crisis has led to a call for greater policy coordination between the 17 members. In time, they could become a deep inner core of the European Union. This is a serious worry for the Conservatives as they have an allergic reaction to any scheme that may have federal features such as a future political union.

The eurozone crisis was and remains a very specific financial problem which focuses on the member states banking systems as well as the international financial markets, rating agencies and the like. Therefore, the reform proposals have concentrated on particular actions such as a financial transactions tax to be approved under the enhanced co-operation rules allowing the eurozone group to pioneer this tax. The UK will not be obliged to introduce this tax, though London's proposals are not as clear as this action. It becomes difficult to gauge diplomatic success, when the diplomatic goals are hidden from view.

In terms of Britain's relationship with the EU, David Cameron resembles a captured pirate

forced to walk the plank with sharks circling underneath. Rather than facing the humiliation of being prodded in the back with a sword to advance, he has taken the brave step to plunge into deep waters on his own volition. He alluded to this by declaring that "There are always voices saying: Don't ask the difficult questions." But it's essential for Europe - and for Britain - that we do because there are three major challenges confronting us today".¹⁵

When asked in a poll if the UK ought to be closer or more distant to the UK during the current crisis nearly 7 out of 10 Britons believed the UK needed to retain independence from partner EU countries.¹⁶ Only 1 in 7 thought the UK should build closer ties with other EU countries to make Europe more stable and secure.¹⁷ These poll results are indicative of the fact that the British electorate does not empathise with fellow member states. Furthermore, the results demonstrate that the ties that bind Britain to Europe are very weak indeed.

Be that as it may, it still could be the case that the prime minister does not wish to be remembered as the person who took Britain out of Europe, though it is a fact that he does not have a party that is united on remaining in Europe. Therein lies the rub. He personally desires to maintain links with Europe but has to ask his electorate the 'difficult questions' so that further 'difficult questions' are not asked of him by his fellow Members of Parliament. Cameron whilst taking this step may well end up not uniting, but further dividing his party, thus diminishing its chances of electoral success.

3.3 Crisis of European Competitiveness

Concerning the Single Market, Cameron is in accordance with the Conservative philosophy of the past three decades, stretching back to Margaret Thatcher which cherished free markets and freer competition. He stated that

“At the core of the European Union must be, as it is now, the single market. Britain is at the heart of that single market, and must remain so. But when the single market remains incomplete in services, energy and digital - the very sectors that are the engines of a modern economy - it is only half the success it could be. It is nonsense that people shopping online in some parts of Europe are unable to access the best deals because of where they live. I want completing the single market to be our driving mission”.¹⁸ Having said this, however, it must be noted that Cameron is specifically focusing on the sectors that he believes the UK to have a competitive advantage in.

It should be borne in mind, however, that the issue of competitiveness as highlighted by Cameron is considered by many to be a major problem within the EU. The German Chancellor, as well as other EU leaders, also accept that competitiveness in the EU periphery is a serious matter. A good indicator of this is the past decade or so has witnessed the injection of cheap credit into countries such as Greece, Portugal, Spain and even Italy which rather than encouraging greater productivity and technological innovation has, on the whole, led to a rise in labour costs, which naturally have made these countries not more, but less competitive.

3.4 Gap between EU and Citizens

The prime minister freely admits that the British public is disenchanted with Europe. He reveals that “There is a growing frustration that the EU is seen as something that is done to people rather than acting on their behalf. And this is being intensified by the very solutions required to resolve the economic problems. People are increasingly frustrated that decisions taken further and further away from them mean their living standards are slashed through enforced austerity or their taxes are used to bail out governments on the other side of the continent. We are starting to see this in the demonstrations on the streets

of Athens, Madrid and Rome. We are seeing it in the parliaments of Berlin, Helsinki and The Hague. And yes, of course, we are seeing this frustration with the EU very dramatically in Britain”.¹⁹ When asked in a British public opinion poll concerning what they associated with the EU, the top 10 associations resulted in six positive and four negative viewpoints.²⁰

In May 2012, Ken Clarke had also admitted that “The nation is a bit eurosceptic....The nation is extremely worried about present events, as well we might be. We all feel insecure, we all feel worried, we are hoping that a strong government will take us through and some difficult measures are required....The idea that they are all demanding a referendum on the European Union would be regarded as ridiculous, it would be out of sight as a public priority”, dismissing the call as “the demand of a few right-wing journalists and a few extreme nationalist politicians”.²¹

The general public in Britain considers membership of the EU to be disadvantageous. This was verified by the fact that the most common words and phrases associated with the European Union were bureaucracy which headed the list with 46% closely followed by loss of national power (41% and a waste of money (32%).²² Only the seventh most popular view was positive, that of freedom to study work and live anywhere, supported by a quarter of those polled.²³ This was 2% fewer than those who associated corruption with the European Union.²⁴

Whilst the observation of dissatisfaction may very well be true, the prime minister faces a growing national risk in pursuing this theme too deeply. Next year Scotland will hold a referendum on independence with the Scottish Nationalists campaigning on precisely the same platform of greater subsidiarity. If Cameron highlights this principle in London’s relations with Brussels, it will be a tough challenge indeed to counter the same call from Edinburgh targeting London. If there is genu-

inely a case to be made that decisions are taken too far away from the communities affected, i.e. Brussels dominates and is overpowering in terms of legislation, then a democratic solution to multi-level governance must also be presented.

The referendum in this instance becomes a double-edged sword. David Cameron, therefore, needs to be very careful in his public pronouncements. If he genuinely believes that decisions must be taken at the closest level to the community then, logically, he has to support Scottish independence. In arguing the case for Britain being stronger without the EU, that by making ground between themselves and the more federated Europe is in the interests of Britain, it becomes very hard to put forward the case that Scotland will be much worse off without the union.²⁵

In sum, one cannot call for powers to be returned to the nation-state from a supranational organisation, to later on deny regions greater autonomy and accountability. Given the fact that the Conservatives are perfectly happy with the political decision-making in the UK, whilst defending the concept of subsidiarity, they must convincingly demonstrate why it is right and proper that the current political system should remain in place.

The answers given to various poll questions demonstrate the British public understands that in today's world, co-operation and multilateralism are highly significant and more important than relying on bilateral relations or taking unilateral action.²⁶ Given the fact that this is the case, it is difficult to understand why the public believe it is in Britain's interest to pursue its path outside of the EU, rather than from within. One explanatory factor that sheds light on to this dilemma is the articulation put forward by some Conservative Eurosceptics that should Britain withdraw from the EU it would not only survive but prosper just like Switzerland and Norway. Britain would remain very close to the Euro-

pean Union and benefit from free trade whilst being unburdened with any of the obligations.

The one key fact that is forgotten in such an optimistic scenario is the enormous oil and gas wealth that Norway possesses. The days of North Sea oil and gas lifting the British economy have long gone and shall not return. In Switzerland many believe that they have to accept decisions over which they possess no opportunity to influence at present. By becoming a member of the EU and sitting around the table where the decisions are made, will actually be in their national interest.

Cameron fully understands the dilemma of being in Norway's position and admits that "Hundreds of thousands of British people now take for granted their right to work, live or retire in any other EU country. Even if we pulled out completely, decisions made in the EU would continue to have a profound effect on our country. But we would have lost all our remaining vetoes and our voice in those decisions...While Norway is part of the single market - and pays for the principle - it has no say at all in setting its rules: it just has to implement its directives."²⁷ Therefore, there are lots of vested interests in this issue, with many livelihoods depending on remaining "at the heart of Europe", as John Major had emphasised more than two decades ago.²⁸ Tony Blair immediately reinforced the economic dimension by drawing attention to the fact that it would not be in Britain's interests "to separate itself out in the 21st century from the largest political union, the biggest business market in the world, on our doorstep".²⁹

3.5 Competitiveness & Flexibility

Cameron reinforced his perspective of a future Europe by reminding his partners that they "should accept that we, and indeed all member states, will have changes that we need to safeguard our interests and strengthen democratic legitimacy. And we should be

able to make these changes too. Some say this will unravel the principle of the EU - and that you can't pick and choose on the basis of what your nation needs. But far from unraveling the EU, this will in fact bind its Members more closely because such flexible, willing cooperation is a much stronger glue than compulsion from the centre".³⁰ This argument is highly problematic. The prime minister freely admits himself that such an approach is one of having one's cake and eating it. His rebuttal is only a desire that a renewed Union which is based on the premises desired by the UK will be a better and stronger project than the present one. It requires a leap of faith to believe such an outcome given the fact that no details have been fleshed out.

Lord Mandelson picked up on this particular point and alluded to Cameron's lack of understanding of the EU by pointing out that "On the one hand he's saying he wants a new and improved Europe, which I think all of us could subscribe to. On the other hand, he's saying that Britain's membership of Europe is a sort-of blank sheet of paper, which has to be completely renegotiated, and if Britain doesn't get what it wants then we're leaving and heading out through the exit door. I don't think that is an approach that is going to find a very positive response from our partners in Europe... They do not regard the European Union as a sort-of cafeteria service, in which you bring your own tray and then leave with what you want".³¹

The shadow foreign secretary, Douglas Alexander poured further scorn with "We all expected some red lines. We all expected him to say: 'This is where I stand.' the idea that you put a gun to the head of your European partners, that you stand in the departure lounge shouting at 26 other members of the EU as a way to get those changes, doesn't make sense to me".³²

Knowing that in order to gain agreement, negotiation and understanding is vital, Cameron

relied on the historic and traditional strength of Britain: diplomacy. The prime minister said to his "European partners, frustrated as some of them no doubt are by Britain's attitude: work with us on this. Consider the extraordinary steps which the eurozone members are taking to keep the Euro together, steps which a year ago would have seemed impossible. It does not seem to me that the steps which would be needed to make Britain - and others - more comfortable in their relationship in the European Union are inherently so outlandish or unreasonable....It is hard to argue that the EU would not be greatly diminished by Britain's departure".³³ Whilst the last sentence is undeniably true, it is still unclear as to what the British red lines are or will be in a future renegotiation, to prevent such an outcome.

Summarizing the findings of a large-scale public opinion poll concerning British attitudes towards the EU, Niblett provides an unpalatable scenario in that "if a referendum were held as a matter of ideological principle or political experience prior to a serious negotiation and reduced to a simple in/out choice, then the survey indicates that a majority of the British public might choose to leave. There is also strong possibility that other EU member states might not be minded to negotiate concessions to keep the UK inside the EU, leaving opponents of UK membership with a strong case to argue for a negative answer to a straight in/out choice".³⁴

Concerning this diplomatic strategy espoused by David Cameron, Tony Blair was highly critical commenting that "I hear what you say about, 'This is a great negotiating tactic,' but - you know, it reminds me a bit of the Mel Brooks comedy *Blazing Saddles* where the sheriff says at one point during it - holds a gun to his own head and says, 'If you don't do what I want I'll blow my brains out,' you know, you want to watch that one of the 26 don't just say, 'Well okay, go ahead.'"³⁵ Why indeed would all of Britain's European partners agree to everything London demands? That is an impossible scenario.

It seemed as if there were straws in the wind when the prime minister tried to sound confident in defending flexibility by asserting that “With courage and conviction I believe we can achieve a new settlement in which Britain can be comfortable and all our countries can thrive. And when the referendum comes let me say now that if we can negotiate such an arrangement, I will campaign for it with all my heart and soul. Because I believe something very deeply. That Britain’s national interest is best served in a flexible, adaptable and open European Union and that such a European Union is best with Britain in it. Over the coming weeks, months and years, I will not rest until this debate is won. For the future of my country. For the success of the European Union. And for the prosperity of our peoples for generations to come.”³⁶ It is true that future generations will be affected by the outcome of debates concerning the future of Europe. Nevertheless, this is a highly optimistic forecast by the UK Prime Minister: Britain convincing the other 26 member states that London’s blueprint is the only viable one.

The notion of the national interest was close to the heart of the Deputy prime minister and leader of the Liberal Democrats Nick Clegg. He accused Cameron of jeopardizing the national interest: “we should always be governed by what’s in the national interest....My view is that years and years of uncertainty because of a protracted, ill-defined renegotiation of our place in Europe is not in the national interest because it hits growth and jobs.”³⁷

Former Prime Minister Blair roundly criticised Cameron’s strategy and highlighted the difficulties associated by reminding everyone, “so you’re creating a situation of huge uncertainty, and my point is, why would you do that? There’s no necessity to do it; we don’t yet know exactly what we’re going to ask Europe to do, we don’t know what we can get out of it, we don’t know what the rest of Europe is going to do.”³⁸

Whilst Cameron may have felt that he had no choice but to offer a pledge on a European referendum there are, however, distinct advantages for pursuing this strategy. It is, as mentioned, difficult for his political opponents to dismiss the referendum as it will mean they are portrayed as distrusting the electorate. A referendum is considered to be a high watermark for direct democracy. If the voters are kings, then why should they not have the final say when an issue is put to them?

The Liberal Democrats and the Labour Party may not desire a referendum but they cannot openly state that the views of the electorate should not be taken into account. Therefore, the referendum vehicle has certainly the potential to gain time for David Cameron in terms of dampening the anger within his own political party as well as stealing some of the political ground from under the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP). Though one fact remains, the Conservative Party is divided over this issue and even more importantly, the British electorate is divided over Europe.

The UKIP leader Nigel Farage ratcheted up the pressure on the prime minister by announcing his displeasure “If it was a simple In/Out referendum we could hold it before the next general election. If he promised that I’d have cheered.”³⁹ This signalled that UKIP would continue to demand a firm assurance that Britain would leave the EU and not let up on the Conservative leadership. This was reinforced by Mats Persson, the director of the think tank, Open Europe who expressed his dissatisfaction with the speech, echoing UKIP “If he doesn’t get concessions, is he willing to recommend “Out” in a referendum in 2017?”⁴⁰

Optimists view a possible referendum as a blessing in disguise, as it may be that, for once and for all, Britain will decide its relationship with Europe: remaining a permanent member state. Others speculate as to whether the British will succumb to their fears and inse-

curities and withdraw, or overcome the challenges and accept the opportunity of creating a progressive, viable supranational entity. In the last analysis, time will tell whether Britons agree with Churchill's choice when he declared: 'If Britain must choose between Europe and the open sea, she must always choose the open sea.'⁴¹

Through the referendum pledge, David Cameron has tried to both gain time and popularity. He has portrayed himself as a leader who is firmly committed to democratic participation as well as appearing to defend national interests. He believes that the referendum pledge will unify his party and divide the opposition. All of these things may well be true. Another truism however, is that which has been attributed to Abraham Lincoln: You can fool all the people some of the time, and some of the people all the time, but you cannot fool all the people all the time. There will come a time when David Cameron will have to come clean. He will have to nail his colours to the mast and fervently declare that he is not a conservative of the Heath ilk, but even more Europhobic than Margaret Thatcher.

One of the explanatory factors shedding light on the disconnection between Britons and the rest of EU citizens is the deliberate political distancing created by London. British governments whilst not preventing voluntary deeper European integration in principle have managed to opt out of nearly all areas that have a direct effect on their own people. These have included opting out of the Euro, out of the Schengen visa system, as well as out of the social charter (at first). After the absence of highly noticeable "European" ventures such as the above, combined with a generally antagonistic media relating to the EU, it comes as no surprise that Britons are ignorant about the EU.

The disdain with which the European Union is viewed may be explained by the lack of knowledge of the public at large. One method

whereby this could be ascertained was in asking the public to estimate the size of Britain's net financial contribution. Whereas the actual figure was £8.1 billion, in a public opinion poll the most common response was £74 billion—more than nine times the actual figure – a quite remarkable overestimation.⁴²

After being informed of the actual sum, as well as it amounting to only 1.2% of total governmental spending, they were asked their opinion on whether the amount was fair or not. More than half considered the £8.1 billion figure to be too much; only just over a quarter deemed it as about right.⁴³ What this tells us is that a majority of the British believe that contributing to the EU a sum which is just a little more than 1 per cent of total spending to be unacceptable.

The polls do demonstrate, however, that the British are interested in meaningful cooperation, though most conceptions of the EU remain confined to the prism of a trading bloc. This was echoed by Tony Blair himself declaring that "surely the sensible thing is to band together with allies in order to argue the case for change?"⁴⁴

When questioned about how closely Britain should work together with the EU in a range of seven issue areas, most of those questioned supported the UK in working either very closely or fairly closely in each of the issue areas. Heading the list for working closely with the EU was counterterrorism, policing and border security—three quarters of the respondents agreed with this, whereas 7 out of 10 thought Britain should work closely with the EU concerning illegal migration.⁴⁵ It was interesting to note that apart from defence and security, there was higher support for working with the EU than the United States, which demonstrates that the public at large view the EU positively as a trustworthy and credible partner.⁴⁶

British attitudes towards not just piecemeal cooperation but firmer, deeper integration is a

different matter altogether. The inherent cautiousness reflects a fundamental scepticism among the electorate concerning the benefits of being an EU member. When questioned concerning the benefits of being a member of the European Union almost half of the British general public considers the ease of travel within Europe to be most apt - with 42% believing that the most significant benefit of membership being the fact that it was easier to work and retire elsewhere in Europe.⁴⁷

Given the fact that freedom of movement was considered to be the most important benefit of membership, it is difficult to explain why 60% considered this to be precisely the danger of being a member; as they thought too many people from elsewhere in the EU coming to work in the UK was the second worst disadvantage of remaining a member of the European Union.⁴⁸ The worst disadvantage was considered to be far too many EU laws and regulations. When the figures are looked at in more detail a significant cleavage can be observed between older and younger respondents.⁴⁹ 8 out of 10 of those close to the pension age i.e. over 60 years old, believed that too much regulation came from Brussels, whereas only slightly more than a third of those aged between 18 and 24 concurred.⁵⁰

It must not be forgotten that for the best part of half a century, various British governments have taken a pragmatic approach towards membership, believing that despite disagreements, British interests were better served by being inside than not. Another important factor to bear in mind is the lack of an emotional attachment that other EU member states have towards the post-war European project. The British have always viewed membership in terms of a costs-benefits analysis, as of only one circle amongst three.

The media's constant fear of ceding sovereignty and rhetoric of sacrificing national interests at the altar of integration have made the British highly sceptical of anything asso-

ciated with the EU. David Cameron and his Conservative Party see everything related to the EU as either in or out, or win or lose. When everything is pictured as black or white it is tough to achieve progress; co-operation in a zero sum game is impossible to secure.

It must be borne in mind that for any actor to exact change in an organisation, the first rule is to be a part of it. Institutional change occurs from within, not from the outside. Desiring to be or remaining outside, ultimately results in being forced to accept an outcome without any input whatsoever. Only by being inside the EU, can the UK change the EU. From the outside all it will witness is the condensation caused by its own breath on the window whilst trying to peek inside to where the decisions are being taken.

Furthermore, even if part of the EU, the chances of changing a particular policy is related to the extent the member state is part of and bound by that policy. Opting out of policies mean a severe loss of leverage. The UK for example, cannot have any influence over Schengen or the euro as it has opted out of these policy areas. Therefore, it is foolish to believe and disingenuous to offer changes in these issue areas.

3.6 Power

London has traditionally been much more interested in widening the European integration process rather than deepening it. During Mrs Thatcher's premiership, her governments looked much more favourably on expanding the EEC as it was then. Deepening measures such as an exchange rate mechanism were frowned upon. Schemes to facilitate greater trade and establishing a single market were firmly supported.

This traditional British approach continued in the 1990s and beyond as the UK was once again a passionate supporter of the EFTA enlargement in the mid-1990s. The new Labour

government of Tony Blair in 1997 continued with the established course of European expansion by enthusiastically encouraging the eastward enlargement of 2004. Britain still continues to support the further expansion of the European Union to include Croatia, Macedonia and Turkey.

David Cameron and the Conservatives know full well from their own experience that new members of the European Union have to accept what is called the *Acquis Communautaire*. The government of Edward Heath had to accept all previous decisions reached by the EEC when Britain joined in 1973. Similarly, the 10 new members that joined in 2004 also had to accept everything that the European Union had agreed to since its establishment in 1958. Just like the British in 1973, the Poles, Hungarians, Czechs as well as minnows such as the Maltese, had to accept hundreds of volumes of previous legislation; they had no option of choosing to accept what they liked and rejecting what was not to their advantage. Therefore, becoming a new member state entails that there is no opportunity to pick and choose, what is liked and not liked.

Despite the fact that David Cameron knows this to be the case, it is very difficult to understand how he can suggest that Britain can successfully re-negotiate its membership with the European Union. It goes without saying that if the British were able to succeed in this endeavour; many other member states would also want to replicate this venture. As there is no single member state that is wholly in agreement and supportive of all actions taken by the EU, fellow member states are likely to consider this British approach as one that could seriously undermine the foundations of the EU. During negotiations - should they occur as David Cameron has outlined - it should not come as a surprise if other EU member states are likely to ask for similar exceptions when they hear of the British proposals.

Similar to most of the British press and other European Conservatives, Cameron is unhap-

py with the perceived loss of sovereignty and projected national power. He believes "Power must be able to flow back to Member States, not just away from them....Countries are different. They make different choices. We cannot harmonise everything. For example, it is neither right nor necessary to claim that the integrity of the single market or full membership of the European Union requires the working hours of British hospital doctors to be set in Brussels irrespective of the views of British parliamentarians and practitioners. In the same way we need to examine whether the balance is right in so many areas where the European Union has legislated including on the environment, social affairs and crime. Nothing should be off the table".⁵¹ Naturally not everything can be harmonised but international politics resembles national politics in terms of it also relating to the art of the possible. Compromises have to be made and priorities determined and lesser important aims sacrificed for vital interests. Britain cannot have all of its wants and reject everything that is unpalatable. No international organisation exists where this is the case, as the EU is not the Warsaw Pact and Britain most certainly cannot become the Soviet Union.

3.7 Democratic Accountability

Cameron is probably right to acknowledge that "Democratic consent for the EU in Britain is now wafer thin. Some people say that to point this out is irresponsible, creates uncertainty for business and puts a question mark over Britain's place in the European Union. But the question mark is already there and ignoring it won't make it go away. In fact, quite the reverse. Those who refuse to contemplate consulting the British people, would in my view make more likely our eventual exit. Simply asking the British people to carry on accepting a European settlement over which they have had little choice is a path to ensuring that when the question is finally put - and at some stage it will have to be - it is much more likely that the British people will reject

the EU. That is why I am in favour of a referendum. I believe in confronting this issue - shaping it, leading the debate. Not simply hoping a difficult situation will go away".⁵² One fact that Cameron does not acknowledge is the role referendums have played in British national politics. In actual fact it is only the EU issue which has established a referendum as precedent. Therefore, perhaps it is correct after all to ask for another one. Though, will this mean that referendums are to be called whenever there is disunity in any party in government? That in itself is not an argument to discount a referendum on the EU; nevertheless, it remains a danger.

What of general elections? Parties that win are accepted as having gained a political mandate to govern and enter into international obligations. Furthermore, it has long been established as a firm principle that Parliament cannot bind its successors. For this reason, if there is a philosophical objection to the notion of European integration then there is no need for a referendum as this could be made explicit in the Conservative election manifesto. Should they win, they could simply withdraw from the EU due to their manifesto commitment.

Whilst Cameron offers the electorate a referendum, he cannot come clean over which corner he defends. To be fair, he cannot be asked to predict the outcome of a hard fought negotiation that has not yet taken place. As Tony Blair has remarked: "We don't yet know exactly what we're proposing, or what we can get negotiated; we don't yet know what the rest of Europe is going to propose".⁵³ Nevertheless, it is David Cameron who has drawn this premise. There were no national interests that forced him to venture down this particular path, the interests - as far as can be seen - are all party political.

Ken Clarke⁵⁴, the outspoken very much pro-European Minister without Portfolio had predicted a week before Cameron's speech:

"If you realise you're doomed in Parliament you demand a referendum".⁵⁵ It was precisely this point that Fiona Hall, the leader of the Liberal Democrat MEPs also made in attacking the speech drawing attention to the fact that "Today David Cameron spoke not as prime minister but as a Tory party leader backed into a corner by his outspoken tea-party backbenchers. He promised an in-out referendum on an uncertain renegotiation of the UK's relationship with the EU that leaves more questions than answers and creates a climate of uncertainty for investors".⁵⁶ She accused Cameron of having "failed to reassure our European partners over the UK's commitment to push for EU-wide reform rather than unilateral repatriation and cherry-picking".⁵⁷

It is not surprising for a Conservative Prime Minister to quote from the 20th century's most famous Prime Minister: Churchill. "What Churchill described as the twin marauders of war and tyranny have been almost entirely banished from our continent. Today, hundreds of millions dwell in freedom, from the Baltic to the Adriatic, from the Western Approaches to the Aegean. And while we must never take this for granted, the first purpose of the European Union - to secure peace - has been achieved and we should pay tribute to all those in the EU, alongside NATO, who made that happen. But today the main, over-riding purpose of the European Union is different: not to win peace, but to secure prosperity".⁵⁸ Certainly security was a primary factor during the initial phase of European integration and Churchill's input is undeniable. The idea of living in freedom - unafraid of communism - was part and parcel of the political project of the EU. Cameron's comments heralded a harking back to the origins of the Schumann Plan. Having reminded his audience of this fact, how this related to the future, however, was left blank.

Interestingly and directly related to this theme, Britons, when asked in a poll concerning future EU scenarios, chose as the most

popular vision for the future of Europe, a less integrated European Union which resembled very little more than a free-trade area.⁵⁹ This view was shared by 31% of the respondents, yet slightly more than a quarter of those questions supported a complete withdrawal from the EU.⁶⁰

Relating to a future timetable, the prime minister provided a timeline for his proposed referendum by admitting that “The next Conservative Manifesto in 2015 will ask for a mandate from the British people for a Conservative government to negotiate a new settlement with our European partners in the next Parliament. It will be a relationship with the single market at its heart. And when we have negotiated that new settlement, we will give the British people a referendum with a very simple in or out choice. To stay in the EU on these new terms; or come out altogether. It will be an in/out referendum.”⁶¹ This will be the same as the Scottish referendum which will include a question on becoming an independent country or not.

What if the Conservatives do not win outright? If they are in a coalition, will this be a firm uncompromised coalition protocol issue? If they are once more together with the Liberal Democrats in government, will they accept this demand as a democratic measure to ask the public? In the highly unlikely event of a Labour-Tory grand coalition will they go ahead too? In all of these scenarios (as well as with the Conservatives in government either alone or in a coalition) the referendum looks set to take place.

The most recent poll conducted measuring British attitudes towards the European Union among both opinion-formers as well as the general public, indicates that the call for a referendum is supported not only by those who are Conservative by political affiliation, but by almost half of Labour Party supporters, with slightly more than half of Liberal Democrats also supporting voting in a referendum

on Europe.⁶² Not surprisingly, the support for a referendum rises with age. 7 out of 10 people over the age of 60 want to have a say over continued membership.⁶³

Whilst referendums are held to decide a single issue one way or the other, the electorate in responding to the question that they face tends to decide its response according to the evaluation of the current government. Referendums tend to become a vehicle of passing judgement on a sitting government rather than making a decision on the merits of the case. This is something that could prove to be a significant challenge to David Cameron, as should he be successful in gaining power alone in 2015, the referendum will take place during what is usually considered by political observers to be the period of “mid-term blues”. The electorate may well exact revenge for policies that it is unhappy with, rather than fervently believing in the European Union, or disliking it immensely.

Pursuing the theme of democracy, Cameron candidly affirmed that “There is not, in my view, a single European demos. It is national parliaments, which are, and will remain, the true source of real democratic legitimacy and accountability in the EU.”⁶⁴ It is a truism that parliamentary regimes are always inclined to be democracies.

Moreover, it is accepted that there is no European demos and Europe-wide opinion polls do suggest that there is growing dissatisfaction with Brussels. Coupled with the fact those voter turnouts for elections to the European Parliament are always very low, it is hard to disagree with David Cameron’s observation. Nevertheless, given the fact that the EU has been holding pan-European direct elections to the European Parliament for almost thirty-five years, a continent-wide electorate –even if not a demos - can be said to have been established. The fact that at least the representatives of the EU electorate are all seated together in the same institution and

participate, not on the basis of nationality, but according to political groupings must not be forgotten.

However, when one looks at the disenchantment of the peripheral EU member states' electorates, they are more often than not directed at their own national politicians and their prevailing political elites rather than EU institutions and their policies. In some, disapproval is much more national, rather than directed at the supranational EU. Ultimately electorates view their national decision-makers as being responsible for their national predicament.

As mentioned, due to so few being active in European Parliamentary elections there is definitely a sense of democratic deficit within the European Union. This was certainly not helped in the end of 2011 when technocratic governments took the helm in Greece and Italy. In the former it was noticeable that both a far left political party Syriza, as well as an extreme right-wing political party Golden Dawn, greatly increased their popularity. Throughout the rest of the European Union extremist parties on both sides of the political spectrum have also garnered much more support than they had previously been able to achieve.

Britain is no exception to this recent political phenomenon as UKIP, which does not categorize itself as a mainstream party, has also been performing well in the polls. The major fear for the Conservative Party is for UKIP to attract their disenchanted voters and MPs to join forces under its political roof. That would be calamity for the Conservatives, as it would virtually destroy any chance of regaining power on their own. They would be forced to continue entering coalitions with smaller parties which could include UKIP itself.

3.8 Fairness

With regard to the related matter of institutions, the British prime minister shared his

suspensions: "Can we really justify the huge number of expensive peripheral European institutions? Can we justify a Commission that gets ever larger? Can we carry on with an organisation that has a multi-billion pound budget but not enough focus on controlling spending and shutting down programmes that haven't worked? And I would ask: when the competitiveness of the single market is so important, why is there an environment council, a transport council, an education council but not a single market council?"⁶⁵ Whilst the final question is an apt one, Britain has been as bad as – or participated as – any other member state, in trying to offer a home to European agencies. Therefore, the call for better auditing and reappraising programs is not weighty enough to warrant in itself a call to take a decision to exit the EU.

In this and other respects, national as well as international politics hardly remain stagnant and static, but are constantly changing and highly dynamic. A good example of this is the political stance taken by national parties with regard to European integration. In the early 1980s in Britain the political party that felt the greatest unease with Europe was not the Conservative, but the Labour Party. It was in fact the Labour Party that campaigned to withdraw from the EEC in the early 1980s; it would be perfectly fair to label the Labour Party at that time as "Eurosceptic". This was not a great fear for the Conservatives as their grassroots supporters were hardly going to jump ship and join Labour purely because they were opposing Europe. There was no credible right wing political party offering this possibility at the time.

After years of hostility and ill will against Europe that were incubated during the Thatcher and Major premierships, the Conservative grassroots became highly sceptical which was also demonstrated by high-profile Conservative MPs such as Bill Cash and John Redwood to name but two. In 2013, the situation is very different. Now there is a right wing politi-

cal party - UKIP - whose central message is to withdraw from the EU, which is actively targeting conservative grassroots voters and is being secretly supported by a number of current Conservative MP's. It is precisely this new political reality that Cameron believes has forced his hand to demand a referendum sometime in 2016/17.

4. Regions

Anti-European conservatives have always blamed and hated Edward Heath for joining the EEC. For this section of the Conservative Party, one particular issue that has traditionally been at the top of their political agenda has been unity of the United Kingdom. They have consistently blamed Heath for being pro-European and accused him of orchestrating a method by which to garner local support in favour of Europe. The accusation rests on him arranging the money which was returned to the UK from Brussels entering via the regions, thus creating the impression that the British were financially benefiting from membership.

The year that Britain entered was also the time when the EEC established the Regional Development Fund. Heath had instituted local government re-organisation with a view to moving local government towards regionalisation. A decade later with the passage of the Single European Act in 1986 'Regionalisation' became a significant policy of the EU, with the Maastricht Treaty establishing the Committee of the Regions headquartered in Brussels. This did not go down at all well with the Conservatives.

The very same year, in 1992 the European Commission published a map – 'The European Community – a Community with no internal frontiers.' The map showed Great Britain which included Scotland, Northern Ireland, Wales and nine other regions. This caused a furore in the 'traditional' conservative camp as there was no mention of England. Three

years later, following a review of the local government structure, unitary authorities started to be established and in the next three years - between 1995 and 1998 - 46 unitary authorities came into existence.⁶⁶ The anti-European conservatives firmly believed that all of this was part of the regionalisation plan.

4.1 Local Government under Labour

When the Labour Government took office in 1997, it quickly introduced devolution in Scotland, Northern Ireland, Wales & London leaving eight remaining regions in England. These acts were interpreted as regionalisation once more by the same conservatives. A year later the Labour Government launched the 'Democratic Renewable Debate' and in the same year the Regional Development Agencies Act was passed foreseeing the establishment of Regional Development Agencies.⁶⁷ The RDAs co-ordinated Land use, Transport, Economic development, Agriculture, Energy & Waste.⁶⁸ All the RDAs had Brussels offices and each region was considered to ultimately have two sections of government: an elected assembly as well as a development agency.

In 1999, Regional Assemblies were established; whose Members were 'stakeholders' and councillors from local authorities.⁶⁹ Representatives were appointed which disgruntled many conservatives. The Government was aware that there would be some opposition to regionalisation and on the assumption that the Anglican Church would be seen as neutral and apolitical, appointed Bishops as Chairmen of Constitutional Conventions.⁷⁰ According to the conservatives, the purpose of these was to hold meetings to persuade local people that they had a 'regional identity'.

In 2001 the Government issued a Planning Green Paper, removing the County Councils from the planning process.⁷¹ Later on in the year, the Department for Transport, Local Government and the Regions (DTLR) Minister Lord Falconer stated in the House of Lords

that 'three tiers of Government are too many' and the government was 'looking at county and district councils'.⁷²

A year later the Government introduced its White Paper: 'Your Region, Your Choice – Revitalising the English Regions', asserting that it would 'Bring Democracy closer to the people' and that the cost of running a region would be approximately £25 million which was hotly disputed by the conservatives at the time⁷³. Each Region was to have 25 elected representatives looking after the region which was far less than the County and District/ Borough Councillors present at the time. The conservatives feared that this would make the representatives unknown to most of the electorate.

In answering questions in the House of Commons in 2003, Nick Raynsford MP declared that: 'Where an elected regional assembly is established, existing two-tier local government will be restructured as unitary authorities. It is now quite clear that County and District/Borough Councils will be replaced with Unitary Authorities and Regions.'⁷⁴ Later on in the year the District Auditor upheld complaints that the North East Assembly was misusing funds by paying for the publication of propaganda promoting an elected assembly.⁷⁵ This breached the Local Government Act, which gave councillors clear instructions regarding their behaviour as councillors. As a result, at the suggestion of John Prescott, some Regions set themselves up as Limited Companies to protect their members against legal claims for misuse of public funds.⁷⁶ They claimed that they were 'directors' rather than 'councillors'

The White Paper estimated that each assembly would require about £25 million a year to run. Due to a number of Regions already being established it was possible to compare actual costs with estimates. The anti-European Conservatives were aghast that despite what they considered a perfectly adequate parliament building existing in Scotland, the new

Parliament decided to build a new one at an estimated cost of £40 million which quickly escalated to £400 million.⁷⁷ A public enquiry which cost in excess of £1 million was held after allegations of fraud in the placing of the contract. In the end the Conservatives were angered by both the implementation of devolution as well as the expenditure associated with it.

Conservatives reminded the electorate that whereas Scotland used to be run by 5 ministers; there were now 20.⁷⁸ Before devolution there were 3,336 officials working for the old Scottish Office; there were now 4,272, costing an extra £20 million.⁷⁹

As for Wales, the total number of civil servants rose from 2,250 to almost 3,400.⁸⁰ The Conservatives focused heavily on the Welsh Assembly deciding to build a three-storey modern glass debating chamber on the edge of Cardiff Bay for £12 million. In 2001, when the costs had reached £27 million the architect, Lord Rogers was sacked.⁸¹ The Assembly then advertised for a fixed-price builder; Taylor Woodrow Construction won the work and engaged Lord Rogers as a sub-contractor. The Assembly then announced that the cost of the work was £41 million, to which has to be added IT equipment, furnishings, professional fees and VAT.⁸² During the debate on whether Wales should have an Assembly, those in favour said its running costs would be covered through the money saved from abolishing quangos. In the event, the quangos were merged into the Assembly administration, which incensed the Conservatives.

Since the 1970s the anti-European Conservative faction has been ill at ease with what they regard as breaking-up the union. They never liked the idea of devolution when it was put to a referendum by the Labour government in its dying days in 1979 and were delighted to see it defeated. When Labour returned to power after eighteen years and immediately took up from where they had left off, this caused

consternation in the conservative ranks. The establishment of the Scottish Parliament and the Welsh Assembly were all interpreted as a European scheme trying to reduce the national power of Britain through the principle of subsidiarity.

When highly publicised financial expenditures were factored in, for some the disquiet transformed into alarm. The forthcoming Scottish referendum on independence is the latest cause of apprehension for the Conservatives who firmly hold onto the view that the United Kingdom should remain precisely that: united. Therefore, the question of the regions is a highly politically charged issue for most conservatives, but even more so for those that wish to exit the EU. It is these conservatives who have never forgiven Heath for entering the EEC, subsequently bequeathing the problem matter of the regions, and quite possibly the fragmentation of the UK.

5. Forecasts

The Conservative Party has always harboured members both represented in Parliament and in the country at large that have advocated staying outside of European integration. To counter the charge of isolationism David Cameron admitted that “I never want us to pull up the drawbridge and retreat from the world. I am not a British isolationist. I don’t just want a better deal for Britain. I want a better deal for Europe too. So I speak as British prime minister with a positive vision for the future of the European Union. A future in which Britain wants, and should want, to play a committed and active part”⁸³

A recent poll found that those most wanting to withdraw from the EU came from Conservative supporters of pension age - over 60 years old.⁸⁴ The younger the age of the respondent, the more favourable the perception of the European Union was. Interestingly, Scotland was the most pro-European region of the United Kingdom with 4 out of 10 supporting

membership, although even here more - 41% - desired withdrawal.⁸⁵

The major issue relating to the referendum is the cost in terms of economic uncertainty. This was made clear by both the Labour leader, a former Conservative Deputy prime minister as well as the prominent Conservative leadership candidate of the 2000s, Ken Clarke. According to Clarke, a referendum would “throw absolute confusion” over the UK’s involvement in the EU, undermining efforts to retain the faith of the markets in the economy, adding that he couldn’t “think of anything sillier to do”⁸⁶

When referring to the last referendum held in 1975 where opponents of the EU immediately ignored the yes result, he makes a prescient remark by asserting “it would settle nothing.... Particularly it would settle nothing with the more frenzied Euro-sceptics who keep believing that European bogies are under the bed”⁸⁷ The referendum would not close the European wound for Britons.

Lord Heseltine when questioned over a promise to hold a referendum openly declared his hostility by referring to the economic damage this could cause: “To commit to a referendum about a negotiation that hasn’t begun, on a timescale you cannot predict, on an outcome that’s unknown, where Britain’s appeal as an inward investment market would be the centre of the debate, seems to me like an unnecessary gamble”⁸⁸ He further questioned “Why put your factory [in Britain] when you don’t know - and they can’t tell you - the terms upon which you will trade with us in future?”⁸⁹

The leader of the opposition, Ed Miliband cautioned the prime minister that he ought to take Mr Heseltine’s comments very seriously.”It’s devastating for the prime minister that you’ve now got Lord Heseltine saying that he’s essentially operating in the party interest, not the national interest....If you’re an investor thinking about putting your money

into Britain, you're not going to be doing that if you think Britain's about to leave the European Union."⁹⁰

Nigel Farage rejects such arguments, putting forward the view that Europe is not essential for British business. "Outside the European Union, there are nearly 50 trade agreements that the EU has with other parts of the world. They are not bound by the rules, they are not part of that union, that is how business operates....We're living in a global economy, and important as Europe is as a marketplace, it is now down to 38% of our exports, and likely to fall further. The UKIP argument is we must embrace the rest of the world for trade, not just Europe."⁹¹ Farage's comments do not take into account that the UK would be bound by various European regulations when trading with the EU; regulations over which it would have no voice whatsoever. The UK would find itself in the present position of Norway.

Moreover, as Nikki Sinclair, the MEP for the We Demand a Referendum Party has identified "the Lisbon treaty also obliges the EU to negotiate Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) with a member-state that wishes to withdraw, as well as with states that are not EU members", pondering "why did Cameron choose to omit this fact from his speech?"⁹²

Needless to say, exiting the Union would mean a less effective UK in global affairs. This was put succinctly by Gunther Kirchbaum, the chair of the European affairs committee of Germany's Bundestag, when he said: "I'm deeply convinced that to get out of the European Union would also mean to lose influence. Businessmen in Britain are really concerned."⁹³

6. Conclusion

When reading the speech by the prime minister it is clear that there are only three conceivable forms of association with the EU. The first alternative could be classified as an ex-

tremely loose form of association, which may not even include inclusion in the single market. This was alluded to in the speech through a reference to "of course Britain could make her own way in the world, outside the EU, if we chose to do so"⁹⁴. Nevertheless, such an arrangement is highly unlikely to be considered as a possible form of association. The second form is the EEA model which David Cameron has criticised, but is a likely contender for Britain, should it decide to withdraw from the EU. The third is the current one, namely membership. This as it presently stands, is highly problematic for the Conservative Party.

Should Britain withdraw from the European Union it is highly likely that its relationship will resemble the second form of association: that of Norway's with the EU. This would entail entering into negotiations and making agreements with the EU concerning many issue areas such as border controls, immigration, police cooperation, foreign, security and defence policy. These are only some of the areas which would have to be negotiated and agreed to.

A post-exit British relationship with the EU would still mean that the public having extensive contacts with continental Europe. These would range from the aforementioned internal affairs and foreign policy to include vast realms of the economy and business world. These would include labour market and working conditions, health and welfare issues, regional policy, environment, energy, transport, climate change, research, education, agriculture and fisheries, food, alcohol policy, gender equality, consumer protection and many other important topics.

The new relationship would be founded upon Britain incorporating EU law - over which it had no input whatsoever. British ministries would work closely on EU-EEA matters, implementing the required EU laws. The impact on the public at large would affect daily life, for example, in terms of their working envi-

ronment, as well as the quality of the food they ate or the state of vehicles that they drove. There would also be significant structural impacts such as the requirements of a common labour market as well as the financial market - affecting the city of London.

If the British relationship did resemble the Norwegian one, that would entail Britain incorporating close to 75% of EU legislation as domestic law. Needless to say, these would not only remain on the statute books, but would have to be implemented wholesale. This would certainly be a relationship classified as association with the EU without being a member, which is precisely what some Conservatives desire. In this instance Britain would neither be fully inside the European Union, nor completely outside of it.

Such a relationship would be a difficult one to manage due to the structural tensions inherent in such an arrangement. The House of Commons and Lords would have to consent to ratify all new EU agreements or legislative acts that created significant new obligations for Britain. In effect all new laws coming from Brussels would have to be ratified by Parliament.

Given the fact that most Conservatives heavily criticise the European Union in terms of its democratic deficit, in such a proposed new relationship Britain would suffer from precisely this deficiency. London would be bound to adopt EU policies and rules on vast ranges of issues without being a member, therefore, without any voting rights. Britain's interests could not be defended during decision-making. This is precisely the Democratic deficit that some Conservatives fear most.

In such a scenario, Britain would not be represented in the decision-making processes which would have direct consequences for itself. Not only that, it would not have any significant influence either. At present, Brit-

ain does have full access to the single market as well as possessing full voting rights. To rub further salt into the wound of a democratic deficit, in a Norwegian-style scenario, Britain would have to actually contribute financially for enjoying the benefits of European integration without having a say on the goals and aims of future developments.

Certainly, it is debatable whether one can truthfully state that Britain has the same political influence that France or Germany has concerning the whole gamut of topics and issues that the EU has responsibilities for. Having said this, however, the fault for having insufficient influence cannot be laid at the door of David Cameron alone, as this is a reflection of the lack of European enthusiasm demonstrated by all British governments, with the sole exception being that of the Heath government of 1970-74.

It can certainly be argued that Britain has been effectively not a major player within the European Union for the past three decades. Perhaps the heyday of British influence in the European integration process was in the immediate aftermath of its membership in the 1970s. The referendum scheduled for 2017 or so will be one whereby the British public choose to have an even lesser influence in the European Union. Even if they've vote to remain a member of the EU it will not mean having greater influence in terms of the future direction of the EU.

Concerning the third option, when one focuses on the current relationship between Britain and the EU it is an undeniable fact that Britain has more opt-outs than any other member state. Therefore, the proposed referendum is really not a debate on Europe concerning Britain playing an equal and highly significant role "at the heart of Europe". One must be reminded that Britain has steadfastly refused to join the single currency, though nine other countries have also thought it wise not to adopt the euro.

At the end of 2011, Prime Minister Cameron vetoed a financial settlement at a European summit, forcing all other member states excluding the Czech Republic to agree amongst themselves upon a fiscal compact as an inter-governmental treaty, outside of the EU treaties. This example highlights the fact that Britain has severe reservations about cooperating with its European partners under the roof of the European Union.

This self-exclusion is further demonstrated by the fact that Britain alongside Ireland is also outside of the Schengen zone. It should be borne in mind, however, that even Norway and Switzerland, both of whom are not members of the European Union, are members of this border free zone. Therefore, Norway and Switzerland are actually more integrated into the EU than Britain is, in this particular policy area.

In the final analysis, Prime Minister David Cameron is stuck between a rock and a hard place. His call for a referendum on continued British membership in the European Union some time in 2017-2018 has raised several eyebrows as well as questions.

Firstly, the major problem revolves around the issue of uncertainty -- be it political or economic. Now that the genie is out of the bottle, it is impossible to conclusively assert that Britain will remain a member of the EU. This means that foreign investors will think twice about investing in Britain, questioning whether it will remain part of the single market. European partners will also pay less attention as the representative of London may not be sitting around their table in a few years' time.

Secondly, there is the related matter of configuring interests. More than half a century after Acheson's famous remark, the British continue to search in vain for an influential global role for themselves. As a result, in a post-financial crisis, globalizing world, where

capital is increasingly mobile and technology vital for all aspects of the economy, Britain must decide what is - and is not - in its national interests.

Standing at nearly half a billion, the population of the EU is the third largest in the world after China and India. Its sheer size and its impact in commercial, economic and financial terms make it a globally important power. It continues to account for the greatest share of world trade, whilst generating one quarter of global wealth.

Therefore, are British national interests best served remaining in a 27-member organization competing against more than a billion Chinese and another billion Indians, or taking on -- as a small island nation of 60 million or so people - the considerable economies of the United States and Japan? If Britain desires to punch above its weight both commercially and diplomatically, it makes no sense whatsoever to divorce itself from one of the most powerful political and trading blocs the world has ever witnessed.

In this vein, some believe that the answer to Britain's European woes is America. The problem with such a proposition is to what extent London can hope to stabilize itself in the stormy waters of the world economy through a 'special relationship' with Washington, where the United States is the EU's largest trading partner with two-way trade flows across the Atlantic worth close to 400 billion euros a year. This utopian solution was also laid to rest in the immediate aftermath of the speech by David Cameron when President Obama's advice and hope for seeing a strong Britain within a strong EU were made known.

Thirdly, as investigated earlier, what would future British-EU relations resemble? Post-exit Britain could become part of the European Economic Area (EEA) beside Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein. Britain alongside these three countries would have access to the

European market and vice versa, but would have to adopt all legislation that governs the four freedoms: goods, people, services and capital.

Consequently, should the British vote to leave the EU and accept a relationship resembling that of Norway, they would be forced to firstly adopt European legislation; secondly, adapt to the rules imposed; and thirdly, pay for participating economically - whilst being frozen out of all political discussions and decision-making. Consequently, the British have to evaluate a European Union which, in half a century has united a continent from the Atlantic to the Black Sea, expanding its membership from six to 27 - deciding ultimately if it will be reduced to 26.

Britain as an established middle-ranking power has faced the challenge of settling its foreign policy identity whilst trying to increase its capacities and capabilities. To compound matters more, this venture is taking place amidst domestic austerity and a quite uncertain international order. When the domestic political environment is added, a highly explosive cocktail is born.

Prime Minister Cameron faces a doubly difficult challenge. Firstly, to convince his European partners to agree to the changes that he believes will benefit them collectively. Secondly, to convince his MP's to maintain the party remains afloat and appear united going into the general election of 2015. Should he

somehow secure victory, then the obstacle he has set himself will stare him in the face: Referendum on continued membership.

Cameron will need to make up his mind if it is the national interests of Britain, and the party interests of the Conservatives to remain a member state of a major political actor on the international stage, a major world trading power with a combined GDP larger than the United States. Whether it is better to stay inside the EU, whose trade with the rest of the world accounts for around one fifth of global exports and imports, despite possessing only 7% of the world's population; a supranational entity that is the world's biggest exporter and the second-biggest importer.

All of this presupposes two facts: the conservatives will win the general election in 2015, and that Cameron himself will return as prime minister. Neither of these is guaranteed. The Conservatives may well lose to Labour in two years' time, or win with another person at the helm. In either of these two scenarios, the referendum pledge could be quickly forgotten.

Thus, the stakes are exceedingly high. 2015 will witness a watershed election: one where the result will decide the course of politics for decades, proving to be a dividing line between historical periods. Britain will either firmly drop anchor in the safe haven port of Europe, or venture out alone into the stormy winds and waves of the North Atlantic; there is no charted course in between.

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Annex A

Edward Heath, Brussels, 22 January 1972

We mark today, with this ceremony, the conclusion of arduous negotiations over more than ten years which have resulted in another great step forward towards the removal of divisions in Western Europe.

This uniting of friendly States within the framework of a single community has been brought about by the sustained and dedicated work of many people. Their efforts were essential to the success which we are celebrating.

My tribute here is to all who have laboured in this great enterprise — not only to those who have negotiated, Ministers and officials, together with the members of the Commission who have contributed so much, but to all who, in their many different ways, have supported and advanced the idea of a united Europe.

Just as the achievement we celebrate today was not preordained, so there will be nothing inevitable about the next stages in the construction of Europe.

They will require clear thinking and a strong effort of the imagination.

Clear thinking will be needed to recognise that each of us within the Community will remain proudly attached to our national identity and to the achievements of our national history and tradition.

But, at the same time, as the enlargement of the Community makes clear beyond doubt, we have all come to recognize our common European heritage, our mutual interests and our European destiny.

Imagination will be required to develop institutions which respect the traditions and the individuality of the Member States, but at the same time have the strength to guide the future course of the enlarged Community.

The founders of the Community displayed great originality in devising the institutions of the Six. They have been proved in the remarkable achievements of the Community over the years.

It is too early to say how far they will meet the needs of the enlarged Community.

For we are faced with an essentially new situation, though one which was always inherent in the foundation of the Community of the Six, which was visualized in the preamble to the Treaty of Rome and which has been created by its success.

Let us not be afraid to contemplate new measures to deal with the new situation.

There is another cause for satisfaction.

“Europe” is more than Western Europe alone.

There lies also to the east another part of our continent: countries whose history has been closely linked with our own.

Beyond those countries is the Soviet Union, a European as well as an Asian power.

We in Britain have every reason to wish for better relations with the states of Eastern Europe. And we do sincerely want them.

Our new partners on the continent have shown that their feelings are the same. Henceforth our efforts can be united.

The European Communities, far from creating barriers, have served to extend east-west trade and other exchanges.

Britain has much to contribute to this process, and as Members of the Community we shall be better able to do so.

Britain, with her Commonwealth links, has also much to contribute to the universal nature of Europe's responsibilities.

The collective history of the countries represented here encompasses a large part of the history of the world itself over the centuries.

I am not thinking today of the Age of Imperialism, now past: but of the lasting and creative effects of the spread of language and of culture, of commerce and of administration by people from Europe across land and sea to the other continents of the world.

These are the essential ties which today bind Europe in friendship with the rest of mankind.

What design should we seek for the New Europe?

It must be a Europe which is strong and confident within itself.

A Europe in which we shall be working for the progressive relaxation and elimination of east/west tensions.

A Europe conscious of the interests of its friends and partners.

A Europe alive to its great responsibilities in the common struggle of humanity for a better life.

Thus this ceremony marks an end and a beginning.

An end to divisions which have stricken Europe for centuries. A beginning of another stage in the construction of a new and greater Europe.

This is the task for our generation in Europe.

Source: <http://www.cvce.eu/viewer/-/content/46e212e9-8499-40e1-aebb-73bfec068f9e/45bb74bd-554c-49d4-8212-9144ce2e8c1d/en>

Annex B

Margaret Thatcher 1988 Speech

Prime Minister, Rector, Your Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen:

First, may I thank you for giving me the opportunity to return to Bruges and in very different circumstances from my last visit shortly after the Zeebrugge Ferry disaster, when Belgian courage and the devotion of your doctors and nurses saved so many British lives.

And second, may I say what a pleasure it is to speak at the College of Europe under the distinguished leadership of its [Professor Lukaszewski] Rector.

The College plays a vital and increasingly important part in the life of the European Community.

And third, may I also thank you for inviting me to deliver my address in this magnificent hall. What better place to speak of Europe's future than a building which so gloriously recalls the greatness that Europe had already achieved over 600 years ago.

Your city of Bruges has many other historical associations for us in Britain. Geoffrey Chaucer was a frequent visitor here.

And the first book to be printed in the English language was produced here in Bruges by William Caxton.

Britain and Europe

Mr. Chairman, you have invited me to speak on the subject of Britain and Europe. Perhaps I should congratulate you on your courage.

If you believe some of the things said and written about my views on Europe, it must seem rather like inviting Genghis Khan to speak on the virtues of peaceful coexistence!

I want to start by disposing of some myths about my country, Britain, and its relationship with Europe and to do that, I must say something about the identity of Europe itself. Europe is not the creation of the Treaty of Rome.

Nor is the European idea the property of any group or institution.

We British are as much heirs to the legacy of European culture as any other nation. Our links to the rest of Europe, the continent of Europe, have been the dominant factor in our history.

For three hundred years, we were part of the Roman Empire and our maps still trace the straight lines of the roads the Romans built.

Our ancestors—Celts, Saxons, Danes—came from the Continent.[fo 1]

Our nation was—in that favourite Community word—"restructured" under the Norman and Angevin rule in the eleventh and twelfth centuries.

This year, we celebrate the three hundredth anniversary of the glorious revolution in which the British crown passed to Prince William of Orange and Queen Mary .

Visit the great churches and cathedrals of Britain, read our literature and listen to our language: all bear witness to the cultural riches which we have drawn from Europe and other Europeans from us.

We in Britain are rightly proud of the way in which, since Magna Carta in the year 1215, we have pioneered and developed representative institutions to stand as bastions of freedom.

And proud too of the way in which for centuries Britain was a home for people from the rest of Europe who sought sanctuary from tyranny.

But we know that without the European legacy of political ideas we could not have achieved as much as we did.

From classical and mediaeval thought we have borrowed that concept of the rule of law which marks out a civilised society from barbarism.

And on that idea of Christendom, to which the Rector referred—Christendom for long synonymous with Europe—with its recognition of the unique and spiritual nature of the individual, on that idea, we still base our belief in personal liberty and other human rights.

Too often, the history of Europe is described as a series of interminable wars and quarrels.

Yet from our perspective today surely what strikes us most is our common experience. For instance, the story of how Europeans explored and colonised—and yes, without apology—civilised much of the world is an extraordinary tale of talent, skill and courage.

But we British have in a very special way contributed to Europe.

Over the centuries we have fought to prevent Europe from falling under the dominance of a single power.

We have fought and we have died for her freedom.

Only miles from here, in Belgium, lie the bodies of 120,000 British soldiers who died in the First World War.

Had it not been for that willingness to fight and to die, Europe would have been united long before now—but not in liberty, not in justice.

It was British support to resistance movements throughout the last War that helped to keep alive the flame of liberty in so many countries until the day of liberation.

Tomorrow, King Baudouin will attend a service in Brussels to commemorate the many brave Belgians who gave their lives in service with the Royal Air Force—a sacrifice which we shall never forget.

And it was from our island fortress that the liberation of Europe itself was mounted.

And still, today, we stand together.

Nearly 70,000 British servicemen are stationed on the mainland of Europe.

All these things alone are proof of our commitment to Europe's future.[fo 2]

The European Community is *one* manifestation of that European identity, but it is not the only one.

We must never forget that east of the Iron Curtain, people who once enjoyed a full share of European culture, freedom and identity have been cut off from their roots.

We shall always look on Warsaw, Prague and Budapest as great European cities.

Nor should we forget that European values have helped to make the United States of America into the valiant defender of freedom which she has become.

Europe's Future

This is no arid chronicle of obscure facts from the dust-filled libraries of history.

It is the record of nearly two thousand years of British involvement in Europe, cooperation with Europe and contribution to Europe, contribution which today is as valid and as strong as ever [sic].

Yes, we have looked also to wider horizons—as have others—and thank goodness for that, because Europe never would have prospered and never will prosper as a narrow-minded, inward-looking club.

The European Community belongs to *all* its members.

It must reflect the traditions and aspirations of *all* its members.
And let me be quite clear.

Britain does not dream of some cosy, isolated existence on the fringes of the European Community. Our destiny is in Europe, as part of the Community.

That is not to say that our future lies only in Europe, but nor does that of France or Spain or, indeed, of any other member.

The Community is not an end in itself.

Nor is it an institutional device to be constantly modified according to the dictates of some abstract intellectual concept.

Nor must it be ossified by endless regulation.

The European Community is a practical means by which Europe can ensure the future prosperity and security of its people in a world in which there are many other powerful nations and groups of nations.

We Europeans cannot afford to waste our energies on internal disputes or arcane institutional debates.

They are no substitute for effective action.

Europe has to be ready both to contribute in full measure to its own security and to compete commercially and industrially in a world in which success goes to the countries which encourage individual initiative and enterprise, rather than those which attempt to diminish them.

This evening I want to set out some guiding principles for the future which I believe will ensure that Europe does succeed, not just in economic and defence terms but also in the quality of life and the influence of its peoples.[fo 3]

Willing Cooperation Between Sovereign States

My first guiding principle is this: willing and active cooperation between independent sovereign states is the best way to build a successful European Community.

To try to suppress nationhood and concentrate power at the centre of a European conglomerate would be highly damaging and would jeopardise the objectives we seek to achieve.

Europe will be stronger precisely because it has France as France, Spain as Spain, Britain as Britain, each with its own customs, traditions and identity. It would be folly to try to fit them into some sort of identikit European personality.

Some of the founding fathers of the Community thought that the United States of America might be its model.

But the whole history of America is quite different from Europe.

People went there to get away from the intolerance and constraints of life in Europe.

They sought liberty and opportunity; and their strong sense of purpose has, over two centuries, helped to create a new unity and pride in being American, just as our pride lies in being British or Belgian or Dutch or German.

I am the first to say that on many great issues the countries of Europe should try to speak with a single voice.

I want to see us work more closely on the things we can do better together than alone.

Europe is stronger when we do so, whether it be in trade, in defence or in our relations with the rest of the world.

But working more closely together does not require power to be centralised in Brussels or decisions to be taken by an appointed bureaucracy.

Indeed, it is ironic that just when those countries such as the Soviet Union, which have tried to run everything from the centre, are learning that success depends on dispersing power and decisions away from the centre, there are some in the Community who seem to want to move in the opposite direction.

We have not successfully rolled back the frontiers of the state in Britain, only to see them re-imposed at a European level with a European super-state exercising a new dominance from Brussels.

Certainly we want to see Europe more united and with a greater sense of common purpose. But it must be in a way which preserves the different traditions, parliamentary powers and sense of national pride in one's own country; for these have been the source of Europe's vitality through the centuries.

Encouraging change

My second guiding principle is this: Community policies must tackle present problems in a *practical* way, however difficult that may be.

If we cannot reform those Community policies which are patently wrong or ineffective and which are rightly causing public disquiet, then we shall not get the public support for the Community's future development.

And that is why the achievements of the European Council in Brussels last February are so important.[fo 4]

It was not right that half the total Community budget was being spent on storing and disposing of surplus food.

Now those stocks are being sharply reduced.

It was absolutely right to decide that agriculture's share of the budget should be cut in order to free resources for other policies, such as helping the less well-off regions and helping training for jobs.

It was right too to introduce tighter budgetary discipline to enforce these decisions and to bring the Community spending under better control.

And those who complained that the Community was spending so much time on financial detail missed the point. You cannot build on unsound foundations, financial or otherwise, and it was the fundamental reforms agreed last winter which paved the way for the remarkable progress which we have made since on the Single Market.

But we cannot rest on what we have achieved to date.

For example, the task of reforming the Common Agricultural Policy is far from complete. Certainly, Europe needs a stable and efficient farming industry.

But the CAP has become unwieldy, inefficient and grossly expensive. Production of unwanted surpluses safeguards neither the income nor the future of farmers themselves.

We must *continue* to pursue policies which relate supply more closely to market requirements, and which will reduce over-production and limit costs.

Of course, we must protect the villages and rural areas which are such an important part of our national life, but not by the instrument of agricultural prices.

Tackling these problems requires political courage.

The Community will only damage itself in the eyes of its own people and the outside world if that courage is lacking.

Europe Open to Enterprise

My third guiding principle is the need for Community policies which encourage enterprise. If Europe is to flourish and create the jobs of the future, enterprise is the key.

The basic framework is there: the Treaty of Rome itself was intended as a Charter for Economic Liberty.

But that it is not how it has always been read, still less applied.

The lesson of the economic history of Europe in the 70's and 80's is that central planning and detailed control *do not* work and that personal endeavour and initiative *do*.

That a State-controlled economy is a recipe for low growth and that free enterprise within a framework of law brings better results.

The aim of a Europe open to enterprise is the moving force behind the creation of the Single European Market in 1992. By getting rid of barriers, by making it possible for companies to operate on a European scale, we can best compete with the United States, Japan and other new economic powers emerging in Asia and elsewhere.[fo 5]

And that means action to *free* markets, action to *widen* choice, action to *reduce* government intervention.

Our aim should *not* be more and more detailed regulation from the centre: it should be to deregulate and to remove the constraints on trade.

Britain has been in the lead in opening its markets to others.

The City of London has long welcomed financial institutions from all over the world, which is why it is the biggest and most successful financial centre in Europe.

We have opened our market for telecommunications equipment, introduced competition into the market services and even into the network itself—steps which others in Europe are only now beginning to face.

In air transport, we have taken the lead in liberalisation and seen the benefits in cheaper fares and wider choice.

Our coastal shipping trade is open to the merchant navies of Europe.

We wish we could say the same of many other Community members.

Regarding *monetary matters*, let me say this. The key issue is not whether there should be a European Central Bank.

The immediate and practical requirements are:

- ◆ to implement the Community's commitment to free movement of capital—in Britain, we have it;
- ◆ and to the abolition through the Community of exchange controls—in Britain, we abolished them in 1979;
- ◆ to establish a genuinely free market in financial services in banking, insurance, investment;
- ◆ and to make greater use of the ecu.

This autumn, Britain is issuing ecu-denominated Treasury bills and hopes to see other Community governments increasingly do the same.

These are the *real* requirements because they are what the Community business and industry need if they are to compete effectively in the wider world.

And they are what the European consumer wants, for they will widen his choice and lower his costs.

It is to such basic practical steps that the Community's attention should be devoted.

When those have been achieved and sustained over a period of time, we shall be in a better position to judge the next move.

It is the same with *frontiers* between our countries.

Of course, we want to make it easier for goods to pass through frontiers.

Of course, we must make it easier for people to travel throughout the Community.

But it is a matter of plain common sense that we cannot totally abolish frontier controls if we are also to protect our citizens from crime and stop the movement of drugs, of terrorists and of illegal immigrants.[fo 6]

That was underlined graphically only three weeks ago when one brave German customs officer, doing his duty on the frontier between Holland and Germany, struck a major blow against the terrorists of the IRA.

And before I leave the subject of a single market, may I say that we certainly do not need new regulations which raise the cost of employment and make Europe's labour market less flexible and less competitive with overseas suppliers.

If we are to have a European Company Statute, it should contain the minimum regulations.

And certainly we in Britain would fight attempts to introduce collectivism and corporatism at the European level—although what people wish to do in their own countries is a matter for them.

Europe Open to the World

My fourth guiding principle is that Europe should not be protectionist.

The expansion of the world economy requires us to continue the process of removing barriers to trade, and to do so in the multilateral negotiations in the GATT.

It would be a betrayal if, while breaking down constraints on trade within Europe, the Community were to erect greater external protection.

We must ensure that our approach to world trade is consistent with the liberalisation we preach at home.

We have a responsibility to give a lead on this, a responsibility which is particularly directed towards the less developed countries.

They need not only aid; more than anything, they need improved trading opportunities if they are to gain the dignity of growing economic strength and independence.

Europe and Defence

My last guiding principle concerns the most fundamental issue—the European countries' role in defence.

Europe must continue to maintain a sure defence through NATO.

There can be no question of relaxing our efforts, even though it means taking difficult decisions and meeting heavy costs.

It is to NATO that we owe the peace that has been maintained over 40 years.

The fact is things *are* going our way: the democratic model of a free enterprise society *has* proved itself superior; freedom is on the offensive, a peaceful offensive the world over, for the first time in my life-time.

We must strive to maintain the United States' commitment to Europe's defence. And that means recognising the burden on their resources of the world role they undertake and their point that their allies should bear the full part of the defence of freedom, particularly as Europe grows wealthier.

Increasingly, they will look to Europe to play a part in out-of-area defence, as we have recently done in the Gulf.

NATO and the Western European Union have long recognised where the problems of Europe's defence lie, and have pointed out the solutions. And the time has come when we must give substance to our declarations about a strong defence effort with better value for money.[fo 7]

It is not an institutional problem.

It is not a problem of drafting. It is something at once simpler and more profound: it is a question of political will and political courage, of convincing people in all our countries that we cannot rely for ever on others for our defence, but that each member of the Alliance must shoulder a fair share of the burden.

We must keep up public support for nuclear deterrence, remembering that obsolete weapons do not deter, hence the need for modernisation.

We must meet the requirements for effective conventional defence in Europe against Soviet forces which are constantly being modernised.

We should develop the WEU, not as an alternative to NATO, but as a means of strengthening Europe's contribution to the common defence of the West.

Above all, at a time of change and uncertainty in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, we must preserve Europe's unity and resolve so that whatever may happen, our defence is sure.

At the same time, we must negotiate on arms control and keep the door wide open to cooperation on all the other issues covered by the Helsinki Accords.

But let us never forget that our way of life, our vision and all we hope to achieve, is secured not by the rightness of our cause but by the strength of our defence.

On this, we must never falter, never fail.

The British Approach

Mr. Chairman, I believe it is not enough just to talk in general terms about a European vision or ideal.

If we believe in it, we must chart the way ahead and identify the next steps.

And that is what I have tried to do this evening.

This approach does not require new documents: they are all there, the North Atlantic Treaty, the Revised Brussels Treaty and the Treaty of Rome, texts written by far-sighted men, a remarkable Belgian— Paul Henri Spaak —among them.

However far we may want to go, the truth is that we can only get there one step at a time.

And what we need now is to take decisions on the next steps forward, rather than let ourselves be distracted by Utopian goals.

Utopia never comes, because we know we should not like it if it did.

Let Europe be a family of nations, understanding each other better, appreciating each other more, doing more together but relishing our national identity no less than our common European endeavour.

Let us have a Europe which plays its full part in the wider world, which looks outward not inward, and which preserves that Atlantic community—that Europe on both sides of the Atlantic—which is our noblest inheritance and our greatest strength.

May I thank you for the privilege of delivering this lecture in this great hall to this great college.

Source: <http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/107332>

Annex C

Tony Blair Speech, 23 June 2005

It is an honour to be here in the European Parliament today.

With your permission, I will come back after each European Council during the UK Presidency and report to you. In addition, I would be happy to consult the Parliament before each Council, so as to have the benefit of the views of the European Parliament before Council deliberations.

This is a timely address. Whatever else people disagree upon in Europe today, they at least agree on one point: Europe is in the midst of a profound debate about its future.

I want to talk to you plainly today about this debate, the reasons for it and how to resolve it. In every crisis there is an opportunity. There is one here for Europe now, if we have the courage to take it.

The debate over Europe should not be conducted by trading insults or in terms of personality. It should be an open and frank exchange of ideas. And right at the outset I want to describe clearly how I define the debate and the disagreement underlying it.

The issue is not between a "free market" Europe and a social Europe, between those who want to retreat to a common market and those who believe in Europe as a political project.

This is not just a misrepresentation. It is to intimidate those who want change in Europe by representing the desire for change as betrayal of the European ideal, to try to shut off serious debate about Europe's future by claiming that the very insistence on debate is to embrace the anti-Europe.

It is a mindset I have fought against all my political life. Ideals survive through change. They die through inertia in the face of challenge.

I am a passionate pro-European. I always have been. My first vote was in 1975 in the British referendum on membership and I voted yes. In 1983, when I was the last candidate in the UK to be selected shortly before that election and when my party had a policy of withdrawing from Europe, I told the selection conference that I disagreed with the policy. Some thought I had lost the selection. Some perhaps wish I had. I then helped change our policy in the 1980's and was proud of that change.

Since being Prime Minister I signed the Social Chapter, helped, along with France, to create the modern European Defence Policy, have played my part in the Amsterdam, the Nice, then the Rome Treaties.

This is a union of values, of solidarity between nations and people, of not just a common market in which we trade but a common political space in which we live as citizens. It always will be.

I believe in Europe as a political project. I believe in Europe with a strong and caring social dimension. I would never accept a Europe that was simply an economic market.

To say that is the issue is to escape the real debate and hide in the comfort zone of the things we have always said to each other in times of difficulty.

There is not some division between the Europe necessary to succeed economically and social Europe. Political Europe and economic Europe do not live in separate rooms.

The purpose of social Europe and economic Europe should be to sustain each other.

The purpose of political Europe should be to promote the democratic and effective institutions to develop policy in these two spheres and across the board where we want and need to cooperate in our mutual interest.

But the purpose of political leadership is to get the policies right for today's world.

For 50 years Europe's leaders have done that. We talk of crisis. Let us first talk of achievement. When the war ended, Europe was in ruins. Today the EU stands as a monument to political achievement. Almost 50 years of peace, 50 years of prosperity, 50 years of progress. Think of it and be grateful.

The broad sweep of history is on the side of the EU. Countries round the world are coming together because in collective cooperation they increase individual strength. Until the second half of the 20th Century, for centuries European nations individually had dominated the world, colonised large parts of it, fought wars against each other for world supremacy.

Out of the carnage of the Second World War, political leaders had the vision to realise those days were gone. Today's world does not diminish that vision. It demonstrates its prescience. The USA is the world's only super power. But China and India in a few decades will be the world's largest economies, each of them with populations three times that of the whole of the EU. The idea of Europe, united and working together, is essential for our nations to be strong enough to keep our place in this world.

Now, almost 50 years on, we have to renew. There is no shame in that. All institutions must do it. And we can. But only if we remarry the European ideals we believe in with the modern world we live in.

If Europe defaulted to Euro scepticism, or if European nations faced with this immense challenge, decide to huddle together, hoping we can avoid globalisation, shrink away from confronting the changes around us, take refuge in the present policies of Europe as if by constantly repeating them, we would by the very act of repetition make them more relevant, then we risk failure. Failure on a grand, strategic, scale. This is not a time to accuse those who want Europe to change of betraying Europe. It is a time to recognise that only by change will Europe recover its strength, its relevance, its idealism and therefore its support amongst the people.

And as ever the people are ahead of the politicians. We always think as a political class that people, unconcerned with the daily obsession of politics, may not understand it, may not see its subtleties and its complexities. But, ultimately, people always see politics more clearly than us. Precisely because they are not daily obsessed with it.

The issue is not about the idea of the European Union. It is about modernisation. It is about policy. It is not a debate about how to abandon Europe but how to make it do what it was set up to do: improve the lives of people. And right now, they aren't convinced. Consider this.

For four years Europe conducted a debate over our new Constitution, two years of it in the Convention. It was a detailed and careful piece of work setting out the new rules to govern a Europe of 25 and in time 27, 28 and more member states. It was endorsed by all Governments. It was supported by all leaders. It was then comprehensively rejected in referendums in two founding Member States, in the case of the Netherlands by over 60 per cent. The reality is that in most Member States it would be hard today to secure a 'yes' for it in a referendum.

There are two possible explanations. One is that people studied the Constitution and disagreed with its precise articles. I doubt that was the basis of the majority 'no'. This was not an issue of bad drafting or specific textual disagreement.

The other explanation is that the Constitution became merely the vehicle for the people to register a wider and deeper discontent with the state of affairs in Europe. I believe this to be the correct analysis.

If so, it is not a crisis of political institutions, it is a crisis of political leadership. People in Europe are posing hard questions to us. They worry about globalisation, job security, about pensions and living standards. They see not just their economy but their society changing around them. Traditional communities are broken up, ethnic patterns change, family life is under strain as families struggle to balance work and home.

We are living through an era of profound upheaval and change. Look at our children and the technology they use and the jobs market they face. The world is unrecognisable from that we experienced as students 20, 30 years ago. When such change occurs, moderate people must give leadership. If they don't, the extremes gain traction on the political process. It happens within a nation. It is happening in Europe now.

Just reflect. The Laeken Declaration which launched the Constitution was designed "to bring Europe closer to the people". Did it? The Lisbon agenda was launched in the year 2000 with the ambition of making Europe "the most competitive place to do business in the world by 2010". We are half way through that period. Has it succeeded?

I have sat through Council Conclusions after Council Conclusions describing how we are "reconnecting Europe to the people". Are we?

It is time to give ourselves a reality check. To receive the wake-up call. The people are blowing the trumpets round the city walls. Are we listening? Have we the political will to go out and meet them so that they regard our leadership as part of the solution not the problem?

That is the context in which the Budget debate should be set. People say: we need the Budget to restore Europe's credibility. Of course we do. But it should be the right Budget. It shouldn't be abstracted from the debate about Europe's crisis. It should be part of the answer to it.

I want to say a word about last Friday's Summit. There have been suggestions that I was not willing to compromise on the UK rebate; that I only raised CAP reform at the last minute;

that I expected to renegotiate the CAP on Friday night. In fact I am the only British leader that has ever said I would put the rebate on the table. I never said we should end the CAP now or renegotiate it overnight. Such a position would be absurd. Any change must take account of the legitimate needs of farming communities and happen over time. I have said simply two things: that we cannot agree a new financial perspective that does not at least set out a process that leads to a more rational Budget; and that this must allow such a Budget to shape the second half of that perspective up to 2013. Otherwise it will be 2014 before any fundamental change is agreed, let alone implemented. Again, in the meantime, of course Britain will pay its fair share of enlargement. I might point out that on any basis we would remain the second highest net contributor to the EU, having in this perspective paid billions more than similar sized countries.

So, that is the context. What would a different policy agenda for Europe look like?

First, it would modernise our social model. Again some have suggested I want to abandon Europe's social model. But tell me: what type of social model is it that has 20m unemployed in Europe, productivity rates falling behind those of the USA; that is allowing more science graduates to be produced by India than by Europe; and that, on any relative index of a modern economy - skills, R&D, patents, IT, is going down not up. India will expand its biotechnology sector fivefold in the next five years. China has trebled its spending on R&D in the last five.

Of the top 20 universities in the world today, only two are now in Europe.

The purpose of our social model should be to enhance our ability to compete, to help our people cope with globalisation, to let them embrace its opportunities and avoid its dangers. Of course we need a social Europe. But it must be a social Europe that works.

And we've been told how to do it. The Kok report in 2004 shows the way. Investment in knowledge, in skills, in active labour market policies, in science parks and innovation, in higher education, in urban regeneration, in help for small businesses. This is modern social policy, not regulation and job protection that may save some jobs for a time at the expense of many jobs in the future.

And since this is a day for demolishing caricatures, let me demolish one other: the idea that Britain is in the grip of some extreme Anglo-Saxon market philosophy that tramples on the poor and disadvantaged. The present British Government has introduced the new deal for the unemployed, the largest jobs programme in Europe that has seen long-term youth unemployment virtually abolished. It has increased investment in our public services more than any other European country in the past five years. We needed to, it is true, but we did it. We have introduced Britain's first minimum wage. We have regenerated our cities. We have lifted almost one million children out of poverty and two million pensioners out of acute hardship and are embarked on the most radical expansion of childcare, maternity and paternity rights in our country's history. It is just that we have done it on the basis of and not at the expense of a strong economy.

Secondly, let the Budget reflect these realities. Again the Sapir report shows the way. Published by the European Commission in 2003, it sets out in clear detail what a modern European Budget would look like. Put it into practice. But a modern Budget for Europe is not one that 10 years from now is still spending 40 per cent of its money on the CAP.

Thirdly, implement the Lisbon Agenda. On jobs, labour market participation, school leavers, lifelong learning, we are making progress that nowhere near matches the precise targets we set out at Lisbon. That Agenda told us what to do. Let us do it.

Fourth, and here I tread carefully, get a macroeconomic framework for Europe that is disciplined but also flexible. It is not for me to comment on the Eurozone. I just say this: if we agreed real progress on economic reform, if we demonstrated real seriousness on structural change, then people would perceive reform of macro policy as sensible and rational, not a product of fiscal laxity but of commonsense. And we need such reform urgently if Europe is to grow.

After the economic and social challenges, then let us confront another set of linked issues - crime, security and immigration.

Crime is now crossing borders more easily than ever before. Organised crime costs the UK at least £20bn annually.

Migration has doubled in the past 20 years. Much of the migration is healthy and welcome. But it must be managed. Illegal immigration is an issue for all our nations, and a human tragedy for many thousands of people. It is estimated that 70 per cent of illegal immigrants have their passage facilitated by organised crime groups. Then there is the repugnant practice of human trafficking whereby organised gangs move people from one region to another with the intention of exploiting them when they arrive. Between 600,000 and 800,000 people are trafficked globally each year. Every year over 100,000 women are victims of trafficking in the European Union.

Again, a relevant JHA agenda would focus on these issues: implementing the EU action plan on counter-terrorism which has huge potential to improve law enforcement as well as addressing the radicalisation and recruitment of terrorists; cross-border intelligence and policing on organised crime; developing proposals to hit the people and drug traffickers hard, in opening up their bank accounts, harassing their activities, arresting their leading members and bring them to justice; getting returns agreements for failed asylum seekers and illegal immigrants from neighbouring countries and others; developing biometric technology to make Europe's borders secure.

Then there is the whole area of CFSP. We should be agreeing practical measures to enhance European defence capability, be prepared to take on more missions of peacekeeping and enforcement, develop the capability, with NATO or where NATO does not want to be engaged outside it, to be able to intervene quickly and effectively in support of conflict resolution. Look at the numbers in European armies today and our expenditure. Do they really answer the strategic needs of today?

Such a defence policy is a necessary part of an effective foreign policy. But even without it, we should be seeing how we can make Europe's influence count. When the European Union agreed recently a doubling of aid to Africa, it was an immediate boost not just for that troubled continent, but for European cooperation. We are world leaders in development and proud of it. We should be leading the way on promoting a new multi-lateral trade agreement which will increase trade for all, especially the poorest nations. We are leading the debate on climate change and developing pan-European policies to tackle it. Thanks to Xavier Solana,

Europe has started to make its presence felt in the MEPP. But my point is very simple. A strong Europe would be an active player in foreign policy, a good partner of course to the US but also capable of demonstrating its own capacity to shape and move the world forward.

Such a Europe - its economy in the process of being modernised, its security enhanced by clear action within our borders and beyond - would be a confident Europe. It would be a Europe confident enough to see enlargement not as a threat, as if membership were a zero sum game in which old members lose as new members gain, but an extraordinary, historic opportunity to build a greater and more powerful union. Because be under no illusion: if we stop enlargement or shut out its natural consequences, it wouldn't, in the end, save one job, keep one firm in business, prevent one delocalisation. For a time it might but not for long. And in the meantime Europe will become more narrow, more introspective and those who garner support will be those no in the traditions of European idealism but in those of outdated nationalism and xenophobia. But I tell you in all frankness: it is a contradiction to be in favour of liberalising Europe's membership but against opening up its economy.

If we set out that clear direction; if we then combined it with the Commission - as this one under Jose Manuel Barroso's leadership is fully capable of doing - that is prepared to send back some of the unnecessary regulation, peel back some of the bureaucracy and become a champion of a global, outward-looking, competitive Europe, then it will not be hard to capture the imagination and support of the people of Europe.

In our Presidency, we will try to take forward the Budget deal; to resolve some of the hard dossiers, like the Services Directive and Working Time Directive; to carry out the Union's obligations to those like Turkey and Croatia that wait in hope of a future as part of Europe; and to conduct this debate about the future of Europe in an open, inclusive way, giving our own views strongly but fully respectful of the views of others.

Only one thing I ask: don't let us kid ourselves that this debate is unnecessary; that if only we assume 'business as usual', people will sooner or later relent and acquiesce in Europe s it is, not as they want it to be. In my time as Prime Minister, I have found that the hard part is not taking the decision, it is spotting when it has to be taken. It is understanding the difference between the challenges that have to be managed and those that have to be confronted and overcome. This is such a moment of decision for Europe.

The people of Europe are speaking to us. They are posing the questions. They are wanting our leadership. It is time we gave it to them.

Source: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/4122288.stm

Annex D

David Cameron EU Speech, 23 January 2013

“This morning I want to talk about the future of Europe.

But first, let us remember the past.

Seventy years ago, Europe was being torn apart by its second catastrophic conflict in a generation. A war which saw the streets of European cities strewn with rubble. The skies of London lit by flames night after night. And millions dead across the world in the battle for peace and liberty.

As we remember their sacrifice, so we should also remember how the shift in Europe from war to sustained peace came about. It did not happen like a change in the weather. It happened because of determined work over generations. A commitment to friendship and a resolve never to re-visit that dark past – a commitment epitomised by the Elysee Treaty signed 50 years ago this week.

After the Berlin Wall came down I visited that city and I will never forget it.

The abandoned checkpoints. The sense of excitement about the future. The knowledge that a great continent was coming together. Healing those wounds of our history is the central story of the European Union.

What Churchill described as the twin marauders of war and tyranny have been almost entirely banished from our continent. Today, hundreds of millions dwell in freedom, from the Baltic to the Adriatic, from the Western Approaches to the Aegean.

And while we must never take this for granted, the first purpose of the European Union – to secure peace – has been achieved and we should pay tribute to all those in the EU, alongside NATO, who made that happen.

But today the main, over-riding purpose of the European Union is different: not to win peace, but to secure prosperity.

The challenges come not from within this continent but outside it. From the surging economies in the East and South. Of course a growing world economy benefits us all, but we should be in no doubt that a new global race of nations is underway today.

A race for the wealth and jobs of the future.

The map of global influence is changing before our eyes. And these changes are already being felt by the entrepreneur in the Netherlands, the worker in Germany, the family in Britain.

So I want to speak to you today with urgency and frankness about the European Union and how it must change – both to deliver prosperity and to retain the support of its peoples.

But first, I want to set out the spirit in which I approach these issues.

I know that the United Kingdom is sometimes seen as an argumentative and rather strong-minded member of the family of European nations.

And it's true that our geography has shaped our psychology.

We have the character of an island nation – independent, forthright, passionate in defence of our sovereignty.

We can no more change this British sensibility than we can drain the English Channel.

And because of this sensibility, we come to the European Union with a frame of mind that is more practical than emotional.

For us, the European Union is a means to an end – prosperity, stability, the anchor of freedom and democracy both within Europe and beyond her shores – not an end in itself.

We insistently ask: How? Why? To what end?

But all this doesn't make us somehow un-European.

The fact is that ours is not just an island story – it is also a continental story.

For all our connections to the rest of the world – of which we are rightly proud – we have always been a European power – and we always will be.

From Caesar's legions to the Napoleonic Wars. From the Reformation, the Enlightenment and the Industrial Revolution to the defeat of Nazism. We have helped to write European history, and Europe has helped write ours.

Over the years, Britain has made her own, unique contribution to Europe. We have provided a haven to those fleeing tyranny and persecution. And in Europe's darkest hour, we helped keep the flame of liberty alight. Across the continent, in silent cemeteries, lie the hundreds of thousands of British servicemen who gave their lives for Europe's freedom.

In more recent decades, we have played our part in tearing down the Iron Curtain and championing the entry into the EU of those countries that lost so many years to Communism. And contained in this history is the crucial point about Britain, our national character, our attitude to Europe.

Britain is characterised not just by its independence but, above all, by its openness.

We have always been a country that reaches out. That turns its face to the world...

That leads the charge in the fight for global trade and against protectionism.

This is Britain today, as it's always been: Independent, yes – but open, too.

I never want us to pull up the drawbridge and retreat from the world.

I am not a British isolationist.

I don't just want a better deal for Britain. I want a better deal for Europe too.

So I speak as British Prime Minister with a positive vision for the future of the European Union. A future in which Britain wants, and should want, to play a committed and active part.

Some might then ask: why raise fundamental questions about the future of Europe when Europe is already in the midst of a deep crisis?

Why raise questions about Britain's role when support in Britain is already so thin.

There are always voices saying "don't ask the difficult questions."

But it's essential for Europe – and for Britain – that we do because there are three major challenges confronting us today.

First, the problems in the Eurozone are driving fundamental change in Europe.

Second, there is a crisis of European competitiveness, as other nations across the world soar ahead. And third, there is a gap between the EU and its citizens which has grown dramatically in recent years. And which represents a lack of democratic accountability and consent that is – yes – felt particularly acutely in Britain.

If we don't address these challenges, the danger is that Europe will fail and the British people will drift towards the exit.

I do not want that to happen. I want the European Union to be a success. And I want a relationship between Britain and the EU that keeps us in it.

That is why I am here today: To acknowledge the nature of the challenges we face. To set out how I believe the European Union should respond to them. And to explain what I want to achieve for Britain and its place within the European Union.

Let me start with the nature of the challenges we face.

First, the Eurozone.

The future shape of Europe is being forged. There are some serious questions that will define the future of the European Union – and the future of every country within it.

The Union is changing to help fix the currency – and that has profound implications for all of us, whether we are in the single currency or not.

Britain is not in the single currency, and we're not going to be. But we all need the Eurozone to have the right governance and structures to secure a successful currency for the long term.

And those of us outside the Eurozone also need certain safeguards to ensure, for example, that our access to the Single Market is not in any way compromised.

And it's right we begin to address these issues now.

Second, while there are some countries within the EU which are doing pretty well. Taken as a whole, Europe's share of world output is projected to fall by almost a third in the next two decades. This is the competitiveness challenge – and much of our weakness in meeting it is self-inflicted.

Complex rules restricting our labour markets are not some naturally occurring phenomenon. Just as excessive regulation is not some external plague that's been visited on our businesses. These problems have been around too long. And the progress in dealing with them, far too slow.

As Chancellor Merkel has said – if Europe today accounts for just over 7 per cent of the world's population, produces around 25 per cent of global GDP and has to finance 50 per cent of global social spending, then it's obvious that it will have to work very hard to maintain its prosperity and way of life.

Third, there is a growing frustration that the EU is seen as something that is done to people rather than acting on their behalf. And this is being intensified by the very solutions required to resolve the economic problems.

People are increasingly frustrated that decisions taken further and further away from them mean their living standards are slashed through enforced austerity or their taxes are used to bail out governments on the other side of the continent.

We are starting to see this in the demonstrations on the streets of Athens, Madrid and Rome. We are seeing it in the parliaments of Berlin, Helsinki and the Hague.

And yes, of course, we are seeing this frustration with the EU very dramatically in Britain.

Europe's leaders have a duty to hear these concerns. Indeed, we have a duty to act on them. And not just to fix the problems in the Eurozone.

For just as in any emergency you should plan for the aftermath as well as dealing with the present crisis so too in the midst of the present challenges we should plan for the future, and what the world will look like when the difficulties in the Eurozone have been overcome.

The biggest danger to the European Union comes not from those who advocate change, but from those who denounce new thinking as heresy. In its long history Europe has experience of heretics who turned out to have a point.

And my point is this. More of the same will not secure a long-term future for the Eurozone. More of the same will not see the European Union keeping pace with the new powerhouse economies. More of the same will not bring the European Union any closer to its citizens. More of the same will just produce more of the same – less competitiveness, less growth, fewer jobs.

And that will make our countries weaker not stronger.

That is why we need fundamental, far-reaching change.

So let me set out my vision for a new European Union, fit for the 21st Century.

It is built on five principles.

The first: competitiveness. At the core of the European Union must be, as it is now, the single market. Britain is at the heart of that Single Market, and must remain so.

But when the Single Market remains incomplete in services, energy and digital – the very sectors that are the engines of a modern economy – it is only half the success it could be.

It is nonsense that people shopping online in some parts of Europe are unable to access the best deals because of where they live. I want completing the single market to be our driving mission.

I want us to be at the forefront of transformative trade deals with the US, Japan and India as part of the drive towards global free trade. And I want us to be pushing to exempt Europe's smallest entrepreneurial companies from more EU Directives.

These should be the tasks that get European officials up in the morning – and keep them working late into the night. And so we urgently need to address the sclerotic, ineffective decision making that is holding us back.

That means creating a leaner, less bureaucratic Union, relentlessly focused on helping its member countries to compete.

In a global race, can we really justify the huge number of expensive peripheral European institutions?

Can we justify a Commission that gets ever larger?

Can we carry on with an organisation that has a multi-billion pound budget but not enough focus on controlling spending and shutting down programmes that haven't worked?

And I would ask: when the competitiveness of the Single Market is so important, why is there an environment council, a transport council, an education council but not a single market council?

The second principle should be flexibility.

We need a structure that can accommodate the diversity of its members – North, South, East, West, large, small, old and new. Some of whom are contemplating much closer economic and political integration. And many others, including Britain, who would never embrace that goal. I accept, of course, that for the single market to function we need a common set of rules and a way of enforcing them. But we also need to be able to respond quickly to the latest developments and trends.

Competitiveness demands flexibility, choice and openness – or Europe will fetch up in a no-man's land between the rising economies of Asia and market-driven North America.

The EU must be able to act with the speed and flexibility of a network, not the cumbersome rigidity of a bloc.

We must not be weighed down by an insistence on a one size fits all approach which implies that all countries want the same level of integration. The fact is that they don't and we shouldn't assert that they do.

Some will claim that this offends a central tenet of the EU's founding philosophy. I say it merely reflects the reality of the European Union today. 17 members are part of the Eurozone. 10 are not.

26 European countries are members of Schengen – including four outside the European Union – Switzerland, Norway, Liechtenstein and Iceland. 2 EU countries – Britain and Ireland – have retained their border controls.

Some members, like Britain and France, are ready, willing and able to take action in Libya or Mali. Others are uncomfortable with the use of military force.

Let's welcome that diversity, instead of trying to snuff it out.

Let's stop all this talk of two-speed Europe, of fast lanes and slow lanes, of countries missing trains and buses, and consign the whole weary caravan of metaphors to a permanent siding.

Instead, let's start from this proposition: we are a family of democratic nations, all members of one European Union, whose essential foundation is the single market rather than the single currency. Those of us outside the euro recognise that those in it are likely to need to make some big institutional changes.

By the same token, the members of the Eurozone should accept that we, and indeed all Member States, will have changes that we need to safeguard our interests and strengthen democratic legitimacy. And we should be able to make these changes too.

Some say this will unravel the principle of the EU – and that you can't pick and choose on the basis of what your nation needs.

But far from unravelling the EU, this will in fact bind its Members more closely because such flexible, willing cooperation is a much stronger glue than compulsion from the centre.

Let me make a further heretical proposition.

The European Treaty commits the Member States to “lay the foundations of an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe”.

This has been consistently interpreted as applying not to the peoples but rather to the states and institutions compounded by a European Court of Justice that has consistently supported greater centralisation.

We understand and respect the right of others to maintain their commitment to this goal. But for Britain – and perhaps for others – it is not the objective.

And we would be much more comfortable if the Treaty specifically said so freeing those who want to go further, faster, to do so, without being held back by the others.

So to those who say we have no vision for Europe.

I say we have.

We believe in a flexible union of free member states who share treaties and institutions and pursue together the ideal of co-operation. To represent and promote the values of European civilisation in the world. To advance our shared interests by using our collective power to open markets. And to build a strong economic base across the whole of Europe.

And we believe in our nations working together to protect the security and diversity of our energy supplies. To tackle climate change and global poverty. To work together against terrorism and organised crime. And to continue to welcome new countries into the EU.

This vision of flexibility and co-operation is not the same as those who want to build an ever closer political union – but it is just as valid.

My third principle is that power must be able to flow back to Member States, not just away from them. This was promised by European Leaders at Laeken a decade ago. It was put in the Treaty. But the promise has never really been fulfilled. We need to implement this principle properly.

So let us use this moment, as the Dutch Prime Minister has recently suggested, to examine thoroughly what the EU as a whole should do and should stop doing.

In Britain we have already launched our balance of competences review – to give us an informed and objective analysis of where the EU helps and where it hampers. Let us not be misled by the fallacy that a deep and workable single market requires everything to be harmonised, to hanker after some unattainable and infinitely level playing field.

Countries are different. They make different choices. We cannot harmonise everything. For example, it is neither right nor necessary to claim that the integrity of the single market, or full membership of the European Union requires the working hours of British hospital doctors to be set in Brussels irrespective of the views of British parliamentarians and practitioners.

In the same way we need to examine whether the balance is right in so many areas where the European Union has legislated including on the environment, social affairs and crime. Nothing should be off the table.

My fourth principle is democratic accountability: we need to have a bigger and more significant role for national parliaments.

There is not, in my view, a single European demos.

It is national parliaments, which are, and will remain, the true source of real democratic legitimacy and accountability in the EU.

It is to the Bundestag that Angela Merkel has to answer. It is through the Greek Parliament that Antonis Samaras has to pass his Government's austerity measures.

It is to the British Parliament that I must account on the EU budget negotiations, or on the safeguarding of our place in the single market.

Those are the Parliaments which instil proper respect – even fear – into national leaders. We need to recognise that in the way the EU does business.

My fifth principle is fairness: whatever new arrangements are enacted for the Eurozone, they must work fairly for those inside it and out.

That will be of particular importance to Britain. As I have said, we will not join the single currency. But there is no overwhelming economic reason why the single currency and the single market should share the same boundary, any more than the single market and Schengen.

Our participation in the single market, and our ability to help set its rules is the principal reason for our membership of the EU.

So it is a vital interest for us to protect the integrity and fairness of the single market for all its members.

And that is why Britain has been so concerned to promote and defend the single market as the Eurozone crisis rewrites the rules on fiscal coordination and banking union.

These five principles provide what, I believe, is the right approach for the European Union.

So now let me turn to what this means for Britain.

Today, public disillusionment with the EU is at an all time high. There are several reasons for this.

People feel that the EU is heading in a direction that they never signed up to. They resent the interference in our national life by what they see as unnecessary rules and regulation. And they wonder what the point of it all is.

Put simply, many ask “why can't we just have what we voted to join – a common market?”

They are angered by some legal judgements made in Europe that impact on life in Britain. Some of this antipathy about Europe in general really relates of course to the European Court of Human Rights, rather than the EU. And Britain is leading European efforts to address this. There is, indeed, much more that needs to be done on this front. But people also feel that the EU is now heading for a level of political integration that is far outside Britain's comfort zone.

They see Treaty after Treaty changing the balance between Member States and the EU. And note they were never given a say.

They've had referendums promised – but not delivered. They see what has happened to the Euro. And they note that many of our political and business leaders urged Britain to join at the time.

And they haven't noticed many expressions of contrition.

And they look at the steps the Eurozone is taking and wonder what deeper integration for the Eurozone will mean for a country which is not going to join the Euro.

The result is that democratic consent for the EU in Britain is now wafer thin.

Some people say that to point this out is irresponsible, creates uncertainty for business and puts a question mark over Britain's place in the European Union.

But the question mark is already there and ignoring it won't make it go away.

In fact, quite the reverse. Those who refuse to contemplate consulting the British people, would in my view make more likely our eventual exit.

Simply asking the British people to carry on accepting a European settlement over which they have had little choice is a path to ensuring that when the question is finally put – and at some stage it will have to be – it is much more likely that the British people will reject the EU.

That is why I am in favour of a referendum. I believe in confronting this issue – shaping it, leading the debate. Not simply hoping a difficult situation will go away.

Some argue that the solution is therefore to hold a straight in-out referendum now.

I understand the impatience of wanting to make that choice immediately.

But I don't believe that to make a decision at this moment is the right way forward, either for Britain or for Europe as a whole.

A vote today between the status quo and leaving would be an entirely false choice.

Now – while the EU is in flux, and when we don't know what the future holds and what sort of EU will emerge from this crisis is not the right time to make such a momentous decision about the future of our country.

It is wrong to ask people whether to stay or go before we have had a chance to put the relationship right.

How can we sensibly answer the question 'in or out' without being able to answer the most basic question: 'what is it exactly that we are choosing to be in or out of?'

The European Union that emerges from the Eurozone crisis is going to be a very different body. It will be transformed perhaps beyond recognition by the measures needed to save the Eurozone.

We need to allow some time for that to happen – and help to shape the future of the European Union, so that when the choice comes it will be a real one.

A real choice between leaving or being part of a new settlement in which Britain shapes and respects the rules of the single market but is protected by fair safeguards, and free of the spurious regulation which damages Europe’s competitiveness.

A choice between leaving or being part of a new settlement in which Britain is at the forefront of collective action on issues like foreign policy and trade and where we leave the door firmly open to new members.

A new settlement subject to the democratic legitimacy and accountability of national parliaments where Member States combine in flexible cooperation, respecting national differences not always trying to eliminate them and in which we have proved that some powers can in fact be returned to Member States.

In other words, a settlement which would be entirely in keeping with the mission for an updated European Union I have described today. More flexible, more adaptable, more open – fit for the challenges of the modern age.

And to those who say a new settlement can’t be negotiated, I would say listen to the views of other parties in other European countries arguing for powers to flow back to European states.

And look too at what we have achieved already. Ending Britain’s obligation to bail-out Eurozone members. Keeping Britain out of the fiscal compact. Launching a process to return some existing justice and home affairs powers. Securing protections on Banking Union. And reforming fisheries policy.

So we are starting to shape the reforms we need now. Some will not require Treaty change.

But I agree too with what President Barroso and others have said. At some stage in the next few years the EU will need to agree on Treaty change to make the changes needed for the long term future of the Euro and to entrench the diverse, competitive, democratically accountable Europe that we seek.

I believe the best way to do this will be in a new Treaty so I add my voice to those who are already calling for this.

My strong preference is to enact these changes for the entire EU, not just for Britain.

But if there is no appetite for a new Treaty for us all then of course Britain should be ready to address the changes we need in a negotiation with our European partners.

The next Conservative Manifesto in 2015 will ask for a mandate from the British people for a Conservative Government to negotiate a new settlement with our European partners in the next Parliament.

It will be a relationship with the Single Market at its heart.

And when we have negotiated that new settlement, we will give the British people a referendum with a very simple in or out choice. To stay in the EU on these new terms; or come out altogether.

It will be an in-out referendum.

Legislation will be drafted before the next election. And if a Conservative Government is elected we will introduce the enabling legislation immediately and pass it by the end of that year. And we will complete this negotiation and hold this referendum within the first half of the next parliament.

It is time for the British people to have their say. It is time to settle this European question in British politics.

I say to the British people: this will be your decision.

And when that choice comes, you will have an important choice to make about our country's destiny.

I understand the appeal of going it alone, of charting our own course. But it will be a decision we will have to take with cool heads. Proponents of both sides of the argument will need to avoid exaggerating their claims.

Of course Britain could make her own way in the world, outside the EU, if we chose to do so. So could any other Member State.

But the question we will have to ask ourselves is this: is that the very best future for our country?

We will have to weigh carefully where our true national interest lies.

Alone, we would be free to take our own decisions, just as we would be freed of our solemn obligation to defend our allies if we left NATO. But we don't leave NATO because it is in our national interest to stay and benefit from its collective defence guarantee.

We have more power and influence – whether implementing sanctions against Iran or Syria, or promoting democracy in Burma – if we can act together.

If we leave the EU, we cannot of course leave Europe. It will remain for many years our biggest market, and forever our geographical neighbourhood. We are tied by a complex web of legal commitments.

Hundreds of thousands of British people now take for granted their right to work, live or retire in any other EU country.

Even if we pulled out completely, decisions made in the EU would continue to have a profound effect on our country. But we would have lost all our remaining vetoes and our voice in those decisions.

We would need to weigh up very carefully the consequences of no longer being inside the EU and its single market, as a full member.

Continued access to the Single Market is vital for British businesses and British jobs.

Since 2004, Britain has been the destination for one in five of all inward investments into Europe.

And being part of the Single Market has been key to that success.

There will be plenty of time to test all the arguments thoroughly, in favour and against the arrangement we negotiate. But let me just deal with one point we hear a lot about.

There are some who suggest we could turn ourselves into Norway or Switzerland – with access to the single market but outside the EU. But would that really be in our best interests?

I admire those countries and they are friends of ours – but they are very different from us. Norway sits on the biggest energy reserves in Europe, and has a sovereign wealth fund of over 500 billion euros. And while Norway is part of the single market – and pays for the principle – it has no say at all in setting its rules: it just has to implement its directives.

The Swiss have to negotiate access to the Single Market sector by sector. Accepting EU rules – over which they have no say – or else not getting full access to the Single Market, including in key sectors like financial services.

The fact is that if you join an organisation like the European Union, there are rules.

You will not always get what you want. But that does not mean we should leave – not if the benefits of staying and working together are greater.

We would have to think carefully too about the impact on our influence at the top table of international affairs. There is no doubt that we are more powerful in Washington, in Beijing, in Delhi because we are a powerful player in the European Union.

That matters for British jobs and British security.

It matters to our ability to get things done in the world. It matters to the United States and other friends around the world, which is why many tell us very clearly that they want Britain to remain in the EU.

We should think very carefully before giving that position up.

If we left the European Union, it would be a one-way ticket, not a return.

So we will have time for a proper, reasoned debate.

At the end of that debate you, the British people, will decide.

And I say to our European partners, frustrated as some of them no doubt are by Britain's attitude: work with us on this.

Consider the extraordinary steps which the Eurozone members are taking to keep the Euro together, steps which a year ago would have seemed impossible.

It does not seem to me that the steps which would be needed to make Britain – and others – more comfortable in their relationship in the European Union are inherently so outlandish or unreasonable.

And just as I believe that Britain should want to remain in the EU so the EU should want us to stay.

For an EU without Britain, without one of Europe's strongest powers, a country which in many ways invented the single market, and which brings real heft to Europe's influence on the world stage which plays by the rules and which is a force for liberal economic reform would be a very different kind of European Union.

And it is hard to argue that the EU would not be greatly diminished by Britain's departure. Let me finish today by saying this.

I have no illusions about the scale of the task ahead.

I know there will be those who say the vision I have outlined will be impossible to achieve. That there is no way our partners will co-operate. That the British people have set themselves on a path to inevitable exit. And that if we aren't comfortable being in the EU after 40 years, we never will be.

But I refuse to take such a defeatist attitude – either for Britain or for Europe.

Because with courage and conviction I believe we can deliver a more flexible, adaptable and open European Union in which the interests and ambitions of all its members can be met.

With courage and conviction I believe we can achieve a new settlement in which Britain can be comfortable and all our countries can thrive.

And when the referendum comes let me say now that if we can negotiate such an arrangement, I will campaign for it with all my heart and soul.

Because I believe something very deeply. That Britain's national interest is best served in a flexible, adaptable and open European Union and that such a European Union is best with Britain in it.

Over the coming weeks, months and years, I will not rest until this debate is won. For the future of my country. For the success of the European Union. And for the prosperity of our peoples for generations to come.”

Source: <http://www.number10.gov.uk/news/eu-speech-at-bloomberg/>

Annex E

John Major Speech, 23 March 1991.

Ladies and Gentlemen, I must begin by telling you how proud I am to be here today. Proud to be your Leader. Very proud to have been chosen to lead your Conservative Party in the 1990s. Proud to follow Margaret Thatcher and proud to build on her policies in the years to come.

And what I want to do today is to set out our agenda for the decade. A full agenda for a Conservative Government as we plan for the century that lies ahead.

It's a good moment for us to be taking stock together. My first weeks at Number 10 were dominated by international tension and the demands placed on this country by a dangerous war. Now - together -we are resolving the great domestic issues facing this country. And it has been a remarkable week.

Seven days ago, Mr Kinnock accused us of not doing anything. Now he says we are doing too much. Just a week ago, he accused me of refusing to change our policies. Now he says I'm changing them all. He can't seem to make his mind up. He's very indecisive. I think the word is dithering.

But then - poor man - he doesn't have the experience of the Conservative Party.

The Conservative Achievement

Ours is the oldest political party in the world. But in many ways it is also the freshest. We have never rested on success. Never clung to past positions when the time called for fresh ideas. We have always been the first to look ahead to find ways to meet the challenges that face our country.

That is why our party has lasted and grown. Our duty now is to press on with reform and to carry through the long-term changes this country wants and needs.

Whenever the British people have looked for a new lead it is to the Conservative Party that they have turned.

Rallying the country in the dark days of the last world war. Lifting post-war controls and creating wealth for the social improvements of the 1950s and 1960s. Leading Britain into the opportunities of Europe in the 1970s. And rolling back the tide of Socialism and opening up choice and freedom throughout the 1980s. All under Conservative leadership.

What then is our task for the 1990s? It is to prepare to meet the challenges of the 21st century. And it is to dedicate ourselves to the service of the British people. Of all the people - however they vote, wherever they live, whoever they are. There must be no barriers, no boundaries, no doors bolted in the Britain that we strive to create.

Guiding Principles for the 1990s

Governments have three fundamental responsibilities:

- to defend the security of the realm;

- to protect the value of the currency;
- and to raise the living standards of the people.

We will discharge those duties as no other party would or could.

And as we pursue them, five great principles will guide us;

1. That we are a national party.
2. That we give opportunity and power to the people.
3. That we need a strong and stable economy in which the wealth that is created is owned more widely.
4. That we want a citizen's charter to deliver quality in every part of public service.
5. And that we work, not for short-term gain, but for the long-term good of the nation as a whole.

The National Party : uniting and leading the nation

When I say that we are a national party, I mean two things. Firstly, that we are a party that works for all the people. But secondly, that we will stand four-square for the union. There is something unique about the United Kingdom, a country which draws together in partnership the rich traditions of four great nations.

We have much to learn from each other and much to give. We must respect the particular needs of each of those nations. We must cherish the diversity that gives each of them its character. But above all we must stand together.

There is far more that binds us than divides. And the things that bind us are the deepest of all. Common principles. Centuries of partnership. The very interweaving of families. When young men and women from England, Scotland, Ireland and Wales stood together in the Gulf, they were rightly proud of their roots. But no-one doubted that all fought together in the name of Britain. This Party must never let that spirit of union be lost.

I want to take our policies to every corner of our country. Our ambitions should not be limited. In the 1990s I want to see us once more the leading Party in Scotland and in Wales. And I want to see the spread of Conservative values in Northern Ireland as well. There must never be no-go areas for Conservatism and for the hope our policies bring.

Power to the people

In the 1990s Britain faces an historic choice. To retreat into Socialism, or to move forward again to spread independence and opportunity to all.

What is the difference between us and Labour?

Power over the people is Labour's dream. Power to the people is ours. Giving power to the people will be our second guiding principle for the 1990s.

When we came to office, they said the people could not be trusted. We trusted them.

They said that big industries were best in state hands. We sold them to the people. And their performance was transformed.

They said public sector homes must not be sold. We sold them to the people. And one and a half million families have a security they only dreamed of before.

They said lower income tax meant more greed. We cut tax for the people. And what resulted was not greed but opportunity, personal choice, and record charitable giving. The people gave Labour the right answer to that.

So how right we were. Where Labour lectured the people, we listened. We understood their hopes. And we acted to make them reality.

Labour's legacy

Perhaps some of you remember what used to happen under Socialism. How it used to feel for the ordinary man and woman. I do.

When if you didn't join a union you could be shut out of a job.

When if you were a council tenant you had to beg to paint your own front door - and were lucky if you could.

When you had to ask permission to take money on holiday abroad. Do you remember? £50. And Britons abroad were the humiliated paupers of Europe.

When if you were a pensioner and put some savings aside for a rainy day, you saw their value halved in just five years.

Now Labour talk to us about "quality" and "freedom". "Quality and Freedom". The Party that gave us the closed shop, the shoddy estate, and the shattered pound. What right have they to talk of freedom? They don't understand it. They don't trust it. And they would never deliver it.

We are wholly different. Our aim is opportunity for all. And so long as I am privileged to lead this Party our Conservative revolution for the people will continue.

Extending Choice

I want no complacency in any quarter.

I want to see more privatisation. The sale of the rest of British Telecom, and the new plans for British Rail and British Coal. For privatisation means personal ownership and better services. It has been an outstanding success.

I want to see more competition, more contracting-out, less regulation and less government intervention. All that has been proved to be right. We will not change that winning formula.

And I want to see more choice. You know, whenever we have extended choice for the people, the Left have fought us all the way. But time and again we have won. And through us, the public have won.

Choice has improved the standard of services for all. It is a strange but telling truth. But if it's bad for Labour it is almost certainly good for the people. And it is a safe, safe bet that if it's good for Labour it is bound to be bad for the people.

We opened up the market in television. Labour opposed us. But every night millions of people have wider choice - not only Channel 4, but satellite channels as well.

We deregulated the sale of spectacles. I claim no special interest in that. Labour fought it tooth and nail. But the range of glasses was widened and better value ensued.

A fortnight ago we opened up air routes to new airlines. Labour criticised us. But within hours of our decision fares across the Atlantic were cut by 15%.

Last week we announced more competition in telephone services. Labour attacked us again. But as a result domestic and international call charges will be coming down.

Watching television. Seeing properly. Travelling abroad. Just chatting on the phone. Some of the basic building blocks of a satisfying life. All improved by Conservative policies. All opposed by Labour.

And, you know, when you look at Neil Kinnock's so-called new policies, they don't amount to much, do they? Yesterday's mashed potatoes. Just contemplate them. Turn them round in your mind. And the more you think, the more he'll shrink.

More choice in the 1990s

In the 1990s we will extend public choice yet wider. And the reason we do it will be to extend opportunity and improve family life for all.

We are giving parents more say in the running of schools and making more schools independent of council direction.

We will give those hospitals and those doctors who want it more control over the decisions that affect their patients.

We will extend bus deregulation, bringing to the cities the long-distance coach revolution that has seen more people travelling more cheaply than ever before.

And we will reform the market in housing bringing new opportunities to those now remaining under council control. Rents into mortgages. Giving life to empty council property. More use of homesteading. The aim is a new and better deal for those who are not yet home owners. They, too, deserve the opportunities that Conservative housing policies have given to millions. And they must not be locked out of receiving them.

Personal independence in a strong economy

This Government's strongest commitment is to the long-term success of the economy. And to put more of the wealth that is created into the hands of the people. That is our third guiding principle for the 1990s.

Last Tuesday, Norman Lamont demonstrated our intentions. Circumstances were not easy. Every tax cut had to be paid for. But our guiding principles shone through.

To cut and simplify the burden of direct taxation on people and business.

To support families.

To nourish enterprise.

To create a tax system which is fair, restrained and free from distortion. A system which leaves as much as possible of your income in your hands.

That's why we shifted more of the load of local taxation from people to spending - and why we will keep that local burden down under the new system that will replace the Community Charge.

That's why we made the shift in tax in such a way that the money goes to people directly, through lower charges - not to the councils who have driven the Community Charge so high.

That's why we used the Budget to strike more distortions out of the tax system.

And that's why we cut the rate of tax on businesses and increased child benefit for all families.

Just compare our principles with Labour's.

They believe that all the fruits of economic growth - growth created by your efforts - should be spent by them.

They believe none of it should be used to cut the burden of your tax.

They are against a simpler tax system. They want to introduce ever more distortions into the system to confuse and bemuse the taxpayer.

And they have one answer to every problem: spend more money. Taxpayers' money. Your money.

But Labour has one big problem. But apart from him. One or two of its politicians - just one or two - are uneasily aware that people don't want more taxes and less wealth. So they are shamelessly trying to con the British people.

Out of one side of their mouths, Labour tell you they would spend more on everything. Out of the other, they try to pretend they would spend almost nothing.

Which is it? Will they tell us?

Do they think the British people can't add up?

Don't they know that the British people can? And they will see that Labour doesn't add up.

Local Government Reform

Now Labour have made another miscalculation. They've asked for a confidence debate on our policies.

And do you know what that means?

They'll have to tell us what their policies are.

Take local government, just for a start. First, Norman Lamont dramatically reduced the burden of local taxation in the Budget. Then, on Thursday, Michael Heseltine revealed our plans to find the right role for local government in the future, so that we can work with it, not fight against it.

By making it more accountable to voters. By simplifying its structure. By clarifying its functions. By testing its efficiency. And by reforming its finance.

He set out the principles on which local taxation will be based in the future.

First, on the number of people in each household. For I believe it is right that contributions should reflect the numbers using local services.

Secondly, in part on the value of the property people live in. We will not allow high property prices in some parts of the country to feed through into excessive local taxes.

We understand those fears. A fair local tax is one which does not fall too heavily on any single group. Let me be clear.

We will not permit local authorities to impose penal taxes on the few -as they could and did under the old rating system - while the many bear no share of the costs of local government. And we will not allow the reform of local taxation to trigger a new spiral in local spending.

We have made these clear pledges. And we have demonstrated our commitment to them by reducing the burden of local tax immediately.

By contrast, what does Labour offer? A rag-bag of confused ideas dressed up as "fair rates". How could rates ever be fair?

Labour will not answer even the most basic question: at what level should local taxation be set? How much should be raised? They can't say. They won't say. Because they don't know. Dithering again. But don't worry. If they won't answer these questions, we will. We will do the sums for Labour and publish them.

Beating inflation

The key message from this Budget was that the battle against inflation is being won. This year inflation will be down to just 4% and falling still further.

And as it falls, we will bring interest rates down as well. As we did yesterday - the fourth cut since we entered ERM. I disagree strongly with those who criticise our entry into the ERM. Does anyone seriously imagine that, against the background of the dramatic events of the last few months - a recession at home and abroad, a change of Prime Minister and even the fighting of a war - that interest rates could have been cut and the pound stayed strong outside the ERM? Of course not. And it is sheer folly to say so.

We took tough action when it was needed to bring inflation under control. Now we are seeing the results. Inflation is coming down in Britain, when others are seeing it rise. Interest rates are falling, when elsewhere they are rising. And when across the world the impact of the recession is being felt, Britain is coming through the worst and will soon be growing again. And never forget how this country has progressed since 1979. In the 1980s our economy grew faster than Italy or France, faster even than Germany. The purchasing power of the average family is up by almost a third. Personal wealth has been spread wider than ever before.

We can beat our competitors. And, yes, we can even beat our competitors in Germany. There is no reason to be defeatist about our prospects. I believe in Britain and in the ability of the British people to win. And win we will.

Growing personal wealth; widening personal ownership

Over the decades ahead we shall see the fruits of our free market policies. The widening of ownership isn't an index of greed, as Labour so shallowly claim.

Indeed, it is the very foundation of personal security, the keystone of independence, the gateway to opportunity and prosperity for generations to come.

People who own homes; people who own shares; people who have savings. That security adds to a sense of dignity and pride. And they have an independence of action denied to those without homes or shares or savings. We want more of such people. Our Right-to-Buy policies have achieved a property-owning democracy. We now want to extend and deepen the Right to Own.

Already - each year - some 10 billion pounds is inherited through home ownership. In a Conservative Britain, inheritance is no longer the privilege of the rich. It is already the prospect of the majority. And we must make it the birthright of all. We wish to see that money held by future generations for their own use.

How different it is with Labour. Clause Four Socialism they say is dead. I wish it was. It's still there in the small print. And tax demand Socialism lives on. The single unifying principle of every Labour government is higher personal taxation. They can always agree on that. Not much else. But always that.

How characteristic that they now see family savings as a target for tax. You inherit, they take. You save, they tax. And this from the Party that says it wants investment. The only thing you

can be sure of is that a Labour Chancellor will have his hands in your pockets, even more often than you do.

Labour's threat to savings

Under Labour anyone inheriting a house or flat worth more than £30,000 and investing that money in savings would face a tax surcharge. That is their response to millions of people's efforts to build their family's security.

Labour fought to stop those people buying their homes. While we helped them. But now they are back again. When those hard-earned savings in bricks and mortar come down to children Labour's plan is to tax them away. A tax surcharge on savings. Nothing could more clearly show the hostility of Labour to personal independence. And the ignorance of Labour of the opportunities the next century will bring.

And take pensions, too. Under Labour the opportunities to save for retirement independently of the state would be dashed away. Early next century there will be some three million more pensioners than there are today. Those working now want opportunities now to save money for old age in the way they want. Our Government has helped them to do just that. Some 4 1/2 million people now have personal pensions of their own.

But what is Labour's response to this social revolution? Again hostile, ignorant, vindictive. Their spokesman boasts he will "turn the pensions market on its head". Only last week they announced the latest step in their vendetta against personal choice. They warned they would act immediately to grab over £600 million a year from investors in personal pensions and strip them of the help a Conservative government has given them. So, if you're young today, remember today. Labour are planning to destroy your prosperity tomorrow.

Safe in Labour's hands?

You know, as over the years we debated the National Health Service, one phrase became famous. 'Safe in our hands'. Margaret Thatcher said it. And how right she was. Under her Government the Health Service had more resources, took on more doctors and nurses, and provided more treatment than ever before.

Safe in our hands the Health Service was, is, and will be. It has served me and my family well over the years. And I can promise you this. It will be there in the future to serve every family well so long as a Conservative Government continues.

But can Mr Kinnock say the same to the families working to build their independence?

41/2 million personal pensions. Safe in your hands, Neil?

The shares that over 5 million people have in privatised companies. Safe in your hands, Neil?

The lower taxation that has raised living standards to record levels. Safe in your hands, Neil?

The right to go to work free from union interference. Safe in your hands, Neil?

The battle against inflation that means security for all. Safe in your hands, Neil?

Five questions which Mr Kinnock will never answer. He dare not. But we know the answer. Not safe. Not secure. In fact, doomed - under Labour. The Conservative Party has fought for those rights and given them to the people of this country. We must never allow Labour to steal them away.

And when we speak of safety there is one area above all that counts -the defence of the realm. Is that safe in Labour's hands?

Where would our defence have been if Labour had been in power this last ten years?

Defence spending cut to ribbons. Our forces slashed.

Our nuclear capability going or gone. Going or gone. Just as Saddam Hussein was building his own.

We have seen this last two months how right we were to keep our forces strong and ready. And how superbly we were served.

It was all possible because Margaret Thatcher's Government prepared for the unexpected.

Unlike Labour. Unprepared. Even for the expected.

Of course, we welcome the changes that have taken place in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. But great uncertainties remain. And secure defence is still our foremost duty.

For Labour defence is an embarrassment. Some of them hate it. Some resent it. Some just wish the need for it would go away. Those attitudes spell disaster.

In our Party we know that the unexpected does occur, and that when it comes to defence you err on the side of safety. You don't take risks with defence.

The British people will never trust with office a Labour party they do not trust on defence.

Quality in public service

Mr Chairman; the fourth great challenge for us in the 1990s will be to take our Conservative revolution into the dustiest and darkest corners of public service. Too many people still have to feel the benefits of the changes we have made.

Education

Getting it right in education is crucial.

Some people seem to think we have no right to insist on higher standards for our children. That it is a matter to be left to the "experts". Well, people like that have some learning to do themselves. We do have that right. Every child in every classroom has a right to higher standards. And we intend to ensure that they receive them.

Ken Clarke has insisted that children should be taught to spell. What a revolutionary thought. I agree with him on that. So do parents. So do employers. But it seems not everyone does. There are those who defend something called "real books" - where young children are given books and expected to pick up reading, as the Schools' Inspectors put it, by a "process of osmosis". It sounds pretty odd to me.

It did occur to me that this "real books" method might explain Mr Kinnock's grasp of economics. Because do you know what the Inspectors say about people taught by the "real books" method? I looked it up.

"They were able", the Inspectors said, "to tell stories, but relied heavily on pictures..."

"They were ill-equipped to move on to unfamiliar material, for example non-fiction..." (They mean facts - unfamiliar indeed to him.)

"They were weak readers of instructions and questions in subjects such as maths."

Adding up was never his strong point.

Yes, it does sound familiar, doesn't it? I think it explains a lot.

But I have to say also that I have a suspicion, which I share with Ken Clarke, and millions of parents in this country today. And that is that there has been too much experimentation, too much theory, too little attention to the basics. Theories come and go. But children have just one opportunity to be taught. And that must not be lost.

That is why reform in education is top of our list.

- * Pushing through the changes in our schools that give more say to parents and more freedom for schools themselves.
- * Tackling the truancy that if unchecked allows vulnerable children to lose out on opportunity and which is a seedcorn for crime.
- * Setting clear standards of what should be taught.
- * And, yes, I say it to those who still seem to be fighting it, testing to see how children are doing.

Of course testing is right. How can you find out where teaching is going wrong unless you know whether it is going wrong?

The key people behind a good education are good teachers. That is why I am determined to see their status properly recognised and quality rewarded. Good schools. Good teachers. Good discipline. And good results. That is what parents demand and pupils deserve. And what this Government will deliver.

Ensuring quality: a citizen's charter

Our changes in education are about raising quality. But quality applies elsewhere as well.

What we now aim to do is to put in place a comprehensive citizen's charter. It will work for quality across the whole range of public services. It will give support to those who use the services in seeking better standards.

People who depend on public services - patients, passengers, parents, pupils, benefit claimants - all must know where they stand and what service they have a right to expect. All too often today the individual is unable to enforce better service from those who provide it. I know how powerless an individual can feel against the stone-walling of a town hall. How

hopeless when he is bounced from phone to phone by some impersonal voice. How frustrated to be told yet again: "we regret the inconvenience this may cause". And I see no reason why the public should have to tolerate that. Not just inconvenience. But often hardship. And all too often personal loss.

Most of those who work so hard and so well in our public services will agree with me when I say this situation must be brought to an end. And end it we will. By injecting competition, extending privatisation and widening competitive tendering. And alongside this by measures under a citizen's charter to enforce accountability and achieve quality control. This will look systematically at every part of public service to see how higher standards can be achieved.

Some mechanisms are already in place. The Audit Commission, for example, does superb work on behalf of the citizen. How typical that it is lined up in Labour's programme for the axe.

But we will define clear and appropriate mechanisms for enforcing standards right across the public service. Sometimes an audit function. Sometimes an ombudsman. Sometimes simply the separation of powers between those who provide services and those who check on them. Some other ideas, too.

We will enforce publication of results by public services, make inspectorates truly independent, and make properly accountable those in control. We will seek to extend the principle of performance-related pay. And, where necessary, look for ways of introducing financial sanctions, involving direct compensation to the public or direct loss to the budgets of those that fall down on the job.

We will also look to public bodies to publish clear contracts of service -contracts that mean something - against which performance can be judged. Our programme will mean that for the first time all those people who depend on public service will have strong support from within the public sector itself in enforcing quality control.

Quality in service is our aim for the 1990s. Second-class services cannot be excused by handing out third-class treatment to those who complain.

Building for the Long-term

The principles I have set out for the 1990s - building the unity of the nation, giving opportunity and power to the people, sustaining a stable economy and spreading wealth, striving for quality in public services -all these are essential to Britain's future. Together they flow from our fifth guiding principle - to consider the interests not only of this generation but of those to come.

And as we build for the long-term, unlike our opponents, we will build on ideals, and on principle. Labour wouldn't recognise principle if it gripped them by the windpipe. And the Liberal party is riddled with self-interest. We needn't detain ourselves with Liberal policy. They would sign up to anything, so long as it means a seat at the table. That is Liberal policy. They say they want proportional representation. Note that. Their first and only policy objective. A policy that is in their own self-interest. Not on health. Not on the economy. Not on defence. On Liberal self-interest. And they will give anything for it. Defence cuts. Higher taxes. Even Labour Government. What they really want is not proportional representation but

permanent representation for the Liberal Party in Government whatever the policies. Well, there is a simple answer to Mr Ashdown. He can't have it from us. And he won't get it.

It is because we care for lasting principles that I want to place Britain at the heart of Europe.

But partnership in Europe will never mean passive acceptance of all that is put to us. No-one should fear we will lose our national identity. We will fight for Britain's interest as hard as any Government that has gone before. I want Britain to inspire and to shape Europe as decisively as we have over the Single Market programme. Then we will fight for Europe's interests, too. But not from the outside where we would lose. From the inside where we will win.

We are rightly proud of our national traditions, all of them, English, Scottish, Welsh and Irish. We are proud of Britain, of what it has meant and will mean to the world. I wish that all who wrote and taught and spoke in our country could share that pride. I wish that they could help to open the eyes of the whole nation to what that means. For in the history of our nation and in the towns and villages that form it lies a great part of our identity.

But that identity comes too from the values we share. And they are values that are shared by our friends abroad - personal freedom, opportunity, respect for one's fellow citizens and their views, a fundamental belief that power should be with the people and not the state.

Idealism, yes. But practical idealism. Democracy. Plain common or garden decency. It is those values I believe in. And it is those values that Britain stands for. The world needs those values more than ever before. And it needs us to work with those who share them. They are values that spring from the very fibre of ordinary men and women. Lasting values. Commonsense values. Conservative values. The values which I and all of us in our Party will fight to uphold.

Source: <http://www.johnmajor.co.uk/page2017.html>

**Annex F
UK Proximity to EU**

Does the current economic crisis show the UK should be closer or more distant from the EU?

Sample	The current economic situation shows that the UK needs to retain independence from other EU countries	The current economic situation shows that the UK should build closer ties with other EU countries to make Europe more stable and secure	Neither	Don't know
General public	68	13	7	12

General public

Voting intention

Subgroup	The current economic situation shows that the UK needs to retain independence from other EU countries	The current economic situation shows that the UK should build closer ties with other EU countries to make Europe more stable and secure	Neither	Don't know
Con	88	5	5	2
Lab	60	21	6	13
Lib Dem	42	32	17	9

2010 vote

Subgroup	The current economic situation shows that the UK needs to retain independence from other EU countries	The current economic situation shows that the UK should build closer ties with other EU countries to make Europe more stable and secure	Neither	Don't know
Con	87	5	4	4
Lab	61	19	6	14
Lib Dem	59	20	12	9

Gender

Subgroup	The current economic situation shows that the UK needs to retain independence from other EU countries	The current economic situation shows that the UK should build closer ties with other	Neither	Don't know
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	other EU countries	EU countries to make Europe stable and secure	to make more	
Female	69	9	7	15
Male	67	17	7	9

Age

Subgroup	The current economic situation shows that the UK needs to retain independence from other EU countries	The current economic situation shows that the UK should build closer ties with other EU countries to make Europe stable and secure	Neither	Don't know
18-24	41	18	9	31
25-39	61	15	9	15
40-59	73	11	6	10
60+	79	12	4	5

Social grade

Subgroup	The current economic situation shows that the UK needs to retain independence from other EU countries	The current economic situation shows that the UK should build closer ties with other EU countries to make Europe stable and secure	Neither	Don't know
ABC1	67	15	7	11
C2DE	69	10	6	15

Region

Subgroup	The current economic situation shows that the UK needs to retain independence from other EU countries	The current economic situation shows that the UK should build closer ties with other EU countries to make Europe stable and secure	Neither	Don't know
London	60	19	8	13
Midlands / Wales	69	10	7	13
North	70	11	6	13
Rest of South	72	12	6	9
Scotland	53	19	9	19

Source: 0712ch_yougov_surveyanalysis.pdf, accessed January 27, 2013, http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/Research/Europe/0712ch_yougov_surveyanalysis.pdf

Annex G
Words and phrases associated with the EU

	Sa m pl e	Bur eau cra cy	L os of na tio na l po w er	A w as of na o n l bo rd er se cu rit y	Und erm inin g our nati onal cult ure	Co rru pti on	Fr ee do m to stu dy wo rk an d liv e an yw he re in the E U	F r e e al di ve r si ty	C ult ur e an d se cu rit y	Pe ac e an d se cu rit y	Pr ote cti on of citi zen s' rig hts	A str on ge r sa y in th e wo r ld	De mo cra cy	B et te r q u al ity of lif e	Jo b cre atio n	O t her	D o 'n t k no w
Ge ne ral pu bli c	46	41	3 2	28	28	27	25	1 7	12	12	10	7	7	3	3	1	1 1
O pi ni on - fo r m er s	62	29	2 7	20	15	22	50	3 5	16	26	17	24	9	8	3	1	1

Source: 0712ch_yougov_surveyanalysis.pdf, accessed January 27, 2013, http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/Research/Europe/0712ch_yougov_surveyanalysis.pdf

Annex H UK Financial Contribution

How large do you think the UK's net contribution to the EU is?

Sample	Under £5 billion	£5 billion - £10 billion	£11 billion - £20 billion	£21 billion - £50 billion	More than £50 billion
General public	11	20	16	22	31

General public

Voting intention

	Under £5 billion	£5 billion - £10 billion	£11 billion - £20 billion	£21 billion - £50 billion	More than £50 billion
Con	6	20	16	26	32
Lab	11	22	17	22	28
Lib	8	23	18	25	26
Dem					

2010 vote

	Under £5 billion	£5 billion - £10 billion	£11 billion - £20 billion	£21 billion - £50 billion	More than £50 billion
Con	7	20	15	25	32
Lab	12	22	15	23	29
Lib	12	20	19	21	29
Dem					

Gender

	Under £5 billion	£5 billion - £10 billion	£11 billion - £20 billion	£21 billion - £50 billion	More than £50 billion
Female	9	21	15	20	34
Male	12	19	16	25	28

Age

	Under £5 billion	£5 billion - £10 billion	£11 billion - £20 billion	£21 billion - £50 billion	More than £50 billion
18-24	20	24	16	17	23
25-39	14	25	16	23	23
40-59	8	19	17	24	32
60+	7	16	13	22	42

Social grade

	Under billion	£5 billion	£5 billion - \$10 billion	£11 billion - £20 billion	£21 billion - £50 billion	to More than £50 billion
ABC1	9	20	17	23	30	
C2DE	13	20	14	21	33	

Region

	Under billion	£5 billion	£5 billion - \$10 billion	£11 billion - £20 billion	£21 billion - £50 billion	to More than £50 billion
London	11	20	18	21	30	
Midlands / Wales	13	21	16	19	30	
North	10	20	14	25	31	
Rest of South	10	18	16	24	33	
Scotland	12	26	11	20	31	

Source: 0712ch_yougov_surveyanalysis.pdf, accessed January 27, 2013, http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/Research/Europe/0712ch_yougov_surveyanalysis.pdf

Annex I

Evaluation of UK Contribution

In 2010 to 2011, the UK government made a net contribution to the EU of £8.1 billion (1.2% of all government spending). Do you think this amount is too much, too little or is it about right?

Sample	Too much	About right	Too little	Don't know
General public	53	27	5	16

General public

Voting intention

	Too much	About right	Too little	Don't know
Con	71	21	2	6
Lab	42	35	9	14
Lib Dem	35	47	4	14

2010 vote

	Too much	About right	Too little	Don't know
Con	71	20	2	7
Lab	42	34	6	18
Lib Dem	45	33	7	14

Gender

	Too much	About right	Too little	Don't know
Female	49	28	3	21
Male	56	26	7	11

Age

	Too much	About right	Too little	Don't know
18-24	32	31	11	27
25-39	44	31	5	20
40-59	57	26	4	14
60+	64	23	3	9

Social grade

	Too much	About right	Too little	Don't know
ABC1	51	30	5	14
C2DE	55	23	5	18

Region

	Too much	About right	Too little	Don't know
London	40	37	9	14
Midlands / Wales	52	28	3	17
North	56	24	3	18

Source: 0712ch_yougov_surveyanalysis.pdf, accessed January 27, 2013, http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/Research/Europe/0712ch_yougov_surveyanalysis.pdf

Annex J
Advantages of EU membership

Sample	Greater ease of travel with in Europe	Easier for British people to work and retire elsewhere in Europe	Increased trade and investment between member states	Peace in Europe	Easier to catch criminals across European borders	Stronger say in the world	Economic prosperity	Something else	Don't know	Not applicable, I do not think there have been any advantages from the UK's membership of the EU
General public	49	42	37	34	30	18	13	2	11	18

General public

Voting intention

	Greater ease of travel with in Europe	Easier for British people to work and retire elsewhere in Europe	Increased trade and investment between member states	Peace in Europe	Easier to catch criminals across European borders	Stronger say in the world	Economic prosperity	Something else	Don't know	Not applicable, I do not think there have been any advantages from the UK's membership of the EU
Conservative	54	45	38	34	28	11	7	1	4	18
Labour	54	43	42	40	36	26	19	1	11	13
Liberal Democrat	72	66	68	55	55	32	22	3	9	3

2010 vote

	Greater ease of travel with Euro pe	Easier for British people to work and retire elsewhere in Europe	Increased trade and investment between member states	Peace in Europe	Easier to catch criminals across European borders	Stronger say in the world	Economic prosperity	Something else	Don't know	Not applicable, I do not think there have been any advantages from the UK's membership of the EU
Conservative	46	41	31	28	25	9	6	1	6	25
Labour	50	40	42	40	33	24	19	1	14	15
Liberal Democrat	59	53	46	43	41	25	17	3	8	12

Gender

	Greater ease of travel with Euro pe	Easier for British people to work and retire elsewhere in Europe	Increased trade and investment between member states	Peace in Europe	Easier to catch criminals across European borders	Stronger say in the world	Economic prosperity	Something else	Don't know	Not applicable, I do not think there have been any advantages from the UK's membership of the EU
Female	46	38	31	28	31	16	9	1	14	20
Male	53	46	44	40	30	20	17	2	8	16

Age

	Greater ease of travel with in Europe	Easier for British people to work and retire elsewhere in Europe	Increased trade and investment between member states	Peace in Europe	Easier to catch criminals across European borders	Stronger say in the world	Economic prosperity	Something else	Don't know	Not applicable, I do not think there have been any advantages from the UK's membership of the EU
18 - 24	47	41	40	33	28	23	21	4	20	6
25 - 39	49	39	40	28	29	21	14	2	15	12
40 - 59	47	41	34	33	31	15	11	2	11	19
60 +	54	46	37	41	32	16	10	0	4	27

Social grade

	Greater ease of travel with in Europe	Easier for British people to work and retire elsewhere in Europe	Increased trade and investment between member states	Peace in Europe	Easier to catch criminals across European borders	Stronger say in the world	Economic prosperity	Something else	Don't know	Not applicable, I do not think there have been any advantages from the UK's membership of the EU
ABC1	54	46	44	37	31	20	15	2	8	15
C2DE	43	36	29	29	29	15	10	1	15	21

Region

	Greater ease of travel with European	Easier for British people to work and retire elsewhere in Europe	Increased trade and investment between member states	Peace in Europe	Easier to catch criminals across European borders	Stronger say in the world	Economic prosperity	Something else	Don't know	Not applicable, I do not think there have been any advantages from the UK's membership of the EU
London	52	45	42	37	32	23	16	3	10	11
Midlands / Wales	47	40	38	30	24	15	12	1	14	18
North	44	39	33	32	32	16	11	1	12	19
Rest of South	54	43	37	36	32	18	11	2	9	19
Scotland	51	44	40	34	34	21	20	1	10	20

Source: 0712ch_yougov_surveyanalysis.pdf, accessed January 27, 2013, http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/Research/Europe/0712ch_yougov_surveyanalysis.pdf

Annex K
Disadvantages of EU membership

Sample	Too many EU laws and regulations	Too many people from the EU coming to work in Britain	Less safe borders meaning more people come to Britain illegally	Subsidizing agriculture in other EU countries through the EU's Common Agricultural Policy	British parliament having less power	Too many imports into Britain from the rest of Europe damaging UK jobs and prosperity	Something else	Don't know	Not applicable, I do not think there have been any advantages from the UK's membership of the EU
General public	65	60	57	53	53	37	2	11	4

General public

Voting intention

	Too many EU laws and regulations	Too many people from the EU coming to work in Britain	Less safe borders meaning more people come to Britain illegally	Subsidizing agriculture in other EU countries through the EU's Common Agricultural Policy	British parliament having less power	Too many imports into Britain from the rest of Europe damaging UK jobs and prosperity	Something else	Don't know	Not applicable, I do not think there have been any advantages from the UK's membership of the EU
Conservative	85	76	71	70	72	44	2	3	1
Labour	57	54	52	45	42	32	2	10	6
Liberal Democrat	53	46	32	60	37	12	1	11	8

m									
2010 vote									
	Too many EU laws and regulations	Too many people from the rest of the EU coming to work in Britain	Less safe borders meaning more people come to Britain illegally	Subsidizing agriculture in other EU countries through the EU's Common Agricultural Policy	British parliament having less power	Too many imports into Britain from the rest of Europe damaging UK jobs and prosperity	Something else	Don't know	Not applicable, I do not think there have been any advantages from the UK's membership of the EU
Con	84	76	73	68	73	47	3	4	1
Lab	57	51	52	44	41	33	2	14	7
Lib Dem	62	55	47	53	48	30	2	8	5

Gender

	Too many EU laws and regulations	Too many people from the rest of the EU coming to work in Britain	Less safe borders meaning more people come to Britain illegally	Subsidizing agriculture in other EU countries through the EU's Common Agricultural Policy	British parliament having less power	Too many imports into Britain from the rest of Europe damaging UK jobs and prosperity	Something else	Don't know	Not applicable, I do not think there have been any advantages from the UK's membership of the EU
Female	64	62	57	48	51	41	2	13	4
Male	66	59	56	58	56	33	3	9	4

Age

	Too many EU laws and regulations	Too many people from the rest of the EU coming to work in Britain	Less safe borders meaning more people come to Britain illegally	Subsidizing agriculture in other EU countries through the EU's Common Agricultural Policy	British parliament having less power	Too many imports into Britain from the rest of Europe damaging UK jobs and prosperity	Something else	Don't know	Not applicable, I do not think there have been any advantages from the UK's membership of the EU
18 - 24	36	41	33	27	34	26	1	26	8
25 - 39	51	49	46	38	40	31	4	14	6
40 - 59	71	64	60	56	55	37	2	9	4
60 +	83	74	74	73	71	46	2	4	3

Social grade

	Too many EU laws and regulations	Too many people from the rest of the EU coming to work in Britain	Less safe borders meaning more people come to Britain illegally	Subsidizing agriculture in other EU countries through the EU's Common Agricultural Policy	British parliament having less power	Too many imports into Britain from the rest of Europe damaging UK jobs and prosperity	Something else	Don't know	Not applicable, I do not think there have been any advantages from the UK's membership of the EU
AB C1	66	58	53	55	53	34	3	9	5

C2D	64	64	62	50	54	41	2	14	3
E									
Region									
	Too many EU laws and regulations	Too many people from the rest of the EU coming to work in Britain	Less safe borders meaning more people come to Britain illegally	Subsidizing agriculture in other EU countries through the EU's Common Agricultural Policy	British parliament having less power	Too many imports into Britain from the rest of Europe damaging UK jobs and prosperity	Something else	Do n't know	Not applicable, I do not think there have been any advantages from the UK's membership of the EU
London	58	56	56	52	47	33	3	11	4
Midlands / Wales	64	64	54	50	54	36	3	12	4
North	65	59	59	51	51	38	2	12	4
Rest of South	71	64	60	60	60	40	2	9	3
Scotland	58	47	48	41	40	28	3	13	11

Source: 0712ch_yougov_surveyanalysis.pdf, accessed January 27, 2013, http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/Research/Europe/0712ch_yougov_surveyanalysis.pdf

**Annex L
Future EU Scenarios**

People hold different views about how they would like to see the European Union develop. Which of these statements comes closest to your view?

Sample	A fully integrated Europe with all decisions taken by a European government	No European government but a more integrated European Union than now, with a single currency and no frontier controls	No European government but a more integrated European Union than now, with a single currency and no frontier controls	The more or less as it is now	A less integrated Europe than now with the European Union amounting to little more than a free trade area	Complete British withdrawal from the European Union	Don't know
General public	4	8	16	31	26	15	
Opinion-formers	5	21	19	45	8	1	

General public

Voting intention

Subgroup	A fully integrated Europe with all decisions taken by a European government	No European government but a more integrated European Union than now, with a single currency and no frontier controls	No European government but a more integrated European Union than now, with a single currency and no frontier controls	The more or less as it is now	A less integrated Europe than now with the European Union amounting to little more than a free trade area	Complete British withdrawal from the European Union	Don't know
Con	2	2	11	47	31	6	
Lab	6	12	22	28	19	14	
Lib Dem	6	27	24	23	9	11	

2010 vote

Subgroup	A fully integrated Europe with all decisions taken by a European government	No European government but a more integrated European Union than now, with a single currency and no frontier controls	No European government but a more integrated European Union than now, with a single currency and no frontier controls	The more or less as it is now	A less integrated Europe than now with the European Union amounting to little more than a free trade area	Complete British withdrawal from the European Union	Don't know
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	A fully integrated Europe with all major decisions taken by a European government	No European government but a more integrated European Union than now, with a single currency and no frontier controls	The situation more or less as it is now	A less integrated Europe than now with the European Union amounting to little more than a free trade area	Complete British withdrawal from the European Union	Don't know
Con	2	3	10	40	38	7
Lab	6	12	21	28	18	15
Lib Dem	4	14	21	29	19	13

Gender

Subgroup	A fully integrated Europe with all major decisions taken by a European government	No European government but a more integrated European Union than now, with a single currency and no frontier controls	The situation more or less as it is now	A less integrated Europe than now with the European Union amounting to little more than a free trade area	Complete British withdrawal from the European Union	Don't know
Female	3	6	15	28	27	21
Male	5	11	17	34	25	9

Age

Subgroup	A fully integrated Europe with all major decisions taken by a European government	No European government but a more integrated European Union than now, with a single currency and no frontier controls	The situation more or less as it is now	A less integrated Europe than now with the European Union amounting to little more than a free trade area	Complete British withdrawal from the European Union	Don't know
18-24	5	13	17	25	12	29
25-39	4	9	22	28	17	19
40-59	4	7	14	33	28	14
60+	4	7	11	34	37	7

Social grade

Subgroup	A fully integrated Europe with all decisions taken by a European government	No European government but a more integrated European Union than now, with a single currency and no frontier controls	The situation more or less as it is now	A less integrated Europe than now with the European Union amounting to little more than a free trade area	Complete British withdrawal from the European Union	Don't know
ABC1	4	11	18	35	21	11
C2DE	4	5	12	26	33	20

Region

Subgroup	A fully integrated Europe with all decisions taken by a European government	No European government but a more integrated European Union than now, with a single currency and no frontier controls	The situation more or less as it is now	A less integrated Europe than now with the European Union amounting to little more than a free trade area	Complete British withdrawal from the European Union	Don't know
London	6	10	16	33	20	15
Midlands / Wales	4	6	13	35	27	15
North	4	9	15	29	26	17
Rest of South	3	7	17	31	28	13
Scotland	6	12	20	25	20	16

Opinion-formers

Voting intention

Subgroup	A fully integrated Europe with all major decisions taken by a European government	No European government but a more integrated European Union than now, with a single currency and no frontier controls	The more or less as it is now	A less integrated Europe than now with the European Union amounting to little more than a free trade area	Complete British withdrawal from the European Union	Don't know
Conservative	1	10	12	68	9	0
Labour	10	35	28	24	2	2
Lib Dem	7	31	22	36	3	0

Sector

Subgroup	A fully integrated Europe with all major decisions taken by a European government	No European government but a more integrated European Union than now, with a single currency and no frontier controls	The more or less as it is now	A less integrated Europe than now with the European Union amounting to little more than a free trade area	Complete British withdrawal from the European Union	Don't know
Business	3	18	17	52	8	2
Charity	3	22	26	38	9	1
Culture & leisure	9	25	14	42	10	0
Education	4	20	16	51	8	1
Govt & politics	5	22	30	34	7	1
Health	7	18	23	43	9	0
Media	5	20	18	45	9	3
Other	6	21	17	49	6	0

Gender

Subgroup	A fully integrated Europe with all decisions taken by a European government	No government but a more integrated European Union than now, with a single currency and no frontier controls	European a more or less as it is now	The situation more or less as it is now	A less integrated Europe than now the European Union amounting to little more than a free trade area	Complete British withdrawal from the European Union	Don't know
Female	4	19	24	43	7	3	
Male	6	22	17	46	9	1	

Source: 0712ch_yougov_surveyanalysis.pdf, accessed January 27, 2013, http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/Research/Europe/0712ch_yougov_surveyanalysis.pdf

Annex M

Views on Holding a Referendum

Do you think that the government should or should not commit to holding a referendum on whether the UK should remain a member of the EU?

Sample	Should commit to holding a referendum	Should NOT commit to holding a referendum	Don't know
General public	57	26	17
Opinion-formers	42	53	5

General public

Voting intention

Subgroup	Should commit to holding a referendum	Should NOT commit to holding a referendum	Don't know
Con	71	21	8
Lab	50	34	16
Lib Dem	40	46	14

2010 vote

Subgroup	Should commit to holding a referendum	Should NOT commit to holding a referendum	Don't know
Con	72	18	9
Lab	49	30	21
Lib Dem	53	34	13

Gender

Subgroup	Should commit to holding a referendum	Should NOT commit to holding a referendum	Don't know
Female	55	20	24
Male	60	31	9

Age

Subgroup	Should commit to holding a referendum	Should NOT commit to holding a referendum	Don't know
18-24	37	33	31
25-39	47	30	23
40-59	62	23	16
60+	70	22	8

Social grade

Subgroup	Should commit to holding a referendum	Should NOT commit to holding a referendum	Don't know
ABC1	54	31	15
C2DE	62	19	20

Region

Subgroup	Should commit to holding a referendum	Should NOT commit to holding a referendum	Don't know
London	53	32	15
Midlands / Wales	59	23	18
North	58	23	19
Rest of South	59	26	15
Scotland	52	26	22

Opinion-formers

Voting intention

Subgroup	Should commit to holding a referendum	Should NOT commit to holding a referendum	Don't know
Conservative	52	43	5
Labour	21	73	6
Lib Dem	36	61	3

Sector

Subgroup	Should commit to holding a referendum	Should NOT commit to holding a referendum	Don't know
Business	47	48	5
Charity	32	61	7
Culture & leisure	43	54	3
Education	44	54	2
Govt & politics	42	53	4
Health	48	45	7
Media	43	52	5
Other	38	49	13

Gender

Subgroup	Should commit to holding a referendum	Should NOT commit to holding a referendum	Don't know
Male	44	52	5

Source: 0712ch_yougov_surveyanalysis.pdf, accessed January 27, 2013, http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/Research/Europe/0712ch_yougov_surveyanalysis.pdf

Annex N Voting Preferences

If there was a referendum on the UK's membership of the European Union, how would you vote?

	I would vote to remain a member of the European Union	I would vote to leave the European Union	I would not vote	Don't know
General public	30	49	5	16
Opinion-formers	63	27	1	9

General public

Voting intention

Subgroup	I would vote to remain a member of the European Union	I would vote to leave the European Union	I would not vote	Don't know
Con	22	69	1	8
Lab	40	37	5	17
Lib Dem	64	25	0	10

2010 vote

Subgroup	I would vote to remain a member of the European Union	I would vote to leave the European Union	I would not vote	Don't know
Con	19	70	2	9
Lab	39		4	20
Lib Dem	44		4	13

Gender

Subgroup	I would vote to remain a member of the European Union	I would vote to leave the European Union	I would not vote	Don't know
Female	25	48	6	21
Male	36	49	5	10

Age

Subgroup	I would vote to remain a member of the European Union	I would vote to leave the European Union	I would not vote	Don't know
18-24	39	29	10	21
25-39	31	42	8	19
40-59	29	50	4	16
60+	28	61	2	10

Social grade

Subgroup	I would vote to remain a member of the European Union	I would vote to leave the European Union	I would not vote	Don't know
ABC1	37	45	4	14
C2DE	22	53	7	18

Region

Subgroup	I would vote to remain a member of the European Union	I would vote to leave the European Union	I would not vote	Don't know
London	33	45	6	16
Midlands / Wales	26	52	6	16
North	29	47	4	20
Rest of South	31	51	6	12
Scotland	40	41	3	15

Opinion-formers

Voting intention

Subgroup	I would vote to remain a member of the European Union	I would vote to leave the European Union	I would not vote	Don't know
Conservative	48	40	0	12
Labour	89	7	0	4
Lib Dem	75	19	3	3

Sector

Subgroup	I would vote to remain a member of the European Union	I would vote to leave the European Union	I would not vote	Don't know
Business	58	29	1	12
Charity	68	20	1	11
Culture & leisure	62	26	0	12
Education	62	22	2	13
Govt & politics	66	25	1	8
Health	64	27	0	9
Media	64	26	2	8
Other	55	30	0	15

Gender

Subgroup	I would vote to remain a member of the European Union	I would vote to leave the European Union	I would not vote	Don't know
Female	64	23	2	11
Male	62	30	1	8

Source: 0712ch_yougov_surveyanalysis.pdf, accessed January 27, 2013, http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/Research/Europe/0712ch_yougov_surveyanalysis.pdf

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