

# THE GERD CONFLICT: CHALLENGES TO EGYPT'S WATER SECURITY



ALI HIJAZI





## Copyright

Ankara - TURKEY ORSAM © 2020

Content of this publication is copyrighted to ORSAM. Except reasonable and partial quotation and use under the Act No. 5846, Law on Intellectual and Artistic Works, via proper citation, the content may not be used or re-published without prior permission by ORSAM. The views expressed in this publication reflect only the opinions of its authors and do not represent the institutional opinion of ORSAM.

ISBN: 978-605-06622-1-4

### Center for Middle Eastern Studies

**Adress** : Mustafa Kemal Mah. 2128 Sk. No: 3 Çankaya, ANKARA

**Phone** : +90 850 888 15 20 Faks: +90 312 430 39 48

**Email** : orsam@orsam.org.tr

**Photos** : Anadolu Agency (AA)

# THE GERD CONFLICT: CHALLENGES TO EGYPT'S WATER SECURITY

## About the Author

### Ali Hijazi

Ph.D. Candidate

Middle East Studies / Social Sciences University of Ankara.

A Jordanian citizen. I have Masters in Political Science from School of International Studies at the University of Jordan, B.A. in Political Science from Applied Sciences Private University with an honor list of the University. A former researcher and member of the "Protection Commission" at the National Centre for Human Rights of Jordan. I conducted many tasks through documentation, fact-finding, follow-up of practices and violations, monitor and follow the decentralized and the municipal elections in Jordan. I typically enrolled in the Research and Academic Training Program, at the Center for Strategic Studies - University of Jordan. I gathered literature and drafted primary papers on various subjects including Jordanian politics and Conflicts Resolutions. My Research experiences enthusiasm and innovative experimental approaches to the study of International Relations and conflicts in the Middle East.

July 2020

## Contents

---

Introduction.....	3
The Nile River and the GERD: The Story From the Beginning.....	3
Egypt's Water Security - Different Perspectives.....	7
What are the Contention Points Over GERD? .....	8
Ethiopian Perspective - The Rising African Giant .....	9
GERD Technical Problems .....	11
Principles Agreement 2015: Tipping-Point.....	11
What is The Principles Agreement? .....	12
What is Next For The 2015 Agreement? .....	13
Offered Options .....	14
What Should the Egyptians do? .....	15
Is the “Military-Option” Open to All Parties? .....	16
How Players Negotiate .....	17
Has Israel Intervened in the Crisis Line? .....	18
Conclusion: Lessons to Learn.....	18
End Notes .....	21
Further References:.....	22

### Images

<i>Image-1.</i> The Nile River .....	4
<i>Image-2.</i> GERD Final expected construction.....	6
<i>Image-3.</i> Ethiopia Ethnic Main Groups .....	10

### Table

<i>Table 1.</i> Scenarios of the GERD reservoir filling. ....	8
---	---

The Egyptian regime has left its regional strategic role in the region, which has negatively impacted its ability to manage the conflict with Ethiopia, the "Rising African giant", which seeks to take the initiative of the leadership role in the region.

## Introduction

The phenomenon of conflict, within the international relations framework, has a set of intellectual theses that may contribute to the interpretation of the external behavior of states, within the priorities of national and international institutions in conflict resolution. Trying to simulate these theses is done to solve the conflict with the least possible losses. Therefore, we must understand the stage of severity of which this crisis has reached to tackle realities realistically, especially in the pre-armed conflict phases. In these earlier phases, the conflict management is broader particularly in adapting issues to pressures while retaining the ability to choose between alternatives that are available to each side involved directly or indirectly.

In recent decades, access to energy resources has become the most important form and cause of conflicts and wars and, in the future, conflicts will be about the world's most expensive natural resource, water. Water is a strategic necessity for all people as it is the basis of life on Earth. It is associated with socio-economic development as well as food and energy production and is at the heart of climate change adaptation. Water has also become a rights issue as the world's population increases. With the need to create a balance between community requirements and

the available resources, the challenges involved in the following years will be even more pressing.

While water covers 72% of the earth's surface, all freshwater represents only 2.8% of the overall volume. Of this 2.45% of the freshwater is represented as ice-shaped and groundwater. Thus, humans have only 0.35% of the world's total water supply<sup>1</sup>. And according to FAO\* this will be reduced during the coming years due to climate change. In return, 17 countries in the world suffer from a severe shortage of water resources, 12 of them are located in the Middle East and North Africa<sup>2</sup>. Hence the importance of establishing the GERD subject, the main cause of the conflict over the Nile waters between Egypt and Ethiopia, because Egypt is coming to a real problem that will affect its water security and its existence as a state. To understand it and the impacts on Egypt's water security, we must go back in history.

## The Nile River and the GERD: The Story From the Beginning

Egypt has several water resources, which provide together about 59.5 billion cubic meters per year. The Nile River provides the largest quantity of these resources with about 55.5 billion cubic meters per year, which is an estimated 98%. The Nile is the world's longest river with a length approximately 6,695 kilometers from the first tributary "Ruvyironza River" in Burundi, to its estuary, and the average water flow is approximately 84 billion cubic meters annually. It has two main tributaries, the White Nile, which originates from Lake Victoria and which is located in the center of the African continent and is shared by three countries: Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania. The other tributary is the Blue Nile which originates from Lake Tana in Ethiopia. The two tributaries meet in Khartoum and continue to the Mediterranean Sea<sup>3</sup>.



**IMAGE-1.** The Nile River

Note: Labels collected by many sources. Original Map Source: Stratfor 2012

The Nile spans across 11 African countries known as “the Nile Basin” countries: Eritrea (as an observer), the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Burundi, Rwanda, Tanzania, Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia, Southern Sudan, Sudan, and Egypt. The White Nile provides about 15% of the total water amount that reaches the downstream countries (Egypt and Sudan) with a quantity of

8.5 billion cubic meters, while the Blue Nile provides about 85% with a quantity of 47 billion cubic meters. The Blue Nile River passes through three cycles for 20 years, the first cycle is 7 years long with heavy rains on the Plateau of Ethiopia, the second cycle is 7 years long with moderate rainfall, and the third cycle is 6 years of scarce rains.

Since the beginning of the last century, and with the strategic importance of the Nile, many agreements and pacts have been signed between several parties to organize the river's quota and rights distribution, all these agreements guaranteed Egypt sovereignty over the Nile and its share of it. Part of these agreements were not recognized by most Nile Basin countries but as "colonial conventions." The relevant countries in the current crisis were not part of it but it was governed by the colonial circumstances and policies that governed international politics at that time. As an example, the Rome Protocol of 1891 between Britain and Italy, which occupied Eritrea at the time, and the Rome agreement of 1925, which is a series of letters exchanged between Britain and Italy and which recognizes the rights of Egypt and Sudan in the Blue and White Nile and their tributaries.

In contrast, there are also several agreements which included the current conflict parties, and Egypt relies on it as a reference in their discussions on GERD conflict, the most important being<sup>4</sup>:

- The Addis Ababa agreement of 1902, signed between Britain (on behalf of Sudan) and Ethiopia. The most important article is number 3, which included promises of Emperor Menelik II Not to issue any instructions concerning the Blue Nile or Lake Tana that could hinder the flow of the Nile. This treaty ended the international conflict between European countries competing for Britain.
- The Nile River Sharing Agreement between Egypt and Sudan 1959 includes the full control of the Nile waters connecting Egypt and Sudan based on the new variables that appeared on the scene at the time. According to this agreement, Egypt's total share of water (after distributing the water benefit from the High Dam) has become 55.5 billion cubic

meters, and Sudan's total share has become 18.5 billion cubic meters.

- The Nile Basin Initiative, signed in Dar es Salaam in 1999 as part of a regional inter-governmental partnership, which looked to develop the Nile cooperatively and promote regional peace, water security, and socio-economic benefit-sharing. The agreement includes Egypt, Sudan, Uganda, Ethiopia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Burundi, Tanzania, Rwanda, Kenya, and Eritrea. This initiative was to be transformed into a permanent framework for cooperation under the name of the "Nile Basin Commission".
- The Agreement (Framework of Cooperation) between the Nile Basin Countries, was signed in Entebbe, the Ugandan city, in 2010, by six countries so far: Ethiopia, Uganda, Rwanda, Tanzania, Kenya, and Burundi. It was rejected by both Egypt and Sudan because it didn't recognize the rights of Egypt and Sudan on the Nile. Egypt froze its membership in the Nile Basin Initiative in October 2010, as a reaction to this agreement.
- The Agreement of Principles of 2015, signed in Khartoum between Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan, which is a pivotal point in the conflict path on the Nile River between Egypt and Ethiopia, will be discussed later in this study.

The **GERD** project, or as it is called the "Great Millennium Dam" has a long history of events that varied between pushing and attracting. The idea of constructing the dam began in 1964, when The United States Bureau of Reclamation (USBR) submitted a survey of the Blue Nile at the invitation from the Ethiopian government, intending to store water in Ethiopia<sup>5</sup>. The dam is located on the Blue Nile stream in the northwestern part of Ethiopia in Benishangul-Gumuz, near the Ethiopian-Sudanese border, 500 kilometers

away from Addis Ababa and 40 kilometers away from the Sudanese border. The project spans 1800 square kilometers. The total storage capacity of the dam is approximately 74.5 Billion cubic meters, which equal to the Egypt and Sudan shares of the Nile River annually. The dam includes two separate parts:

- **The first part:** is composed of roller-compacted concrete, held on an area of 1780 meters, the high-wall of concrete is 155 meters while the high-water is 145 meters, the storage capacity of approximately 14.5 billion cubic meters.
- **The second part:** is the “auxiliary saddle dam”, which is built of rock rubble and gravel, with ½ meter-thick of the concrete layer, the measurements are 4800 meters in length and 55 meters in height. It will store approximately 60 billion cubic meters of water, and help divert any excess water from the primary reservoir back along the course of the Nile.

The dam comprises two hydroelectric power plants with 16 turbines, according to SALINI IMPREJLO “the Italian main contracting company of the project.” The dam will produce 6450 megawatts of hydroelectric power per year, of which 2000 megawatts will be allocated for export to other countries. With this production, the dam will rank first in Africa in electricity production and also globally.

Note: Information collected by many sources- The cost of the GERD project is estimated at approximately 4.8 billion USD<sup>6</sup>, excluding the cost of power transmission lines, which is about 7% of Ethiopia's 2016 GDP\* and about 5% of Ethiopia's 2017 GDP. The Ethiopian Government has undertaken several measures to provide financing, the most important is the issuance of bonds to Ethiopians at home and abroad by the Ethiopian Electricity Company. Government officials were also encouraged to allocate one or two monthly salaries to buy GERD bonds, and raising a lot of money through taxes. In addition




IMAGE-2. GERD Final Expected Construction.

to those amounts, Ethiopia has issued international sovereign bonds, which raised nearly 1 billion USD by the end of 2014. Chinese banks also contributed about 1.8 billion USD to finance the project to buy turbine stools and power plants.

Decades of Ethiopian attempts were made to put forward the idea of the Renaissance Dam. They finally surveyed and designed the final dam site in 2009-2010. On March 30, 2011, Ethiopia announced the project and the next day a contract of 4.8 billion USD was awarded for the Italian company without competitive bidding. On 2 April 2011, former Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi laid the foundation stone of the dam, announcing the inauguration of the Renaissance Hydroelectric Dam, and the birth of the real conflict beginning over the Nile River between Egypt and Ethiopia. In September 2011, the Egyptian and Ethiopian parties agreed to form an international commission to study the effects of GERD construction. In May 2013, the International Committee of Experts issued its report, which required technical studies to assess the impact of the dam on the downstream states. Negotiations were suspended after Egypt refused to set up a technical committee without foreign experts. It resumed in June 2014 again and agreed after that to select two advisory foreign offices, to carry out the required studies of the dam.

The Nile Basin has been closely linked to the formation of the social, cultural, and political structures of the Egyptian people. Currently, about 97 million people live on the river banks of the Nile in Egypt.

## Egypt's Water Security - Different Perspectives

Water security is one of the cornerstones of a country's national security and economic development. It determines the stability of water resources and the response of those resources to cover the state's water needs. The water balance system is divided into three phases: the water balance phase, the water abundance phase, and the water scarcity phase. To obtain water sources, this has intensified competition between the countries to ensure a balance between the country's water needs and the available quantity.

The Nile Basin is the lifeblood of Egyptians, as 95% of Egypt is a desert, and ancient Egyptian civilization emerged and evolved on the riverbanks until nowadays. The Nile Basin has been closely linked to the formation of the social, cultural, and political structures of the Egyptian people. Currently, about 97 million people live on the river banks of the Nile in Egypt.<sup>7</sup> The Nile is a source of agricultural life and other resources such as electricity, which is produced by the High Dam and is estimated at 2100 Megawatts of hydroelectric power per year, covering Egypt's electricity needs. With the GERD project began, there was a growing fear in all Egyptian circles about threatening Egypt's water share of the Nile. Especially after Egypt entered the phase of water scarcity, the share decreased to 700 cubic meters per capita annually, which was less than 30% of the water scarcity line which set by the United Nations at 1000 cubic meters per capita annually<sup>8</sup>. Besides, Egypt's actual water resource needs are 80 billion cubic meters, which means that Egypt already has a deficit of 20.5 billion cubic meters. According to studies, this project has negative effects that threaten the survival of the Egyptian state itself. These negative effects are because of the environmental and socially catastrophic impacts due to the movement modification of the Nile River, and

the radical reduction of its natural flow, threatening the environmental structure and biological components.

## What are the Contention Points Over GERD?

After a series of discussions, negotiations and differing positions between the two main parties of the conflict, the Egyptian and Ethiopian, the main dispute currently is related to the operation and filling procedures of the GERD reservoir. Ethiopia announced that it intends to start filling the reservoir in July 2020<sup>9</sup> and the dam will begin to operate at full capacity by 2023.

The most significant effects that Egypt is trying overcome are the destruction of agricultural farmland because of drought and desertification, low groundwater level, seawater interference in the Nile Delta and increased land salinity, increased pollution and threats to the fisheries farms.

Egypt demands that the filling process of the reservoir be between 10-21 years, to mitigate the negative effects of the process and refuses to reduce the water amount to be any less than 40 billion cubic meters per year during the filling phase. Egypt also demands that, storage must be

only in the rainy season and stops in drought times (the scarce rain cycle). Ethiopia, on the other hand, demands that the filling process take 3-5 years and be throughout the whole year and believes that the required water amount from Egypt annually will hinder its ability to fill the dam at a specific time and produce electricity. It intends to supply Egypt with 32 billion cubic meters per year during the reservoir filling phase.

The inevitable result for Egypt, with the beginning of the filling process, will be negative implications for all its prospects. The severity of these effects depends entirely on the reservoir filling period which Ethiopia will resort to in its plan of implementation.

The most significant effects that Egypt is trying overcome are the destruction of agricultural farmland because of drought and desertification, low groundwater level, seawater interference in the Nile Delta and increased land salinity, increased pollution and threats to the fisheries farms. (90% of the fish stock in the Nile river is concentrated in Egypt, and there are generally more than 800 species of fish.) In addition to these effects, the energy sector will be negatively affected by nearly half due to the capacity reduction of the High Dam to produce hydroelectric power. This will, of course, harm the stability and development in the region. Scenarios of the GERD reservoir filling, and the expected effects of Egypt's most important water security indicators according to the duration of each as shown in Table I:

Scenario (Duration of years)	Loss rate from Egypt's total annual water budget (cubic meters)	Loss ratio from Egypt's total annual water budget (%)	Loss rate of Egypt's agricultural area (acres ≈ sq. kilometer)	Loss ratio of Egypt's agricultural area (%)	Impact on labor force (Total loss %)	Impact on unemployment rate (Additional Increases %)
21 yr.	3 bn	5	750,000 ≈ 3035	2.5	Not going to cause huge impacts	
10 yr.	8 bn	14	2 m ≈ 8094	18	6	17
7 yr.	12 bn	22	3 m ≈ 12140	30	9	20
5 yr.	20 bn	36	5 m ≈ 20234	50	15	27
3 yr.	27 bn	50	6.75 m ≈ 27316	67	21	34

TABLE-1. Scenarios of the GERD Reservoir Filling.

Source: Al Jazeera Media Network, *Saving The Nile*, Retrieved from URL <https://interactive.aljazeera.com/aje/2020/saving-the-nile/index.html> Copyright 2020

Some experts also predict that the lake will initially run out as “dead storage”, which means the deposition of water will be in underground caves as a result of a geological defect in the soil and which will increase the filling duration of the reservoir for more than 11 years.

In order to remedy these effects, Egypt has developed a plan that has included several studies and procedures, most of which focus on seawater desalination and wastewater reuse. This would be in addition to the utilization of agriculture which needs less water. Some crops are water-intensive and are an important agricultural source for Egypt, such as rice cultivation. One kilo of rice cultivation requires about 1600 liters of water and Egypt grows about 4.5 million tons per year. This will affect the Egyptian food basket and agriculture in general and will force Egypt to import these agricultural materials, which will increase the financial and economic burden.

In contrast, the balance of biodiversity depends on the water flowing into the Nile, an integrated ecosystem-based on water quality, quantity, temperature, rapid flow, the silt containing some micro-organic ingredients.

## **Ethiopian Perspective - The Rising African Giant**

In order to understand the Ethiopian position in all its dimensions, we must highlight the Ethiopian local situation, which will show us the importance of GERD for them as well as their path in managing this conflict. Ethiopia considers the GERD issue as a top priority for national security and dignity, as it is the lifeblood of all its economic and energy resource problems.

Demographically and topographically Ethiopian territory is divided diagonally across the

highlands and mountains, creating different and complex races. The country's population is highly diverse. The Amhara and the Tigray settled in the northern and central highlands of Ethiopia. The Oromo, the largest ethnic group in Ethiopia, became concentrated on the country's southern side before the migration prompted them to expand into the central and western regions of Ethiopia. The short Italian colonial-era succeeded in inflaming ethnic tensions against imperialism, which, dominated by the Amhara, coincided with the Soviet tide expansion and economic crises, leading to the overthrow of the imperial regime by the junta.

The Amhara kept their control over the Ethiopian system, leading to more opposition from other races such as the Oromo, Tigray, and even the Eritreans, who succeeded in independence from Ethiopia in 1993 and turned Ethiopia into a landlocked country. At that time, a new constitution was adopted that transformed Ethiopia into a federal system, dividing the country into autonomous regions based on the local population's ethnic and linguistic composition. Under the new political system, although the Tigray made up only about 6% of Ethiopia's population, they controlled the political system for three decades. That hegemony has turned into a clear majority among the country's interlocking and broad-based security apparatus, pushing the rest of races to the margins of the political system.


During 2015-2016, Ethiopia has seen a large wave of protests in the Oromo region, primarily due to their sense of persecution, coincided with increasing poverty, deteriorating economic conditions, and ethnic and religious differences. Coinciding with government development plans for The Oromo-majority regions, plans which aim to “as the Oromo perspective” disrupt the country's demographics, by confiscating the land which controls by them for the Tigray. Later on,

the protesters' demands expanded for more representation in the Tigray -controlled federal government, and as protests continued, other ethnic groups across the country joined it.

In this volatile geopolitical environment, Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn announced his resignation, declaring a state of emergency in the country on February 16, 2018. On April 2, 2018, Abiy Ahmed Ali was sworn in as prime minister, after being confirmed as prime minister by the Ethiopian parliament, the first prime minister from the Oromo took over the country.

Abiy Ahmed, the “Godfather of the Renaissance”, bore the burden of a great legacy of problems which he was required to solve. These

included a disjointed society on the edge of civil war, a repressive political system, a corrupt security system, and an economy that had grown steadily but suffered severely due to growing debt, declining liquidity and currency, heavy dependence on imports, poor income distribution, and a geopolitical and military conflict over trade routes and waterways. In contrast, these problems were met with an ambitious political agenda to restore maritime access, a transnational discourse focused on interracial reconciliation, reform of the federal political system to be more representative, as well as largely political and economic plans to face problems. These political and economic plans would adopt a full or partial privatization policy of large corporations and



**IMAGE-3.** Ethiopia Ethnic Main Groups.

Labels Source: World Population Review, *Ethiopia Population 2020 (Live)*, Retrieved from URL

<https://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/ethiopia-population/> Copyright 2020. Original Map Source: Stratfor 2018

increasing exports to stimulate growth and achieve more foreign exchange.

Regionally, the Ethiopian government has sought to avoid the dominance of foreign powers through a “Zero-Problems” Foreign Policy, primarily with Eritrea and Somalia. As Gulf interests increased in the Horn of Africa, relations began to strengthen significantly, as their ambitions converged to access the ports of the Horn of Africa.

This review of the Ethiopian political system clarified the great transformation in the domestic and foreign policy of this country and the mentality that has managed for the country to play a major role in the African continent and the Middle East. This mentality considers GERD to be one of the main targets to implement because of the contribution of this dam to the comprehensive development of major agricultural projects, fishing activities, job creation, and increased food provision for the local population. Besides this the amount of hydroelectric power generated by the dam will cover the electricity needs of Ethiopia, where about 70% of the population suffers from a lack of electricity, a very large rate. The surplus electricity will be sold through huge power transmission lines to neighboring countries. These will provide wealth by increasing treasury imports and attracting the beneficiary countries of the Ethiopian side to any issue that occurs at the regional level.

Hence the importance of GERD for Ethiopia, which aims to make no concessions on their position while insisting on achieving all those targets in the shortest possible time, regardless of the negative effects for Egypt. For them, the Egyptians want to disrupt the dam work in order to achieve other regional objectives.

### **GERD Technical Problems**

In addition to the causes of conflict between

Egypt and Ethiopia, there are some technical problems about the dam construction itself, which must be discussed regardless of the outcome of the GERD conflict.

Some dam experts warn about the collapse of the dam in the following years, the dam is composed of roller-compacted concrete and the subsoil must withstand the enormous pressure caused by the weight of this concrete. However, the dam is built on the “Great Rift Valley” region, a seismically active area, as well as being built on basalt rocks that cannot withstand a huge construction such as the GERD. It is also located on a very rugged slope. GERD is constructed on an inclined plateau with a factor of safety of 1.5 degrees which must not become lower than 8 degrees<sup>10</sup>.

A collapse would lead to a major humanitarian disaster, the most important of which would be the collapse of the three Sudanese dams (ER Roseires, Sennar, and Merowe) which would cause the sinking of Khartoum underwater at the level of 9 meters. After 18 days the water would reach the High Dam in Egypt, if the reservoir lake is full, the dam will be collapse and sink Cairo with it. The Ethiopians confirmed that their studies about the dam had revealed that the project would be based on solid ground. And the materials examined confirmed that the current site is ideal for the construction.

### **Principles Agreement 2015: Tipping-Point**

In June 2014, Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi agreed with Ethiopian Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn to resume negotiations without foreign experts. Until reaching the 2015 Principles Agreement, el-Sisi, who has been in charge of the GERD file since April 2011, adopted the “Bona Fides” principle in the negotiating processes, to reach Egypt targets from these negotiations. However, his management

of the dam file, according to international experts, has failed.

Signing this agreement had a legal and international impact on Egypt and it seems that Egypt has not realized it until later. This was considered a legal default by both the Egyptian and Sudanese parties.

### What is The Principles Agreement?

The 2015 Agreement of Principles is a “Declaration of Principles” signed in Khartoum between Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, Ethiopian Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn, and Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir on March 23, 2015. The agreement includes 10 basic principles which are consistent (as considered by the conflict parties) with the general rules of international law which govern international rivers\*. Its aim is to resolve the long-running dispute over the Nile waters and the GERD. The agreement provides a framework for commitments to ensure reaching a full agreement between the three States, including the method and rules of filling and operating the dam reservoir, after the completion of joint studies.

As a result, signing this agreement had a legal and international impact on Egypt and it seems that Egypt has not realized it until later. This was considered a legal default by both the Egyptian and Sudanese parties. The agreement was marked as a turning point over the GERD conflict because, under the agreement, el-Sisi ceded Egypt's legal and historical share of the Nile. He also gave legitimacy to the dam construction that it was deprived of before. First of all, it legalized the dam construction works, be-

cause the Ethiopians should notify the Egyptians when they started implementing the Dam, relying on previous agreements and within the rules of international law. This had not been done and this caused a problem with the legality of the dam's implementation. Signing this agreement granted Ethiopia the legal right of the construction retroactively.

Furthermore, Article “9” stipulates that cooperation should be based on “equal sovereignty”, which is wrong because shared water resources are not subject to the sovereignty of any state and international law has abandoned the sovereignty theory in shared water resources issue. It also abandoned the “water sharing” theory and replaced it with “fair and reasonable use” theory. Besides this, Ethiopia's argument for the dam construction was based on electricity production but this article transferred Ethiopia's right from producing the electricity to water fair use, which might include selling it.

Article 10 stipulated that, if the parties do not succeed in dispute resolution through negotiations, they could “collectively” seek for conciliation or mediation. This is also wrong because it gave Ethiopia the right to impose its point of view on the others, which is currently happening. This deprives them of recourse to the international community without its consent.

The fundamental problem in the Declaration of Principles is the preamble that the three countries have committed themselves to. The following principles on the Renaissance Dam reflects the nature of the Declaration of Principles to commit states themselves to a single will and the text should have expressed a contractual commitment of states that “committed and agreed to the following”. The difference between them is that a single obligation may change by changing the opinion or position of the State itself, which is a

very weak legal obligation. At least, the filling and operating rules had to be agreed in detail to preserve the remaining historical rights of the Egyptians from the Nile.

The strategic mistake made by Egyptians was that they did not examine the institutional and legal framework of the agreement. They just focused on resolving the dam's technical framework. The basis of this agreement is to preserve the rights of Egypt and Sudan in the Nile but it added rights to Ethiopia which it had been deprived of for decades. Under this, Egypt agreed to Ethiopia's right to build the dam without any guarantees or commitments, which gave Ethiopia the argument to request international funding, which was hampered by the Egyptian positions of rejection before that. Before this agreement, Egypt was confident that international donors will not invest in controversial water projects along the Nile unless the concerned countries reach unanimity on the matter, but the situation changed now.

### **What is Next For The 2015 Agreement?**

In December 2015, the foreign ministers of Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia signed the Khartoum Document, which included the confirmation of the Declaration of Principles agreement signed by the leaders of the three countries. It also included commissioning a French office to carry out technical studies for the project, as an advisory party but in May 2017 negotiations were again stalled due a dispute over the initial report of the French office.

Four-years of unsuccessful negotiations failed to reach an agreement between the main two parties in the conflict "Egypt and Ethiopia." Afterwards President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi tried to provide a reassurance message for Egyptians, when he said everything going well in 2017.

This was followed by an oral promise in June 2018 by Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed during his visit to Cairo. He promised not to prejudice Egypt's share of the Nile, which was considered an unusual precedent in the international negotiations protocols.

After that, in October 2019, Cairo announced that the negotiations had reached an impasse and demanded an international mediator intervention in the negotiations. This was what happened when Washington responded to Cairo's call with World Bank participation in efforts to bring the two sides closer together. This coincided with the threat of Abiy Ahmed within the Ethiopian parliament after he announced his country's adherence to the negotiations option.

Washington's involvement began in negotiations with the current administration, since November 2019, sponsored by the U.S. Treasury. This included the filling and operating technical processes and it ended in February 2020 when Ethiopia announced its withdrawal from the tripartite agreement, which it was scheduled to sign in Washington, claiming that it needed more consultations with local stakeholders. Some reports mentioned that Ethiopia did not want to enter into an agreement that could not be passed through the parliament, with its impacts for the upcoming domestic elections. Egypt considered it an "intentional" action through the foreign ministry statement to impede the negotiations. On February 29, 2020, Egypt signed the initials of the agreement individually.

In an unprecedented escalation from the Ethiopian side, Ethiopia announced that it intends to begin filling the dam in July 2020, without committing to sign the Washington Agreement. Cairo rejected this later on, according to Its Foreign Minister Sameh Shoukry, who considered it as a violation of the international law rules,

and contrary to Article 5 of the Declaration of Principles of 2015.

Ethiopia considered the Washington agreement an interference in its sovereignty, because the final agreement, according to its statement, was the result of World Bank dictates, which is considered an aberration of the U.S. role. As well, it agreed to enter the negotiations without waiving any of its rights, arguing that any solution must be in the African House. This turnaround in the Ethiopian position can be understood as these meetings during four months did not give Ethiopia the water amount which it hoped for during the process of filling the dam reservoir. The United States proposal was 37 billion cubic meters as an annual share of water to Egypt, while Ethiopia endeavored that this share not be more than 31 billion cubic meters.

But there is some ambiguity about the U.S. role in these negotiations. Many questions arise about the inability of the United States as a superpower to convince Ethiopia of the solutions which have been put forward. Because the only fact here is that the construction of GERD did not stop at all during the length of the negotiations. This gave Ethiopia a gain in exploiting the time factor as an advantage, the factor which allowed it to complete more than 80% of the dam construction work. So, the question is, "did the United States manipulate matters with the Egyptian regime?"

Generally speaking, heading to America has made the situation more complicated, because Ethiopia's failure to sign the Washington agreement raises question marks about it. Despite its declaration that it seeks a positive agreement that guarantees the rights of all parties, it has ultimately sought to achieve one clear goal of gaining more time. This is time that Cairo will pay for later in this political game.

## Offered Options

Escalation of tensions between Egypt and Ethiopia over GERD opens the door for speculations about which paths Egypt must take to resolve the case. In the meantime, several scenarios could be predictable for directions of possible conflict.

The first of these scenarios is for Egypt to accept that the Renaissance dam is an irreversible fait accompli. This will, of course, create new regional crises in the region because Ethiopia has thus imposed itself as a new regional power. This is as opposed to Egypt, which has not used its strategic power to manage this conflict. Ethiopia will not only stop at this project, but it will also, by using the new regional influence, build new dams on the Nile, which will deprive Egypt of more water and will destroy Egypt's water and food security permanently. This will provide an opportunity for Ethiopia to gain a fortune, which it will use to build its military arsenal. This arsenal will be parallel after many years with Egypt's military arsenal.

Here, the Egyptian party will act with the dam conflict "as it never happened", and will imposition a political and media investment of the crisis, that will be reflected in the coverages of the mass media, which is considered as close to the official perspectives. To conceive the observers from inside and outside Egypt as this is a culmination of Egypt's diplomatic efforts. And that the Egyptian regime has created a state of détente for Egypt's future water problems, at least in a medium and long-term perspective.

The second scenario envisions a return to the negotiating table under Ethiopian conditions, without the intervention of foreign mediators. This will show Egypt after all these years as the "weaker party" that may force it to give up its "intransigence", as described by the Ethiopian

side, on the GERD negotiations. Although this option will be better for Egypt, it will not differ much from the first scenario in input data and output results. This is because Ethiopia has proved its superiority over Egypt in its conflict managing method over the years. This has swung Egypt's image as a regional power and lost the Egyptian street's confidence in their negotiator. They do not expect any change in their negotiating style.

The third scenario, which is best for all parties, is taking the Nile dispute to the Security Council, as stipulated in the Charter of the United Nations to resolve conflicts that threaten security and world peace by peaceful means. Here, Egypt must obtain a council resolution to stop all operations related to the dam construction until this ongoing conflict is resolved within the United Nations. Egypt should have taken this step before signing the Principles Agreement in 2015.

The fourth and final scenario is a military solution, a scenario that is excluded by all parties and remains on the theoretical level. Carrying out a military strike to the dam without engaging in a full-scale war, the dimensions of this scenario are very disastrous for all parties. This is what we will explain in detail later in this study.

### **What Should the Egyptians do?**

If Egypt wants to successfully engage in this conflict with Ethiopia, there are several key lines to consider. First, Egypt must increase its presence in the Horn of Africa, Bab al-Mandab, and the Gulf of Aden in an attempt to encircle Ethiopia, based on that Ethiopia through the Dam seeks to be a main source of electricity for the horn of Africa, the east coast of Africa, and South Sudan. This necessarily requires a restructuring of the foreign policy of the Egyptian state in more than one direction with Arab, African and even regional and international

countries and by creating strategic partnerships and organizing common interests. This will change Egypt's position on the strategic region map, and make it the regional gateway to the world. Egypt has the ingredients to take the initiative of this strategic role but public policy management needs to be radically changed.

Secondly, from the point of view that the countries of the world are suffering from a food shortage crisis, especially in the next two decades, studies about climate change and lack of resources confirm that this suffering will take on a more severe image in the coming years. Here, Egypt must enter the line of re-changing the world's map of the food basket and turn into one of the world's food centers. What it will take will be necessary support for Egypt's position in the Nile water-sharing crisis.

In contrast, the Egyptian regime should take steps that change its image and create a state of confidence with the Egyptians about the outcome of these negotiations. This situation will only begin with one starting point: the Egyptian regime showing the people an openness with them about the lapses of public policy that have been followed in previous years. The Egyptian regime must avoid manipulating and admit the real potentials and elements of the public policies and how to exploit those elements in the negotiating process. This begins with creating a high-level negotiating team of experts in law, strategy, negotiating, political, and military tracks. The decision-makers must create a participatory environment in the crisis management process, based on the distribution of the actual powers guaranteeing an active role for different community groups and officials. These measures will reflect positive impacts. Firstly, these will confuse the Ethiopian side in the negotiations which will confuse the Ethiopian party in the negotiations, which may force them to reach a

level that satisfies both sides and the least damage for Egypt. Secondly, If the Egyptian negotiator fails to achieve the desired results. at least it will save the regime's face in front of its people because the damage will be borne by all involved parties.

### Is the “Military-Option” Open to All Parties?

In “The New Middle East” book by Peres, he talked about the war over water in the Middle East, promoting the idea that the water in the region belonged to all countries, and the lack of agreement to divide it among all countries, including the Zionist entity, would bring us back to war, as happened in the 1967 war. He also talked that one of the most important reasons was Syria's attempt to divert the Jordan River, that evolved into the preparations that led to the Six-Day War, as he mentioned.<sup>11</sup> In addition, according to the Pacific Institute, which merged a database on worldwide disputes related to water, there have been 92 water-related incidents in the Middle East. Most of these were due to developmental disputes where water was used as a military tool or target<sup>12</sup>. So, Does this apply to the GERD dispute?

It seems that the conflict between Egypt and Ethiopia opened the way for the turn of events in more than one direction, including Ethiopia's attempt to regain its naval military power. About that we can notice that the conflict between Egypt and Ethiopia has led to successive events that have revealed rising tensions in the Red Sea region. Beginning with a visit by French President Emmanuel Macron to Addis Ababa in March 2019 and signing the defense cooperation agreement, Paris pledged to develop the Ethiopian navy<sup>13</sup>. In December, “The Capital” newspaper announced Ethiopia's readiness to establish a naval base in Djibouti, which gives Ethiopia a rare military presence at the southern entrance

to the Red Sea. Addis Ababa sees that the region is experiencing a leadership vacuum and that there's space for a regional force to play a leadership role and prevent foreign powers from monopolizing the control, it is true. However, establishing a navy fleet from A to Z requires substantial financial investment and much time and resources for training troops.

Egypt has put forward the military option several times recently, in response to Ethiopia's attempts more than once to begin the dam construction before expressing its understanding of the dam establishment without harming the water interests of the downstream states. One was when Sadat threatened war in February 1978 after hints from Ethiopia of building dams on the Blue Nile. Before that, WikiLeaks documents showed that Egypt, in the mid-1970s, carried out a blown-up of equipment while it was going by sea to Ethiopia to build a large dam at the time<sup>14</sup>. During Hosni Mubarak's tenure, he announced in 2005 that he had ruled out the war option with Ethiopia, However, in the WikiLeaks leak, there were discussions about military cooperation with Sudan by allowing Egyptian troops, including commando units, to be stationed in Sudan for the possibility of operations such as blowing up the dam. Former Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir has agreed to allow the Egyptians to build a small airbase in Kosti city<sup>15</sup>. Military intervention was one of the available options for emergencies.

Comparing the military capabilities between the two countries, the advantage will be with the Egyptian army<sup>16</sup>. Although Ethiopia is geographically one of the most mountainous countries in the world, and taking into consideration the alliances of each party that may change the balance in favor of one party, military intervention and use of military force outside the country's borders need to realize the balance of power and

certain considerations to make international arrangements about it. Although the military option remains a possibility for all parties, it must be the last option to resort to by all parties.

Several political and economic factors play a major role in the possibility of using direct armed conflict, including Egypt's internal front weakness and the regional situation surrounding it as well as the regional and international consequences of the war costs. Egypt is not ready to take this option with all regional pressures. The Ethiopian side will never be able to afford the war, because one of the consequences of that war could be the dam collapse, which has suffered lack of financing for several years. This is in addition to the time which it took to be built. Also, there are regional and international powers that have significant investments in that region that will prevent a military confrontation between the two parties, whatever this prevention takes.

This conflict needs to be managed in a different way. With the fact that the international community has become disorganized and is trying to solve its problems through military intervention, which is one of the challenges at the international relations level, it remains unacceptable and contrary to the legitimate action of the Security Council and has serious implications for the international system. Moreover, there are other strategies and tactics in which the conflicted parties can achieve more effective results through it more than military confrontation. If we look at what's going on the world today, all the conventional wars end very horribly. Parties initiate some kind of wars, have a plan for how it will look like and how it will turn out, and most of the time, it ends differently of how it was expected. It costs a ton of money and loss of human life. Many aims can be obtained by other means, short of armed war.

## How Players Negotiate

According to the indications and frequent information about how each party manages this dispute "from their point of view", The Ethiopians showed their mastery of skillfully playing in this crisis. No one can deny that their ability earned time in their favor and they completed more than 80% of the dam project. Their ambitious plans have changed more than once obviously. First, they demanded that the dam be able to generate electricity. Then this idea evolved to exporting electricity abroad, then to their water rights of the Nile, and finally reached their ambition to use the river water for agriculture. The existing pattern of agriculture, which depends on the rain for six months, and is suspended from November to May due to drought, is not suitable for them and is incompatible with their plans. Hence the alternate path of using the dam, revealing that Ethiopia is a country seeking development (which is their right) and one of the ways of development is an expansion of agriculture. This is what they have already begun by contracting with transnational corporations in Saudi Arabia, China, and Israel to cultivate millions of acres for them. As part of this, the Ethiopian Foreign Ministry summoned all its ambassadors and organized courses for them to highlight the economic diplomacy role on how to attract foreign investment and open doors for Ethiopian products in global markets<sup>17</sup>.

Ethiopia's foreign policy manages the file skillfully at the level of direct negotiation and it has announced that it has taken several steps that appear to be lenient and positive with it. However, the official positions and statements are one thing and what happens on-the-ground is something else. The cessation of direct negotiations more than once is a method of time attrition until the finished dam becomes a fait accompli; it is now negotiating with the logic of

power after nearly 80% of the dam construction has completed.

During recent years, the Egyptian side has continued to handle with Ethiopians with a “well-intentioned manner.” It is not a correct policy to manage a significant issue that carries strategic and seriousness importance, even if this intention exists with the other party. That is the custom of politics. The Egyptians showed up that they are eager to move forward with any agreement whatever it contains. They know that Ethiopia does not have the actual ability to provide 74 billion cubic meter annually for the dam reservoir during the filling process, which will “practically” need more than this number to fill due to the wastage rate (dead storage), meanwhile providing 32 billion cubic meters annually, which is the share that Ethiopia intends to confer to Egypt. So the question here is “what are the negotiating targets for Egypt?”

Ethiopia's modality on crisis resolution has not carried reassuring signs for the Egyptians, and it narrowed their options to manage the crisis. The Ethiopians' decision to build three more dams with a storage capacity more than 200 billion cubic meters of water means they've taken over the Nile<sup>18</sup>, there are no negotiations that could force Ethiopia to cede, and whatever the concession level they're going to make, it will not reach the lowest ambitions of the Egyptian side and that is a difficult and impossible figure for Egypt to bear.

### **Has Israel Intervened in the Crisis Line?**

In 2016, Benjamin Netanyahu, the prime minister of Israel, visited Ethiopia, Rwanda, Kenya, and Uganda, and announced that Israel will come back to Africa. The Israel-Africa relationship began in the 1950s by diplomatic relations with most countries on the continent

except the Arab countries. After the October 1973 war, the AU\* decided to freeze diplomatic relations between Israel and most African countries but it did not hinder commercial trades between them. By the late 1990s, Israel resumed relations with 39 African countries.

Currently, Israel is providing technical and financial support to Ethiopia, as it seeks to achieve interests at the strategic level in the Horn of Africa region due to it embracing the Nile headwaters and its important sea crossings and seaports. At the diplomatic level by gaining the African countries' votes in international forums and the United Nations, as well as at the economic level, the African marketplace is important for Israeli production and an important source of diamonds.

Although the Israeli Embassy stated to deny the news about Israeli defense systems installation to protect the GERD<sup>19</sup>, Israeli media reported that there was considerable tension between Egypt and Israel over the deployment of the Israeli “Spyder-MR” missile system around GERD<sup>20</sup>. Israel is trying to surround and pressure Egypt as well as looking for strategic interests with the Horn of Africa countries. If there is actual military confrontation, Israel's only option is to support a peaceful solution between the two parties without interference, at least that will be its public role for all. As a strategic target, currently, it will not lose any side in favor of the other, because their interest is to maintain zero-sum relations with both parties.

### **Conclusion: Lessons to Learn**

Thomas Schelling writes, “The strategy is not with the “efficient application” of force but with the “exploitation of potential force”. It is concerned not just with enemies who dislike each other but with partners who distrust each other”<sup>21</sup>. An axiom of politics is that states act to

their interests and exploit their power “at the appropriate time” to achieve maximum gains. What it has of pressure will qualify it to achieve that, one of the state powers is the knowledge of how to exploit the situation with partners and adversaries, regardless of the reality of these relations with them, to enhance the chances of succeeding. Although Ethiopia's utterance expresses one thing and its actions express something else, that is one of the negotiations axioms. Any party will take advantage of any weakness that shows from the others regardless of the nature of the relations that bind them, and It will open the way to disavowal of any binding legal agreement. That is how to conduct the political process because the interests between states and companies precede the law and Egypt must play this chord. Political and economic alliances are a tool of the “balance of power” policy. International law does not go beyond the idea of it being a relative fact, linked to the relations that are created among nations and based on the principle of force. The importance of these states varies according to their role in the regional and international arena and so the idea of expanding the vital sphere of States is linked to those alliances.

By looking at the domestic and regional policy indicators of the Egyptian regime, we can see that it is seeking to achieve self-interest as a key priority. It is not interested in the country's regional role and economic capabilities. It is in favor of establishing itself for a long time. The Egyptian state has been preoccupied with its domestic affairs and moved away from regional strategic objectives, naturally in favor of other parties that seek influence in the region and decide Egypt's moves in a national matter as its water security associated with the GERD file. Moreover, from the outset, the regime is not looking for a proper and effective response to the crisis as much as it is looking for political propaganda that serves as a means to breaking

its chains of failure in the eyes of society. One of them is that parties are seeking a conspiracy against Egypt by establishing strategic relations with Ethiopia, Egypt acting as if history and geography have just been drawn. For certain state's interests are not affiliated and associated with Egypt's interests, there is only one rule, each country works to achieve just its interests, regardless of the party which will achieve its interests through it. The world is changing dramatically as is the vocabulary of conflicts and power with the change of era, method, and nature. The Egyptian state, must adapt to this change in the way of negotiation management.

Years of failure to manage the GERD case have proved that the Egyptian regime is compelled to take over major policies about gaining leverage to achieve what it aspires to with gains with Ethiopia. This is because what happens today will rule future generations for several years. Its effects will be felt in 20-25 years. In return, it is not a politically intelligent move to put the responsibility of the failure of negotiations on the January 2011 revolution in Egypt.<sup>22</sup> The regime should stick to rallying the internal front and not vice versa. This is the most appropriate time with the impact of the coronavirus crisis on the countries' economies and the halting of the companies operating in the dam, which are currently rearranging their economic conditions for the post-coronavirus world.

To sum up, the time factor is very important for the Egyptian party and should not be wasted anymore. They must open communication channels with all involved countries especially with Ethiopia to allow convergence of the views, in addition to mobilizing regional and international support and exhausting all other means. This does not mean harming Ethiopia's economic and development interests but rather reaching an agreement which the parties could achieve

their interests through without harming each other. It also means reaching an equation that guarantees achieving a regional partnership in the Nile, where water will be distributed fairly. Egypt can't deny Ethiopia's right to develop and build dams for power generation and irrigation. This is the reason why they must play a very calculated diplomatic game to avoid making more mistakes, to find a mutually acceptable outcome that gives both sides as much of what they want as possible. These measures should include increasing the dam's factor of safety because any effect of damage will have a catastrophic impact on the states involved in the conflict.

Furthermore, the failure to resolve this dispute will have negative results, for Egypt and the regional countries, that were supposed to be very calculated in avoiding such. The explosion of poverty, high unemployment, and other effects in a country and region, that are originally described as politically and socially unstable, will lead to untold consequences. And this will, of course, increase the burden of the Egyptian State, its supporting states, and regional states in the Middle East and North Africa. This is true even in Europe, which must all have a positive role in this crisis.

## End Notes

- \* FAO: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations.
- \* GDP: Gross Domestic Product.
- \* For Details about “Dead Storage”: <https://www.bigditch.com.au/dam-dead-storage/>
- \* For details about “Convention on the law of the non-navigational uses of international watercourses”: <https://legal.un.org/avl/ha/clnuiw/clnuiw.html>
- \* AU: African Unity.
- <sup>1</sup> CIEAU: Water Information Center (No Date). *What are the water resources in the World*. Retrieved from URL <https://www.cieau.com/connaitre-leau/les-ressources-en-france-et-dans-le-monde/ou-en-sont-les-ressources-en-eau-dans-le-monde/>
- <sup>2</sup> Hofste, R., Reig, P., Schleifer, L. (2019, August 06). 17 Countries, Home to One-Quarter of the World's Population, Face Extremely High Water Stress. World Resources Institute. Retrieved from URL <https://www.wri.org/blog/2019/08/17-countries-home-one-quarter-world-population-face-extremely-high-water-stress>
- <sup>3</sup> Heggy, E., and others (2020). *SAVING THE NILE*. Al Jazeera Media Network. Retrieved from URL <https://interactive.aljazeera.com/aje/2020/saving-the-nile/index.html>
- <sup>4</sup> Knaepen, H., Byiers, B. (March 2017). *Understanding the Nile Basin Initiative*. ECDPM. (7-9)
- <sup>5</sup> Samaan, M. (2019). *The Nile Development Game*. Springer Nature. (100-102).
- <sup>6</sup> Ighobor, K., Bafana, B. (2014, December). *Financing Africa's massive projects*. United Nations. Retrieved from URL <https://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/december-2014/financing-africa%E2%80%99s-massive-projects>
- <sup>7</sup> Collected information: Central Agency for Public Mobilization And Statistics of Egypt. Retrieved from URL <http://www.capmas.gov.eg/Pages/populationClock.aspx> (accessed 2020, May 10).
- <sup>8</sup> Seif Eldin, M. (2019, September 10). Gyptian prime minister: we have entered the stage of water poverty. Tellerreport. Retrieved from URL <https://www.tellerreport.com/news/2019-10-09—egyptian-prime-minister—we-have-entered-the-stage-of-water-poverty-.B1zZF53idH.html>
- <sup>9</sup> Mutahi, B. (2020, January 13). *Egypt-Ethiopia row: The trouble over a giant Nile dam*. BBC. Retrieved from URL <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-50328647>
- <sup>10</sup> El-Nashar, W., Elyamany, A. (2018, December). *Managing risks of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam on Egypt*. Sciencedirect. Retrieved from URL <https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2090447917300837>
- <sup>11</sup> Peres, S. with Naor, A. (1993). *The New Middle East*. Henry Holt and Company. (123-132)
- <sup>12</sup> Headley, T. (2018, October 28). The Coming Fight for Middle Eastern Water. Center for the National Interest. Retrieved from URL <https://nationalinterest.org/blog/middle-east-watch/coming-fight-middle-eastern-water-34392>
- <sup>13</sup> Irish, J. (2019, March 12). *Ethiopia, France sign military, navy deal, turn 'new page' in ties*. Reuters. Retrieved from URL <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ethiopia-france/ethiopia-france-sign-military-navy-deal-turn-new-page-in-ties-idUSKBN1QT2W3>

- <sup>14</sup> Kelley, M., Johnson, R., (2012, October 13). *STRATFOR: Egypt Is Prepared to Bomb All Of Ethiopia's Nile Dams*. BUSINESS INSIDER. Retrieved from URL <https://www.businessinsider.com.au/hacked-stratfor-emails-egypt-could-take-military-action-to-protect-its-stake-in-the-nile-2012-10>
- <sup>15</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>16</sup> See: Globalfirepower. Comparison Results (Egypt vs Ethiopia). Retrieved from URL <https://www.globalfirepower.com/countries-comparison-detail.asp?form=form&country1=egypt&country2=ethiopia&Submit=COMPARE>
- <sup>17</sup> WikiLeaks: The Saudi Cables. Documents of translated interview for former Israel Ambassador Oded Ben-Haim with “The Capital” in 2011. Wikileaks Cable: Doc#518767403752c-1f77-e111-846d-001aa0248408.tif. Released (2015, June 19), Retrieved from URL <https://wikileaks.org/saudi-cables/doc51876.html>
- <sup>18</sup> Mulat, A., Moges, S., Moges, M. (2018, April). *Evaluation of multi-storage hydropower development in the upper Blue Nile River (Ethiopia): regional perspective* Sciencedirect. Retrieved from URL <https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2214581817302185#>
- <sup>19</sup> News: (2019, October 23). *Israel denies installing air defence system in Ethiopia*. The Middle East Monitor. Retrieved from URL <https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20191023-israel-denies-installing-air-defence-system-in-ethiopia/>
- <sup>20</sup> News: (2019, July 08). *Friction with Cairo over the Israel air defense system for Ethiopia's Great Nile dam*. DEBKAFfile. Retrieved from URL <https://www.debka.com/friction-with-cairo-over-the-israel-air-defense-system-for-ethiopias-great-nile-dam/>
- <sup>21</sup> Schelling, T. (1980). *The Strategy of Conflict*. Harvard University Press. (5)
- <sup>22</sup> News: (2019, October 15). *Sisi Blames Renaissance Dam Crisis on January 25th Uprising: Egypt Bared Its Back and Shoulder in 2011*. Egyptianstreets. Retrieved from URL <https://egyptianstreets.com/2019/10/15/sisi-blames-renaissance-dam-crisis-on-january-25th-uprising-egypt-bared-its-back-and-shoulder-in-2011/>

## Further References:

- <sup>1</sup> Hindawi, S. (2018, March 25). *Distance Zero: Renaissance Dam. Before and after it's too late*. Al Jazeera Media Network. “accessed 2020, April 07”. Retrieved from URL <https://www.bing.com/Translator?toWww=1&redig=7DE7C6FB41524E5B9EBF9FCE01F3A7D1>
- <sup>2</sup> Abtidon, S. (2018, July 09). *Ethiopia: Geopolitical variables And the future of balance in the Horn of Africa*. Al Jazeera Centre for Studies. “accessed 2020, April 12”. Retrieved from URL <https://studies.aljazeera.net/en/node/4332>
- <sup>3</sup> Benaim, D., Hanna, M. (2018, August 09). *Water Wars on The Nile*. Foreign Affairs. “accessed 2020, April 01”. Retrieved from URL <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/africa/2018-08-09/water-wars-nile>
- <sup>4</sup> Abteu, W., Dessu, S. (2019). *The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam on the Blue Nile*. Springer.








# ORTADOĐU ETÜTLERİ

MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES



Hakemli Siyaset ve Uluslararası İliřkiler Dergisi

## ORSAM Yayınları

ORSAM, süreli yayınları kapsamında Ortadoğu Analiz ve Ortadoğu Etütleri dergilerini yayınlamaktadır. İki aylık periyotlarla Türkçe olarak yayınlanan Ortadoğu Analiz, Ortadoğu'daki güncel gelişmelere dair uzman görüşlerine yer vermektedir. Ortadoğu Etütleri, ORSAM'ın altı ayda bir yayınlanan uluslararası ilişkiler dergisidir. İngilizce ve Türkçe yayınlanan, hakemli ve akademik bir dergi olan Ortadoğu Etütleri, konularının uzmanı akademisyenlerin katkılarıyla oluşturulmaktadır. Alanında saygın, yerli ve yabancı akademisyenlerin makalelerinin yayımlandığı Ortadoğu Etütleri dergisi dünyanın başlıca sosyal bilimler indekslerinden Applied Sciences Index and Abstracts (ASSIA), EBSCO Host, Index Islamicus, International Bibliography of Social Sciences (IBBS), Worldwide Political Science Abstracts (WPSA) tarafından taranmaktadır.



📍 Mustafa Kemal Mah. 2128. Sok.  
No:3 Çankaya/Ankara

☎ +90 (850) 888 15 20  
📠 +90 (312) 430 39 48

✉ info@orsam.org.tr  
🌐 www.orsam.org.tr

📱 f in t v  
orsamorgtr