Iraqi military forces including 1300 armored vehicles and 40 thousand people reached the end in Talafar Operation in a shorter time than expected and shifted the direction towards al-Hawija, DAESH stronghold in Kirkuk. After the operations launched in this region also ended in a little while, this military concentration in the region has led to remarkable repercussions in Kirkuk and its vicinity which have been at the center of debates since the night of 15 October.
As a consequence of these repercussions, it is seen that KDP-affiliated peshmerga and public security forces and the peshmerga that constitute PUK extension which is affiliated with Najmaldin Karim and Kosrat Rasul and is also accompanied by PKK have remained ineffective. The inactive position of the peshmerga composed of two different structures called 70th and 80th brigades and the consequences of its position have left a mark on this extraordinary day at least as considerably as the effects of Iraqi army and al-Hashd al-Shaabi.
It is possible to interpret the developments of this extraordinary day as a revenge for the developments taking place 21 years ago. The process beginning in August 1996 when Barzani led Saddam’s Army to Erbil caused PUK-Talabani to lose influence in Erbil and the initiatives to be taken by KDP-Barzani side. The revenge for this deal made between Barzani and Saddam Hussein has been taken within 21 years in Kirkuk. As the phrase goes, Hero Talabani has dealt a blow to Barzanis. In this sense, having regard to the currently ongoing process, it can be seen that the situation has been reversed upon the influence of Hero Talabani.
Taking into account the developments within the last few days, we see that there is a process emerging as a result of an immense migration wave reversing the demographic transition systematically carried out since 2003 and of the withdrawal of the peshmerga.
As to the ongoing process in Kirkuk, the answers to the questions where the peshmerga forces will be concentrated, where they will be organized, which region they will defend and what means and components they will use are remarkably important. Another question which should be answered is where and how KRG will react to reclaim the positions it has lost.
Besides, there is another question: To what extent will Iraqi army and Shiite militia acting with it maintain their ambition and determination and in which territory they will lose their influence or will have it lost?
It should be primarily indicated that there is a mind and strategy which has completed the operations in Talafar and al-Hawija in a short time, manages DAESH-related process wisely and makes this immense armada ready to deeply affect the process in terms of the referendum. Whose will has managed such a multi-component, multi-actor, multi-layer and multi-space process and how has this will managed it so wisely? As a response to this question, some will say that this process has naturally arisen from within. However, it is an undebatable fact that a superior mind shows itself in the field. This mind has not been shaped upon coincidence.
Immediately before the process in Kirkuk, after a conflictual and tense 4-day period during which PUK peshmerga constituted the main axis and PKK acted as mixer against al-Hashd al-Shaabi and Turkmen components in the organization in Tuzkhurmatu, it was seen that the concentration shifted from the south, southwest and west towards Kirkuk with increasing determination and justification.
Qassem Suleimani, Quds Force Commander of Iranian Revolutionary Guards, was seen together with Talabani’s son in the graveside of Talabani in Sulaymaniyah, he was assigned as the official advisor of al-Hashd al-Shaabi upon an official statement and different axis from the picture of referendum emerged after the negotiations with PUK backbone. All this corresponds to the 4-day period. Following these negotiations, it was seen that Kurdish-axis power and political axis shifted and the effects arising from these axis suddenly started be felt. In this picture, it is seen that former Governor Najmaldin Karim and Kosrat Rasoul became alone and PUK backbone started to adopt an attitude on the axis of the central government.
Iraqi central government, on its part, made a statement relating to PKK and, ‘contrary to the recent past’, indicated that PKK presence in Kirkuk would be a casus belli. This certainly includes another balance and makes reference to a regional picture of Iraq, Iran and Turkey, going beyond a local perspective.
Since the night of 15 July, central Iraqi forces aiming to gain influence in critical territories, public areas-military bases, oil and natural gas fields in Kirkuk have captured most of the areas it targeted within 12 hours after beginning to be seen in the field.
Seeing that we have come thus far, it would be useful for us to define the counter forces (polarization) causing the emergence of these effects upon such a strong and sudden consequence.
Erbil-Baghdad polarization (Counter axis of Barzani-Central government)
Erbil-Sulaymaniyah polarization (Counter axis of KDP-PUK)
Polarization within PUK (Counter axis of Talabani family against Najmaldin Karim/Kosrat Rasul)
At this point, we should also touch upon PKK. Aiming to be present and gain influence notably in Kirkuk and disputed territories under the auspices and leadership of former Governor Najmaldin Karim, PKK acted as the very mixer. Seeing that it has made itself used and it has also used some wills by this means, it is possible to foresee that its main objective is to form a clear axis by triggering enmity between Turks/Turkmens and Kurds.
On the other hand, similarly to the mission it undertook in terms of the Yazidi drama in Sinjar beginning with the influence of DAESH in Mosul in June 2014, the provocations of the so-called “freedom fighters” and the role it undertook in Kirkuk yesterday are the clearest proof showing that he runs after a crafty strategy in order to use what it gained in Syria as an initiative in Iraq.
Everyone should see that PKK acts in such an actuality as to take control of the initiatives of KRG beyond the mountainside and of KDP, PUK and Gorran in disputed territories like Kirkuk. In fact, one of the most important factors of Barzani’s such attitude is PKK that comes first among those who push Barzani towards such choice and deepen the process with ‘its influence in the mountains of northern Iraq, Sinjar, northern Syria and disputed territories and its cooperation with global powers’.
It is also a fact that should not be ignored that PKK will try to infiltrate among Kurds by making use of their weakness and to use its mentors in Syria, Iraqi central government and Iran in Iraqi territory ‘just as it did in the past’.
Even though the USA indicates that “they will not allow the outbreak of any conflicts”, it should be seen that there is no effect which will prevent the outbreak of conflicts at this phase. At this point, we can mention about a deal ‘which is said to be secret’. The articles of the deal which is said to be signed between Talabanis and Hadi al-Amiri, the secret leader of al-Hashd al-Shaabi are as follows:
1. Central Iraqi Forces will be deployed in disputed territories and the peshmerga will withdraw.
2. 17 cities and districts including Kirkuk will be handed over to the central government.
3. A joint administration will be formed at the center of Kirkuk.
4. 15 Kurdish neighbors in Kirkuk will be governed by Kurds and the other 25 neighbors will be controlled by other structures.
5. Strategic areas such as Kaiwan (K1) military base, the airport and oil fields in Kirkuk will be under the control of the central government.
6. Halabja, Sulaymaniyah and Kirkuk regions will be established (which means that KRG will be disintegrated).
7. A new administration will be formed for this new region.
8. The salaries of the public officials in Sulaymaniyah and Kirkuk and those of the peshmerga in Sulaymaniyah will be paid by the central government.
In this process in which KDP-Barzani axis is completely ignored and its sources are cut off, we will see in a short time how Barzani will react, how he will use his Mosul move, what kind of approach will be adopted by notably the USA and the other powers influencing Iraq towards the de facto situation and what kind of repercussions will appear at the end of this deal. However, above all that is mentioned, another problem is about understanding what DAESH might do in this process since it will certainly take actions in order to have some gains out of the process.
