

ORSAM REVIEW OF REGIONAL AFFAIRS

NO.26, JUNE 2015



THE SHIITE MILITIAS IN SYRIA AND POLITICAL SOLUTION

Oytun ORHAN

Oytun Orhan is a researcher at ORSAM, focusing on Middle Eastern affairs, in particular Syria and Lebanon. He has been a doctoral candidate at the International Relations Department in Abant Izzet Baysal University since 2010. His master's thesis was entitled "The Effect of Identity on Syria's Regional Policies (1946-2000)". Mr. Orhan has published several articles and commentaries in academic and policy-oriented outlets, as well as giving interviews to media. Mr. Orhan has attended several conferences, has been to several field trips in the region, and served in UN elections observation teams in Iraq, Lebanon and Afghanistan.

One of the main difficulties for resolving Syrian crisis is the high number of foreign fighters who have joined to the civil war. Nevertheless this problem is just examined in the context of foreign fighters that have joined ISIS. On the other hand, there are also tens of thousands of foreign fighters fighting on the regime's side. A great portion of these fighters are the militia groups coming from Iraq and Lebanon with Iran's support. These groups are fighting not only for identity solidarity but also to keep Assad regime, which they see as the guarantor of their safety, in power. Iran's and militia groups' impact is growing in this portrait while the Syrian regular army is weakening. Paramilitarization process is one of the biggest obstacles for any resolution in Syria and this risk is getting worse every day. In this study, Shia militias, who form the regime side of the foreign fighters problem in Syria, are examined in detail within the framework of the mentioned argument.

The debates about the foreign fighters in the Syrian civil war revolve around the context of the ISIS. Nevertheless, another aspect of the problem is the volunteer fighters and militia forces from various countries, particularly Iraq and Lebanon, who fight in the civil war on the side of the regime. There is no direct state support for foreign fighters joining the ISIS, besides the civil society organizations that may facilitate recruitment. ISIS and other extremist groups recruit new militants

through social media and the international network that it possesses. Therefore, it would be wrong to define the ISIS-controlled territories as a sphere of influence of any country. As for the foreign fighters affiliated with the Syrian regime, most of them operate with the guidance, coordination and support of Iran and the Lebanese Hezbollah. Both actors fight against the Syrian opposition in the battlegrounds.

In the meantime, the regime's army is weakening



day by day and becoming increasingly dependent on foreign fighters. There is even a widespread belief that Hezbollah's entry into the civil war in 2013 was the most important factor in the regime's survival. Iraqi Shiite militias, similarly, played an important role during the defensive battles in critical regions. While Hezbollah was critical in the defense of the Lebanese border, Damascus and Homs, Iraqi Shiite militias undertook critical roles in the defense of settlements such as Damascus and its surroundings, Aleppo and its environs, and Nubul and Zahra in Idlib.

In 2013 and 2014, the Syrian regime has enjoyed relative success in defense and initiated an offensive stage. It has managed to keep Damascus and almost all city centers. Making gains in the coastal regions and large provinces such as Damascus, Hama and Homs, the regime got very

close to completely encircling Aleppo and forcing the opposition fighters to surrender as it was in Homs. In 2015, on the contrary, it is understood that it is almost impossible to quell the uprising through military means. The opposition has made significant gains in the northern and southern fronts in Syria. The regime is unable to establish a permanent military superiority in any area. When the regime establishes control in a region, fighting re-erupts in another region, and the opposition groups recapture the areas taken by the regime. Once about to encircle Aleppo, the regime now faces losses around the city and Idlib. With the loss of Idlib, the province of Latakia, which is crucial for the regime, is under a grave threat. In the southern front, the opposition makes advances around Dera'a, Damascus and along the Lebanese border. Under such conditions, the Syrian

One of the main aspects of the foreign fighters problem in Syrian civil war is the volunteer fighters and militia forces from various countries, particularly Iraq and Lebanon, who fight on the side of the regime.



army faces difficulties in terms of renewing its capacity and keeping the morale of its troops high.

One of the most important reasons for the shattering of the military balance to the detriment of the regime in 2015 is the return of the Iraqi Shiite militia to their home country after the capture of Mosul by the ISIS in June 2014. With this development, Iraq's security has become a priority for the Iraqi Shiite militia and Ayatollah Ali Sistani, Iraqi Shiite religious leader, called for the return of the forces fighting in Syria.¹

Summing up the developments mentioned above, the following observations can be made:

- a. As the regime weakens in Syria, supporting external actors gain greater influence and the regime's dependence on these actors intensify.
- b. Parallel to the weakening of the central army, both the regime and the opposition experience proliferation of militias.
- c. Iran's influence in Syria increases as almost all militias are supported and manipulated by Iran.

d. Increasing militia presence and weak central authority makes it difficult for a political solution due to the risk of the absence of the state party.

Despite being an exaggeration, some Syrian opposition groups state that “Syria is gradually undergoing an Iranian invasion.” They believe that they defeated the regime, but they are now fighting against Iran and its proxies.² Iran pursues a foreign policy that does not refrain from resorting to hard power in the competition for regional influence. Nevertheless, it shows great care not to become a direct adversary, while utilizing hard power. Iran engages in military conflicts through its patronage relations with non-state actors in the Middle East based on shared identity or interests. Therefore, it prevents the conflict spilling inside its own borders, reduces costs for a sustainable conflict, mitigates

direct losses and becomes immune to the international law. Through militia forces it supports, Iran builds influence on central governments. Iran provides recruitment, military training, firepower, financial aid and military advisors to these actors. Hezbollah in Lebanon, Shiite militia in Iraq and lastly Shiite militia in the Syrian civil war are examples of Iran’s policy.

Despite its alliance with Iran since 1980, Syria has been able to act independently in foreign and domestic politics. Nevertheless, as the regime has weakened and Shiite militias increased, the Assad regime gradually became dependent on Iran, which acquired effective control over some Syrian territories. This paper focuses on the issue of the Shiite militias in Syria that led to the aforementioned situation. After briefly touching upon the process leading to the “Shiite Jihad” in Syria,

One of the most important reasons for the shattering of the military balance to the detriment of the regime in 2015 is the return of the Iraqi Shiite militia to their home country after the capture of Mosul by the ISIS in June 2014.

this paper will seek to explain the militia forces fighting on behalf of the Assad regime in Syria.

The Shiite Jihad in Syria and the Development of Militia Forces

The presence of armed pro-regime militias in Syria can be traced back to 1963, when the Baath Party rose to power. This armed group called “People’s committees” made up of Syrian volunteers from pro-regime minority groups has served as

a tool without a hierarchical structure in order to suppress social movements.³ With the onset of the Syrian popular uprising in March 2011, the People’s committees provided local support to the regime. Near the end of 2012, the regime, with the guidance of Iran, reorganized the People’s committees as a local militia under the name of “National Defense Forces” (NDF). Iran has played a great part in the emergence and development of the NDF. In 2012, the U.S. Department of Transportation declared sanctions against



the NDF, for it received training, arms, equipment and money from the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps.⁴ Acquiring a hierarchical structure, the NDF also received arms, wages and air support when needed, from the regime, which expected the NDF to protect their own regions against the opposition. When a settlement is captured by the army and Hezbollah, its administration is given to the NDF militia. As of 2015, its fighter count is estimated around 40,000.

Pro-regime militias consisting of foreign fighters were seen in Syria for the first time in the middle of 2012. The first wave of foreign Shiite fighters consists of former fighters that had taken refuge in Syria in 2007 after the Iraqi government's operations against the Mahdi army of the Sadr Movement. Another group was volunteer Iraqi Shiite fighters, who were followers

of Iranian religious leader Ali Khamanei and Welayat-i Faqih doctrine. Afterwards, Lebanese Hezbollah and Iraqi Shiite militias from Asaib ahl al-Haq, Iraqi Hezbollah and Sayyid al-Shuhada started to cross into Syria in 2013. Among those, Hezbollah's participation in the civil war had the most critical impact. Changing the course of the civil war, Hezbollah helped the regime control the Lebanese border, which paved the way for the recapture of Homs. Hezbollah's experience and organization helped it achieve greater success than the regime's army, especially in urban combat. It is possible to deem Hezbollah, which has 5,000-6,000 forces on the ground as of 2015, as a "special forces" branch of the regime's army.

Similar to the methods of the ISIS, social media and web-based forums have been actively used for recruiting foreign fighters

Iran shows great care not to become a direct adversary, while utilizing hard power in the Middle East. Iran engages in military conflicts through its patronage relations with non-state actors in the Middle East based on shared identity or interests.

THE SHIITE MILITIAS IN SYRIA AND POLITICAL SOLUTION

The Pro-Regime Shiite Militia Groups in Syria and Their Regions of Activity⁵

IRAQI MILITIAS

Abu Fadl Abbas Brigade: Led by Abu Ajeeb Abu Hajjar, Abu Fadl Abbas Brigade is the umbrella organization for the Iraqi Shiite militia in Syria. They operate in rural Damascus, the Sayyidah Zeynep bint Ali Shrine, rural Homs, Malula, Qalamoun and Yabroud. They follow the doctrine of Welayat-i Faqih.

The following five groups are splinter groups from the Mahdi Army of Sadr. All these groups have declared allegiance to Welayat-i Faqih and severed their ties with the Sadr Movement.

Asaib Ahl al-Haq:

Asaib ahl al-Haq, which was founded with the support of Iran and Hezbollah after its separation from the Mahdi Army, is the most numerous Iraqi Shiite militia group within al Abbas Brigade. Its area of operation includes Aleppo, Damascus, the Sayyidah Zeynep bint Ali Shrine, rural Damascus, rural Aleppo, Qusayr and Yabroud. They follow the ideology of Khomeini and receive Iran's support. The Kafil Zeyneb brigade fights in Syria under Asaib ahl al-Haq. It is known as the most radical Iraqi Shiite group that carries out bloody attacks.

Esedullah Galib Brigade:

Esedullah Galib Brigade is known to be close to Asaib ahl al-Haq. It operates in Damascus, the Sayyidah Zeynep bint Ali Shrine and rural Damascus.

Imam Hussein Brigade:

Imam Hussein Brigade fights in Aleppo, Damascus and in the Sayyidah Zeynep bint Ali Shrine.

Rapid Intervention Force:

Rapid Intervention Force is an Iraqi militia group operating under al-Abbas Brigade. It cooperates with Dhu al-Fiqar Brigade and Imam Hussein Brigade. Its area of operation includes Damascus, rural Damascus, the Sayyidah Zeynep bint Ali Shrine and Yarmouk.

Dhu al-Fiqar Brigade:

Dhu al-Fiqar Brigade was founded in June 2013 for protecting the Sayyidah Zeynep bint Ali Shrine. The leaders of the group had formerly fought in al-Abbas Brigade. It is a group separated from the Sadr Movement. Its area of operations includes rural Damascus, Damascus, the Sayyidah Zeynep bint Ali Shrine, Deraa, rural Homs and Quneitra.

Nujaba Hezbollah Movement:

It is a front organization established by Iraqi Hezbollah and Asaib ahl al-Haq for sending fighters to Syria. The sub-groups of this organization in Syria are Ammar Ibn Yasir Brigade, al-Hamad Brigade, Imam Haan Mujtaba, al-Ashtar Union, Abu Hamr Union and Ahmed Kayara Martyrs Brigade. These groups follow the Welayat-i Faqih doctrine. They operate in Aleppo, Damascus and rural Idlib.

Iraqi Hezbollah:

Muhtar army is the Shiite militia group connected to the Iraqi Hezbollah operating in Syria. This group is related to the Quds Force, under the direct command of Qasim Suleimani. Saraya al-Dafa al-Shabi (People's Defense Brigades) is also a group formed in Iraq that fights in Syria.

Promised Day (Yom al-Mawud) Brigade:

Promised Day Brigade is an elite Iraqi Shiite militia force trained and armed by Iran. It has joined the jihad in Syria in 2013.

Sayyid al-Shuhada Brigades:

Sayyid al Shuhada Brigades have joined the civil war in Syria in 2013 with the Iraqi Hezbollah. It claims to have sent 500 Iraqi Shiites to Syria. Its area of operations includes Damascus, rural Damascus and the Sayyidah Zeynep bint Ali Shrine.

Badr Organization:

Badr Organization is an Iran-affiliated group that follows Welayat al-Faqih doctrine. It has announced its entry into the war in Syria in June 2013. It is claimed that it has sent around 1,500 fighters to Syria. Its Syria branch is Shaheed Sadr Baqr Brigade. Other Shiite militia groups that have links with the Badr Organization are Haraqat al-Talia al-Islami and Haraqat al-Abdel. Its area of operations includes Aleppo, Damascus, rural Damascus, the Sayyidah Zeynep bint Ali Shrine and Qalamoun.

Khorasan Pioneer Units (Saraya Talia al-Khorasani):

Saraya Talia al-Khorasani is related to the Badr Organization and receives direct support from the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps. It consists of the followers of Iranian religious leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and uses the emblem of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps.

IRAN

Fatimi Brigade: Shiite Afghans fight in the Fatimi Brigade, which was formed at the end of 2013. It receives direct support from the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps. It fights in Damascus, the Sayyidah Zeynep bint Ali Shrine, Lataki, Qalamoun and Yabroud.

Ansarul Akide Units:

Ansarul Akide Units are related to the Badr Organization. They have joined the war in February 2014.

Wadul Sadiq Corps:

Wadul Sadiq Corps receives direct support from Iran and follows Welayat-i Faqih doctrine.

Hasan al-Mujtaba:

: Its area of operations includes Damascus, rural Damascus and the Sayyidah Zeynep bint Ali Shrine.

Nasr al-Haq:

It operates in Damascus.

**Sukuru Sahra Brigade
Al-Hamad Brigade
Kafilu Zeynep Brigade**

SYRIAN MILITIAS

National Defense Forces:

National Defense Forces is a pro-regime militia force composed of Syrian volunteers majorly from minorities. When the army and Hezbollah clear a region, they leave it to the administration of the NDF. It is estimated that as of 2015, its fighter count is approximately 40,000.

LEBANON

Hezbollah and Amal:

The volunteers from Lebanon to the Syrian civil war are composed of majorly Hezbollah followers and a small number of Amal members. Its area of operations includes Damascus, rural Damascus, the Sayyidah Zeynep bint Ali Shrine, rural Homs, Qalamoun and Yabroud.

Army of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution



for the Shiite jihad in Syria. While internet has been used for recruitment in Iraq and Iran, Hezbollah was directly active for recruitment in Lebanon. Iraqi Shiite leader Ayatollah Ali Sistani had not given a fatwa for jihad in Syria in the first periods of the uprising. Therefore, Iran sought to organize the Iraqi Shiites through Iraqi religious and military leaders, who supported the Shiite jihad in Syria.⁶ There was also no fatwa by Iranian religious leader Khamanei calling for jihad in Syria. Nonetheless, Iran promoted the jihad in Syria through

second-tier clerics. On a website known for its affiliation with Iranian religious leader Ayatollah Ali Khamanei, Iranians were called to “fight in Syria”, stressing that “protecting the holy sites in Syria is a duty for all Shiites” by publishing “a list of names and phone numbers for volunteers’ applications”.⁷

Towards the middle of 2013, the Iraqi Shiite militias fighting in Syria declared the Abu Fadl Abbas Brigade as an umbrella organization. The first wave of Iraqi Shiite militias had come to Syria to protect the

Sayyidah Zeynep bint Ali Shrine.⁸ Most of these are Iraqis, Syrians, Lebanese and Afghans, who fight in the ranks of Abu Fadl Abbas Brigade. Nonetheless, Iraqis were the majority and their leaders were the commanders of different Iraqi militia factions.⁹ The majority of the Iraqi fighters were militants from the Badr Organization of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, Asaib ahl al-Haq, which was formed by former militants from the Mahdi Army of the Sadr Movement and Iraqi Hezbollah. Iraqi Shiite militia leaders stated clearly in interviews that the Syrian government and Iran give arms to the Shiite militias that fight in Syria; and Iran organizes the flow of volunteer fighters from Iraq to Syria. Fighters were being trained in the camps in Iran and transferred to Syria through their local contacts.¹⁰ In 2012, 48 Iranians were captured in Damascus

by the opposition forces. Faced with the claims that they were Iranian soldiers, Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Ekber Salihi made a statement accepting that “there are retired Revolutionary Guard Corps members among those 48 Iranians that were kidnapped by the opposition in Syria”.¹¹ As this statement shows, Iran not only supports the militia forces, but also takes part in fighting in the field.

Although the Shiite militia forces came to Syria to protect the Sayyidah Zeyneb bint Ali Shrine, they have taken part in operations of the Regime’s army against the Free Syrian Army.¹² Afterwards, prominent Iraqi Shiite militia groups, Sayyid al-Shuhada Brigades, Imam Hussein Brigades, Iraqi Hezbollah, Ammar bin Yasin Brigades and Haraqat Hezbollah Nujaba Brigades have declared that they fight in Syria under al Abbas Brigades. In December 2013,

While the majority of foreign fighters in Syria are from Iraq and Lebanon, there are many volunteer Shiites from all around the world, similar to the ISIS, traveling to fight for the regime in Syria.



Iraqi Shiites launched an initiative called “People’s Committee for Defending the Sayyidah Zeyneb bint Ali Shrine” in order to recruit fighters for the jihad in Syria. In 2014, more groups announced their presence in Syria. These are Iraqi militia forces such as Saraya Horasani, Faylaq Vadul Sadiq Corps and Esedullah Galib, which are sub-groups of Harraqat Hezbollah Nujaba.

While the majority of foreign fighters in Syria are from Iraq and Lebanon, there are many volunteer

Shiites from all around the world, similar to the ISIS, traveling to fight for the regime in Syria. Among the non-Arabs, the most numerous group is Shiite Afghans. Volunteers from the communities of 500,000 Afghan Shiites in Iran and 2,000 Afghan Shiites in Syria, who had fled from the Taliban’s oppression, have joined the militia groups. Fatimiyun Brigade and Hezbollah Afghanistan are the militia forces that Shiite Afghans joined. In addition to these, Afghans also fight in Asaib

ahl al-Haq and Dhu al-Fiqar Brigade. While there are also fighters from Hijaz Hezbollah, which operates among the Saudi Arabia Shiites, there is little participation from the Gulf countries. There are Zeidis from Yemen's Ensarullah, Pakistani Shiites, Shiites from India, Shiite volunteers from African countries such as Somalia and Cote d'Ivoire and Shiite Arabs from even the U.S.A. and Canada fighting for pro-regime Shiite militia groups in Syria.¹³

The foremost factor that motivates foreign fighters to join pro-regime, Iran-backed militia groups is religion. Nevertheless, they also have a very realistic motive, beside religious reasons. Shiite forces in Iran, Iraq and Lebanon believe that the conflict in Syria is a struggle that will determine their own fate. Therefore, they fight for their own vital interests besides supporting their "Shiite brethren".

Moreover, the financial incentives, such as payment of regular salaries from Iran, is another incentive to go to Syria.¹⁴

Proliferation of Militia Forces in Syria and Political Solution

The Syrian army has lost over 100,000 men and has weakened almost by half in terms of manpower and firepower. The prolonged civil war and the inability to defeat the opposition by military means have diminished the army's will to carry on the fight. Simultaneously, the NDF, Hezbollah and Iraqi militias have come to the forefront in order to compensate for the army's weakness. These forces, which were formed as support units at first, have gradually been increasing their influence. The regime's dependence on these forces has increased. Afterwards, it is expected that as the

When the militia forces achieve control in the regime's side over time, it will be impossible to find a state party to negotiate for political solution and make peace.

central authority fades, militia forces will pursue their own interests, resulting in a fractured structure similar to Iraq. Even today, the Shiite foreign fighters remain crucial elements of Assad regime's survival strategy. After the recent advances of the opposition forces on the one hand, and regime's losses against the ISIS on the other, the regime's plan to strengthen its hold in the areas it controls depends on a fresh wave of assistance from Iran as well as new flow of Shiite militias.¹⁵

A significant portion of the militia forces receive support from Iran. Iran's support is vital for the Assad regime that is fighting for survival. Nevertheless, it is likely that the Syrian regime is uncomfortable with the fact that it loses control of some territories and Iran establishes its control in the

country. Pro-regime actors that paid a price during the civil war will most likely not withdraw from Syria without any expectations. Albeit impossible, even if the Syrian regime emerges victorious, the victory will not belong to the regime and Syria will be under the influence of foreign actors. At this point, the Syrian regime will have to struggle primarily against Iran.

Whatever this looming risk is, the Syrian army is an entity with a capacity for regular and rational acts. A solution must be reached before the state structure in Syria is totally devastated. When the militia forces achieve control in the regime's side over time, it will be impossible for finding a state party to negotiate for political solution and make peace.

Endnotes

- 1 Zeina Karam, Qassim Abdul-Zahra, "Iraq Militia Return From Syria To Fight Insurgents", 21 June 2014, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/06/21/iraq-militia-syria-_n_5518228.html
- 2 Meeting with Syria Provisional Government Deputy Prime Minister Nadir Osman; Gaziantep, 29 April 2015.
- 3 Will Fulton, Joseph Holliday, Sam Wyer, Iranian Strategy in Syria, Institute for the Study of War, May 2013, <http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/IranianStrategyinSyria-1MAY.pdf>.
- 4 Will Fulton, Joseph Holliday, Sam Wyer, Iranian Strategy in Syria, Institute for the Study of War, May 2013, <http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/IranianStrategyinSyria-1MAY.pdf>.
- 5 These information was prepared with reference to the report by Phillip Smyth, "The Shiite Jihad in Syria And Its Regional Effects".
- 6 Phillip Smyth, "The Shiite Jihad in Syria And Its Regional Effects", The Washington Institute, February 2015, <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/PolicyFocus138-v3.pdf>.
- 7 "İran, Suriye'de savaşacak gönüllüler arıyor", TimeTurk, <http://www.timeturk.com/m/haber.asp?id=659768>.
- 8 Christopher Anzalone, "Zaynab's guardians: The emergence of Shi'a militias in Syria", Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 23 July 2013, <http://www.openbriefing.org/issuedesks/politicalviolence/the-emergence-of-shia-militias-in-syria/>
- 9 Phillip Smyth, "The Shiite Jihad in Syria And Its Regional Effects", The Washington Institute, February 2015, <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/PolicyFocus138-v3.pdf>.
- 10 Christopher Anzalone, "Zaynab's guardians: The emergence of Shi'a militias in Syria", Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 23 July 2013, <http://www.openbriefing.org/issuedesks/politicalviolence/the-emergence-of-shia-militias-in-syria/>
- 11 "Tahran: Bazıları emekli devrim muhafızı", Al Jazeera Türk, 8 August 2012, <http://www.aljazeera.com.tr/haber/tahran-bazilari-emekli-devrim-muhafizi>
- 12 Christopher Anzalone, "Zaynab's guardians: The emergence of Shi'a militias in Syria", Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 23 July 2013, <http://www.openbriefing.org/issuedesks/politicalviolence/the-emergence-of-shia-militias-in-syria/>
- 13 Phillip Smyth, "The Shiite Jihad in Syria And Its Regional Effects", The Washington Institute, February 2015, <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/PolicyFocus138-v3.pdf>.
- 14 Nick Paton Walsh, "Afghan' in Syria: Iranians pay us to fight for Assad", CNN International, 31 Ekim 2014, <http://edition.cnn.com/2014/10/31/world/meast/syria-afghan-fighter/>
- 15 Phillip Smyth, "Assad Strikes Back", Foreign Policy, 27 May 2015.

ORSAM is an independent think-tank specializing on Middle Eastern affairs. ORSAM seeks to diversify sources of knowledge on the region and establish a channel of communication between the local experts and Turkish academic and policy circles. Toward that end, ORSAM facilitates the exchanges of officials, academics, strategists, journalists, businesspeople and members of civil society from the region with their Turkish counterparts. ORSAM conducts studies on the regional developments and disseminates their results to the policy and academic circles as well as the wider public through various publication outlets. ORSAM publications include books, reports, bulletins, newsletters, policy briefs, conference minutes and two journals *Ortadoğu Analiz* and *Ortadoğu Etütleri*.

© Content of this report is copyrighted to ORSAM. Except reasonable and partial quotation and use under the Act No. 5846, Law on Intellectual and Artistic Works, via proper citation, the content may not be used or re-published without prior permission by ORSAM. The views expressed in this report reflect only the opinions of its authors and do not represent the institutional opinion of ORSAM.



ORSAM

Ortadoğu Stratejik Araştırmalar Merkezi (ORSAM)

Süleyman Nazif Sokak No: 12-B Çankaya / Ankara

Tel: 0 (312) 430 26 09 Fax: 0 (312) 430 39 48

www.orsam.org.tr