

ORSAM REVIEW OF REGIONAL AFFAIRS

No.69, MAY 2018



IRAQI POLITICAL MAP BEFORE 2018 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS

Hüseyin Aslan & Dr. Ahmed Yousif Ckittan Aljumaily

Dr. Ahmed Yousif Ckittan Aljumaily received his Ph.D. degree from the University of Baghdad. He is a researcher at the Al-Nahrain Research Center.

Huseyin Arslan continues to serve as Political Unit Director at the Al-Nahrain Research Center.

As parliamentary elections in Iraq approach, competition between different political parties has begun. The political parties in Iraq have begun to mobilize and train their party organizations and the public opinion. The campaign of demeaning, glorifying and defamation continues among the politicians. At the same time, temporary and new coalitions have been formed between political parties due to the differentiation and divisions originating from ethnic and sectarian reasons among and within themselves. The Iraqi Parliament, which consists of 329 seats and has a four-year constitutional period, decided to organize parliamentary elections on May 12th at the session held on 23 January 2018 with the participation of 229 deputies.

As parliamentary elections in Iraq approach, competition between different political parties has begun. The political parties in Iraq have begun to mobilize and train their party organizations and the public opinion. The campaign of demeaning, glorifying and defamation continues among the politicians. At the same time, temporary and new coalitions have been formed between political parties due to the differentiation and divisions originating from ethnic and sectarian reasons among and within themselves. The Iraqi Parliament, which consists of 329 seats and has a four-year constitutional period, decided to organize parliamentary elections on May 12th at the session held on 23 January 2018 with the participation of 229 deputies.

The Iraqi Parliament, which consists of 329 seats and has a four-year constitutional period, decided to organize parliamentary elections on May 12th at the session held on 23 January 2018 with the participation of 229 deputies. Even though the Sunni and Kurdish parties requested for the deferral

of the elections arguing the voting right of the emigrants who could not come back yet because of the conditions in Mosul, Al-Anbar, and Saladin provinces, the date has not been changed. However, some conditions have to be met for the elections. The most important of these conditions are: the provision of election security, return of immigrants to their provinces, completion of required preparations to conduct elections in accordance with electronic counting and ranking, absence of armed groups among the participating parties, presence of local and international observers to pursue the elections, the establishment of ballot boxes for the immigrants in all provinces. The parliamentary committees have been established to monitor the fulfillment of these conditions.

The slogans, party programs and election campaigns of political parties in Iraq are almost no different than one another. But this election is different from the previous elections. As the terrorist organization ISIS did occupy the northern and western provinces of Iraq by June 2014, these regions

suffered great destruction and those living there either died or had to emigrate. In the recent past, Iraqi security forces have achieved a great victory by liberating these provinces from the ISIS terror. The Iraqi political scene, on the other hand, witnessed the emergence of new influential actors such as Hashdi Shaabi, which played a substantial role in the struggle against ISIS. For, Hashdi Shaabi commanders joined the political life by announcing their candidacy in the elections on May 12th.

All these actors, directly reflecting in the Iraqi political scene, reshaped the political parties and the current picture as they influenced the grassroots by directing voters' views to a certain side. These actors aim to achieve great interests in ministries or within the bureaucracy after the elections, claiming that they represent the power of political parties or components that reflect the representation rate of these parties in parliament, and that they defend their rights and interests. Political parties or groups in Iraq are based on the sectarian and national identities of the

people in order to gain political interests. Therefore, these formations have not been linked to a national supra-identity by surpassing nationalism, racial and sectarian factors. In spite of the changes experienced or the differences between themselves, some political parties have not been able to turn fully into a national actor by overcoming national and sectarian dependence.

In this context, the Iraqi political map will be handled in two parts before the parliamentary elections in this study. What are the attitudes of Iraqi political parties and groups in the elections? Which politicians and groups will participate in the elections? What is the Iraqi political map in national and sectarian context? What will be the results of the elections or what are the proportions of the political groups?

I. What are the attitudes of Iraqi political parties and groups in Iraq in the elections?

As a result of the debate started by the date of the upcoming Parliamentary elections among

As a result of the debate started by the date of the upcoming Parliamentary elections among different political parties and actors, the current table is divided into two large groups: Those who agree with and those who oppose the holding of elections on 12 May 2018. The "opponent" demands that the elections be postponed to the end of 2018, while the "acceptant" wants the elections to be held on the date set in the Constitution.

different political parties and actors, the current table is divided into two large groups: Those who agree with and those who oppose the holding of elections on 12 May 2018. The “opponent” demands that the elections be postponed to the end of 2018, while the “acceptant” wants the elections to be held on the date set in the Constitution.

According to the Sunni political parties, which are among the “opponents”, the elections must be postponed because the necessary conditions for the elections in the provinces occupied by ISIS have not been provided yet. In this context,

security and stability must be ensured for the elections, emigrants must return, appropriate conditions must be created for elections, armed groups must leave aside their weapons, and it should be only the state that should have weapons. According to the Sunni parties, elections should be postponed for at least one year due to the reasons mentioned above. Moreover, the conditions set by the government and political forces must be fulfilled during this process and the duration of parliament must be extended.¹

In the same context - some Turkmen parties, especially the “Turkmeneli Party”, also



asked for the postponement of the elections by 6 months until the return of emigrants to their provinces were completed. Besides, it was emphasized that the Turkmen regions were recently marginalized by the Kurdish parties and it was demanded that 1/3 of the seats allocated to the Kirkuk province be given to the Turkmens in the elections.

Shiite parties and some political forces refused to postpone the parliamentary elections, arguing that if the elections were held in the period specified by the constitution, a constitutional vacuum would emerge.

Against this approach of the Shiite parties, the Sunni Bloc in the Iraqi Parliament has officially filed an appeal on January 19, 2018, to the parliament presidency to postpone the elections at least in the provinces occupied by ISIS, even if it is not possible to do it all around the country. On January 21, 2018, 144 Kurdish and Sunni parliamentarians out of 328 deputies and the parliamentary president signed an application to the federal court to make a judgment regarding

the constitutionality of the proposal for postponing elections. However, the Iraqi Supreme Court decided unanimously that the “postponement” was a violation of the constitution. This decision of the federal court is based on the Article 56/2 of the Constitution. According to this article, the new parliamentary elections was envisaged to be held as planned. According to the details², which includes the decision in question, the Article 56/2 clearly states that the parliamentary elections are to be held 45 days before the end of the previous election.³

Upon the real reason why the Sunni political parties want to postpone the elections, they exist comments indicating particularly the afraid of the punishment of voters in Sunni provinces such as Nineveh, Al-Anbar, and Saladin. For, political parties could not protect the citizens and territories from the occupation of ISIS and there was a great destruction in those provinces due to the migration and the struggle against ISIS.

At the same time, Sunni political leaders are also concerned about the presence of

Against this approach of the Shiite parties, the Sunni Bloc in the Iraqi Parliament has officially filed an appeal on January 19, 2018, to the parliament presidency to postpone the elections at least in the provinces occupied by ISIS, even if it is not possible to do it all around the country.

Hashdi Shaabi in Sunni regions. For, Hashdi Shaabi has a solid presence in the field and the power to influence elections in the regions where Sunni political parties stand strong. That some Hashdi Shaabi groups will legally participate in the elections and that they have reached to a level of competing with the Sunni political parties by receiving support from voters in Sunni regions make Sunni political groups anxious. Sunni parties are also afraid that Hashdi Shaabi will counterfeit the elections or steer elections towards another direction.

Besides, according to Sunni political parties, it will be a major obstacle before the holding of the elections that those who had to emigrate have not come back to their territories yet. Since, voter records need to be updated, and the mechanisms that will enable emigrants to vote are also required. In short, the Sunni parties have stated that more time is needed to figure out these problems before making a choice to determine the next four years. However, this very request of the Sunni groups did not receive

an answer and Iraq entered the election process, and the electioneering process has been launched as of April 14.

II. Political Map in Iraq before elections

On January 10, 2018, the Iraqi Independent Electoral Commission announced that applications for electoral list expired. Accordingly, 143 political parties will participate in the election with the 27 coalitions they form with the 7188 candidates; the parties that do not enter the coalition will join the elections with a separate list.

According to the Electoral Commission, about 24 million people have the right to vote. Yet, nearly 50 percent of voters have not received their voter cards.

Political parties and groups will compete for 329 seats in 18 provinces. Among them, 9 quota seats have been reserved for minorities, including 5 Christians, 1 Sabean, 1 Yazidi, 1 Shebek and 1 Feyli (Shia) Kurd.

This is explained in detail in the following table:

#	Governorate	Number of Seats	Number of List
1	Al-Anbar	15	32
2	Babil	17	26
3	Baghdad	69+1 Sabaen +1 Christian	40
4	Basra	25	28
5	Dhi Qar	19	24
6	Diyala	14	36
7	Dohuk	11+1 Christian	24
8	Erbil	15+1 Christian	27
9	Qadisiyyah (Diwaniya)	11	25
10	Karbala	11	25
11	Kirkuk	12+1 Christian	31
12	Maysan	10	21
13	Muthanna	7	22
14	Najaf	12	29
15	Nineveh (Mosul)	31+ 1 Christian +1 She- bek +1 Yazidi	44
16	Saladin	12	33
17	Sulaymaniyah	18	26
18	Wasit	11+1 Feyli Kurds	33
Total		329	/

IRAQI POLITICAL MAP BEFORE 2018 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS

The coalitions which will be participated in the parliamentary elections of 2018 are as follows according to the Iraqi Independent Electoral Commission:⁴

#	Coalition	Party Order	Party	Party (English)	Party Leader	Governorate
1	Victory Coalition	1	Kitle Irak Al Nahda Al Salam	Iraq Peace and Development Party	Nevvaf Suud Zeyn al Basha	
		2	Hizbul Fadile Al Islamiya	Islamic Virtue Party of Iraq	Hashim Abdul Hasan Ali Hashim al Hashimi	
		3	Kitle Moustakiloun	Free Mass	Hussein Ibrahim Salih al Shehristani	
		4	Hizbul Hak al Medeni Al Turkmeni	Turkmen Civil Rights Party	Turhan Mızhır Hassan	
		5	İttihad Al Islami Li Turkmen Al Irak	Iraqi Turkmen Islamic Union	Jasım Muhammed Jafar al Beyati	
		6	Tajammu Tenmiyye	Development Community	Adil Abdulselam Ahmed Selman	
		7	Kitlet al-Nasr ve Islah	Victory and Reform Community	Hussam Hassun Kazım al Rubeyayi	
		8	Kutletul Istikrar	Stability Mass	Muhammed Hassan Atiye al Joburi	
		9	Tayyar Islah al-Watani	National Reform Movement	Ibrahim Jafaary	
		10	Tajammu Muktadiroun Silim ve Bina	Competent Party for Peace and Construction	Bedir Mahmud Fahl Halil	
		11	Hizbul Sebed al-Iraki	Iraq Stable Party	Abdulrahim Jasim Muhammed al Shimmari	

	12	Harakat Wafa al-Irakiya	Fidelity Movement for Iraq	Adnan Abid Hidiir al Zerki	
	13	Muktabar al-Watani al-Iraki	Iraqi National Congress	Aras Habib Muhammed Kerim	
	14	Kullune al-Irak	We are all Iraq	Abdul Rahman Hassan Halid al Lousei	
	15	Intifada al-Shabaniyya al-Moubareke al-Amene al-Amne	General-Secretariat for Shaban Rebellion	Talib Abdulvahap Hussein Saadi	
	16	Tayyar al-Adale ve Nouhoud	Development and Justice Party	Kerim Abdul Rıza al Aliyavi	
	17	Al-Intifada Shabaniyya al-Umane Amne	Shaban Rebellion Security Assembly	Tevfiq Hamud Shettan al Yasiri	
	18	Harakat Ataa	Efficiency Movement	Falih Faysal Fehed Feyyad	
	19	Hizbul Sebed al-Iraki	Iraq Stable Party	Abdulrahim Jasim Muhammed al Shimmari	
	20	Tajammu Ahyar al-Irak	Iraq Gentry Community	Rafik Abdulkerim Muhlif al Fedavi	
	21	Tayyar al-Hikme Watani	National Wisdom Movement	Ammar Abdulaziz Mahsin al Hakim	
	22	Harakat Ittatawur al-Iraki	Iraq Progress Party	Adnan Burhan Mahmud al Cooheyshi	
	23	Tajammu Tuwar al-Intifada	Rebellion Revolutionist Community	Muhanne Name Ezir Cavi	

IRAQI POLITICAL MAP BEFORE 2018 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS

		24	Tayyar Shehid Evvel	First Martyr Movement	Imad al Ghazali	
		25	Tajammu al-Irak al-Jadid	New Iraq Community	Amir Ali Hussein al Moorshidi	
		26	Tayyar al-Abrar al-Watani	National Faithful Party	Abdulvahid Hasan Seylan al Humayti	
		27	Tayyar al-Watani al-Ashair Fil Irak	Iraq National Tribes Movement	Sadi Nayim al Qaabi	
		28	Emel al-Rafidein	Rafideyn (Iraq) Hope	Muhammed Hamid Hashim al Musawi	
		29	Kitle Dirih al-Irak	Iraq Shield Mass	Abdul Hafiz al Shabi	
2	Al-Fatah Coalition	1	Munamzamat Bedr	Bedr Organization	Hadi Farhan Abdullah al Amiri	general
		2	Harakat al-Islamiyya Fil Irak	Free Mass	Ahmed Jasim Sahr al Asadi	general
		3	Harakat al-Siddik ve Atta	Accuracy and Efficiency Movement	Murtaza Ali Mahmud Abud al Saadi	general
		4	Hizbul Taliyya al-Islami	Islam Leadership Party	Ali al Yasiri	general
		5	Harakat Jihad ve Bina	Jihad and Construction Movement	Hasan Razi Kazim al Sairi	general
		6	Kitle Muntasirun	Winners Community	Mehdi Musawi	general
		7	Harakat al-Sadukun	True Movement	Adnan Fayhan Moosa Sherre	general
		8	Tajammu al-Shaabi al-Moustakil	Free National Community	Felah Hassan Yasin Yosuf al Jezayiri	general
		9	Hizbul al-Meheniyyin Lil Aymar	Experts for Reconstruction	Muhammed Sahib Halaf Ghali	general

		10	Tajammu Kefe Serha Lil Tahir	Enough for Change Call Community	Rahim Seyhud Lazim Nuveyr	general		
		11	Tajammu Irak al-Moustakbel	Enough for Change Call Community	Ibrahim Muhammed Ali Bahr al Oolom	general		
		12	Tajammu al-Adale ve Wahda	Union and Justice Community	Amir Hussein Fal Faiz	general		
		13	Kitle al-Wafa ve Tahir	Fidelity and Change Mass	Isqandar Jiwad Vetut	general		
		14	Hizbullah al-Irak	Iraqi Hizbullah	Abu Moustafa al Shibani	general		
		15	Majlisi Ala al-Islami	Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq	Homam Bakr Hammudi	general		
		16	Munamzamat Amel al-Islami al-Irakiya	Iraq Islamic Workers' Organization	Muhammed Jasim Mahsoon al Asadi	general		
		17	Harakat 15 Shaban Islamiyya	Shaban 15 Islamic Movement	Rezzak Yasr Muthr Hassuri al Musawi	general		
		18	Tajammu al-Shabak al-Demokrati	Democratic Shebek Community	Hanan Mahmud al Qaddo	general		
		3	National Entente Coalition	1	Hizbul Vifak El Vatani El Iraki	National Conciliation Party of Iraq	Ayad Hashim Hussein Allavi	
				2	Tecemmü El Vahde Irakiye	Community of Iraqi Unity	Cooneid Muhammed Abdul Qarim	
				3	Hizbul Irak Lil Islah	Reform for Iraq Party	Fadil Hashim Muhammed	
				4	Hizbul Hiwar ve Tahir	Dialogue and Change Party	Abdulkerim Ali Aytan	
				5	Hizbul Hiyar al-Arabi	Iraq Choice Party	Faris Muhlif Halaf	

IRAQI POLITICAL MAP BEFORE 2018
PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS

		6	Cephet al-Wahda al-Wataniyya	National Unity Front	EAqram Ayid Muklif al Asahi	
		7	Tajammu Nahhad Jil	Development of Generation Community	Ali al Haleel al Ali	
		8	Watani Evvelen	Homeland First	Vasfi Asee Hussein al Obeidi	
		9	Bab Al Arab	Arab Gate	Gamal Abdoulvahap Hoomeis	
		10	Mashru al-Watani al-Iraki	National Project of Iraq	Salip Kanber Abduljabbar	
		11	Hizbul Urubiyun	Arabism Party	Sahab Fener Abdul Jabbar Mehdi	
		12	Cephe Irakiyya Lil Hiyvar al-Watani	Iraqi Front for National Dialogue	Salih Muhammed Mutlaq Umar al Joburi	
		13	Tajama al-Medeni Lil Islah	Civil Reform Community	Saleem Abdullah Ahmed Jouburi	
		14	Harakatil Amel ve al-Wafa	Fidelity and Work Movement	Qarim Aftan Ahmed Gait al Joumeyli	
		15	Hizbul Mazhar al-Medeni	Free March Movement	Abdul Kahar al Samarrai	
		16	Hizbul Tahsih al-Watani (Tahsih)	National Correctional Party		
		17	Tayyar Silim al-Medeni	Civil Peace Movement		
		18	Takaddum al-Medeni al-Hur	Free Civil Progress		
		19	Ahrar al-Firat	Free Fırak People	Abdollah Atallah Ahmed Salih	

		20	Tahammu al-Salam Demokrasi	Democracy and Peace Community	Muhammed Iqbal Umar Seyyeedali	
		21	Muahidun	Agreed		
		22	Cephet al-Nahza al-Watani	Iraq Development and Reform Front	Uveyyid Ali Hidir	
4	March	1	Al-Istikame al-Watani	National Honesty	Jafer al Mosawi	
		2	Hizbud Dewle al-Adila	Fair State Party	Hidir Named al Jouburi	
		3	Harakat Shabab Tahir	Young Change Movement	Adnan Abdul Qarim Abid Ali al Uzze	
		4	Hizbud Tarakki ve Islah	Progress and Reform Party	Mizir Gassen Sami Shevqet	
		5	Hizbud Tajammu al-Jumhuri al-Iraki	Iraq Republic Community Party	Hathim Mahmoud Hatap Soutlan	
		6	Hizb al-Shuuyi al-Iraki	Communist Party of Iraq	Raid Cahid Fahmi	
5	Rule of Law Coalition	1	Hizp Duad al-Islami Tandimil Iraq	Islamic Call Party-Iraqi Branch	Hidiir Mosa Jafer al Hizayli	general
		2	Hareket Nur-El Intifada El Tahir	Nur Movement-Rebellion and Change	Muhammed Qazim Firuz al Hindavi	general
		3	Tayyar al-Vast	Midstream	Muvaffak Baqr Qazim al Rubeyari	general
		4	Harakat Beshair al-Shababiya	Young Goodnews Movement	Yasir Abid Siheyl Muhammed al Maliki	general
		5	Kutlet Maan lil Kanun	Unity for Law Movement	Muhammed Abid al Sade Jaaz	general
		6	Hizbul Madani	Civic Party	Hamid Yasser Mahsoon	general

IRAQI POLITICAL MAP BEFORE 2018 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS

		7	Tayyar al-Taqafi ak-Watani	National Culture Movement	Ali Ahmed Adnan Vetut	general
		8	Tajammu Umune Beledune	Reliable Society Homeland	Qusey Abdul Vahap Abud al Suheyf	general
		9	Tayyar Weleyun al-Islami	Islamic Sympathizer Movement	Qemam Ali Hidiir Halaf	general
6	Iraqi Decision Coalition	1	Hizbul Iraq Muttahidun	United Iraq Party	Osama Abdulaziz Muhammed Abdul Aziz al Nujaifi	
		2	Mashru al-Arabi Fil Iraq	Party of Arab Project in Iraq	Khamis Farhan Ali Khancer	
		3	Hizbu Tajammu Mustaqi al-Watani	National Future Community Party	Zafir al Ani	
		4	Mashru al-Irada el-Shaabiya	The National Will Project	Mizhir Abdulkerim Diyab Harbid	
		5	Hizbul Hayba al-Wataniyya	National Glory Party	Hiyid Hamed Abbas al Halbusi	
		6	Hizbul Majid el-Iraqi	Glorius Party of Iraq	Talal Hidiir Abbas	
		7	Hizbul Hak	Tomorrow Iraq Party	Muhammed Nasr Deli Ahmed	
		8	Hizbul Nida al-Watani	National Call Party	Hazim Hamid Hamed al Janabi	
		9	Harakatil Nahda el- Shababiya (Az)	Young Development Movement	Qarima al Juvari	
		10	Ittihad Salahaddin	Saladin Unity	Ibrahim Nams Yassen al Jouburi	
		11	Hizbul Hak al-Watani	National Justice Party	Ahmed Abdul Hamadi al Misari	

7	Anbar Identity	1	Hizbul Hal	Solution Party	Muhammed al Qarbuli	Al-Anbar
		2	Hizbul Asala al-Arabiyya	Arab Nobility Party	Adil Khamis Adool Lateef Fadl	Al-Anbar
		3	Tajammu al-Attahun	Cooperation Community	Ali Farhan Hamid	Al-Anbar
		4	Ittihad al-Quua Wataniyya	National Strength Unity	Muhammed al Halbusi	Al-Anbar
		5	Wahdat Abne al-Iraq	Iraqi Sons Unity	Sadoon Joubur Farhan	Al-Anbar
8	Urbanization Coalition	1	Hizbul Shaab Lil Islah	People's Reform Party	Faiq Dabul Abdullah Sheikh Ali	general
		2	Harakat al-Iraq al-Wataniyya	Iraq National Movement	Muhammed Shakir Eesa Shammary	general
		3	Harakat al-Madaniyya al-Wataniyya	National Civil Movement	Shuruq Tefveeq Abdul Hamed al Abaojy	general
		4	Hizbul Ittifak al-Watani al-Iraqi	Iraq National Alliance Party	Mamoon al Samarrai	general
9	Democratic National Coalition	1	Tajammu Min Ajr al-Demokratiyya al-Irakiyya	Iraqi Community for Democracy	Raheem Abu Jeri Maain Saadi	general
		2	Muhazara al-Wataniya (Mautini)	National Initiative (My Homeland)	Gassan Rabih Attiyah Gazban al Attiyah	general
		3	Al-Basma al-Wataniyya	National Track Party	Faysal Abdullah Oobeyd al Zubeidi	general
		4	Tayyar al-Ichtimai al-Demokrati	Democratic Social Movement	Ali Qazim Azeez al Roofeiri	general

IRAQI POLITICAL MAP BEFORE 2018
PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS

10	Kurdistan Peace List Coalition	1	Ittihad al-Watan al-Kurdistani	Patriotic Union of Kurdistan	Jalal Hoosameddin Noorollah al Talabani	
		2	Hizbud Demokrati al-Kurdistani	Kurdistan Democratic Party	Massoud Barzani	
		3	Hizbu al-Shuuyi al-Kurdistani al-Irak	Communist Party of Kurdistan-Iraq	Kawa Mahmud Shakir	
11	Kirkuk Turkmen Front	1	Cephe Turkmaniya Irakiya	Iraq Turkmen Front	Ershad Rashad Fethollah Abdollah al Salihi	Kirkuk
		2	Hizip Turkmeneli	Turkmeneli Party	Riyad Cemal Emin Sarikahya	Kirkuk
		3	Hizbul Adale al-Turkmani Iraki	Iraq Turkmen Justice Party	Anwar Hamed Gani (Bayraktar)	Kirkuk
		4	Harakat Kawmiya Turkmani	Turkmen National Movement	Hosameddin Ali Veli al Beyatli	Kirkuk
		5	Hizbil Karar al-Turkmani	Turkmen Decision Party	Abdol Qareem Zeynl Qadir Moustafa	Kirkuk
12	National List	1	Gorran (Tahir)	Change	Omar Said Ali	
		2	Al-Jamaa al-Islamiya al-Kurdistaniya al-Irak	Kurdistan Islamic Movement		
		3	Ettahaluf Min Ajr al-Demokratiya ve Adala	Coalition for Democracy and Justice	Barham Saleh	

13	Change and Competent Coalition	1	Tajammu al-Kefaet ve Jamahir	Competent Community of Mass	Heydhem Ramadan Abid Ali	
		2	Hizbul Wafa al-Watani al-Iraki	Iraq National Fidelity Party	Abdul Hidir Tahir	
		3	Tahalif Kuwwa al-Intifaz fil Irak	Alliance of Rebel Forces in Iraq		
		4	Japhat al-Ihtidal al-Watani	National Moderation Front		
		5	Kitle Dammul Dewle	State Support Mass	Saad Abud İsmail Taha	
		6	Duatil Irak Lidami Dewle	Support for the Iraqi State and the Prayers		
14	Iraq Feyli Coalition	1	Mutamar al-Watani al-Am Lil Kurd al-Fiiliyn	Kurd Feyli National General Assembly	Muhammedsaid Tevfik Yahya al Namani	Wasit/ Baghdad
		2	Hizbul Hiwar al-Fiili	Feyli Dialogue Party	Haydar Hashim Ali al Fiili	Wasit/ Baghdad
15	We Will Overcome Coalition	1	Hizbul Wafa	Party of Fidelity	Qasım Muhammed Abid Fehdavi	Al-Anbar
		2	Hizib Surur Irak	Iraqi Wall Party	Yash Hidir Taha Ubeyd al Hayali	Al-Anbar
		3	Kitle al-Irakiya al-Hurra	Free Iraqi Group	Kuteybe Ibrahim Turki al Jouburi	Al-Anbar
		4	Hizbul Jamayir al-Wataniyya	National Mass Party	Ahmed Abdullah Abdul Jouburi	Al-Anbar

IRAQI POLITICAL MAP BEFORE 2018 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS

16	Baghdad Coalition	1	Cephet Inkad Turkmen al-Irak	Iraqi Turkmen Salvation Front	Sabit Muhammed Said Rıza al Bishar	Baghdad
		2	Hizbul Asala al-Arabiyya	Arab Nobility Party	Adil Khamis Adool Latif Fadhil	Baghdad
		3	Wahdet Abne al-Arabiyya	Iraqi Sons Unity	Sadoon Joubur Farhan	Baghdad
		4	Hizbul Hal	Solution Party	Muhammed al Qarboli	Baghdad
		5	Tajammu al-Attahun	Cooperation Community	Ali Farhan Khamid	Baghdad
		6	Hizbul Wafa	Party of Fidelity	Kassem Muhammed Abid Fahdavy	Baghdad
		7	Al-Hurriya ve Taqaddum	Freedom and Progress	Maceed Halaf Gilevi Makki al Lisani	Baghdad
		8	Hizib Surur Irak	Iraqi Wall Party	Yash Hidirr Taha Ubeyd al Hayali	
17	Castle and National Mass Coalition	1	Hizbul Jamayir al-Wataniyya	National Mass Party	Ahmed Abdullah Abdul Jouburi	
		2	Kitle el-Iraqiya al-Hurra	Free Iraqi Mass	Quteybe Ibrahim Turki al Jouburi	
		3	Tajammu al-Kale	Castle Community	Riyad Said Mustafa El Hattap Attai	
18	Rafideyn Coalition	1	Harakat Demokratiyya al-Ashuriyya (Zara)	Assyrian Democratic Movement	Ninos Ptio	
		2	Hizbul Watani al-Ashuri	Assyrian National Party	Amanurl Hoshaya Yohanne Budah	

19	Gathering	1	Tajammu al-Azze al-Watani	National Pride Community		
		2	Amel al-Irakiyya al-Mustakille	Hope for Free Iraq	Emced Muhammed Taha Hamid al Helddilosu	
		3	Al-Irak Hiwiyatunna	Iraqi Identity	Kamil Nevaf Abud al Gareyli	
20	Nineveh Identity	1	Cephet Inkad Turkmen al-Irak	Iraqi Turkmen Salvation Front	Sabit Muhammed Said Rıza El Bishar	Nineveh
		2	Hizbul Asala al-Arabiyya	Arab Nobility Party	Adil Khamis Adool Latif Fadl	Nineveh
		3	Wahdet Abne al-Irak	Iraqi Sons Unity	Sadoon Joubur Farhan	Nineveh
		4	Hizbul Hal	Solution Party	Muhammed al Qarbuli	Nineveh
		5	Hizbul Wafa	Party of Fidelity	Kasseem Muhammed Abid Fehdavy	Nineveh
		6	Al-Hurriya ve Takaddum	Freedom and Progress Party	Macid Halaf Gilevi Mekki al Lisani	Nineveh
		7	Ittihad al-Quua Wataniyya	National Strength Unity	Muhammed al Halbusi	Nineveh
		8	Hizbul Shaab Lil Islah	People's Reform Party	Faik Dabool Abdullah Sheikh Ali	Nineveh
		9	Tajammu al-Attahun	Cooperation Community	Ali Farhan Khamid	Nineveh

Although these coalitions have sectarian or nationalist orientations, the currents that take place in some groups in these elections are trying to form a national coalition and identity by separating themselves from the given orientation. This trend is seen in the National Alliance, the largest political bloc in Iraq, representing the Shiite component, because Ammar al-Hakim the president of both the Sadr Movement and the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, has left the National Alliance. On the other hand, the Dava Party will participate in the elections in two separate lists, namely the al-Nasr (Victory) Coalition headed by Haydar al-Abadi, which encourages opening inside and outside the country,

and the Itilaf Devle el-Kânun (Rule of Law) Coalition, under the chairmanship of Nuri al-Maliki, which emphasizes the political majority.

A similar dissociation has also occurred among the Sunni groups: Selim el-Cuburi has left the Iraqi Islamic Party to establish the Civil Reform Party and Ahmet al-Misari has formed the National Right Party. The Kurdish Parties have also taken their share of these divisions. In particular, Berham Salih left Kurdistan Patriotic Union (PUK) and formed a new party entitled Coalition for Democracy and Justice. The New Generation Party was also established by Şahsuvar Abdülvahit. Opposing the KRG independence



referendum, Abdülvahit draws attention with his views that encourage dialogue with the central government according to the constitution.

III. Election Process in Iraq According to Ethnic, Religious and Muslim Groups

Since 2003, the Iraqi political scene has been ethnically and religiously divided to reflect the social diversity that characterizes Iraqi society. Nevertheless, this split that occurred after the collapse of the old regime has been the sharpest and bloody decay of Iraq since its foundation in the 1920s. In terms of the superiority of sectarian, racial and ethnic character over national identity, the 2018 general elections are no different from this very picture. For, the formation of the political blocs participating in the elections is not different from the previous three elections in general. Political coalitions are divided according to the following classification:

1. Shia Political Parties and Groups Participating in Elections

The Shia political parties with the majority in the Iraqi Parliament are represented by the National Alliance, Rule of Law Coalition, Citizens' Coalition, al-Ahrār Coalition, National Reform Alliance, Islamic Virtue Party and other small parties.

Rule of Law Coalition: Following a dispute among Prime Minister Haydar al-Abadi, former Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki, and some members of the Bedir organization, it has been divided into three main lists. The Islamic Dawa Party will participate in the elections in two separate lists: The Rule of Law, headed by Nuri al-Maliki and al-Nasr under the leadership of Haydar Abadi. The Islamic Dawa Party has allowed its members and supporters to participate in other election lists, though they do not want to join as a party. What is noteworthy is that Nuri al-Maliki still has enough strength and power in the Dawa Party. Parties included in the Rule of Law Coalition are listed above.⁵

The Shia political parties with the majority in the Iraqi Parliament are represented by the National Alliance, Devle al-Kânun Coalition, Vatandaş Coalition, al-Ahrār Coalition, National Reform Alliance, Islamic Virtue Party, and other small parties.

Ittifak al-Nasr: It has been formed by 29 parties under Prime Minister Haydar Abadi's presidency. However, a few weeks after its foundation, 7 political groups, left the coalition altogether, including the National Movement of Wisdom. Therefore, 20 political parties remained in the alliance. The Kitle Mustakilun that left the Rule of Law Coalition incorporated Turkmen Civil Rights Party, Iraqi Turkmen Islamic Union and the Iraqi National Congress, the Rafideyn (Iraq) Umudu and some political figures within the Vatandaş Coalition and the Mubarak Shaban Rebellion General Secretariat. In addition, the National Reform Movement under the leadership of Ibrahim al-Jafari and the Islamic Virtue Party of Iraq from the Coalition of Virtue and Independent Elites also joined the Nasr Alliance. The parties, currents, and groups in the Ittifak al-Nasr are newly-established parties and groups in the political scene. The Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq has emerged as the result of divisions between the National Reform Movement and the Islamic Dawa Party. The differences

between them and that some of their leaders have moved away from the party ideology have been influential in this separation. It can be said that the suggestions for solutions for the changes that took place in Iraq are effective on this division as well. The most crucial developments in this context are the war against ISIS, the anti-corruption campaign, and the KRG referendum. Undoubtedly, the successes and achievements of the al-Nasr leader Haydar al-Abadi in the war against the terrorist organization ISIS, the way he dealt with the KRG referendum crisis and the decreasing control of the KRG and his steps to restore control in Kirkuk are important gains regarding the forthcoming elections. The leader of the al-Nasr Haydar al-Abadi expresses in his statements that they follow a national policy and are away from nationalist and sectarian approaches.

i. Al-Fatah Coalition:

This coalition led by Hadi al-Amiri consists of 18 political groups of Hashdi Shaabi. This alliance was established

following a separation from the Rule of Law. Hadi al-Amiri has likened the relationship between the Bedr Organization and the Rule of Law Coalition to an inseparable situation like “Catholic marriage”. But this marriage lasted only four years. Many parties participated in the Fatah Coalition, formed after the Bedr Organization left the union. Many Hashdi Shaabi groups, especially those fighting the Citizens’ Alliance, the National Reform Coalition and those who have fought ISIS also took part in the Fatah Coalition. In the wake of the establishment of Fatah coalition, a new alliance was formed with the en-Nasr Alliance, but this alliance was not long-lived and was broken down within a few days. One of the biggest reasons for al-Fatah’s withdrawal from the en-Nasr was that more than 70 political parties and groups had joined the coalition. Therefore, it was thought to be very difficult to nominate candidates in the provinces. What’s more, the will of some parties, such as the Sadr Movement, who had disagreements with Fatah, to

participate in the Nasr Coalition prompted Fatah to leave it.⁶ It is argued that the Fatah left the coalition in order to avoid conflicts and that it can still come together with it after the elections. The very point which al-Fatah relies on to achieve success in the elections is that it has been formed by the Hashdi Shaabi group, which have taken place in the struggle against ISIS and achieved success.

ii. Sâîrûn: It was founded by the Sadr Movement. It has decided to join parliamentary elections in a single coalition with the Civil Movement. For the first time, with this coalition of 6 political parties, the Islamic and secular currents are combined into a single list. After the failure of the Islamic parties in the elections, the Sadr Movement Leader Muqtada es-Sadr thinks that by the very coalition with the Civil Movement now is the time to rule the country.⁷ At the same time, Sadr’s alliance with the Communist Party of Iraq is also

One of the biggest reasons for al-Fatah’s withdrawal from the Nasr was that more than 70 political parties and groups had joined the coalition. Therefore, it was thought to be very difficult to nominate candidates in the provinces.

a substantial breakthrough in terms of Iraqi politics.

iii. Tayyar el-Hikme Vattaniyye (National Wisdom Movement): It was founded by al-Hakim, leader of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq on July 24, 2017. With the establishment of the National Wisdom Movement, Ammar al-Hekim has left the Presidency of the Islamic Supreme Council. Ammar al-Hakim tries to attract young people to this new movement. However, his step towards the youngsters has created a disturbance for the other leaders of the party, especially the Iranian opponents. Even though Ammar al-Hekim made an alliance with en-Nasr after establishing the National Wisdom Movement, this alliance was also short-lived. According to an account of an official from al-Hikme, al-Hikme made an alliance with en-Nasr only after it accepted the four conditions stipulated by Haydar al-Abadi: These conditions are as follows. (i) unity in decisions and views; (ii) electoral participation in 14 villages, overcoming

sectarianism; (iii) providing space for young people; (iv) agreement on a common electoral program.⁸ Al-Hikmet has grassroots in the society. For, the al-Hekim family sacrificed much in the struggle against the old regime. The al-Hekim family has been involved in the political life since 2003. At the same time, it pioneers the idea of assigning a greater role to young people in state institutions in the future as part of its attract-youngster policy.

As the 2018 elections approach, disputes among Shia political parties have been escalating and a candidate who is a suitable for the prime-ministry and on whom a consensus can be constituted in the next term is being sought. There is no doubt that this candidate must first be accepted by all Shia parties, and be secondly welcomed by other political parties. It should also not be involved in corruption. At present, the eyes are directed to Mohammed Shia Al Sudani, Minister of Labor and Social Affairs and acting Minister of Industry and Mines. For, Sudani is known for his honesty and professionalism in political and

national circles. Sudani, who has succeeded in managing the two ministries during the fight against corruption, is backed by Prime Minister Haydar al-Abadi, the Shia circles, and all other Shia parties.

2. Sunni Parties and Groups Joining the Elections

Sunni parties and political groups that will compete for the administration and reconstruction of the regions liberated from ISIS are seeking for a strong influence in the central government in Baghdad. Sunni groups with local and small parties and coalitions will participate in the elections with three large lists nationwide:

i. Tehâlûf el-Karâr el-Irâkî (Iraqi Decision Coalition): This coalition, whose leader is currently the Deputy President, Osama Abdul Aziz al-Nujaifi, is known as the largest Sunni group. This coalition consisting of 11 political parties, included important political figures such as Ahmed al-Misari, Selman al-Jumaili. This coalition embarks on a project that seeks

to turn the Iraqi cities where Sunni people populously live into a federal province in Iraq. In addition, many well-known Sunni figures from Baghdad, Nineveh, Saladin, al-Anbar, Diyala, and Kirkuk are a part of this coalition. The coalition includes the following:

a. Hizbul Irak Muttahidun (United Iraq Party): Its leader is Osama al-Nujaifi. Receiving nearly 2.5 million votes in the 2010 elections, the Irakiye Coalition, including Nujaifi, won 91 parliamentary seats and ranked first in the elections. Later in the 2014 elections, it won 23 seats within the Iraq National Strength Unity. Osama al-Nujaifi has served as the Parliamentary President between 2010 and 2014 and has been a vice president since 2014.

b. el-Meşrû' el-Arabî fi'l-Irâk (Party of Arab Project in Iraq): Its leader is Hamis al-Hanjar, businessman, and politician. Hanjar is described as the architect of the Irakiye list under the leadership of Iyad al-Allawi. Hancar is one of the most important political figures

Sunni parties and political groups that will compete for the administration and reconstruction of the regions liberated from ISIS are seeking for a strong influence in the central government in Baghdad.

that evoke the formation of the Sunni region of Iraq. An arrest warrant has been issued for him on charges of terrorism support on grounds that he financed the popular movement in the provinces (Saladin, al-Anbar, Nineveh) inhabited majorly by the Sunnites between 2012 and 2013. He has a crucial influence among the Sunni people, especially the immigrants since he helped thousands of Sunni families who migrated to KRG after the invasion of the Sunni regions by ISIS in 2014.

c. Hizb Tecemmü el-Müstakbel el-Vatanî (National Future Meeting Party): Its leader is Selman el-Cumeyli, Minister of Planning and acting as Minister of Trade. Cumeyli is the important leader of the National Strength Unity and also chaired the Irakiye block in the second term of the 2010-2014 Parliament.

d. Hizb el-Mecid el-Iraqi (Glorious Party of Iraq): Its leader is the head of Parliamentary Honesty Council Talal ez-Zevbaya. Zevbaya,

as an important leader of the United for Reform, received 8,812 votes in the 2014 elections. It was the third-best among the winning groups in the Baghdad province. He is popular in the Sunni neighborhoods in Baghdad province and has been nominated for an important post in the next administration.

e. Hizb al-Hak al-Vatani (National Justice Party): Ahmed al-Mesari, leader of the National Forces Coalition, is considered one of the leading candidates for the upcoming elections. In the 2014 elections, he received 17,304 votes in United for Reform Coalition in the Baghdad province.

Hizbul Hak (Tomorrow Iraq Party): Its leader is Nehide el-Dayni, Member of Parliament from the Diyala province. Dayni received about 28,929 votes in the 2014 elections. Irak Yarın Partisi won the second highest vote in the coalition called “Diyala is our Identity” and won 5 seats in parliament.

The National Will Project Leader Mizhir al-Hirabit, Hizb el-Heybe el-Vataniye Leader Hamed Abbas, National Call Party Leader Hazim el-Cenebi, Hareket en-Nahda el-Shababiyya (Youth Development Movement) Leader Ibrahim es-Serid and Saladin Unity Leader Ibrahim Nemis al-Cuburi are also in the coalition.

ii. National Alliance (Wataniya), also known as the Doctors' Coalition: Because of the high number of people with doctoral degrees within the coalition, it is called the Doctors' Coalition. The aim of this coalition is to revive the coalitions between the Sunni forces in the 2010 elections, especially Selim Cuburi, Salih el-Mutlak and the liberal leader Iyad Allawi. This coalition won 91 seats in the 2010 elections. But in the 2014 elections, they suffered a remarkable defeat as they acted jointly with different parties. The main slogans of this alliance are 'reform, fight against corruption and reshape the political process in the direction of the call of

popular and civilian movements against sectarianism.' The most important parties within the coalition composed of 22 political parties or groups, named above, are as follows:

a. National Conciliation Party of Iraq: Despite being a liberal Shia, its leader Iyad Allawi has been participating in elections with the Sunni coalition and parties since the 2005 parliamentary elections. Allawi is very popular among the Sunnis and received 229,709 votes from the Baghdad province in the 2014 elections.

b. The community of Iraqi Unity: Its leader is Selim Abdullah Ahmad El-Cuburi. It is known that the party represents the Muslim Brotherhood in Iraq. Cuburi received 13,552 votes in the 2014 elections in the Diyala province.

c. Iraqi Front for National Dialogue: Its leader is one of the major Sunni politicians Salih el-Mutlak. Mutlak received 9,927 votes in the

Because of the high number of people with doctoral degrees within the coalition, it is called the Doctors' coalition. The aim of this coalition is to revive the coalitions between the Sunni forces in the 2010 elections, especially Selim el-Cuburi, Salih el-Mutlak and the liberal leader Iyad Allawi.

2014 elections in the Baghdad province.

d. Party of Arab Project in Iraq: It is known that the leader, Jalal al-Zari, has good relations with Qatar. He is influential in the Iraqi Committee of Muslim Scouts.

iii. Âbirûn Coalition: Its leader is the Minister of Electricity Kasim el-Fehdavi. Fehdavi is also the president of the Party of Fidelity. In this coalition, there exist three other party leaders: Yasin Hidir Taha, leader of Hizb es-Sûr el-Irâk (Iraqi Wall Party); Kutaybe el-Cuburi, leader of el-Kitle el-Irakiyye el-Hürre (Free Iraqi Group) Cuburi; Ahmet Adullah el-Cuburi, leader of Hizb el-Cemahir el-Vataniyye (National Mass Party) and the Governor of Saladin.

These coalitions are participating in the elections in provinces such as Baghdad, Nineveh, al-Anbar, Kirkuk, and Diyala. Iraq Islam Party is in competition with Muttahidun for political influence in Nineveh. In the Anbar province, the

National Justice Party and Solution Party are struggling against the Iraq Islam Party. In the Saladin province, the National Dialogue Party and Iraq Islam Party are fighting al-Vataniyya. Indeed, Iyad al-Allawi on one side and Osama al-Nujaifi on the other have decided to establish secondary alliances (coalitions) to get a large number of seats in the provinces with the Sunni majority. There are new parties that want to compete with the traditional Sunni parties in these provinces. Most part of these Sunni forces, that is to say, the tribal groups who have fought against ISIS together with Hashdi Shaabi, are willing to participate in future elections with the support of Shia parties. Some Sunni ministers, deputies and other Sunni figures have explained that they have formed alliances with the Shia parties, passing beyond sectarianism. These new alliances aim to cut off the possible seats that are likely to go to the Shiite parties. In this context, it would be appropriate to say that traditional Sunni parties have established secondary alliances in Sunni provinces. For example, Ahmad el-Mesari,

Hamis el-Hancar, Salih el-Mutlak, within the Arab Coalition in Kirkuk, and Iyad Allawi in the Saladin province formed a coalition called el-Beyt el-Irak in order to compete with the Sunni parties which have close relations with Shiite parties in future elections. Some Sunni groups that are closely related to the Shiites, especially Mishan el-Cuburi and his son Yezan el-Cuburi, formed a union of tribal warriors in the Saladin province with the support of Shiite groups. These forces are expected to join forces after the elections to compete with other forces.⁹

3. Kurdish Parties and Groups Participating in the Elections

The debate between the Kurdish political movements before and after the independence referendum and the withdrawal of the peshmerga forces and their replacement by the central government forces following the events in Kirkuk as of October 16, 2017, resulted in a major disintegration between Kurdish political parties and authorities. Therefore, a political coalition

that would include and represent all Kurdish groups in the elections has not been formed.

Kurdish parties join the elections by individual lists in three Kurdish provinces (Erbil, Sulaymaniyah, and Dohuk). There are a total of 173 candidates from 27 political parties and groups for 16 seats, and one seat is reserved for Christians in Erbil. In the Sulaymaniyah province, 211 candidates from 26 political parties and groups have been nominated for 18 seats. As to Duhok, there are 115 candidates from 24 parties for 12 seats. However, in controversial regions, Kurdish parties will join the elections in a single list. This list includes three parties:

- i. **Kurdistan Democratic Party:** It is among the oldest political parties in Iraq, which was established in 1946 by Molla Mustafa Barzani. The party is widely popular among the Kurds, especially in the provinces of Duhok, Erbil, and Nineveh, who speak the Kurdish dialect of Sorani. It should be noted that the Barzani family has all the

The debate between the Kurdish political movements before and after the independence referendum and the withdrawal of the peshmerga forces and their replacement by the central government forces following the events in Kirkuk as of October 16, 2017, resulted in a major disintegration between Kurdish political parties and authorities.

security and administrative services of the Party as well as political, military and financial authority in Erbil and Duhok provinces, especially in the hands of the Barzani tribe. Barzani explained that he would not nominate any candidates for the elections in the Kirkuk province and he defined Kirkuk as an “occupied city”. The party will take part in the elections with a single list in three provinces of the KRG.

ii. Patriotic Union of Kurdistan: One of the most important Kurdish political parties, the PUK was founded by Celal Talabani in 1975 as a secular liberal movement. It uses the slogans of the right of Kurdish people in Iraq to self-determination, democracy, and human rights. For the first time in 2008, the party experienced division. Noshirvan Mustafa, one of its leaders, established the Goran Movement. In October 2017, after the sickness and death of President Jalal Talabani, his wife Hero Ibrahim Ahmed took over the leadership of the party. With

the passing away of Jalal Talabani, problems within the party worsened and leadership struggle began. Deputy Secretary-General of the Union Kosrat Resul and Berham Salih formed a wing within the party that was called the decision center and charged the party administration (Talabani family) with crimes such as corruption and party monopolization. Berham Salih announced in September 2017 that he officially left the party and formed a political bloc called the “Coalition for Democracy and Justice”. The PUK will participate in a single list in Kirkuk and controversial regions.

iii. National List (Listi Niştimân): The Kurdish parties, which oppose the policies of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), will participate in the elections with a unified list in controversial territories. The list includes the Goran Movement, Coalition for Democracy and Justice and the Kurdistan Islamic Movement. The reasons for these parties to participate in

a unified list in controversial areas are: (a) they are against the administrative policy in the KRG, (b) the controversial territories are under the control of the security forces affiliated with the parties (mostly the KDP).¹⁰ That is why the independence referendum was rejected by these groups and they acted with the federal government.

In these elections, changes are expected to happen in the Kurdish domestic political balance. It is probable that the number of seats that the Kurds are to win, especially in controversial regions, decreases. The worsening economic conditions in the region and the incapability of paying salaries and dues of civil servants, the complete loss of Kirkuk and controversial territories after October 16, 2017, then the immigration experiences of Kurdish families in Tuzhurmatu, Kirkuk, Sinjar and Nineveh Plain will affect Kurdish electoral performance. Administrative and security-related problems, especially with the worsening relations of KDP and PUK in these regions, will affect the electoral performance of Kurdish parties. Besides,

along with the internal disagreements experienced in the parties after the referendum crisis, the decrease in regional and international support for the KRG are the factors that will influence the Kurdish politics negatively. All these problems and complications can lead to a decrease in the strength of the Kurds and a decrease in the votes the Kurdish parties will gain in the controversial regions.

This situation will negatively reflect on the power of the main components of Kurdish politics in the political process following the elections. The PUK-KDP's loss of seats in controversial areas could be a good opportunity for the opposition to grow in Kurdish domestic politics. For this reason, the Kurdish parties have different opinions about the postponement of the elections or attributing a specific role to the controversial areas.¹¹

4. Turkmen Parties and Groups Participating in the Elections

The Turkmen parties, like other parties, are suffering from

There are factors such as the tragedy suffered in the wake of the liberation of Turkmen territories from ISIS and the repossession of the controversial territories by the central government. In this process, the Turkmen entered a process of recovering themselves and of standing together.

separation and division in many terms. The fact that some influential Turkmen political figures act in the direction of their own personal interests has caused the Turkmen politics to break down. Therefore, this situation has been reflected in the public and has prompted the social problems of the Turkmen to worsen further. As a result, the Turkmen political movement is dispersed, weakened and divided within itself.

However, the incidents taking place in the post-ISIS period differentiate the 2018 elections for the Turkmen from the previous ones. There are factors such as the tragedy suffered in the wake of the liberation of Turkmen territories from ISIS and the repossession of the controversial territories by the central government. In this process, the Turkmen entered a process of recovering themselves and of standing together. In this process, the Turkmen have started recovering themselves and showing unity among themselves. In this regard, the efforts of some Turkmen nationalists and the Turkish Government should be appreciated. It should be

stated that the Turkish Government supported these efforts to unite the Turkmen parties and encouraged the Turkmen political leaders to work together, facilitated the communication and contributed to the solution of differences between the Turkmen leaders. Taking into account the specificity of each of the areas inhabited by Turkmen, Turkmen political masses and parties have decided to join these elections with a few alliances (coalitions).

i. Kirkuk Turkmen Front:

A unified list was established in Kirkuk on the initiative of the Iraqi Turkmen Front. In contradistinction to the previous elections, Shia and Sunni Turkmen parties came together in this list with 18 candidates. This is important for the presence of Turkmen identity in Iraq.

ii. Al-Fatah Coalition: The political forces of the Shiite Turkmen in Kirkuk, Nineveh, Saladin and Diyala provinces took place in the Fetih Coalition under Hadi Amiri's presidency. Although the Fetih

coalition does not have a remarkable strength in Kirkuk, the chances of Turkmen candidates representing all parties and political figures in this coalition, which is stronger in other provinces, seem high. Besides, there are also Arabs and Kurds in the list including the Turkmen in the given provinces. It is possible to say that the anticipated victory for the Fetih Coalition in these provinces is for two reasons. The first one is the effect of Bedr Organization in these cities. In particular, there is a great effect of the liberation of these regions from ISIS by Hashdi Shaabi. Secondly, the controversial territories in the provinces were taken back from the control of the Kurdish forces and entered into the authority of the central government.

iii. Zafer Koalisyonu (el-Nasr): Some of the Turkmen political forces have joined en-Nasr under the leadership of Prime Minister Haydar Al-Abadi in Baghdad and Kirkuk provinces. It is expected that the Turkmen

candidate of Irak Türkmenleri İslam Birliđi Abbas al-Bayati will get a seat in the parliament from Baghdad. On the other hand, the participation of the Türkmen Civil Haklar Partisi led by Turhan Mufti in the Zafer Koalisyonu will cause the Turkmen votes in Kirkuk to disintegrate.

iv. Wataniya: The Iraqi Turkmen Front from the Nineveh province is a part of this coalition. Turkmens are expected to have deputies from this list.

v. National Wisdom Movement: Some Turkmen will participate in the elections within this movement, but their chances of being elected are low.

vi. Iraqi Turkmen Salvation Front: The political formation in question was founded by Sabit Bishar, a Turkmen who is from Telafer. Iraqi Turkmen Salvation Front will join the elections in Mosul (Nineveh Identity), Baghdad (Baghdad Coalition) and Saladin Province (Saladin Identity). While this list is

A unified list was established in Kirkuk on the initiative of the Iraqi Turkmen Front. In contradistinction to the previous elections, Shia and Sunni Turkmen parties came together in this list with 18 candidates. This is important for the presence of Turkmen identity in Iraq.

likely to be represented only in Mosul, it is known that it will adopt policies over the Turkmen votes outside Iraq.

IV. Payı Expected Results of the Elections and Share of Political Coalitions

The 2018 parliamentary elections are considered to be the most complex and controversial elections compared to the previous elections held since 2003. For, since the 2005 elections, new alliances and unexpected divisions that marked the Iraqi political scene and that revealed major traditional parties have been experienced. There are no important alliances thanks to which a map of the political process can be drawn in advance. It can take a very long time to establish the government in accordance with the election results of the political parties and groups.

There are possibly two alliances to emerge in the wake of the May 2018 elections. The first is expected to be formed between the Victory Coalition under the leadership of Haydar al-Abadhi, the National

Wisdom Movement under the leadership of Ammar al-Hakim, and the Sâirûn Coalition the leader of which is Muqtada al-Sadr. These parties are then expected to cooperate with lists such as al-Âbirûn list under the leadership of Kasım al-Fehdevi and with the Iraqi Decision Coalition under the leadership of Osama al-Nujaifi. Secondly, there is a possibility that Nuri al-Maliki, leader of the Rule of Law Coalition, will pull the Hashdi Shaabi groups within the el-Fatah Coalition led by Hadi el-Amiri and also some Sunni forces alongside the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq. However, the Kurdish Parties, which are joining the elections disorganizedly, may gather in a single coalition after the elections. Maliki wanted to win the Kurdish support for the coalition that he would form after the elections, so he called out for dialogue with the KRG. However, there is a negative point of view towards Maliki. Because of this negative reaction, the party won many seats in the 2014 elections, but Malik could not take the prime minister post for the third term. Another element that will play the

role of the cornerstone is Turkmen. Along with conflicts, surprises and precise electoral alliances, the political atmosphere, prevailing before the elections, is ready to be recrystallized in a new map that is different from the pre-election period. The Turkmen political forces are likely to succeed if they overcome their political differences and are supported nationally. Of course, the regional powers will also play a crucial role at this point. The Turkmen will have a political influence if they prefer one of the larger coalitions, and this will result in a new struggle among other coalitions to have the majority to establish a new government. On the contrary, if the elections remain the same as before, the power, influence, and influence of the Turkmen component will continue to divide.

Hence, even at the best of times, the Sunni Turkmen can only win 5-6 seats and Shiite Turkmen can get seats 4-5 seats. Therefore, their effectiveness will be diminished in Iraqi political equation and their role in shaping the next government and parliament will remain incapable.

Conclusion

With the start of the countdown for the Iraqi parliamentary elections on 12 May 2018, the Iraqi political scene has become a battlefield between political forces and parties. Some have been exposed to disintegration and division. The rest part has participated in coalitions and alliances. This fact creates a shadow over the future elections and reveals the difficulty of estimating the outcomes of the elections. And the reason is the big events that have taken place in the past four years. These events are as follows: Firstly, in June 2014, ISIS seized one-third of the northern and western regions of Iraq and three provinces. That Hashdi Shaabi emerged, liberated these regions from ISIS and destroyed it, increased its influence at the political level and its political leaders have decided to form coalitions and to participate in the elections. Secondly, the crisis between the KRG and the central government has had important impacts on the political scene. Haydar al-Abadi achieved significant successes and interests in managing the crisis.

With the start of the countdown for the Iraqi parliamentary elections on 12 May 2018, the Iraqi political scene has become a battlefield between political forces and parties. Some have been exposed to disintegration and division. The rest part has participated in coalitions and alliances.

Most importantly, he has recaptured Kirkuk and other controversial regions which are important in terms of petroleum. By putting great political weight on the solution of this problem, Abadi greatly increased his chances of ruling the country in a second term. On the other hand, this crisis caused large divisions among the Kurdish political forces and deepened the divisions significantly. And this will be directly reflected on the map of their parties' seat distribution, unlike the share of seats in the previous elections. The Kurdish element in the Iraqi political equation is trying to achieve its own strength, interests, and desires due to their role that they see as a cornerstone in Iraq. The most important features of political parties and forces in the Iraqi political scene before the elections are as follows:

- i. Some big traditional parties, leaders, and political figures have given up on the basic ideologies and principles which they have established on to achieve their personal interests.
- ii. Some parties and political forces in these elections have

exceeded all expectations regarding themselves by joining coalitions with political forces that were against themselves during previous elections.

- iii. Political groups and parties in Iraq have become only electoral political blocs. Their goals in the elections far from their doctrines or principled thoughts are based on popular support.

The Iraqi electorate will determine the major changes in Iraq's political situation, especially political, economic, social and security fields, that is, the future political map. For, the Iraqi electorate has had significant knowledge about politicians, political figures and the resources of the state since 2003. The experience they gained from the previous elections clearly shows that the main losers are the Iraqi people, and the stones, such as the chess game, are changing place again. Perhaps because the underground resources have been looted by a bad group, the results of the upcoming elections may be fair and will remove the old politicians from the administration.

Endnotes

- 1 <https://www.alarabiya.net/ar/arab-and-world/iraq/2018/01/17/.html>
- 2 "Ref. 8/federal/media/2018", Federal Supreme Court, Republic of Iraq, https://www.iraqfsc.iq/krarat/feden/8_fed_2018en.pdf
- 3 Constitution of Republic of Iraq, General Secretary of the Cabinet, Official site, <http://www.cabinet.iq/PageViewer.aspx?id=2>
- 4 <http://www.ihec.iq/ihecftp/2018/parts/taha2018a.xlsx>
- 5 The statement made by the Dawa Party in order to join the elections: <http://www.al-daawa.org/main/2013-01-07-14-22-14/3539-2018-01-13-16-53-58.html>
- 6 "Hashdi Shaabi leaders withdraw from the Abadi Coalition" <http://www.alquds.co.uk/?p=861832>
- 7 Interview with Muqtada es-Sadr: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=I9sRtdwu8As>
- 8 "Most of Abadi allies withdraw from the coalition", el-Mede Newspaper, 31.01.2018
- 9 The Sunni electoral scene ... disintegration and stability without change!(El Meşhed El İntihabi El Sumi..Tefkik Vetebet Bidün Teğür) special interview, Attitude of Iraq, 07.02.2017 <http://www.al-mawqif.com/82477>
- 10 <http://almustaqbal.com/article/2014573/>
- 11 <http://almustaqbal.com/article/http://www.newiraqcenter.com/2018/02/02/>

ORSAM is an independent think-tank specializing on Middle Eastern affairs. ORSAM seeks to diversify sources of knowledge on the region and establish a channel of communication between the local experts and Turkish academic and policy circles. Toward that end, ORSAM facilitates the exchanges of officials, academics, strategists, journalists, businesspeople and members of civil society from the region with their Turkish counterparts. ORSAM conducts studies on the regional developments and disseminates their results to the policy and academic circles as well as the wider public through various publication outlets. ORSAM publications include books, reports, bulletins, newsletters, policy briefs, conference minutes and two journals *Ortadoğu Analiz* and *Ortadoğu Etütleri*.

© Content of this report is copyrighted to ORSAM. Except reasonable and partial quotation and use under the Act No. 5846, Law on Intellectual and Artistic Works, via proper citation, the content may not be used or re-published without prior permission by ORSAM. The views expressed in this report reflect only the opinions of its authors and do not represent the institutional opinion of ORSAM.



Ortadoğu Stratejik Araştırmalar Merkezi (ORSAM)
Süleyman Nazif Sokak No: 12-B Çankaya / Ankara
Tel: 0 (312) 430 26 09 Fax: 0 (312) 430 39 48
www.orsam.org.tr