

*Report No: 82*  
**THE BLACK SEA INTERNATIONAL**  
*Report No: 16, October 2011*

# AFGHANISTAN IN THE PERSPECTIVE OF NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES

BÖLGE DEVLETLERİNİN  
PERSPEKTİFİNDEN AFGANİSTAN

АФГАНИСТАН С ТОЧКИ ЗРЕНИЯ  
СТРАН РЕГИОНА

CENTER FOR MIDDLE EASTERN STRATEGIC STUDIES  
ORTADOĞU STRATEJİK ARAŞTIRMALAR MERKEZİ  
Центр стратегических исследований Ближнего Востока

THE BLACK SEA INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR RESEARCH AND DIALOGUE



# **AFGHANISTAN IN THE PERSPECTIVE OF NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES**

## **BÖLGE DEVLETLERİNİN PERSPEKTİFİNDEN AFGANİSTAN**

## **АФГАНИСТАН С ТОЧКИ ЗРЕНИЯ СТРАН РЕГИОНА**

**ORSAM Report No: 82  
The Black Sea International Report No: 16**

**October 2011**

**Ankara - TURKEY      ORSAM © 2011**

Content of this report is copyrighted to ORSAM. Except reasonable and partial quotation and exploitation under the Act No. 5846, Law on Intellectual and Artistic Works, via proper citation, may not be used or re-published without prior permission by ORSAM. Assessments expressed in this report reflect only the opinions of its authors and do not represent the institutional opinion of ORSAM.

## ***Contents***

Presentation .....	23
Summary .....	24
India and Pakistan .....	25
Iran .....	27

## **PRESENTATION**

The developments, called the “Arab Spring” since the beginning of 2011, have led to consequences particularly interesting the regional politics and security especially in the context of Libya and Syria. In this regard, it could be said that these problems, which established a presence on regional agenda, besides the Afghanistan problem have affected the policies and priorities of the countries in the region.

It is also seen that in the region, which is complicated by these developments and the new dynamics on Middle East scene, the former problems still maintain their importance. The invasion of Afghanistan by the U.S. and the coalition forces entered the 10th year. Within this period of time, the weakness and fragility of the new government structure in Afghanistan caused suspicion related to the success of the operation led by the U.S. Both Taliban and the other insurgent groups took advantage of the lack of power and authority of the central government, and put Afghanistan into a similar situation as in civil war environment in 1990's. As the process proceeded, the central focus of the solution efforts in Afghanistan was directed towards Taliban's military defeat and its weakening; as well as towards the attitude of including the Taliban elements, rejecting violence and Al-Qaida, into the political life.

In addition to the detection suggesting the fact that the issues in Afghanistan could spread both to the South Asia and the Middle East, and these issues had certain impacts on these territories is true; it should also be indicated that the regional factors could be influential within Afghanistan. In this regard, it is necessary to analyze the Afghanistan policies of the countries in the region.

This study deals with the countries, which are closely interested in the situation in Afghanistan, and which have an influence on the internal balances in Afghanistan; and with their policies. In addition to India and Pakistan, which were assessed together, Iran was also handled.

We will continue our study by further expanding on the Afghanistan problem.

***Assoc.Prof.Dr. Hasan Ali Karasar***  
***Coordinator of ORSAM***  
***The Black Sea International***

***Hasan Kanbolat***  
***Director of ORSAM***

Prepared: ORSAM

# AFGHANISTAN IN THE PERSPECTIVE OF NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES

## Summary

*New Delhi's interest in Afghanistan is considerably important for their own national interests, which are based on the economy in 21st century and on opening up to the world. Deactivating Taliban and similar organizations; balancing Pakistan in the region with the assistance of a government to pursue a new and independent foreign policy; and most importantly, opening up to the Central Asia through a stabilised Afghanistan are significant opportunities for India.*

*Attaching great importance to the stability of Afghanistan in terms of the national security, India provided a financial assistance of 650 million dollars for the projects related to the reconstruction of Afghanistan between 2002 and 2006.*

*First of all, India does not want Taliban to regain its power in Afghanistan, or an anti-Indian government to come into power in the country, in the medium or long term. In addition to this, she has the intention to limit Pakistan's possible influence on this country from the ground up.*

*The economic dimension of the rivalry on Afghanistan is formed around India's striving for establishing an alternative transportation line from Iran's Shah Bahar port to Afghanistan and the Central Asia. Of course, Pakistan objects to this project. Besides, Pakistan perceives this project as a direct threat for her project of turning the Gwadar port into a commercial terminal in the region (particularly when considered that the distance between the two port is only 100 miles).*

*Iran's policy on Afghanistan has been formed by the factors such as; anti-U.S.ism, energy policies, supporting the Shi'ite movements, and thus increasing its own efficiency on Afghanistan.*

*Afghanistan is located on a major dispute area between Teheran and Islamabad, and it is still the same. One of the partial reasons of this is to conserve its own state ideology for the security of Iran, as well as to support the Shi'ite traditions and to protect the Shi'ite population on the borderlines. All these interests have been threatened by Taliban, carrying out activities in Pakistan and by basing on Pakistan, as well as threatened by the anti-Shi'ite Sunni groups.*

## INDIA-PAKISTAN

India and Pakistan share deep cultural and historic ties with Afghanistan but have for decades had competing strategic agendas there. For India, Afghanistan was an important albeit passive geopolitical constraint on Pakistan, as well as the gateway to Central Asia. Pakistan saw Afghanistan as part of a threatening Indian pincer movement, a source of fuel for Pashtun separatism inside Pakistan, and during the Taliban years, a source of “strategic depth” against the Indian threat. These mutual suspicions make it difficult to get Afghanistan’s neighbors to pull together in stabilizing the country. With a new government in Pakistan determined to convince its people that Pakistan is defending its own interests rather than following a U.S. lead, U.S. policy will need to respect the Pakistan government’s need for political space. At the same time, a fine balancing act is needed between India and Pakistan in Afghanistan to ensure its smooth transition, peace, and economic growth.

For Pakistan, a stormy history: For half a century, Pakistan had a kind of “estranged family” relationship with Afghanistan. The same Pashtun clans lived on both sides of the border, and Pashtun nationalism often expressed itself as a demand for a “Pashtunistan” separate from Pakistan. Afghanistan never recognized the border with Pakistan, the Durand Line and pre-1979 Afghan governments encouraged Baluch separatists in Pakistan. India’s place as Pakistan’s major strategic threat made its long-standing friendship with Afghanistan appear in a particularly sinister light. The end of the Soviet invasion brought the hope of turning this hostility into a strategic asset. This was a major factor in the support Pakistan gave to the Taliban government.

The attacks of September 11 led to a reversal of Pakistan’s Afghan policy, but the fall of the Taliban still looked to many in Pakistan like a strategic disaster. The Northern Alliance,

which formed the core of the new Afghan government, had been close to the Indians and hostile to Pakistan’s Taliban contacts. The Pervez Musharraf and Hamid Karzai governments tried to put relations on a better footing, but geopolitics, history, and eventually the two leaders’ personal dislike for each other undermined this goal. Relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan soured further with the intensification of the Taliban insurgency. While Pakistan charges Afghanistan’s government with turning a blind eye to the arms and drug trade, Afghanistan charges that the Taliban operates out of safe havens in Pakistan.

For India, a friend in the West and a bridge to Central Asia: India, on the other hand, has wanted to protect and expand its stake in Afghanistan in order to prevent the consolidation of an anti-India bloc extending westward from Pakistan. It had been blindsided by the Soviet decision to invade Afghanistan in 1979 and was determined to remain closely involved and avoid another unpleasant surprise. It opened consulates in Herat, Mazar-e-Sharif, Kandahar, and Jalalabad, participated (as did Pakistan) in the Bonn conference that established the new government, and took an active part in reconstruction efforts. India has also expanded its relations with the Central Asian countries to Afghanistan’s north and west, a move that has sparked some of the competitive impulses within Pakistan.

This Indian presence stoked Pakistan’s fears. Pakistan charged that the Indian consulates provide cover for Indian intelligence agencies to run covert operations against Pakistan. India attributed a grenade attack on its Jalalabad consulate a few years ago to Pakistan-backed militia. In recent years, Pakistan has accused India of intriguing in collusion with the Afghan Ministry of Tribal Affairs and the Afghan intelligence service to fund and arm rebels of the Baloch Liberation Army who are carrying out a separatist insurgency in Pakistan. During Afghan president Karzai’s visit to Pakistan last year, Musharraf presented

him maps of locations with suspected Indian activity and urged him to rein in the Indians. Pakistan's fears of encirclement by India have been compounded by the Indian Air Force's new facility in Farkhor, Tajikistan, which may house MI-17 helicopter gunships. The air base follows up on a hospital and logistics depot constructed by the Indians in the region some years ago.

**Reconstruction aid:** In the last six years, both countries have provided reconstruction assistance to Afghanistan. India has promised \$750 million in aid in the seven years since the Bonn conference, representing its second-biggest foreign aid commitment. Pakistan in turn has committed \$200 million in the same period and is still hosting over 2 million Afghan refugees. Both countries have focused on infrastructure reconstruction. India has been active on more fronts than Pakistan, partly owing to its closer ties with the former Northern Alliance members of Karzai's government. Indian aid has supported road reconstruction, communications, and expansion of the services sector. Public perceptions of aid to Afghanistan are quite different in India and Pakistan. In India, the media has vocally supported the country's growing role and presence in Afghanistan. Pakistan's media has an embittered view of its involvement, saying that its aid is wasted on an ungrateful Afghanistan, which has become the root of Pakistan's national security problems.

India's most prominent investments have been in building the road that connects Dilaram in western Afghanistan with Zaranj in Iran and another road linking Kandahar with Spin Boldak, an important town on the border with Pakistan. Even in projects carried out by American or European contractors, such as the Kabul-Kandahar highway, it has become commonplace to see Indian subcontractors being engaged, creating positive perceptions among the local Afghan populace. India's role in the reconstruction has thus acted as an exertion of its soft power. Pakistan views these projects with much concern.

**Economic rivalry:** Both India and Pakistan have economic stakes in Afghanistan. One of the fallouts of Afghanistan's reconstruction and foreign aid has been rampant inflation compounded by the replacement of food crops by poppy cultivation. This has probably made it easier for Pakistan to sustain the elimination of its own narcotics production. But it has also raised wheat prices to twice the level prevailing in Pakistan, prompting large-scale smuggling of food and essential commodities into Afghanistan and contributing to nationwide shortages of wheat flour in Pakistan. Estimates of the annual volume of gray market trading run as high as \$10 billion—five times the official volume of trade between the two countries. A strong parallel economy run by Afghan Pashtuns has also emerged in Baluchistan. This is adding to disenchantment about Afghanistan among the Pakistani public. India would like to expand its trade with Afghanistan, but Pakistan continues to block the overland transit of Indian goods through its territory.

For both countries, Afghanistan is a potential route for access to Central Asian energy. A pipeline from Turkmenistan across Afghanistan to Pakistan and India could benefit both countries, but instability in both Afghanistan and Pakistan as well as supply issues in Turkmenistan have put this idea on ice. Given China's growing investment in Central Asian energy, India will be looking for other ways to secure access to these energy supplies. Meanwhile, India is building a port in Chabahar in Iran, which among other things, could connect to the Iranian hinterland and thereby transport Indian goods to Afghanistan, bypassing Pakistan completely. Pakistan sees Chabahar as a rival that could drain business away from Pakistan's new port at Gwadar being built with Chinese assistance.

If stability is restored to Afghanistan, it may become possible to take advantage of other mineral resources there, which would benefit not only Afghanistan, India, and Pakistan

but also other countries. China recently won rights to mine the world's largest undeveloped copper field, located near Kabul, for about \$3 billion. If implemented, this would be the biggest foreign investment in Afghanistan's history. In addition, China promised the Afghans a power plant and a railroad running from Tajikistan into Pakistan. Under present circumstances, however, this type of major project seems a long way off.

*The security equation:* The difficult relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan have made a Pakistani role with the Afghan security services impossible. India has offered security assistance and has provided some training for the Afghan national army. Given Pakistan's resistance, the United States had turned down India's offers to send troops to Afghanistan. However, after the murder of an Indian engineer by the Taliban in 2006, India sent in a company of paramilitary troops to protect the engineers working on the road construction projects. This placement of Indian troops close to its western frontier troubles Pakistan.

*The Taliban connection:* The greatest controversy centers on the role of Pakistan in facilitating the Taliban insurgency that has steadily expanded in Afghanistan over the past two years. Pakistani officials strongly deny any continuing involvement with the Taliban, pointing out that the movement's Pakistani counterparts have been mounting a devastating series of suicide bombings against Pakistan government targets. Pakistan has even contributed to the creation of an intelligence establishment in Kabul to monitor its border areas with Afghanistan along with the Afghans and NATO's International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). However, both private observers and U.S. intelligence estimates note that key members of the Afghan Taliban leadership are based in Quetta in Pakistan's Baluchistan Province. Ironically, the Taliban have also found it necessary to deny that any of the Afghan group's leaders, including Mullah Omar, are based in Pakistan.

Controlling the porous and disputed border between Pakistan and Afghanistan is key for dealing with this problem, and it is the central issue for the United States. In fact, border coordination centers are being set up on either side of the border to monitor the movement of people. Pakistan itself has tried various approaches, including a military effort to bring the largely ungoverned tribal areas under control, an agreement with the tribal and Taliban leadership in the border regions, an aborted effort to mine the border, an unsuccessful attempt to fence the border at points most vulnerable to illegal infiltration, and the institution of modern border-crossing documentation. Most of these measures were unacceptable to the Afghan government but also, more importantly, to Pashtun nationalists on both sides of the border.

*From Taliban to Kashmir?* When the Soviet Army left Afghanistan in 1989, some of the mujahideen groups that had been active in Afghanistan turned their attention to Kashmir and contributed to the insurgency against Indian rule there. Today, India and Pakistan are maintaining a four-year-old peace dialogue, and infiltration by militant groups into Kashmir is well below the level of earlier years. India has a strong stake in Pakistan's efforts to suppress terrorist groups, including those that are active in Afghanistan and those that have been attacking the Pakistan government. A convergence of interests to fight extremist violence has thus emerged between India and Pakistan for the first time. However, it is unlikely that the two countries will be able to turn this into any kind of active cooperation against terrorism given their long-standing animosity.

## IRAN

Afghanistan is one of several contexts in which the long-term common interests of the U.S. and Iran have been overshadowed by the animus originating in the 1953 CIA-led coup in Iran and the Iranian revolution of 1979,



to the detriment of the interests of the U.S., Iran, and Afghanistan. This confrontation has served the interests of the Pakistan military, Taliban, and al-Qaida. Re-establishing the basis for U.S.-Iranian cooperation in Afghanistan would provide significant additional leverage over Pakistan, on whose territory the leadership of both the Taliban and al-Qaida are now found.

During the first half of the Cold War (until the 1978 coup in Afghanistan and the 1979 revolution in Iran), Afghanistan was a non-aligned country with a Soviet-trained army wedged between the USSR and U.S. allies. In the 1970s, under the Nixon Doctrine, the U.S. supported efforts by the Shah of Iran to use his post-1973 oil wealth to support efforts by Afghan President Muhammad Daoud to lessen Kabul's dependence on the USSR. This ended with the successive overthrow of both Daoud and the Shah in 1978 and 1979. A U.S. close partnership with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan emerged as the primary means of maintaining U.S. influence in the Persian Gulf and its eastern flank. Support for Sunni Islamists in Afghanistan and an Islamist-oriented military regime in Pakistan formed parts of this strategy to repulse the USSR from its occupation of Afghanistan, begun in late 1979, and to isolate Iran.

The U.S. led support for the mujahidin based in Pakistan and a greatly enlarged Pakistani security establishment, with co-funding from Saudi Arabia and implementation largely in the hands of Pakistan's Directorate of Inter-Services Intelligence. The ISI also nurtured the Sunni right wing in Pakistan to counter-balance the Pakistan People's Party and ethnic subnationalists. Revolutionary Iran, distracted by its war with Iraq, provided aid to Afghan Shi'a groups that supported the revolutionary line of Khomeini, but did not engage fully.

The dissolution of the USSR and independence of the Central Asian and Caucasus

states in 1991-92 led to the disengagement of the U.S. from the region, reducing external support to the Pakistan-Saudi alliance and providing Iran with more opportunities for maneuver in Afghanistan. Iran broadened its contacts in Afghanistan from Shi'a groups to non-Pashtun groups more generally (including Sunnis and former government militias), helping to broker the formation of the so-called "Northern Alliance" during the 1992 collapse of the Najibullah government.

The opening of Central Asia and the Caspian region to the international oil and gas market created a new strategic stake. Russia aimed to maintain its monopoly on export of these resources through the former Soviet pipeline network. The U.S. sought to promote the autonomy of the Newly Independent States (as they were called) by supporting alternative pipeline routes and hydrocarbon development schemes. But the shortest and most secure routes from the former USSR's energy resources to the sea lay through Iran, which the U.S. had kept under sanctions since the Tehran embassy takeover.

Iran proposed to become the transport hub for both oil and gas, linking the Central Asian-Caspian region to the Persian Gulf. The main focus of U.S. hydrocarbon strategy was the route north and west of Iran, which ultimately led to the construction of the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline. Afghanistan played a role in the secondary theater of the southern and eastern outlet, as the U.S. mildly supported Pakistan's attempts to use the Taliban to provide a secure transport corridor from Pakistan to Turkmenistan via western Afghanistan. Iran saw this as part of the U.S. strategy of encircling and containing Iran.

When Lakhdar Brahimi became the UN Secretary-General's Special Envoy for Afghanistan in 1997, he found that the Government of Iran believed that the U.S., Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia were jointly supporting the Taliban in continuation of their previous

policies. Iran consequently saw the Taliban as the spear-point of its strategic opponent and joined with Russia, India, and the Central Asian states in an effort to support and supply the Northern Alliance. Iran moved beyond its ideological support for Shi'a parties to a strategic policy of supporting all anti-Taliban forces. It settled its differences over Tajikistan with Russia, and the two states brokered the 1997 peace agreement in order to assure a consolidated rear for the Northern Alliance.

Events in August 1998 turned both the U.S. and Iran further against the Taliban. With Pakistan's assistance, the Taliban captured control of most of northern Afghanistan; Pakistani extremists under Taliban command massacred nine Iranian diplomats in Mazar-i Sharif, leading Iran to mobilize troops on the border. Diplomacy by Brahimi averted open warfare. The same week, al-Qaida, then operating out of the Taliban's Kandahar headquarters, attacked the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. Consequently the U.S. began intelligence cooperation with the Northern Alliance. The State Department conducted a dialogue with Iran within the framework of the UN-convened "Six plus Two" group, which included Afghanistan's neighbors, the U.S., and Russia. Pakistan became increasingly isolated in the group. The U.S. and Russia jointly approved Security Council sanctions against the Taliban and al-Qaida, with the support of Iran and against the wishes of Pakistan, which flouted the sanctions.

After 9/11, despite some jockeying for relative advantage, Russia, Iran, India and the United States ultimately cooperated to defeat the Taliban and al-Qaida in Afghanistan, and to establish the new Afghan government. Not only did Iran cooperate with the United States, Russia actively helped it establish support bases in Central Asia. Pakistan was politically marginalized in the process.

U.S.-Iranian cooperation occurred both in the field, in Tajikistan and Afghanistan, and in diplomacy, where I personally witnessed

it. According to Iranian diplomatic sources, members of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC, Sipah-i Pasdaran) cooperated with the CIA and U.S. Special Operations Forces in supplying and funding the commanders of the Northern Alliance. During the war in the fall of 2001, both Russia and Iran wavered between supporting the reconquest of power by President Burhanuddin Rabbani and the plan for a broader political settlement supported by the followers of Ahmad Shah Massoud, the UN, and the U.S.

At the UN Talks on Afghanistan in Bonn, Germany, which negotiated the agreements governing the political transition in Afghanistan, U.S. and Iranian envoys James Dobbins and Javad Zarif cooperated closely on all major issues. Zarif supported efforts to frustrate Rabbani's goal of preventing the meeting from reaching agreement in the hope of consolidating his own power and forestalling formation of a broader government. Zarif's lastminute intervention with the Northern Alliance delegation chair, Yunus Qanuni, convinced the latter to reduce the number of cabinet posts he demanded in the interim administration.

The U.S. and Iran jointly insisted that the Bonn agreement contain a timetable for national elections and require the Afghan administration to cooperate in the fight against terrorism and drugs. Dobbins had to overcome resistance from hard-liners in the Department of Defense in order to cooperate with Iran, but his brief from Secretary of State Colin Powell enabled him to do so. Zarif, affiliated with the reformist trend of President Muhammad Khatami, may similarly have had to overcome resistance. In informal conversation, where I was present as a member of the UN delegation, U.S. diplomats told the Iranians that other issues prevented broader cooperation; the Iranians replied by asking to discuss all issues between the two countries.

The Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarded these events as an opportunity to increase cooperation with the U.S. from Af-

ghanistan to a wider set of issues. Dobbins reports that Iranian officials later offered to work under U.S. command to assist in building the Afghan National Army. U.S.-Iranian cooperation in building the Afghan security forces would have constituted a major investment in realignment to the detriment of Pakistan, whose military counted on monopolizing the role as the U.S.'s intermediaries with Afghanistan as leverage to assure the U.S.-Pakistan military supply relationship.

The Bush administration, however, rejected the initiative. Instead, it charged Iran with "harboring" an Afghan opposition figure and Islamist leader, Gulbiddin Hekmatyar, who was supported by U.S. aid to the mujahidin in the 1980s, and who had sought refuge in Tehran after having been abandoned by Pakistan for the Taliban in 1995. Iran expelled him. U.S. officials also charged that Iran was establishing influence in Herat, which would be somewhat akin to accusing the U.S. of exercising influence over northern Mexico. Additionally, the U.S. alleged that members of al-Qaida had taken refuge in Iran. Some may have done so with the collaboration of local IRGC commanders, but the overwhelming fact was that the surviving core leadership of al-Qaida all made its way to Pakistan, where their logistics and networks had been based and where they remained.

### CENTRAL ASIAN COUNTRIES

It is perhaps easiest to define the interests of the three states that border Afghanistan—Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan—in terms of security. Since they directly face the country at war, it would be expected that they would have the most at stake. This may not necessarily be true, however. Kazakhstan, for example, now has an enormous political and economic stake in the success of the Northern Distribution Network (NDN), a series of agreements between the United States and countries in the Caucasus, Central Asia, and Russia to transport supplies via rail and truck

into Afghanistan. Still, for the three countries that border Afghanistan, direct physical challenges abound. Uzbekistan has most famously struggled with domestic terrorism metastasizing into a transnational security challenge in the form of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), and Tajikistan has faced numerous security challenges along its riparian border with Afghanistan, both from militant groups and narcotics smugglers. Turkmenistan, too, has faced a number of challenges from narcotics smuggling, though less visibly.

The two non-border countries also have encountered problems emanating from Afghanistan. Kyrgyzstan has faced serious challenges from Islamist resistance movements, including the IMU. Even Kazakhstan has struggled, though to a far lesser extent than the other four countries, with militant recruitment.

Uzbekistan in particular seems to be the focus of transnational terrorism in Central Asia. Its most famous militant group, the IMU, began in the Ferghana Valley (a densely populated region split between Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan), but now resides mostly in northwest Pakistan. It is the foundation for most other Islamist networks in the region, including the breakaway group Islamic Jihad Union (IJU), which is implicated in several terrorist incidents throughout Central Asia and Europe. The IMU has been a driving force behind civil unrest in post-Soviet Central Asia for the past decade, and was a major participant in the war in Afghanistan on the side of Taliban, and most recently in the civil unrest in Pakistan. The IMU still claims responsibility for insurgent attacks across northern Afghanistan, and suspected IMU militants regularly are arrested in northern Tajikistan.<sup>6</sup> The IJU seems to focus most of its energies on Pakistan, though its members have been identified and arrested as far away as Germany.

Kyrgyzstan, too, has a problem with Islamist extremism, though it is unclear whether that

problem is constant or growing. While the government of Kyrgyzstan clearly considers Islamism to represent a grave danger—the government in 2006 claimed to have killed several IMU militants near Osh (the group of claimed dead militants included a highly popular Imam with few provable ties to extremism)—it is not clear how immediate that danger is. Either way, Islamist militants with ties to Afghanistan are more likely to reside in the country's mountainous west, an area including the Ferghana Valley.

But beyond their problem with militants, Kyrgyzstan also has a contentious issue in the form of the U.S. air base at Manas. For years, the U.S. military presence just outside of Bishkek has been controversial, whether in terms of how much rent the United States pays, or the many scandals revolving around fuel prices for American aircraft, or even the boorish (and in one case violent) behavior of Americans stationed at the base. The controversy has been intense enough within Kyrgyzstan that during the recent political upheaval there was massive speculation over whether the new interim government would cancel the U.S. lease on the airbase. The new interim president, Rotun Otunbayeva, however, decided to honor the previous regime's security deals, including allowing U.S. access to Manas. It is likely she made this decision in light of how much money the United States pays for the base, which is upward of \$200 million per year, with additional "bilateral assistance" factored in. For a country with a gross domestic product (GDP) of only about \$5 billion, U.S. rents for the base represent a substantial portion of the country's economic activity. It is likely that the Kyrgyz government will consider maintaining the U.S. presence at the base a priority in the future, regardless of its titular head of state.

Tajikistan also faces a security challenge from the war in Afghanistan, though this challenge often is overstated. The most immediate issue they face is an influx of refugees fleeing the

fighting in Afghanistan. Refugee issues are a chronic problem along the Afghan-Tajik border. In late 1992, approximately 60,000 Tajiks fled the civil war and sought shelter in northern Afghanistan; as that flow of people has reversed itself, Tajikistan has struggled with the governance, economic, and security challenges posed by a refugee population it cannot fully support. In addition, Western analysts are fond of identifying Tajikistan as the next flashpoint for Islamist terrorism, though this seems more exaggeration than anything else. It is most likely that some relatively minor security incidents, some of which involve militants from the Afghanistan war, will place stress on the regime of Tajik president Emomali Rahmon, and thus pose a threat to regime survival (prompting a government backlash).

Turkmenistan merits a discussion of its interests, though there is very little information available about them. Officially, the Turkmen government is neutral in all disputes, though they do not hide their concerns very well. Turkmenistan undoubtedly has issues with opium smuggling from Afghanistan, and rumors abound that smugglers are closely aligned with the Taliban. One somewhat publicized incident serves as a good demonstration of the difficulty of discerning how these events will unfold in the future. In September 2008, an armed group widely speculated to be either Islamists or drug smugglers, or both, got into a massive firefight with Turkmen police in the capital city of Ashgabat. There were, however, numerous indications that the fighting may have been related to gas rationing in the capital. Because Turkmenistan's government so tightly regulates information, the real story behind that and similar incidents is difficult to determine.

The Central Asian states possess significant natural resources that they have only begun to exploit in the past twenty years, most notably their considerable energy resources. As such, relations in the region can often revolve

around the development of a stable infrastructure for developing and exporting these resources, with the more traditional security concerns often taking a back seat.

Turkmenistan sits atop one of the world's richest deposits of natural gas, and at least since the mid-1990s, Western energy companies have been trying to export it without using Russian pipelines (which are unreliable for political reasons). Countless energy executives, and just as many conspiracy theorists, who are convinced the conflict in Afghanistan ultimately is concerned with securing export rights to Turkmen gas, dream of completing the various pipelines needed to export Turkmen gas south or east. While the biggest development in Turkmen gas—the Turkmenistan-China gas pipeline—has very little to do with Afghanistan, Turkmenistan's other enormous energy project, called TAPI, does. Traveling from Turkmenistan, south through Afghanistan, then east to Pakistan and onward to India (hence its initials), TAPI has fired the imagination of everyone from the defunct U.S. oil company Unocal to the Asia Development Bank. There is little indication TAPI will be completed while there is active fighting in southern Afghanistan; nevertheless, it is important to Turkmenistan's long-term interests in the area as filtered through its quest for energy exports.

Energy concerns also dominate high-level discussions between Central Asian countries and Afghanistan. In 2009, Uzbekistan began supplying electricity to Kabul around the clock as part of a \$250 million project to use Central Asian hydropower plants to send power southward. Before the agreement, Kabul only had about three hours per day of electricity. Uzbekistan's ascension as a nexus of energy distribution, however, has come at a cost. Additionally, considering Uzbekistan's penchant of terminating international agreements it finds inconvenient, it is unlikely that any state, including Afghanistan, feels particularly comfortable being reliant on Uzbek energy.

Tajikistan suffers from severe chronic power shortages, and the Uzbek government has prevented several ameliorating measures from being pursued, such as purchasing energy from Turkmenistan (power lines must cross Uzbek territory). Tajikistan's best bet for alleviating those shortages is the completion of the troubled Roghun hydroelectric dam. Begun in 1976, construction of the dam has languished, as first the Soviet Union and then Tajikistan continually ran out of money for finishing construction. In 2009, Iran became its latest investor, though there remain doubts about how much good it will do. (Iran is one of Tajikistan's largest investors.) A year later, analysts still were expressing open skepticism of the dam's prospects for completion and for power generation. Uzbekistan, too, has decried the construction of the dam, claiming it will hurt the environment and negatively affect cotton harvests along the Amu Darya River.

Despite such challenges, Tajikistan has hatched plans to transmit power across Afghanistan. These take differing forms: one proposal is to build transmission lines from Roghun to Iran through Mazar-i-Sharif, and another plans to go through Kunduz, to Kabul, to Jalalabad. Given Tajikistan's continuing struggles with its internal electricity supply and management, it is unclear how it could support such a massive energy exportation project, though a recent Asian Development Bank grant could point toward additional international investment.

Beyond energy resources, however, the region faces challenges regarding both the legal and illegal harvesting and export of other natural resources. In Afghanistan, while opium is the most expensive and most visible of these resources, and China's purchase of the Aynak copper mine in Logar has received much attention, many illegal groups harvest and export natural resources of all kinds. The most devastating, from an environmental perspective, is timber. A 2003 United Nations Envi-

ronment Program (UNEP) survey found that nearly 50 percent of forest cover in north-eastern Afghanistan had been destroyed, and woodlands and orchards were devastated across the entire country. While timber is directly exported to Pakistan (and, to a lesser extent, Iran), the carpenters who use Afghan timber export their goods northward to Central Asia. Because Afghanistan's government owns all the natural resources in the country, any resource harvesting outside government sanction is, technically, illegal. Yet, the government has no real means of leasing access, harvesting quotas, or even cadastres of land to local communities for exploitation, so demand in Central Asia (in part) drives illegal resource harvesting.

Access to water also poses a serious challenge to regional resource exploitation. Tajikistan sits atop large water reserves, nearly 40 percent of the total supply in the region, and believes that water is the key to its economic future. Tajikistan also faces grinding disputes with each of its neighbors over water rights: plans to expand Tajik hydropower plants have faced increasingly vigorous opposition from Uzbekistan, which is worried about Tajikistan stunting the supply of water to its vast cotton fields. Complicating the Uzbek-Tajik water dispute is Afghanistan: despite a 1946 treaty between the governments of King Zahir Shah and the Soviet Union (both governments have since fallen) allowing Afghanistan to draw 9 million cubic meters of water per year from the Pyanj River, which borders Tajikistan and Afghanistan and is a tributary of the Amu Darya, it only uses about 2 million cubic meters of water each year. It is unclear how severely Afghanistan's drawing of its full allocation of water from the river would affect either country, but given the growing stress on Central Asian water supplies and access, it is probable that the effect would be extreme, prompting harsh responses from Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.

Many analysts have speculated that ethnic sympathies drive Central Asian regimes' poli-

cies toward Afghanistan. Martha Brill Olcott of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, for example, has explicitly argued, "Tajikistan's security calculations are shaped by the fact that Tajiks are the second largest ethnic community in Afghanistan." Because opposition groups from each country have sought refuge in one another's countries over the past few decades of civil war, so the argument goes, they have therefore retained or developed some sort of ethnic solidarity.

While it may be true that various Tajik militias in Tajikistan and Afghanistan have developed relationships over the past twenty years, there remains little evidence that ethnic solidarity drives the Tajik government's security calculations. For historical reasons, President Rahmon is nervous about encouraging separatism (Tajikistan's bloody civil war in the 1990s involved some separatist movements). In addition, the noted Afghan scholar Thomas Barfield has argued that viewing ethnic affinity in Afghanistan the same way one would examine ethnic nationalism in a region such as the Balkans is a mistake, because identity simply does not operate the same way in Central Asia as it does in Europe.

The high profile of Uzbek militants in global jihad, the Afghan conflict, and security incidents across Central Asia might suggest an ethnic connection to certain security issues. However, as with Tajikistan, there is very little evidence that the Uzbek government considers ethnicity a factor in determining its security posture toward Central Asia. The IMU got its start rebelling against Uzbek dictator Islam Karimov's rule in the late 1990s, and later developed contacts with Tajik militants and ethnically Uzbek Kyrgyz citizens in the Ferghana Valley. In the early 2000s, IMU militants, including its senior leadership, were fighting alongside the Taliban in northern Afghanistan (they later fled to the Federally Administered Tribal Areas in Pakistan when the United States invaded).

Since the U.S. invasion, Uzbek militants have been linked to bomb plots in Germany, terror attacks in Tashkent, and even (possibly) a bloody intra-insurgency conflict in Waziristan. However, the Uzbek government itself seems to filter its decisions through two main lenses: drugs and regime survival. The specific ethnicity of the IMU seems to matter much less than the fact that it is directing its activities against the Uzbek state.

None of this means ethnicity does not matter in each country's view of Afghanistan, merely that such concerns probably do not drive decision-making. For example, there is some evidence for ties of some sort between the Uzbek government and Abdulrashid Dostum, the leader of the Afghan Uzbek Junbish militia. During the late 1990s, Junbish received some funding and weapons during Dostum's fight against the Taliban, and, now there is some evidence that Tashkent provides a corridor for Dostum's drug smuggling. Similarly, the Tajik government had close ties to Shura-e-Nazar, a council of mujahideen founded by Ahmed Shah Massoud, in the 1990s, during the Northern Alliance's struggle against the Taliban. It is likely the Tajik government remains wary of a Pashtun-dominated Afghanistan. Neither of these countries has any objective reason to conduct business with either group, besides ethnicity.

Central Asia clearly will play a role of some sort in Afghanistan's future. But any regional process will not be led by Central Asia. Since the other players involved—the United States, Iran, Pakistan, China, and Russia—all carry greater weight at the negotiating table, the Central Asian states will have to be included in some way in any future talks. Afghanistan's issues with transnational criminal groups pose a critical challenge to every state in Central Asia. It is unclear how well the border states of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, and to a greater extent Kyrgyzstan, can maintain their tentative internal security arrangements with an active, and unchallenged, criminal net-

work operating in Afghanistan. In Kyrgyzstan in particular, rumors abounded that the recent riots were largely the work of criminals and smugglers trying to carve out space for themselves.<sup>119</sup> Tajikistan's experience with criminals and insurgents in the Rasht Valley also point to how critical the issue of Afghanistan's stability is for the government. The Central Asian states should be consulted on any plan to combat transnational crime and counternarcotics operations.

Especially as trade ties increase along the NDN—if it ever begins to carry non-NATO materials—the region as a whole might begin to take a more active role in Afghanistan's affairs. The challenges they face from Afghanistan's chronic insecurity are severe—sanctuary for violent rebels, and a constant source of refugees fleeing north (especially as the refugee camps in Iran and Pakistan have been forcibly depopulated), and a thriving and destabilizing drugs trade.

The challenges that the Central Asian states face in Afghanistan, however, are not as immediate as those posed to either Iran or Pakistan. While Afghanistan (and Pakistan's tribal areas) house Central Asian militants, they have executed terrorist attacks outside that area only sporadically; there have been no major attacks in Tashkent, for example, since 2004.<sup>120</sup> Similarly, there are not the same social ties into the region—while millions of Afghans fled to Pakistan and Iran during the 1980s and 1990s, only a few tens of thousands fled north to Tajikistan, and only for a short time.

But if the challenges facing Central Asia are not immediate, the opportunities are. In particular the NDN, beyond any American designs for leveraging its influence regionally, presents a tremendous opportunity for the development of international trade. Additionally, the nascent steps taken in electricity sharing between Uzbekistan and Afghanistan hold out hope that those relations could

be used to ameliorate some of the troubling power and water conflicts with Tajikistan. Additionally, if the countries of Central Asia are integrated more tightly into regional deliberations about Afghanistan's future, their governments will become more active partners in the process.

In the medium term, however, it is most likely that the Central Asian states will remain wrapped up in their own affairs without careful and constant prodding by the international community to play a more assertive role. Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan—the three states with the most at stake, given their experiences with Islamist militants now

based in Afghanistan—have significant internal political, social, and economic challenges and cannot be expected to play major roles (despite Uzbekistan's proposed expansion of the "6 plus 2" group to a "6 plus 3" group,<sup>121</sup> which was a suggestion that never went anywhere). The best bet for any sort of proactive involvement is probably Kazakhstan, which enjoys sufficient political stability to have grander regional and international ambitions. The best bet for ensuring regional buy-in to any settlement is to bring in these states as participants in the regional negotiations, giving them a clear stake in regional security arrangements and incentives to further regional trade.



## REFERENCES

---

- AFRIDI, Jamal, 2009. "China-Pakistan Relations", Council on Foreign Relations, CFR Publications.
- ASHRAF, Tariq Mahmud, 2008. "Afghanistan in Chinese Strategy Toward South and Central Asia", China Brief, 8/10.
- CORDESMAN, Anthony H., 2010. "Afghan War at End 2009," Crisis and New Realism, Center for Strategic and International Studies.
- EKŞİ, Muharrem, 2009. "Afganistan'da NATO-KGAÖ Yakınlaşma Sürecine Doğru," <http://guneyturkistan.wordpress.com/2009/02/24/afganistan%E2%80%99da-nato-kgao-yakinlasma-surecine-dogru/> Erişim Tarihi: 24 Mart 2010
- GUITTA, Olivier, 2009. "Tackling The Afghanistan-Pakistan Problem: Part 3", Middle East Times.
- KATZMANN, Kenneth, 2010. "Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy," CRS Report for Congress.
- KULOĞLU, Armağan, 2010. "ABD'nin Yeni Afganistan Stratejisi ve Türkiye'nin Durumu," Ortadoğu Analiz, 1/13.
- MALEK, Martin, 2004. "Russian Policy Toward South Asia: An Update", Asian Survey, 44/3.
- NARANG, Vipin, 2009/10. "Posturing for Peace? Pakistan's Nuclear Postures and South Asian Stability", International Security, 34/3.
- SINGH Gunjan, 2010. "China's Afghanistan Policy", Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies Publications, No:3040.

## ACADEMIC STAFF

Hasan Kanbolat	ORSAM Director
Prof. Dr. Hayati Aktaş	ORSAM Trabzon Representative, Karadeniz Technical University Department of International Relations
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Veysel Ayhan	ORSAM Advisor, Gulf of Basra - Abant İzzet Baysal University, Department of IR
Asst. Prof. Dr. Mehmet Şahin	ORSAM Advisor, Middle East - Gazi University, Department of IR
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Harun Öztürkler	ORSAM Advisor, Middle East Economies - Afyon Kocatepe University, Department of Economics
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Özlem Tür	ORSAM Advisor, Middle East - METU, Department of IR
Habib Hümmüzlü	ORSAM Advisor, Middle East
Asst. Prof. Dr. Serhat Erkmen	ORSAM Advisor, Middle East -Ahi Evran University, Department of IR
Dr. Neslihan Kevser Çevik	ORSAM Advisor, Middle East - METU, Department of IR
Dr. Didem Daniş	ORSAM Advisor, Middle East - Galatasaray University, Department of Sociology
Dr. Jale Nur Ece	ORSAM Advisor, Maritime Safety and Security
Dr. İlyas Kamalov	ORSAM Advisor, Eurasia
Dr. Bayram Sinkaya	ORSAM Advisor, Middle East - Atatürk University
Dr. Süreyya Yiğit	ORSAM Advisor, Eurasia
Att. Aslıhan Erbaş Açık (LL.M.) Hamburg	ORSAM Advisor, Energy-Maritime Law
Volkan Çakır	ORSAM Advisor, Africa
Bilgay Duman	ORSAM Researcher, Middle East
Ogün Duru	ORSAM Managing Editor
Noyan Gürel	ORSAM İzmir Representative
Selen Tonkuş Kareem	ORSAM Erbil (Iraq) Representative
Oytun Orhan	ORSAM Researcher, Middle East
Sercan Doğan	ORSAM Research Assistant, Middle East
Nebahat Tanrıverdi	ORSAM Research Assistant, Middle East
Uğur Çil	ORSAM Research Assistant, Middle East
Nazlı Ayhan	ORSAM Research Assistant, Middle East & Projects
Leyla Melike Koçgündüz	ORSAM Research Assistant, Middle East & Projects
Göknil Erbaş	ORSAM Research Assistant, Black Sea
Aslı Değirmenci	ORSAM Research Assistant, Middle East
Jubjana Vila	ORSAM Research Assistant, Middle East
Mavjuda Akramova	ORSAM Research Assistant, Middle East

## ORSAM Water Research Programme

Dr. Tuğba Evrim Maden	ORSAM Water Research Programme Hydropolitics Researcher
Dr. Seyfi Kılıç	ORSAM Water Research Programme Hydropolitics Researcher
Kamil Erdem Güler	ORSAM Water Research Programme Research Assistant
Çağlayan Arslan	ORSAM Water Research Programme Research Assistant
	ORSAM Uzman Yardımcısı, ORSAM Su Araştırmaları Programı

## ORSAM ADVISORY BOARD

Dr. İsmet Abdulmecid	Former President of Iraqi Council of State
Prof. Dr. Hayati Aktaş	ORSAM Trabzon Representative, Karadeniz Technical University Department of International Relations
Hasan Alsancak	BP & BTC Turkey, Energy Security Director
Prof. Dr. Meliha Benli Altunışık	METU, Director of Institute of Social Sciences
Prof. Dr. Ahat Andican	Former Minister & Istanbul University
Prof. Dorayd A. Noori	Vice-Undersecretary in Iraq's Embassy in Ankara
Prof. Dr. Tayyar Arı	Uludağ University, Head of Department of International Relations
Prof. Dr. Ali Arslan	Istanbul University, Department of History
Başar Ay	General Secretary, Turkish Textile Employers' Association
Prof. Dr. Mustafa Aydın	President of Kadir Has University
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Ersel Aydınli	Vice-President of Bilkent University, Fulbright Executive Director
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Veysel Ayhan	ORSAM Advisor, Middle East, Abant İzzet Baysal University, Department of IR
Prof. Dr. Hüseyin Bağcı	METU, Head of Department of International Relations
İtir Bağdadi	Izmir Economy University, Department of International Relations and European Union
Prof. Dr. İdris Bal	Member of Parliament in the 24th Legislative Term of Grand National Assembly of Turkey
Assist. Prof. Dr. Ersan Başar	Karadeniz Technical University, Maritime Transportation and Management Engineering
Kemal Beyatlı	Head of Iraqi Turkman Press Council
Barbaros Binicioğlu	ORSAM Advisor, Middle Eastern Economies
Prof. Dr. Ali Birinci	Police Academy
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Mustafa Budak	Deputy Director General in Prime Ministerial State Archives
Ret. (Air) Gen. Ergin Celasin	23rd Commander of Air Forces
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Mitat Çelikpala	Kadir Has University, Head of Department of International Relations
Prof. Dr. Gökhan Çetinsaya	President of Istanbul City University
Dr. Didem Daniş	ORSAM Advisor, Immigration Studies & Iraqi Refugees, Galatasaray University, Department of Sociology
Prof. Dr. Volkan Ediger	Izmir Economy University, Department of Economics
Prof. Dr. Cezmi Eraslan	President of Atatürk Research Center, Istanbul University, Department of History
Prof. Dr. Çağrı Erhan	Ankara University, Faculty of Political Science, Department of IR & Director of ATAUM
Asst. Prof. Dr. Serhat Erkmen	ORSAM Middle East Advisor, Ahi Evran University, Head of the Department of International Relations
Dr. Amer Hasan Fayyadh	Baghdad University, Dean of Political Sciences Faculty (Iraq)
Aslıhan Erbaş Açık (LL.M. Hamburg)	ORSAM Advisor, Energy-Maritime Law
Cevat Gök	Turkey Representative of Iraqi Al Fırat TV

- Mete Göknel  
Osman Göksel  
Timur Göksel  
Prof. Muhamad Al Hamdani  
Numan Hazar  
Habib Hüzmüzlü  
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Pınar İpek  
Dr. Tuğrul İsmail  
Dr. İlyas Kamalov  
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Hasan Ali Karasar  
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Şenol Kantarcı  
Selçuk Karaçay  
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Nilüfer Karacasulu  
Prof. Dr. M. Lütfullah Karaman  
Asst. Prof. Dr. Şaban Kardaş  
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Elif Hatun Kılıçbeyli  
Prof. Dr. Aleksandr Knyazev  
Prof. Dr. Erol Kurubaş  
Prof. Dr. Talip Küçükcan  
Arslan Kaya  
Dr. Hicran Kazancı  
İzzettin Kerküklü  
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Mustafa Kibaroğlu  
Prof. Dr. Mosa Aziz Al-Mosawa  
Prof. Dr. Mahir Nakip  
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Tarık Oğuzlu  
Prof. Dr. Çınar Özen  
Murat Özçelik  
Assoc. Prof. Harun Öztürkler  
Dr. Bahadır Pehlivan Türk  
Prof. Dr. Victor Panin  
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Fırat Purtaş  
Prof. Suphi Saatçi  
Ersan Sarıkaya  
Dr. Bayram Sinkaya  
Assoc. Prof. Dr. İbrahim Sirkeci  
Dr. Aleksandr Sotnichenko  
Zafer Sultan  
Dr. Irina Svistunova  
Asst. Prof. Dr. Mehmet Şahin  
Prof. Dr. Türel Yılmaz Şahin  
Mehmet Şüküroğlu  
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Oktay Tanrısever  
Prof. Erol Taymaz  
Prof. Sabri Tekir  
Dr. Gönül Tol  
Asst. Prof. Dr. Özlem Tür  
M. Ragıp Vural  
Dr. Ermanno Visintainer  
Dr. Umut Uzer  
Prof. Dr. Vatanyar Yagya  
Dr. Süreyya Yiğit
- Former Director of Petroleum Pipeline Corporation (BOTAS)  
BTC & NABUCCO Coordinator  
Beirut American University (Lebanon)  
Cultural Undersecretary in Iraq's Embassy in Ankara  
Retired Ambassador  
ORSAM Middle East Advisor  
Bilkent University, Department of International Relations  
TOBB University of Economics & Technology, Department of International Relations  
ORSAM Eurasia Advisor  
Bilkent University, Department of International Relations  
Kırıkkale University, Department of International Relations  
Deputy Director, Vodafone (Turkey)  
Dokuz Eylül University, Department of International Relations  
Fatih University, Head of the Department of International Relations  
TOBB Economy and Technology University, Department of International Relations  
Çukurova University, Head of the Department of International Relations  
Kyrgyz Slavic University (Bishkek)  
Kırıkkale University, Head of the Department of International Relations  
Director of Marmara University, Institute of Middle East Studies  
KPMG, Sworn-in Certified Financial Accountant  
Iraqi Turkmen Front Turkey Representative  
President of Kirkuk Foundation  
Okan University, Head of Department of International Relations  
President of Baghdad University (Iraq)  
Erciyes University, Faculty of Economic and Administrative Sciences  
Bilkent University, Department of International Relations  
Ankara University, Faculty of Political Science, Department of International Relations  
Turkish Republic Ambassador to Baghdad  
ORSAM Middle East Economics Advisor, Afyon Kocatepe University, Department of Economics  
TOBB Economy and Technology University, Department of International Relations  
Pyatigorsk University (Pyatigorsk, Russian Federation)  
Gazi University Department of International Relations, Deputy Secretary General of TÜRKSOY  
Secretary-General of Kirkuk Foundation  
Türkmeneli TV (Kirkuk, Iraq)  
ORSAM Middle East Advisor, Atatürk University  
Reader in Demography and Marketing Regent's College, (London, UK)  
St. Petersburg University (Russian Federation)  
President of Lebanese Turkish Association  
Russia Strategic Research Center, Turkey-Middle East Studies Expert (Russian Federation)  
ORSAM Advisor, Middle East, Gazi University, Department of International Relations  
Gazi University, Department of International Relations  
Energy Expert  
METU, Department of International Relations  
Vice President of the METU North Cyprus Campus (TRNC)  
Dean of Izmir University, Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences  
Director of Middle East Institute Turkish Studies (USA)  
ORSAM Advisor, Middle East, METU, Department of International Relations  
General Coordinator of 2023 (Magazine)  
Director of Vox Populi (Rome, Italy)  
Istanbul Technical University, Humanities and Social Sciences  
St. Petersburg City Council Member, St. Petersburg University (Russian Federation)  
ORSAM Eurasia Advisor

## EDITORIAL BOARD OF MIDDLE EAST STUDIES

- Meliha Altunışık  
Bülent Aras  
Tayyar Arı  
İlker Aytürk  
Recep Boztemur  
Katerina Dalacoura  
F. Gregory Gause  
Fawaz Gerges  
Ahmet K. Han  
Raymond Hinnebusch  
Rosemary Holiis  
Bahgat Korany  
Peter Mandaville  
Emma Murphy
- Middle East Technical University (Turkey)  
Ministry of Turkish Foreign Affairs, Head of Center for Strategic Research  
Uludağ University (Turkey)  
Bilkent University (Turkey)  
Middle East Technical University (Turkey)  
London School of Economics (UK)  
Vermont University (USA)  
London School of Economics (UK)  
Kadir Has University (Turkey)  
St. Andrews University (UK)  
City University (UK)  
Durham University (UK)  
George Mason University (USA)  
Durham University (UK)

## MIDDLE EAST ANALYSIS EDITORIAL BOARD

- Prof. Dr. Meliha Altunışık  
Hasan Kanbolat  
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Hasan Ali Karasar  
Asst. Prof. Dr. Serhat Erkmen
- Middle East Technical University, Director of Institute of Social Sciences  
ORSAM Director  
Bilkent University, Department of International Relations  
ORSAM Middle East Advisor, Ahi Evran University, Head of Department of International Relations



MithatpaŐa Caddesi 46/4 Kızılay/Ankara  
Tel: 0(312) 430 26 09 Fax: 0 (312) 430 39 48  
[www.orsam.org.tr](http://www.orsam.org.tr), [orsam@orsam.org.tr](mailto:orsam@orsam.org.tr)  
[www.blacksea.org.tr](http://www.blacksea.org.tr), [blacksea@blacksea.org.tr](mailto:blacksea@blacksea.org.tr)