

ORTADOĞU ETÜTLERİ

MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES

Cilt Volume 8 • Sayı Number 2 • Aralık December 2016

15 TL

- **Obama and Syrian Crisis: Strategic Absence and Its Consequences**
Veysel Kurt
- **Millet System is Alive: Path-Dependency in Ruling Diversity in Cyprus**
Hüseyin Alptekin
- **Iranian Strategic Culture**
Ayşe İrem Aycan Özer
- **Obama Dönemi ABD'nin Ortadoğu Politikası:**
Arap Baharı Sürecinde Demokratik Söylem ve Eylem
Mustafa Cüneyt Özşahin
- **Haçlıları Beklerken: Hatıraları Çerçevesinde**
Bernard Lewis'in Düşünsel ve Siyasal Portresi
Öner Buçukçu
- **Islamic Finance and Voluntarily Financial Exclusion**
in Middle Eastern Countries
Recep Yorulmaz
- **Kitap İncelemesi | Gökhan Ereli**
Yoel Guzansky, The Arab Gulf States and Reform in the Middle East:
Between Iran and the "Arab Spring"

ORTADOĐU MIDDLE
ETÜTLERİ EASTERN
STUDIES



Ortadoğu Araştırmaları Merkezi
مرکز دراسات الشرق الأوسط
Center for Middle Eastern Studies

ORTADOĞU ETÜTLERİ MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES

Siyaset ve Uluslararası İlişkiler Dergisi
Journal of Politics and International Relations

Aralık 2016, Cilt 8, Sayı 2 / December 2016, Volume 8, No 2
www.orsam.org.tr

Hakemli Dergi/ Refereed Journal
Yılda iki kez yayımlanır / Published biannually

Sahibi / Owner: Prof. Dr. Ahmet Uysal

Editör / Editor - in - Chief: Dr. Gökhan Bozbaş

Sayı Editörü / Issue Editor: Prof. Dr. Mahmut Hakkı Akın

Sorumlu Yazı İşleri Müdürü / Managing Coordinator: Dr. Gökhan Bozbaş

YAYIN KURULU / EDITORIAL BOARD

| | | | |
|--------------------|--------------------------------|--------------------|-------------------------------------|
| Ahmet Uysal. | İstanbul Üniversitesi | Mahir Nakip | Çankaya Üniversitesi |
| Akif Kireççi | Bilkent Üniversitesi | Mahmoud Hamad | Drake University/ Cairo University |
| Bahgat Korany | American University of Cairo | Mehmet Şahin | Polis Akademisi |
| Birol Akgün | Yıldırım Beyazıt Üniversitesi | Meliha Altunışık | Ortadoğu Teknik Üniversitesi |
| Cengiz Tomar | Marmara Üniversitesi | Mesut Özcan | Ankara Sosyal Bilimler Üniversitesi |
| Emma Murphy | Durham University | Muhittin Ataman | Ankara Sosyal Bilimler Üniversitesi |
| Fawaz Gerges | London School of Economics | Muhsin Kar | Niğde Ömer Halisdemir Üniversitesi |
| F. Gregory Gause | Vermont University | Peter Mandaville | George Mason University |
| Gökhan Bozbaş | Necmettin Erbakan Üniversitesi | Raymond Hinnebusch | St. Andrews University |
| Göktaş Sönmez | Necmettin Erbakan Üniversitesi | Recep Yorulmaz | Yıldırım Beyazıt Üniversitesi |
| Katerina Dalacoura | London School of Economics | Tayyar Arı | Uludağ Üniversitesi |
| Kemal İnat | Sakarya Üniversitesi | Tim Jacoby | Manchester University |
| | | Zekeriya Kurşun | Fatih Sultan Mehmet Üniversitesi |

Ortadoğu Etütleri şu indeksler tarafından taranmaktadır / indexed by;

Applied Social Sciences Index and Abstracts (ASSIA), EBSCO Host, Index Islamicus, International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBBS), Worldwide Political Science Abstracts (WPSA), ULAKBİM

Makale Önerileri İçin / Submitting Your Articles: info@orsam.org.tr

Yayın İdare Merkezi / Head Office

ORSAM Ortadoğu Araştırmaları Merkezi - Center for Middle Eastern Studies Mustafa Kemal Mahallesi 2128. Sok. No:3 Çankaya / Ankara
Türkiye / Turkey | info@orsam.org.tr | T: +90 312 430 26 09 F: +90 312 430 39 48

Ulusal Süreli Yayın | Ortadoğu Etütleri'ndeki makalelerde yer alan fikirler yalnızca yazarlarını bağlamaktadır. The views expressed in Ortadoğu Etütleri (Middle Eastern Studies) bind exclusively their authors.

Çizgi Kitabevi Yayınları

KONYA | Sahibiata Mah. M. Muzaffer Cad. Helvacıoğlu Apt. No:41/1 Meram

ANKARA | Gazi Üniversitesi Eğitim Fakültesi No: 6/31 Yeni Mahalle

İSTANBUL | Alemdar Mah. Çatalçeşme Sk. No: 42/2 Cağaloğlu

Tel. (0332) 353 62 65-66 - (0212) 514 82 93

www.cizgikitabevi.com

Basım Tarihi / Printed: Haziran / June 2019 - Çimke Ofset Sertifika No: 21941

İÇİNDEKİLER / CONTENTS

OBAMA and SYRIAN CRISIS: STRATEGIC ABSENCE and ITS CONSEQUENCES.....4

Veysel Kurt

MILLET SYSTEM IS ALIVE: PATH-DEPENDENCY IN RULING DIVERSITY IN CYPRUS26

Hüseyin Alptekin

IRANIAN STRATEGIC CULTURE.....44

Ayşe İrem Aycan Özer

**OBAMA DÖNEMİ ABD’NİN ORTADOĞU POLİTİKASI:
ARAP BAHARI SÜRECİNDE DEMOKRATİK SÖYLEM ve EYLEM68**

Mustafa Cüneyt Özşahin

**HAÇLILARI BEKLERKEN: HATIRALARI ÇERÇEVESİNDE BERNARD
LEWIS’İN DÜŞÜNSEL ve SİYASAL PORTRESİ96**

Öner Buçukçu

**ISLAMIC FINANCE and VOLUNTARILY FINANCIAL EXCLUSION
IN MIDDLE EASTERN COUNTRIES 114**

Recep Yorulmaz

KİTAP İNCELEMESİ 138

Gökhan Erel

OBAMA AND SYRIAN CRISIS: STRATEGIC ABSENCE AND ITS CONSEQUENCES

Abstract

This study focuses on the Obama's Syrian policy. It explains the changing policy of US administration towards Syrian crisis by considering Obama's Middle East politics and Arab demonstrations. In this context, Obama's approach to Syrian crisis can be evaluated in three different terms: The first term was started with Syrian uprisings in March and lasted until August 2011. The discourse of Obama in this term was 'encouraging Assad for political reform'. The second term was started with regime change discourse in August 2011 and lasted until 2013 August. Obama's avoiding from military intervention against chemical attack by Assad regime was the basic implication of changing his policy. Emerging of ISIL was a groundwork for Obama to develop a new policy for counter strategy. All changes in Obama's policy towards Syrian crisis implies a strategic absence in his approach.

Keywords: Obama doctrine, Syrian crisis, military intervention, ISIL

Veysel Kurt

Dr., İstanbul Medeniyet
Üniversitesi Siyaset Bilimi
ve Kamu Yönetimi Bölümü

Ortadoğu Etütleri

Volume 8 , No 2
December 2016
pp.4-25

OBAMA VE SURİYE KRİZİ: STRATEJİK NOKSANLIK VE SONUÇLARI

Özet

Bu çalışma Obama'nın Suriye politikasına odaklanmaktadır. Bu bağlamda Obama'nın Ortadoğu politikası ve Arap isyanlarına karşı takındığı tutum dikkate alınarak Suriye krizinde değişen siyaseti açıklanacaktır. Politik reform çağrısı ile başlayan, rejim değişimi söylemi ile devam eden ve nihayetinde IŞİD'e karşı savaşa evrilen Suriye politikasının neden değiştiği ve bu politikanın hem Suriye krizi hem de krizin Türkiye açısından sonuçları değerlendirilecektir. Çalışma Obama'nın yapılandırılmış ve hayata geçirilmiş bir Suriye stratejisi olmadığı varsayımından hareket etmektedir. Bunun yanında Obama yönetiminin krizin evrildiği her yeni aşamada yeni bir pozisyon aldığını ve birbirleri ile tutarsız olan adımlarının kaynağının da bu yaklaşımdan kaynaklandığını iddia etmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Obama doktrini, Suriye krizi, askeri müdahale, IŞİD.

أوباما والأزمة السورية: نتائج انعدام الرؤية الاستراتيجية المختصر

إن هذا العمل يركز على سياسة الرئيس الأمريكي أوباما في سورية. يتم في هذا السياق توضيح سياسة أوباما في الأزمة السورية عبر التركيز على سياسته في الشرق الأوسط وموقفه من التمرد العربي. سيتم تقييم تبدل السياسة التي بدأت بالمناداة بالإصلاح السياسي ومن ثم تغيير النظام وتحولت في الآخر إلى مقاومة تنظيم داعش في سوريا، وتقييم نتائج هذه السياسة من ناحية الأزمة السورية ومن ناحية التأثير على تركيا. العمل ينطلق من مبدأ أنه لا توجد استراتيجية مبنية ومطبقة لأوباما حول سوريا. وإلى جانب ذلك يتم اعتبار أن إدارة الرئيس أوباما تتغير وفقاً للتحويلات التي تطرأ على الأزمة السورية وأنه يتم اتخاذ موقف جديد في كل مرحلة، وأن مصدر هذه الخطوات الغير متناسقة إنما هي هذه السياسة المتبعة.

الكلمات المفتاحية: عقيدة أوباما، الأزمة السورية، التدخل العسكري، داعش

Introduction

The policies applied by the U.S. not only made it one of the main actors in the Syrian crisis, but also opened a pathway for unintended consequences to occur. It is difficult to argue that Obama implemented a strategy that had clear aims, instruments, and a clear method after the uprisings in Syria. It can be observed that although Obama depicted his aims in discourse, rather than implement these, he took position according to the flow of events. Due to the fact that the Assad regime had been problematized by the U.S. administrations throughout the Cold War, 1990s and 2000s, it would have been expected for them to pursue a regime change in Syria. However, although Obama used discourse along these lines after the uprisings began, rather than applying a strategy in this regard, he changed his position according to the Syrian regime on many occasions.

Just because the U.S. has been influential throughout the crisis, this does not mean that it has a consistent Syria policy that it acts within. Strategy is defined as having a concrete objective within political objectives,¹ and the use of instruments in certain ways in order to reach these objectives.² In this sense, it can be stated that, during the first two terms, U.S. policy had two important dilemmas on a strategic level. The first dilemma is the fact that although an objective was depicted on a discourse level, it was never applied in practice. In other words, the desultoriness between discourse and practice. When Obama gave Assad the chance for change and reform, he also stated that Assad would have to step aside. However, the Obama administration never acted, even after the regime intervened in the peaceful protests. A similar situation occurred when Assad passed the "red line" when he used chemical weapons. Meanwhile, the second dilemma was the fact that the Obama administration did not act within the framework of strategic integrity (with clear aims, instruments, and methods). It is possible to state that these two dilemmas were overcome by the Obama administration in their fight against ISIL.

This article is divided into three sections. The first section provides a short summary of how Obama tried to change the Middle East he inherited from the previous administration. The second section provides the reader with the different approaches to Obama's Syria policy and underlines the framework that this study is built upon. The third section assesses the Obama administration's policies in three different milestones. The National Security Strategy

¹ Colin S. Gray, *The Strategy Bridge: Theory for Practise*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010.

² Hasan Basri Yalçın, *Ulusal Güvenlik Stratejisi*, İstanbul: SETA Kitapları, 2017, p.24-25.

published during Obama's tenure will be taken as the primary source in the assessments made throughout this piece. A literature review consisting of academic literature, expert reviews, and news pieces, will also be provided.

Bush's Legacy and Obama's Middle East Policy

The U.S.' Syria policy witnessed many ups and downs for a long time. The U.S. President adopted a new 'Bush Doctrine' after the 9/11 attacks and gave the war on terror a new concept. Within this framework, after the 2003 Iraq war, Syria was listed in the "evil axis" and the issue of whether sanctions will be applied on Syria or whether it will be invaded or not raised on the agenda on the reasoning that Syria was supporting terrorism.³ During this time, the Syrian opposition wanted to transform the Assad regime's openings into a process of "democratization" and therefore used the U.S.' regional political stance as a lever. In this context, in a declaration issued in May 2003, by referring to the U.S.' and Israel's "aggressive, racist, and hostile politics," they requested reform to be made against "hostile enemy threats."⁴

After the assassination of former Lebanon Prime Minister Rafic Hariri on 14 February, 2005, the U.S. administration began applying more pressure on the Assad regime. Prior to the assassination of Hariri, on 2 September, 2004, with the lead of the U.S. and France, resolution 1559 was proposed to the United Nations Security Council, calling Syria to withdraw its soldiers from Lebanon and for the disarmament of groups in Lebanon (these statements pointed to Hezbollah). The Hariri assassination solidified the foundations on which increasing pressure would be applied to the Assad regime in the international arena. On 20 October, the UN Mehlis report that was looking into the assassination of Hariri was announced and on 31 October, UNSC resolution 1636, which foresaw sanctions on Syria, was declared.⁵ The Bush regime also withdrew their Ambassador from Damascus⁶ and relations were reduced to charge d'affaires. With the increasing pressure by the U.S., Syria withdrew its military from Lebanon and this was expected to calm bilateral relations. However, the Bush regime did not send back its Ambassador.

³ Tom Regan, "Is U.S. Planning an Iraq-style 'Regime Change' in Syria?", *Christian Science Monitor*, 9 November 2005.

⁴ Carsten Wieland, *Syria: Ballots or Bullets? Democracy, Islamism, and Secularism in the Levant*, (Seattle: Cune Press, 2006).

⁵ Ellen Lust-Okar, "Reform in Syria: Steering Between the Chinese Model and Regime Change", Marina Ottaway, Julia Choucair-Vizoso, *Beyond the Facade: Political Reform in the Arab World*, Washington, Carnegie Endowment, 2008, p.75.

⁶ "Syria Stops Cooperating With U.S. Forces and C.I.A.", *The New York Times*, 24 May 2005, <https://www.nytimes.com/2005/05/24/politics/syria-stops-cooperating-with-us-forces-and-cia.html>

After Obama got elected, he tried to differ his approach to the Middle East from that of the Bush administration. In comparison to the “preventative action” discourse and policies applied by Bush, Obama preferred a more soft rhetoric, less costly, and a more multilateral approach in his fight against terrorism. There are two clear examples of this. When Obama visited Cairo University in order to clear the image the U.S. had in the region after the invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan, he called for a “new beginning” with the Islamic world.⁷ In regards to Iran, which was a country that the Bush administration had targeted, Obama sent messages to Iran, stating “If it opens the fist it’s clenched, it’ll find our reaching arm.”⁸ Obama employed a similar approach against Syria and in February 2010, he appointed a new ambassador to Syria.⁹

The performance Obama displayed during his first term received positive reactions from the Middle East and the greater Muslim world. However, the stance he took after the beginning of the Arab Spring in 2011 and the increasing complexity in the region brought many debates in both academia and politics. On the one hand, Obama’s rhetoric opening the pathway for change, and on the other, his changing policies in front of oppressive regimes, just like in the case of Syria, became the main focal point of these debates. This is because Obama wanted to reach his own aims by pursuing a multilateral stance without undertaking the costs.

In order to merge these factors, a form of eclecticism was required in both theory and practice. The question of whether or not Obama had a doctrine or grand strategy due to this eclectic strategy preference was intensively discussed. Many international relations theorists and analysts¹⁰ claim that Obama did not have a consistent grand strategy and that he pulled many factors of foreign policy to the center and designed policies accordingly. Gerges described this situation as “a doctrine without a doctrine”¹¹ and Murray defined

⁷ “Obamanın Kahire konuşması”, BBC Turkish, 5 June 2009, http://www.bbc.co.uk/turkish/news/story/2009/06/09_0604_obama_speech.shtml

⁸ Yahya Bostan, “İran seçimleri Obama’nın hesaplarını bozdu”, *Anlayış*, July 2009, No 74.

⁹ Ewen MacAskill, “US appoints first ambassador to Damascus since 2005”, *The Guardian*, 17 February 2010, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/feb/17/us-ambassador-syria-robert-ford>

¹⁰ Some names that share this perspective; John J. Mearsheimer, “Imperial by Design,” *The National Interest* 111, January-February 2011 pp. 16-34, <https://nationalinterest.org/article/imperial-by-design-4576> ; Fareed Zakaria, “Wanted: A New Grand Strategy,” *Newsweek*, 8 December 2008, <https://www.newsweek.com/fareed-zakaria-wanted-new-global-strategy-85311> Niall Ferguson, “Obama’s Egypt and Foreign-Policy Failures”, *Newsweek*, 14 February 2011 <https://www.newsweek.com/obamas-egypt-and-foreign-policy-failures-68731>;

¹¹ Fawaz Gerges, “The Obama approach to the Middle East: the end of America’s moment? ”, *International Affairs*, 89: 2 (2013) 299–323, p.301.

the situation as “Obamaism.”¹² These new definitions were used to explain Obama’s eclectic strategy.

However, it is possible to find the roots of Obama’s foreign policy preferences in the basic approaches used to explain U.S. foreign policy. In this context, the approaches that appear at the forefront are isolationism, interventionism, liberal institutionalism, and selective engagement.¹³ Either take into account a U.S. president’s foreign policy or security doctrine or his discourse on trying to explain specific actions, the President will always make use of one of these doctrines and surround explanations around them. In this sense, Obama’s strategy made use of one of the most important factors of “isolationism,” which is cost-free growth by bringing together liberal powers. In other words, Obama devised a rather concrete and pragmatic strategy by borrowing a target from one tradition and the method from another.¹⁴

Obama’s eclectic approach reflected on the politics of the Middle East and after the Arab uprisings, changes occurred in his strategy according to its limitations. Some researchers argue that the reason why Obama could not act strategically in the Middle East is because he was not ready for the uprisings that broke out in the region. However, it is said that in 2010, the Obama administration had prepared a report that listed the possible consequences that discontent in the Middle East could lead to.¹⁵ More, it is known that in his second term, Bush supported the demands of democratization in the Middle East. In other words, the increasing uprisings of civil society against authoritarian regimes was a consequence of U.S. policies.

¹² Donette Murray, “Military action but not as we know it: Libya, Syria and the making of an Obama Doctrine”, *Contemporary Politics*, 19:2, 146-166, p. 150.

¹³ For a brief summary on these concepts within U.S. Grand Strategy, Barry R. Posen ve Andrew L. Ross. “Competing Visions for US Grand Strategy,” *International Security*, 21, no. 3 (Winter 1996/1997): 5-53. Çağatay Özdemir, *Amerikan Grand Stratejisi: Obama’nın Ortadoğu Mirası*, (SETA Kitapları, İstanbul, 2018), 24-38.

¹⁴ Hasan B. Yalçın, “Obama Stratejisi Ve Ortadoğu”, *Akademik ORTA DOĞU*, Volume 9, No 2, 2015, 55-74.

¹⁵ Mark Landler, “Secret Report Ordered by Obama Identified Potential Uprisings”, *The New York Times*, 11 Şubat 2011, <https://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/17/world/middleeast/17diplomacy.html>

Obama and the Syria Crisis: Three Periods, Three Discourses

After the crisis in Syria erupted, during the last 6 years of the Obama administration, various discourses were used and it was an accepted fact that the administration's policies had changed on many occasions. The changes in discourse and policy implementation had become an observable phenomenon. In this sense, it is possible to assess Obama's Syria policy in three periods. The first period accounts to the beginning of the uprisings and the reform and change calls made to the Assad regime between April 2011 and August 2011. This four month period came to end with the Assad regime's use of weapons against protestors. The second period begins in August 2011 and ends in August 2013 when the Assad regime used chemical weapons. In August 2011, although Obama had stated that it was time for Assad to leave, he did not take any concrete steps in this regard. More, although the U.S. President described the use of chemical weapons as the "red line," he did not opt in for any military action. The third period begins with the emergence of ISIL in 2014. In this period, Obama constructed a strategy built on fight against terrorism. It is possible to state that in comparison to previous periods, there was at least some consistency in discourse and policies in this period.

Call for Reform

With the uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya, which called for regime change, the Obama administration pursued an attitude that supported this request and therefore opened the pathway for change. With the UNSC resolution 1973 on 17 March, 2011, which announced Libya's airspace as a prohibited zone, many thought that the U.S. could apply a similar scenario in regards to the Syria crisis. However, Obama used a more cautious discourse for the Syrian crisis. It is possible to distinguish this from a call for reform rather than direct regime change: Once the uprisings began on 15 March, 2011, in Daraa, the Obama administration stated that a regime change in Syria was inevitable. In a speech he made on 19 May, Obama made his stance clear as he stated, "The Syrian people have shown their courage in demanding a transition to democracy. President Assad now has a choice: He can lead that transition, or get out of the way."¹⁶ As the Assad regime increased their brutality against protestors, Obama started to use more harsh discourse. In a

¹⁶ "President Obama's Middle East speech" CBSNEWS, <https://www.cbsnews.com/news/president-obamas-middle-east-speech-full-text/> 19 Mayıs 2011.

speech he made in April, Obama stated “Until now, the Syrian government has not addressed the legitimate aspirations of the Syrian people. Violence and detention are not the answer to the grievances of the Syrian people.”¹⁷ However, the Assad regime ignored these remarks and started to use more violence. During the armed intervention in the protests of 22 April, at least 70 people died, and this event was described as the “most bloodiest intervention.”¹⁸ Obama responded to this intervention with sanctions. Although not directed at Assad, Obama signed three Executive Orders against former Intelligence chief Ali Mamluk, Assad’s brother Mahir Assad, and Iran Revolutionary Guard Quds Forces.¹⁹

The question as to whether Obama took these actions because it wanted to increase pressure on the Assad regime to pursue reforms, or because he knew that the Syrian regime were not going to, was not very clear. This is because while on one hand the U.S. President put pressure on the regime to conduct reforms, he was also in contact with the opposition. More, the U.S. Ambassador to Syria, Robert Ford, attended the anti-government protests in Hama on 7 July.²⁰ This was an action that caught the attention of the Syrian government, and is something that can be used to describe the ambivalent approach of the U.S. administration. The fact that the administration stated its expectancy of the Syrian regime to pursue reforms on the one hand, and increased the confidence of the opposition on the other, is important in this regard. The attacks on the U.S. and French embassies²¹ that came after the named visit, led the U.S. to adopt a more concrete discourse. This change of policy was reflected in the statement by former U.S. Secretary of State, Clinton, who stated that Assad had lost his legitimacy and that he was not inevitable for the future of Syria.²² Taking this as an advantage, the opposition, which the Obama administration had increased talks with, asked for three clear requests. These were generating a new policy to ensure Assad leaves office, expanding the scope of sanctions, and for the UN Security Council to issue a

¹⁷ “Statement from the President on the Violence in Syria”, April, 8, 2011. <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2011/04/08/statement-president-violence-syria>

¹⁸ “Syria unrest: ‘Bloodiest day’ as troops fire on rallies”, BBC, 22 April 2011, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-13167433>

¹⁹ “Statement by the Press Secretary on Syrian Human Rights Abuses”, 29 April 2011, <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2011/04/29/statement-press-secretary-syrian-human-rights-abuses>

²⁰ “Suriye ABD ve Fransa elçilerini uyardı”, BBC Turkish, 20 July 2011, https://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler/2011/07/110720_syrianfm_usfrance.shtml?utm_source=twitterfeed&utm_medium=twitter

²¹ Nada Bakri, “Crowds in Syria Attack U.S. and French Embassies”, The New York Times, 11 July 2011, <https://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/12/world/middleeast/12syria.html>

²² Richard Spencer, “Syria: Bashar al-Assad not ‘indispensable’, says Hillary Clinton”, The Telegraph, 12 July 2011, <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/8631445/Syria-Bashar-al-Assad-not-indispensable-says-Hillary-Clinton.html>

resolution condemning the violence.²³ Obama welcomed these requests positively and from August onwards, adopted a discourse on the foundations of toppling Assad.

“Regime Change” Discourse

The fact that the Assad regime was promising change on the one hand to save time, and increasing violence on the protestors on the other, caused Obama to revise his discourse on the Syria crisis. This new approach was based on regime change and from August onwards, Obama openly expressed this.²⁴ Obama’s “Assad should now leave” statement that he used on 18 August,²⁵ was consistent with his attitude towards the Arab uprisings. During these dates, the U.S. regime stood beside the anti-government uprisings that occurred in different countries. This attitude speeded up the process of regime change in Tunisia and Egypt. It also contributed to the expansion of the NATO operation in Libya and the toppling of Gaddafi. These developments led to the expectation that regime change was inevitable in Arab Spring countries and that a similar scenario could occur in Syria.

A Syrian opposition figure stated that on 22 August, Assad broadcasted a speech addressing the Syrian people, but that the Syrian people did not watch this and watched the opposition in Libya take over Tripoli instead.²⁶ This statement cannot be assessed independent of Obama’s comments against the Assad regime on 18 August. However, despite his concrete discourse, it was still unknown to the Syrian opposition and the international public how the U.S. President was going to push for regime change. There were two options in this regard.

The first option was a U.S.-led international military coalition against the Assad regime. However, Obama’s approach to changing the policies implemented during the Bush tenure indicated that he would stay away from an intervention approach. The fact that the U.S. decreased its military presence in Iraq in 2010 and 2011 also indicated that it would refrain from directly interfering in crisis regions. Despite all these, the discourse that the U.S. adop-

²³ Kılıç Buğra Kanat, *A Tale of Four Augusts: Obama’s Syria Policy*, İstanbul: SETA Kitapları, 2015, p.76

²⁴ Scott Wilson and “Assad must go, Obama says”, *Washington Post*, August 18, 2011, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/assad-must-go-obama-says/2011/08/18/gIQAelheOJ_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.8dc8a057593c

²⁵ “Statement by President Obama on the Situation in Syria”, 18 August 2011, <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2011/08/18/statement-president-obama-situation-syria>

²⁶ Abdur Rahman al Shami, “Syrians must contemplate foreign help - if not the west’s”, *The Guardian*, 31.07.2011 (Online), <http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2011/aug/31/bashar-assad-must-be-stopped>

ted suggested that it would play a main role and increased expectancies of intervention. It was difficult to conduct a NATO-led operation, as occurred in the case of Libya, due to objections from Russia. It was impossible to convince Russia for any intervention in Syria, whatever the reasons. Therefore, Obama could not risk confronting Russia in this sense.

The second option was to support the organization of the Syrian opposition, arm, and educate them, and to prevent the Assad regime from gaining support in the international arena. With this, the U.S. administration endeavored to increase the Syrian opposition's international legitimacy. An example of this was the Friends of Syria Group meeting that occurred in Tunisia on 24 February, 2012.²⁷ More, former Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton's attendance to the meeting that was held in Istanbul on 1 April, 2012, in which she stated that if the Assad regime does not stop its violence, it will be punished, was a clear indication of the administration's support for the opposition.²⁸ Statements made by the U.S. administration on the lines that the Assad regime was living its final days can also be interpreted as the government preparing to topple the Assad regime.²⁹ However, despite this concrete support, it is difficult to argue that the U.S. administration prepared a strategy with the opposition to topple the Syrian regime.

The Use of Chemical Weapons

In 2012, the use of chemical weapons was also added to the discourse of changing the Assad regime. Without letting go of his discourse on regime change, Obama declared the use of chemical weapons as the "red line."³⁰ While Obama's statement was inferred by some as a warning, other sources suggest that the regime had used chemical weapons on a small level in some areas.³¹ Therefore, it can be stated that Obama made this statement with information provided by intelligence agencies. Re-mentioning the use of chemical weapons, during a speech made at the end of December, Obama stated,

²⁷ "Suriye'nin dostları" Tunus'ta toplandı", CNN Türk, 24.02.2102, <https://www.cnnturk.com/2012/dunya/02/24/suriyenin.dostlari.tunusta.toplandi/650540.0/index.html>

²⁸ "Suriye'nin Dostları" İstanbul'da toplandı", Dünya, 01.01.2012, <https://www.dunya.com/dunya/quotsuriye039nindostlariquot-istanbul039da-toplandi-haberi-169851>

²⁹ Joshua Landis, "The Syrian Uprising of 2011: Why the Asad Regime is Likely To Survive to 2013", Middle East Policy Council, Spring 2012, Volume XIX, Number 1, s.73. pp. 72-77.

³⁰ James Ball, "Obama issues Syria a 'red line' warning on chemical weapons", The Washington Post, 22 August 2012, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/obama-issues-syria-red-line-warning-on-chemical-weapons/2012/08/20/ba5d26ec-eaf7-11e1-b811-090366cb182b_story.html?utm_term=.56455a8f4d63

³¹ "Timeline of Syrian Chemical Weapons Activity", <https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Timeline-of-Syrian-Chemical-Weapons-Activity>,

“We will continue to support the legitimate aspirations of the Syrian people – engaging with the opposition, providing them with the humanitarian aid, and working for a transition to a Syria that’s free of the Assad regime.”³² Obama’s use of ambiguous expressions and rhetoric without having a proper plan also re-emerged as a debate. Although the debate on whether the Syrian opposition should be armed began in February 2013, this was associated with the increasing power of Al Qaeda in Syria. Regardless, Obama rejected the implementation of this plan.³³

The Assad regime had to use chemical weapons in order for it to become apparent that Obama was not acting within a conducted strategy, even when he was calling for reforms and regime change. The Assad regime eventually used chemicals weapons in Eastern Ghouta on 21 August, 2013.³⁴ Although the Assad regime denied accusations of using chemical weapons, the Obama administration stated that it had evidence to show that the Syrian regime were behind the attack.³⁵ Despite this, the fact that Obama stated, “Red line on Syria belongs to the whole world,”³⁶ left military intervention expectations in vain.

A report published after a UN investigation clearly stated that sarin gas had been used.³⁷ This report has been interpreted by Assad’s allies and those opposing him from different perspectives. While Russia argued that the report does not blame Assad, the French and U.S. administrations blamed the Assad regime.³⁸ Despite these accusations, rather than taking action for regime change in Syria, the Obama administration conducted policy on the Syria regime getting rid of its chemical weapons. Due to the events that had occurred, it was expected for Obama to stand behind his statements and to

³² “Remarks by the President at the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Symposium”, 3 December 2012, <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2012/12/03/remarks-president-nunn-lugar-cooperative-threat-reduction-symposium>

³³ John Swaine, “Leon Panetta supports Hillary Clinton plan to arm Syrian rebels”, The Telegraph, 7 February 2013, <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/9856382/Leon-Panetta-supports-Hillary-Clinton-plan-to-arm-Syrian-rebels.html>

³⁴ “Suriye’de kimyasal saldırı iddiası: 1300 ölü”, Hürriyet, 21 August 2013, <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/suriyede-kimyasal-saldiri-iddiasi-1300-olu-24560670>

³⁵ Tucker Reals, “Syria chemical weapons attack blamed on Assad, but where’s the evidence?”, CBS News, 30 August 2013, <https://www.cbsnews.com/news/syria-chemical-weapons-attack-blamed-on-assad-but-wheres-the-evidence/>

³⁶ Ben Wolfgang, “Obama says ‘red line’ on Syria belongs to the World”, The Washington Times, 4 September 2013, <https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/sep/4/obama-says-red-line-on-syria-belongs-to-the-world/>

³⁷ “‘Clear and convincing’ evidence of chemical weapons use in Syria, UN team reports”, US News, 16 September 2013, <https://news.un.org/en/story/2013/09/449052-clear-and-convincing-evidence-chemical-weapons-use-syria-un-team-reports>

³⁸ “U.N. confirms sarin used in Syria attack; U.S., UK, France blame Assad”, Reuters, 16 September 2013, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-syria-crisis-un-idUSBRE98F0ED20130916>

pursue at least a limited military intervention in order to punish the Syrian regime.³⁹ However, Obama continued his position of avoiding intervention in the crisis with an offer that came from Russia.⁴⁰

In accordance with the agreement reached between the U.S. and Russia, the process of eliminating chemical weapons from the Syrian regime began from 14 September onwards. The parties of the agreement that became known as The Framework for Elimination of Syrian Chemical Weapons⁴¹ were the U.S., Russia, and Syria. The role of Russia was to ensure that the Syrian regime remained bound to the agreement. According to the plan, Syria was going to join the Chemical Weapons Convention and the chemical weapons that it had were going to be eliminated in the most efficient way. With this aim, the U.S. and Russia were going to present a proposal to the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and were going to watch its application. In addition to this, the United Nations Security Council issued decision no. 2118, in regards to the Syria regime applying the plan laid out. According to this decision, the elimination of chemical weapons was going to be completed in 2014.

In June 2014, it was reported that this plan had been implemented and that a majority of the chemical weapons had been eliminated.⁴² After this date, the debate as to whether the Syrian regime had got rid of all its chemical weapons continued for a while. Due to the fact that the decision gave reference to the seventh section of the disarmament deal, there were comments that an armed intervention could occur.⁴³ However, this scenario never came on the agenda. The U.S. administration continued to act within the agreement that it reached with Russia. This approach of the Obama administration (although it did not declare it openly) was an indication that it left out the option of a military operation against the Assad regime. More importantly, this allowed for Russia to become a more active player in the Syria crisis and increased its influence on the Assad regime.

The reason why the Obama administration opted for such an attitude was because it did not have as much influence on Syria as it did on other count-

³⁹ Douglas L. Kriner, "Obama's Authorization Paradox: Syria and Congress's Continued Relevance in Military Affairs", *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, 2014, 44, no. 2 (June), 309-327, p.310.

⁴⁰ Don Roberst, Julian Borger, "Syria crisis: Obama welcomes Russia's chemical weapons proposal", *The Guardian*, 10 September 2013, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/09/us-russian-proposal-syria-chemical-weapons>

⁴¹ "Framework for Elimination of Syrian Chemical Weapons", US Department of State, 14 September 2013, <https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/09/214247.htm>

⁴² Joshua Berlinger, "Syria's chemical weapons destroyed, monitoring group says", *CNN*, 5 June 2014, <https://edition.cnn.com/2016/01/05/middleeast/syria-chemical-weapons/index.html>

⁴³ "Q&A: Syria chemical weapons disarmament deal", *BBC*, 30 January 2014, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-23876085>

ries in the region.⁴⁴ In addition to this, during this time, Obama was trying to design a new Middle East policy, including the nuclear weapons negotiations with Iran. This was another reason that discouraged Obama from a military intervention. While the negotiations with Iran decreased the possibility of a military intervention for the U.S., this situation allowed for Iran to use more aggressive tactics in Syria. This includes adding Hezbollah and many other Shia organizations to work for the maintenance of the Assad regime. Obama's strategy created a major power gap in Syria and this created a threat to other regional countries that were involved in the crisis.

From 2012 onwards, groups that the U.S. listed as terrorist organizations (for instance Hezbollah and Al-Qaeda) began to fight within themselves due to their ideological differences. The civil war in Syria also became an area in which regional countries such as Turkey, Iran, and Saudi Arabia confronted each other. After Russia committed itself to a high-level military engagement in Syria in 2015, Obama stated that "Syria will become Russia's nightmare."⁴⁵ Although Obama was being criticized from within the American establishment, he benefited from the fact that Syria crisis became an arena where U.S. rivals were confronting each other. Although it can be debated as to whether Obama pursued a strategy in order to construct such an atmosphere, it can be stated that his attitude was aggressive.⁴⁶

Obama stated the reason why he did not militarily intervene in the Syria crisis just before his resignation. According to the former U.S. President, although non-interference would have political consequences for the U.S., not intervening was acting in accordance with American interests... A military intervention is usually only accepted in Washington if the U.S. is under a direct threat. However, this belief could have led to wrong decisions being made.⁴⁷ Obama and his administration believed that intervening in Syria was going to cause more grave consequences and feared that engagement would inevitably lead to mission creep, drawing the U.S. into an Afghan-style quagmire.⁴⁸ Engagement was not a viable option for Obama, not only in Syria, but in other places of the world, as he was trying to decrease the cost and level of U.S. engagement across the world.

⁴⁴ Kılıç Buğra Kanat, *A Tale of Four Augusts: Obama's Syria Policy*, İstanbul: SETA Kitapları, 2015, p.68-69

⁴⁵ Kevin Liptak, "Obama: Russia heading for 'quagmire' in Syria", CNN, 2 October 2015, <https://edition.cnn.com/2015/10/02/politics/president-obama-syria-russia-assad/index.html>

⁴⁶ Hasan Basri Yalçın, *Ulusal Güvenlik Stratejisi*, İstanbul: SETA Kitapları, 2017, p.44.

⁴⁷ Jeffrey Goldberg, "The Obama Doctrine", *The Atlantic*, April 2016, <https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/04/the-obama-doctrine/471525/>

⁴⁸ Steven Heydeman, "Why United States has not intervened in Syria", *The Washington Post*, 14 March 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/03/14/why-the-united-states-hasnt-intervened-in-syria/?utm_term=.822fa2afb8d0

The murder of U.S. Ambassador to Libya on 11 September 2012 in Benghazi led to the criticism of Obama's policies towards the Arab uprisings. This attack took place in Libya, where the U.S. was helping the opposition topple Gaddafi. This event also caused a risk for Obama's re-election, as it occurred just before the mid-term elections. However, although Obama was elected for his second consecutive term, he did not adopt an interventionist attitude in Syria.

The Fight Against ISIL and the Changing Position of the U.S.

From this date onwards until the emergence of ISIL in 2014, the Obama administration was accused of inaction in the Syria crisis.⁴⁹ ISIL's capture of Mosul in June 2014 not only expanded its sphere of control in Iraq and Syria, but was also a turning point for an international campaign to be organized against the terrorist organization. Obama had ordered airstrikes against the terrorist organization in Iraq, but when American journalist James Foley was brutally murdered and his video leaked to the media in August, the U.S. President launched a comprehensive strategy. On 10 September, 2014, the main aspects of the strategy against ISIL was released. According to this, air strikes against ISIL were to begin, the U.S. was to support countries fighting against the group, in order to prevent ISIL attacks, the regime were to increase counter-terrorism capacities, and finally, help migrants that were displaced from their homes due to ISIL.⁵⁰

It can be stated that this period was the only time that Obama had acted in a consistent manner throughout the beginning of the crisis. More, it can be further stated that this attitude coincided with the approach of the national security strategy published by Obama and that the consistency in his attitude during this time was due to this. This document clearly states the fight against terrorism and that the administration will fight against Al-Qaeda, ISIL and other terrorist organizations.⁵¹ Obama stated that the U.S. would Obama stated that they would fight against terrorism uncompromisingly and acted within this framework. In other words, a strategy based on the concrete goal of eliminating ISIL, which adopted a multilateral approach by working with

⁴⁹ "Obama's legacy will be forever tarnished by his inaction in Syria", *The Conversation*, 25 November 2016, <http://theconversation.com/obamas-legacy-will-be-forever-tarnished-by-his-inaction-in-syria-67030>

⁵⁰ "Statement by the President on ISIL", 10 September 2014, <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/09/10/statement-president-isil-1>

⁵¹ "National Security Strategy", February 2015, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2015_national_security_strategy_2.pdf

the international coalition and local forces and which used military instruments was put into action. This strategy was still prevalent after Obama left office in 2016 and it was expected for the next administration to adopt this approach.

Obama's new Syria strategy was based on two foundations. The first is "The Global Coalition Against ISIL," which was launched in September 2014, and which consists of 79 different states and international organizations.⁵² The second leg of the strategy are the military structures on the ground, local government forces, and terrorist organizations. The main function of the coalition was to contribute to air operations. Governments on the ground and non-state actors were the main bodies involved in the clashes. The U.S. forces in the field, whose numbers were decreasing considerably, controlled both coalition and local forces. After the emergence of ISIL, the U.S. armed and organized the PYD – the Syrian wing of the PKK terrorist organization. Although the U.S. organized this group under the umbrella of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), it is well known that the PYD was the main force and that Syrian Arab forces do not have much say. This strategy produced a major cost for Turkey, who is also a coalition partner.

The relationship the U.S. established with the PYD after ISIL's attack on Ayn al-Arab (Kobani) in September 2014,⁵³ had important consequences for Turkey. The Obama administration's withdrawal of help to the Syrian opposition allowed for radical organizations to gain power and for ISIL to settle near Turkey's border. The fact that the U.S. administration used the PYD as a force on the ground against ISIL increased the organization's capabilities, weapon capacity, military education, its ability to increase its financial support, and allowed the organization to obtain de facto control in Syria. This situation meant a multi-layer national security concern for Turkey. The PKK's increasing attacks in Turkey, its "de-facto controlled areas" such as Cizre, Sur, and Nusaybin, and ISIL's attacks both within Turkey and outside were all due to the power gap that was left free in Syria. In other words, the terrorist organizations that emerged in Syria left Turkey face-to-face with a serious risk.

Obama's intention to lead a cost-free maneuverer against the Syria regime became clear in an interview he gave in April 2016. The statement "Erdogan

⁵² <https://theglobalcoalition.org/en/home/>

⁵³ "Battle for Kobane: Key events", 25 June 2015, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-29688108>

refused to enter into Syria with his strong army"⁵⁴ is an indication of this. This approach also suited the "rather than intervening in crises, let other international actors take responsibility" attitude of the Obama administration.⁵⁵

Since the beginning of the Syria crisis in March 2011, although Obama constructed discourse that created an expectancy of military intervention against the Assad regime, a strategy following suit never occurred. More so, Obama's lack of a strategy became clear as the discourse he adopted throughout the crisis was not constructed in parallel to the reactions that his administration gave to events. This is something that caused the further deepening of the crisis. As the crisis deepened, the risks that the Obama administration had to encounter increased and the possibility of an intervention became more difficult. This situation is especially true for the first two periods that are assessed in this paper. Although the U.S. administration worked to eliminate the Assad regime from chemical weapons, it never followed as to whether they were successful in this objective or not. The only time that the Obama administration acted within a concrete strategy was when it put into action its fight against ISIL. The reason why Obama acted in this manner in the Syria crisis was a matter of debate for a long time. This paper has argued that the reason why Obama hesitated to and did not intervene in the Syria crisis was because the U.S. President wanted to avoid high costs. Although Obama described the use of chemical weapons as the "red line," his discourse on trying to push the matter as an international one and later accepting Putin's proposal are indicators of this very finding.

Conclusion

This study has periodized the Obama administration's attitude towards the Syria crisis and has explained how the administration's policies changed over the 6 year period in concern. In this regard, the article has divided Obama's Syria policy to three different periods and three different discourses. The first period was when expectations on the Assad regime listening to the demands of the opposition were high. The statement that if the Assad regime does not fulfill these demands it "will have to move from the way" created an expectancy that the U.S. administration could militarily intervene in the crisis. Rather than forming a rapprochement with the opposition,

⁵⁴ Jeffrey Goldberg, "The Obama Doctrine", *The Atlantic*, April 2016, <https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/04/the-obama-doctrine/471525/>

⁵⁵ Hasan B. Yalçın, "Obama Stratejisi Ve Ortadoğu", *Akademik ORTA DOĞU*, Volume 9, No 2, 2015, 55-74.

the Assad regime increased its repressive handling of the protests and this created a change in the Obama administration's discourse. From this point onwards, the possibility of a U.S. military intervention became more debated. However, Obama avoided taking a step in this regard and labeled the use of chemical weapons as a red line. Although the Assad regime used chemical weapons in August 2013, the Obama administration repeatedly avoided intervention. Even when operation plans were being discussed, after this two-year period, it became clear that the Obama administration will not resort to military intervention.

By avoiding a military intervention, the U.S. administration caused the Syria crisis to evolve into a multi-layer and multi-actor crisis. Dragging the country into a vortex meant groups that the U.S. defined as terrorist organizations fighting each other and U.S. rivals losing energy in Syria. The fighting between groups associated with Hezbollah and Al-Qaeda and the heated tension between countries such as Saudi Arabia and Turkey, who were active in the crisis, strengthened the U.S.' arm against these actors.

It is possible to state that the U.S. avoidance of a military intervention against the Assad regime caused the Syria crisis to evolve onto a different level, which led to two important consequences. The first was the strengthening of non-state actors in Syria both in terms of power and authority after 2014. This situation is not only applicable to ISIL and groups affiliated to Al-Qaeda, but other groups such as Hezbollah and PYD. As the U.S. took steps to stop the expansion of ISIL, it opened the pathway of growth for the PYD.

The second important consequence of Obama's policies is the fact that it allowed for Russia and Iran to increase their support for the Assad regime in the name of fighting terrorism. In this respect, it can be observed that the U.S. was forced to make a choice between either terrorist organizations or the Assad regime for the future of Syria. In such an atmosphere, the opposition was dismantled into many different small groups and slowly lost its control of many areas. Looking at the map of Syria as the Obama reign came to an end, it can be seen that while the East of the Euphrates was in the hands of ISIL and the PYD, the West of the Euphrates was dominated by the Assad regime, which gained control due to the help of the Iran and Russia regimes – even if this meant leading to civilians being displaced.

Within this chaos, the Obama administration done something very important that it had never done so before. It put into action a concrete strate-

gy in the fight against ISIL. The main aim of this strategy was to eliminate ISIL. A military method was adopted and an international coalition was formed, which would work with local forces. One important consequence of Obama's fight against terrorism was that it changed Turkey's approach to the Syria crisis. This strategy of the U.S. President created grave consequences for Turkey. Among these include the PKK's de-facto rule and self-declared autonomy in areas in Syria, the end of the "peace process" in Turkey and the fact that it wanted to cause a similar situation occurring in Syria in Turkey. In addition to these can be listed the fact that ISIL had settled on the Turkish border and that the group conducted many attacks both within and outside of Turkey's borders. All of these caused a serious threat to Turkey's national security. The fact that the 15 July military coup attempt occurred within this atmosphere is also not a coincidence. Its only after defeating this coup attempt that the Turkish government was able to fully operate against these threats and begin to obtain some outcomes. Finally, Turkey's attempt to find a new solution to the crisis through the Astana process with Russia can be stated as a mandatory consequence of the options made by the U.S. in the Syria crisis.

REFERENCES

- Al Shami, Abdur Rahman, "Syrians must contemplate foreign help - if not the west's", *The Guardian*, 31 July 2011, <http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2011/aug/31/bashar-assad-must-be-stopped>
- Arms Control Association, "Timeline of Syrian Chemical Weapons Activity", March 2019, <https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Timeline-of-Syrian-Chemical-Weapons-Activity>,
- Bakri, Nada, "Crowds in Syria Attack U.S. and French Embassies", *The New York Times*, 11 July 2011, <https://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/12/world/middle-east/12syria.html>
- Ball, James, "Obama issues Syria a 'red line' warning on chemical weapons", *The Washington Post*, 22 August 2012, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/obama-issues-syria-red-line-warning-on-chemical-weapons/2012/08/20/ba5d26ec-eaf7-11e1-b811-09036bcb182b_story.html?utm_term=.56455a8f4d63
- BBC Turkish "Obamanın Kahire konuşması", 5 June 2009, http://www.bbc.co.uk/turkish/news/story/2009/06/090604_obama_speech.shtml

- BBC *Turkish*, "Suriye ABD ve Fransa elçilerini uyardı", 20 July 2011, https://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler/2011/07/110720_syrianfm_usfrance.shtml?utm_source=twitterfeed&utm_medium=twitter
- BBC, "Battle for Kobane: Key events", 25 June 2015, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-29688108>
- BBC, "Q&A: Syria chemical weapons disarmament deal", 30 January 2014, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-23876085>
- BBC, "Syria unrest: 'Bloodiest day' as troops fire on rallies", April, 22, 2011, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-13167433>
- Berlinger, Joshua, "Syria's chemical weapons destroyed, monitoring group says", CNN, 5 June 2014, <https://edition.cnn.com/2016/01/05/middleeast/syria-chemical-weapons/index.html>
- Bostan, Yahya, "İran seçimleri Obama'nın hesaplarını bozdu", *Anlayış*, July 2009, No 74.
- CNN Türk, "Suriye'nin dostları" Tunus'ta toplandı", *CNN Türk*, 24.02.2012, <https://www.cnnturk.com/2012/dunya/02/24/suriyenin.dostlari.tunusta.toplandi/650540.0/index.html>
- Dünya, "Suriye'nin Dostları" İstanbul'da toplandı", *Dünya*, 01.01.2012, <https://www.dunya.com/dunya/quotsuriye039nin-dostlariquot-istanbul039da-toplandi-haberi-169851>
- Fareed Zakaria, "Wanted: A New Grand Strategy," *Newsweek*, 8 December 2008, <https://www.newsweek.com/fareed-zakaria-wanted-new-global-strategy-85311>
- Ferguson, Niall, "Obama's Egypt and Foreign-Policy Failures", *Newsweek*, 14 February 2011 <https://www.newsweek.com/obamas-egypt-and-foreign-policy-failures-68731>
- Gerges, Fawaz, "The Obama approach to the Middle East: the end of America's moment? ", *International Affairs*, 89: 2 (2013), 299–323.
- Goldberg, Jeffrey, "The Obama Doctrine", *The Atlantic*, April 2016, <https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/04/the-obama-doctrine/471525/>
- Goldberg, Jeffrey, "The Obama Doctrine", *The Atlantic*, April 2016, <https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/04/the-obama-doctrine/471525/>
- Gray, Colin S., *The Strategy Bridge: Theory for Practise*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010.
- Heydeman, Steven, "Why United States has not intervened in Syria", *The Washington Post*, 14 March 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/03/14/why-the-united-states-hasnt-intervened-in-syria/?utm_term=.822fa2afb8d0
- <https://theglobalcoalition.org/en/home/>

- Hürriyet, "Suriye'de kimyasal saldırı iddiası: 1300 ölü", *Hürriyet*, 21 August 2013, <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/suriyede-kimyasal-saldiri-iddiasi-1300-olu-24560670>
- Kanat, Kılıç Buğra, *A Tale of Four Augusts: Obama's Syria Policy*, İstanbul: SETA Kitapları, 2015.
- Kriner, Douglas L., "Obama's Authorization Paradox: Syria and Congress's Continued Relevance in Military Affairs", *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, 2014, 44, no. 2 (June), 309-327.
- Landis, Joshua, "The Syrian Uprising of 2011: Why the Asad Regime is Likely To Survive to 2013", *Middle East Policy Council*, Spring 2012, Volume XIX, Number 1, pp. 72-77.
- Landler, Mark, "Secret Report Ordered by Obama Identified Potential Uprisings", *The New York Times*, 11 Şubat 2011, <https://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/17/world/middleeast/17diplomacy.html>
- Liptak, Kevin, "Obama: Russia heading for 'quagmire' in Syria", *CNN*, 2 October 2015, <https://edition.cnn.com/2015/10/02/politics/president-obama-syria-russia-assad/index.html>
- Lust-Okar, Ellen, "Reform in Syria: Steering Between the Chinese Model and Regime Change", Marina Ottaway, Julia Choucair-Vizoso, *Beyond the Facade: Political Reform in the Arab World*, Washington, Carnegie Endowment, 2008.
- MacAskill, Ewen, "US appoints first ambassador to Damascus since 2005", *The Guardian*, 17 February 2010, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/feb/17/us-ambassador-syria-robert-ford>
- Mearsheimer, John J., "Imperial by Design," *The National Interest* 111, January-February 2011 pp. 16-34. <https://nationalinterest.org/article/imperial-by-design-4576>
- Murray, Donette, "Military action but not as we know it: Libya, Syria and the making of an Obama Doctrine", *Contemporary Politics*, 19:2, 146-166.
- Office of the Spokesperson of US Department of State, "Framework for Elimination of Syrian Chemical Weapons", *US Department of State*, 14 September 2013, <https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/09/214247.htm>
- Özdemir, Çağatay, *Amerikan Grand Stratejisi: Obama'nın Ortadoğu Mirası*, İstanbul: SETA Kitapları, 2018.
- Posen, Barry R. Ross. Andrew L. "Competing Visions for US Grand Strategy," *International Security*, 21, no. 3 (Winter 1996/1997): 5-53.
- President Obama, "President Obama's Middle East speech" *CBSNEWS*, <https://www.cbsnews.com/news/president-obamas-middle-east-speech-full-text/> 19 Mayıs 2011.

- Reals, Tucker, "Syria chemical weapons attack blamed on Assad, but where's the evidence?", *CBS News*, 30 August 2013, <https://www.cbsnews.com/news/syria-chemical-weapons-attack-blamed-on-assad-but-wheres-the-evidence/>
- Regan, Tom, "Is U.S. Planning an Iraq-style 'Regime Change' in Syria?", *Christian Science Monitor*, 9 November 2005.
- Reuters, "U.N. confirms sarin used in Syria attack; U.S., UK, France blame Assad", 16 September 2013, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-syria-crisis-un-idUSBRE98F0ED20130916>
- Roberts, Don and Berger, Julian, "Syria crisis: Obama welcomes Russia's chemical weapons proposal", *The Guardian*, 10 September 2013, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/09/us-russian-proposal-syria-chemical-weapons>
- Spencer, Richard, "Syria: Bashar al-Assad not 'indispensable', says Hillary Clinton", *The Telegraph*, 12 July 2011, <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/8631445/Syria-Bashar-al-Assad-not-indispensable-says-Hillary-Clinton.html>
- Swaine, John, "Leon Panetta supports Hillary Clinton plan to arm Syrian rebels", *The Telegraph*, 7 February 2013, <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/9856382/Leon-Panetta-supports-Hillary-Clinton-plan-to-arm-Syrian-rebels.html>
- The Conversation, "Obama's legacy will be forever tarnished by his inaction in Syria", *The Conversation*, 25 November 2016, <http://theconversation.com/obamas-legacy-will-be-forever-tarnished-by-his-inaction-in-syria-67030>
- The New York Times, "Syria Stops Cooperating With U.S. Forces and C.I.A.", 24 May 2005, <https://www.nytimes.com/2005/05/24/politics/syria-stops-cooperating-with-us-forces-and-cia.html>
- The White House Office of the Press Secretary, "National Security Strategy", February 2015, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2015_national_security_strategy_2.pdf
- The White House Office of the Press Secretary, "Remarks by the President at the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Symposium", 3 December 2012, <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2012/12/03/remarks-president-nunn-lugar-cooperative-threat-reduction-symposium>
- The White House Office of the Press Secretary, "Statement by President Obama on the Situation in Syria", 18 August 2011, <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2011/08/18/statement-president-obama-situation-syria>
- The White House Office of the Press Secretary, "Statement by the Press Secretary on Syrian Human Rights Abuses", 29 April 2011, <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2011/04/29/statement-press-secretary-syrian-human-rights-abuses>

- The White House Office of the Press Secretary, "Statement by the President on ISIL", 10 September 2014, <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/09/10/statement-president-isil-1>
- The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, "Statement from the President on the Violence in Syria", April, 8, 2011. <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2011/04/08/statement-president-violence-syria>
- UN News, "'Clear and convincing' evidence of chemical weapons use in Syria, UN team reports", *US News*, 16 September 2013, <https://news.un.org/en/story/2013/09/449052-clear-and-convincing-evidence-chemical-weapons-use-syria-un-team-reports>
- Wieland, Carsten, *Syria: Ballots or Bullets? Democracy, Islamism, and Secularism in the Levant*, (Seattle: Cune Press, 2006).
- Willson, Scott, "Assad must go, Obama says", *Washington Post*, August 18, 2011, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/assad-must-go-obama-says/2011/08/18/gIQAelheOJ_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.8dc8a057593c
- Wolfgang, Ben, "Obama says 'red line' on Syria belongs to the World", *The Washington Times*, 4 September 2013, <https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/sep/4/obama-says-red-line-on-syria-belongs-to-the-world/>
- Yalçın, Hasan B., "Obama Stratejisi Ve Ortadoğu", *Akademik ORTA DOĞU*, Volume 9, No 2, 2015, 55-74.
- Yalçın, Hasan Basri, *Ulusal Güvenlik Stratejisi*, İstanbul: SETA Kitapları, 2017.

MILLET SYSTEM IS ALIVE: PATH-DEPENDENCY IN RULING DIVERSITY IN CYPRUS

Abstract

This article sees the roots of the identity politics in Cyprus in the historical legacy of the Ottoman millet system. It demonstrates that ethnic divisions in Cyprus have been (re)produced by the institutionalized political legacies going back to the Ottoman millet system. The system persists due to a number of institutionalist mechanisms from path dependency (historical institutionalism) to the elite incentives to continue the status quo (rational choice institutionalism) and the limits of cultural repertoire (sociological/cultural institutionalism). The change toward a different model of ruling diversity is not impossible, but extremely unlikely given the rational, cultural, and historical bases of the millet system-like designs in Cyprus. Hence, there still seems to be no alternative to the bi-communality of the island in negotiating for its future politics. Given the resistance of current institutional legacy in Cyprus, the change can only be possible with deeper exogenous shocks or a long chain of small steps that might take unpredictable length.

Key words: Cyprus, millet system, historical institutionalism, path dependency, ethnic politics.

Huseyin Alptekin

Dr., İstanbul Şehir
Üniversitesi Siyaset Bilimi
ve Uluslararası İlişkiler
Bölümü

Ortadoğu Etütleri

Volume 8 , No 2
December 2016
pp.26-43

“MİLLET SİSTEMİ YAŞIYOR: KIBRIS'TA FARKLILIKLARIN İDARESİNDE İZLEK BAĞIMLILIĞI”

Özet

Bu makale Kıbrıs adasında Osmanlı döneminden bugüne gözlemlenen kimlik politikalarını Osmanlı millet sisteminin bir mirası olarak görmektedir. Adadaki iki temel etnik grup olan Türk ve Rum nüfusları millet sistemi ile kurumsallaşmış ve yüzyıllar boyunca bu sistemin mirası üzerinde hayat bulmuştur. Bu mirası cari kılan temel üç mekanizmanın her üçü de kurumsal literatür içinde kalınarak açıklanabilir: tarihsel kurumsalcılığın izlek bağımlılığı kavramı, siyasi elitlerin statükoyu korumaya yönelik motivasyonları (rasyonel seçim kurumsalcılığı) ve kültürel repertuar (sosyolojik/kültürel kurumsalcılık). Bu şartlar altında başka bir modele geçiş imkansız olmasa da oldukça zor görünmektedir. Bu bakımdan geleceğe dair projeksiyonlar da millet sisteminin genel çerçevesi dışında düşünülemez. Herhangi bir değişiklik ise ancak iki şekilde mümkün olabilecektir: tarih boyunca yaşanmış kırılmalardan da daha derin bir harici şok yahut çok uzun bir dönem boyunca ısrarla aynı doğrultuda süregidecek olan değişim adımları.

Anahtar kelimeler: Kıbrıs, millet sistemi, tarihsel kurumsalcılık, izlek bağımlılığı, etnik siyaset.

يستمر النظام الملي: التزام المنهج في إدارة المجموعات المختلفة بقبرص الفحوى

إن هذه المقالة ترى بأن سياسات الهوية في جزيرة قبرص منذ عهد الدولة العثمانية وحتى يومنا هذا هي ميراث لنظام الملة (الشعب) العثماني. إن وجود العرقين الذان يمثلان المجموعتين العرقيتين الأساسيتين في الجزيرة ألا وهما العرقان التركي و اليوناني قد وجدا بشكل مؤسسي عبر نظام الملة العثماني (الشعب) وقد استمر هذا النظام في الوجود لمئات السنين بفضل العثمانيين. ويمكن شرح الآليات الثلاثة التي ضمنت استمرار هذا النظام عبر البقاء ضمن الأدب المؤسسي. مفهوم محور الارتباط المؤسسي التاريخي (مؤسسية الاختيار العقلاني) والتحفيزات المقدمة من النخب السياسية للمحافظة على المستوى أو المنحى و المرجع الثقافي (مؤسسية سوسولوجيا/ثقافية). وإنه على الرغم من أن الانتقال إلى نظام آخر تحت هذه الظروف ليس بالأمر المستحيل التحقق ولكنه سوف يكون صعبا للغاية. ولذا لا يمكن التفكير في التخطيط المستقبلي خارج النطاق العام لنظام الملة (الشعب)، وإن أي تغيير يمكن أن يتحقق فقط عبر شكلين فقط. صدمة خارجية تكون أقوى من الانكسارات التي تمت عبر التاريخ، أو خطوات تغييرية قابلة للاستمرار بشكل إصرار مستمر على مدى زمن طويل جدا.

الكلمات المفتاحية: قبرص، نظام الملة، المؤسسية التاريخية، الارتباط المحوري، السياسة العرقية.

Introduction

This article discusses the relationship between the institutional patterns of minority policies and minority formation as well as minority reproduction in Cyprus. It demonstrates that ethnic divisions in Cyprus have been (re)produced by the institutionalized political legacies going back to the Ottoman millet¹ system. Yet, at times, there seems to be an increasing gap between the popular demands and institutional provision. While cultural groups have increasing internal heterogeneity and diversifying demands, political institutions are unable to match these demands. This paper argues that this mismatch is a result of the political designs in Cyprus going back to the original millet system, which more or less has survived until today as the primary boundary maker in the island.²

The millet system is based on recognition of the diversity based on religious lines. By enforcing such a boundary marker, it sustains the identity differences based on religion while pushing cross-cutting communal cleavages to evaporate. The following political regimes since the Ottoman millet system up to today have kept this division as the primary boundary of the majority and minority in respective states. As a result of this process, the Cypriot political systems up to day have been resistant to the social forces pushing for greater or lesser diversity. The millet system and its ongoing legacy in the island prevented the two major identity groups of the island to be multiplied. Yet it, at the same time, prevented the assimilation of these broad identity groups into one.

Political legacies of governing diversity

Scholars of ethnic politics distinguish between different ways of governing ethno-cultural diversity. As put forward by Rogers Brubaker's seminal work,³ citizenship is matter of closure. It determines and enforces the rules of membership in the club and hence creates a bounded society under the

¹ Although the term 'millet' is used as the equivalent of 'nation' in contemporary Turkish, the term referred to religious divisions rather than ethno-linguistic divisions in the Ottoman era.

² This article is written based on the author's paper presented at APSA 2010 Conference. See, Hüseyin Alptekin. "Millet System is Alive: Path-dependency in Turkish and Cypriot Minority Incorporation Patterns", APSA 2010 Annual Meeting Paper, (2010).

³ Rogers Brubaker, *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany*, (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1992), pp. 21-25.

title of nation. In other words, citizenship draws the lines of exclusion and inclusion to draw the boundaries of political societies. For Brubaker, this occurs in two major ways in modern times: including those who are born in the homeland of the nation (*jus soli*) and including those who carry the blood of the nation (*jus sanguinis*). In Brubaker's distinction, both kinds of citizenship distinguish the citizens from non-citizens yet in reality, many citizenship regimes also categorize their very own citizens into different ethno-cultural groups. The millet system, in this regard, is one major historical case of ruling ethno-cultural diversity within the scope of citizenship. Needless to say, this citizenship model is not same as modern notions of citizenship but rather refers to a pre-modern membership style in the political society (the state). This proto-citizenship comes without the modern connotations of the term such as the universal rights and freedoms associated with modern citizenship.

The millet system takes individuals as embedded in cultural communities, in which culture is more or less equal to religion. It grants collective rights to such cultural communities. The political society in this formulation becomes the sum of such communities clearly separated from each other and each with its own hierarchical organization. For Parekh, the central political authority not only refrains from interfering with the internal affairs of religious communities but also "recognize and institutionalize their autonomy, enforce their customs and practices, and so on. Individuals are assumed to owe their primary loyalty to their respective communities, and derivatively and secondarily to the state."⁴ Amongst such cultural communities, one was the dominant community. As explained by Kurtaran,⁵ in the case of the Ottomans, Sunni Muslims, regardless of their ethnic origins, were the dominant community and, hence, had the right to rule the country. Christian and Jewish communities (*millets*), on the other hand, had religious freedoms and non-territorial self-government with respect to the intra-group affairs. The millet system was put into force following the capture of Istanbul by Sultan Mehmet II in 1453. The system was abolished with a series of reforms throughout the 19th century. Nevertheless, as will be discussed below, the system's legacy has lived for longer.

⁴ Bhikhu Parekh, *Rethinking Multiculturalism*, (New York: Palgrave, 2000), p. 200.

⁵ Uğur Kurtaran, "Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Millet Sistemi", *Kafkas Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi*, Vol. 1, No. 8 (2011).

The millet system incorporates minority communities as unitary and fixed blocs without paying attention to intra-group diversity or individual rights, which would be anachronistic to expect in such a pre-modern historical context. Accordingly, the Muslim and non-Muslim subjects of the Ottoman Empire were divided strictly. Yet, the millet system in the Ottoman Empire and, specifically, in Cyprus faced some severe problems as modern notions of citizenship flourished in the West. First, the millet system did not see an inherent value in diversity, but rather accepted it as an inevitable fact. In this sense, the reason why the state enabled different communities to survive was not their inherent value. Nevertheless, the lives and belongings of the members of different millets were sacred based on the Islamic law. Second, the millet system did not define diversity in the broader sense, but it rather defined it along a single spectrum: the religion. Third, this single spectrum did not aim to support and recognize intra-community diversity. Crosscutting cleavages and non-religious communities were mostly disregarded in the system. Finally, the millet system was not a system of equality but formed a hierarchy of communities, the Muslim millet being in control. As argued by Barkey and Gavrilis, one major function of the millet system was to ensure that the minorities could remain under the state control.⁶

From these aspects, the millet system is not a version of contemporary liberal multiculturalism or even modern consociationalism. While consociationalism follows the principles of millet system in many aspects, it often provides a more egalitarian relationship between the majority and minority groups. Hence, consociationalism resembles the millet system with all the conditions except for the last one: promoting strict authority hierarchies between communities. While consociationalism is put in force in deeply divided societies where there is some sort of balance of power, millet system is based on one superior group recognizing others' right to survival and even self-government to a certain extent. This being said, the millet system's emphasis on inter-communal hierarchies is not in full contradiction with contemporary consociationalism's assumed egalitarian design. Even in consociational forms of ruling diversity, one cannot see a fully egalitarian share of power or respect between communities. And in most egalitarian consociational systems, this can be possible only for the few major communities while the smal-

⁶ Karen Barkey and George Gavrilis, "The Ottoman Millet System: Non-territorial Autonomy and Its Contemporary Legacy." *Ethnopolitics* Vol. 15, No. 1 (2016).

ler or less salient ones do not benefit from the fruits of diversity.⁷ Following Chandra and Wilkinson's ethnic structure and ethnic practice distinction,⁸ one can claim that there will always be unrecognized minority communities in every society as their ethnic structure does not fully into visible and strong practices. In such cases, some cultural communities remain as latent communities mostly existing in the structural realm but not in ethnic practice. Such groups tend to remain unrecognized even in the consociational systems. Hence, even a textbook example of consociationalism like Lebanon will exclude some groups, which lack ethnic practice, as it becomes almost impossible to balance more than four communities, each having veto rights in certain levels.

Path-dependency of ruling diversity in Cyprus

The legacy of the Ottoman period in Cyprus did not rest in a common life based on shared social, judicial and moral processes or value. Nevertheless, the inter-communal relations were not antagonistic either. Hence, such a salience of bipolar identity structure, in fact, was not seen having a potential for violent conflict. "Centuries of Ottoman rule show that a relatively peaceful ethnic and religious cohabitation has been, in fact, the "normal" state of affairs, a status of *longue durée*."⁹

The order in the island was based on the distant yet peaceful coexistence of separate and segregated faith communities, even in the same villages with very limited interaction crosscutting the communal cleavages. It should be noted that this bi-communal design was not an outcome of nationalism or some sort of nationalist policies of the Ottoman Empire. The waves of nationalism reached Cyprus centuries after the capture of the island by the Ottomans in 1571. When the wave of nationalism reached the island, it found the bi-communal structure of the island given and was embraced in a way suiting to the existing communal lines. In accordance with Gellner's analysis,

⁷ For a discussion of consociationalism see Arend Lijphart, "Consociational Democracy", *World Politics*, Vol. 21 No. 2 (1969).

⁸ Kanchan Chandra and Steven Wilkinson, "Measuring the Effect of "Ethnicity"." *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol. 41. No. 4-5 (2008). Ethnic structure-practice distinction, which distinguishes between all the ethnic categories and the categories activated in different contexts. Accordingly, ethnic structure refers to the distributions of attributes (e.g., language, skin color) in a given population whereas ethnic practice refers to activation of one or more of these attributes by agents as the defining characteristic ethnic identity.

⁹ Irene Dietzel and Vasilios N. Makrides. "Ethno-Religious Coexistence and Plurality in Cyprus under British Rule (1878–1960)", *Social Compass*, Vol. 56, No. 1 (2009), p.70.

nationalism is a functional outcome of industrialization, which was not a visible process in Cyprus in much of the imperial age. As Cassia states,¹⁰ “neither religion nor ethnicity were major sources of conflict in a society composed of two ethnic groups” in Cyprus during the Ottoman rule. Following Cassia’s description of the Ottoman rule in Cyprus, one can reach to four legacies in the island. First, the Turks of the island were relatively small in number but they were also the ruling community in charge of the island. Second, the Greek Cypriot Orthodox Church emerged as a part of the Ottoman millet system in fulfilling two primary functions: collecting taxes and representing the Greek population of the island, not in a democratic sense but rather as playing an intermediary role between the Orthodox Greek public and the state apparatus. Third, the Church, as an outcome of this intermediary role and authority driven from this role, could own large monastic estates and carried out agrarian production for the European markets. Last but not least, Greeks and Turks emerged and have remained as the two major communities of the island as the former was connected to the European markets with business ties and the latter concentrated on land ownership and remained in charge of administrative matters of the island.¹¹

Thus, Muslim-Turkish and Orthodox-Greek identities in Cyprus have remained as the major communities of the island up until today. This distinction was enforced by legal regulations in the island under different rules from the Ottomans until the contemporary era. However, the durability of the identities has not stuck to single, one-dimensional patterns. While the borders have resisted change over the course of time, the nature of these two communities has passed through certain changes. Until recent periods, religious roots of the identities were more significant than ethnic-linguistic roots. Yet, the picture has started to change in the recent history with the process of secularization and increasing heterogeneity within the two communities of the island. Apart from the secular-religious divisions within each respective community, ideological cleavages have also emerged as the island has been modernizing. While some previously silent, invisible cultural groups have increasingly been mobilized, secular political movements also have

¹⁰ Paul Sant Cassia, “Religion, Politics and Ethnicity in Cyprus during the Turkokratia (1571–1878)”, *European Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 27, No. 1 (1986), p. 3.

¹¹ Cassia, “Religion, Politics and Ethnicity in Cyprus during the Turkokratia (1571–1878)”, pp. 5-6.

increasingly had differing attitudes. For instance, most recently, leftist and pro-integrationist Turkish Cypriots held different political views from what used to be the common stance of the Turkish community in the island. On the other hand, the role of the church has become a central question amongst the Orthodox Greek population of the island. Such intra-community political cleavages started to shake the traditional bi-communal stance, yet has remained far from changing the bi-communal status quo. Further, the migration patterns into the island also increased intra-communal differences especially in the Turkish Cypriot case. Yet again, the institutional designs of respective regimes have long resisted to this intra-communal diversification. In other words, the bi-communal institutional design formed a strong path dependency, which outlived even the states that kept them in force.

Such a strong path dependency cannot only be explained by the enforcing mechanisms of formal political institutions. Even exogenous shocks and critical junctures did not break this path as the island has been through multiple wars and crises over centuries. This is a phenomenon that needs explanation based on the findings of sociological and rational choice branches of institutionalism on top of historical institutionalism. Rational choice institutionalism can be fruitful in shedding light on the strategic context of the existing institutional design. This approach can shed light on how the existing elites of respective communities found the status-quo beneficial for their individual interests. From the perspective of rational choice institutionalism, the millet system-like designs sustained the equilibrium line for the communal elites.¹²

Sociological institutionalism, on the other hand, goes beyond the strategic context provision of institutional framework and sees institutions and their enforcement of the rules stemming from “a set of shared understandings that affect the way problems are perceived and solutions are sought.”¹³ The ongoing path dependency in bi-communal design, hence, cross-cut the major historical ruptures and could reach up to now with the support of institutions not only in the sense as formal rules but also as strategic context and quite informal ways as in providing a cultural repertoire facilitating the survival of the system over generations and across different rules.

¹² For the role of elites in the maintenance of status quo in Cyprus, see James H. Wolfe, “Cyprus: Federation Under International Safeguards”, *Publius: The Journal of Federalism*, Vol. 18, No. 2 (1988).

¹³ Kathleen Thelen, “Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics”, *Annual Review of Political Science*, Vol. 2, No.1 (1999), p. 371.

Enduring Identity Distinctions in Cyprus in the post-Ottoman era The British rule

The way diversity is ruled in accordance with the millet system continued in Cyprus in a different form during the British rule. "Village administrative councils were segregated and handled community affairs separately, with specially formed Joint Councils for the adjudication of matters common to both groups."¹⁴ For linguistic and religious reasons, the Greek and Turkish schools of Cyprus had been separate before the British rule and remained so during it.¹⁵ Eighty-two years of British rule from 1878 to 1960¹⁶ strictly followed the Ottoman way of communal segregation in managing diversity.

The Greek War of Independence (1821–1829) started the path toward "exclusive nationalism" as the Orthodox Church also embraced nationalism in the aftermath.¹⁷

The annexation of the island by the British in 1878 bolstered the demands of enosis (the ideal of unification with the mainland Greece) by Greek Cypriots. In the year of 1900, there were seven newspapers printed on the island and the newspapers were yearning for the motherland Greece. Even the name of the most liberal one of the seven was Enosis.¹⁸ Although the motherland relinquished *Megali Idea*¹⁹ for a while after the Minor Asian Catastrophe (1919-1922), Greek Cypriots lost nothing from their enthusiasm for enosis under the British administration.

The intensifying anti-colonial demands of the Greek population of the island and violent acts of EOKA (National Organization of Freedom Fighters, *Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agoniston*) targeting Turkish Cypriots alongside the British pushed the Turkish population closer to the British administration. The millet system had already divided the two societies of the island, but the increasing demands for enosis created a new phenomenon, antagonism, between the two societies. Turkish Cypriots developed their natio-

¹⁴ Vangelis Calotychoş, "Interdisciplinary Perspectives: Difference at the Heart of the Cyprus Identity and Its Study", Vangelis Calotychoş. "Cyprus and Its People" (Colorado: Westview Press, 1998), pp. 5-6.

¹⁵ Rebecca Bryant, "An Education in Honor", Vangelis Calotychoş. "Cyprus and Its People", (Colorado: Westview Press, 1998), p.56.

¹⁶ The British took over the administration in 1878 but eventual annexation did not happen until the breakout of the World War I in 1914.

¹⁷ Dietzel and Makrides, "Ethno-Religious Coexistence and Plurality in Cyprus under British Rule (1878–1960)", p. 80.

¹⁸ Necati Kızılyürek, *Milliyetçilik Kıskaçında Kıbrıs*. (İstanbul: İletişim, 2002), p.79.

¹⁹ *Megali Idea* means the Great Idea in Greek and refers to the aim of the uniting all Greeks.

nationalism as a defensive contra-nationalism against enosis demands and soon ended up with their own violent organization. The TMT (Turkish Defense Organization, *Türk Mukavemet Teşkilatı*) was formed to retaliate against the EOKA operations.

As the international circumstances change with the end of the World War II and start of the Cold War, the British Empire lost its grip in its overseas territories. As the British rule is losing its capacity, inter-communal violence and violent acts against British administration escalated. This process pushed Britain to accept to end its rule in the island. Nevertheless, it was too late for Greece to annex Cyprus as Turkey was now back in the game and taking part in the negotiations over the future of the island. Cyprus was recognized as a sovereign state by virtue of a constitution and three treaties, the Treaty of Guarantee, the Treaty of Alliance, and the Treaty of Establishment, all of which came into force on August 16, 1960.

“Drafted by the Greek and Turkish governments, and not by the Cypriot themselves, it [1960 constitution] contained in it provisions for segregation at all levels between the Greek and Turkish communities, thus making the constitution virtually unworkable”.²⁰ Nevertheless, the alternative scenario of majoritarian decision making would strip the Turkish Cypriots off their agency in determining the political future of the island. Hence, once again, Cyprus continued the bi-communal design of the millet system’s legacy.

Post-Independence developments: one state, two nations

The 1960 constitution has in fact a sui generis form when compared to the constitutions of different countries over the world. Its durability was guaranteed by the guarantor countries, namely Turkey, Greece and Britain according to the Treaty of Guarantee. These countries were equipped with authority to recognize and guarantee the independence, territorial integrity and security of the Republic of Cyprus.²¹ Moreover, the first subsection of the Article 182 of the Constitution did not allow any amendments of the Basic Articles, which were the products of inter-state negotiations of the guarantor

²⁰ John Zarocostas, “Cyprus”, Mohammed Ayoob, “Conflict and Intervention in the Third World”, (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1980).

²¹ Treaty of Guarantee Article 2.

states.²² For a change to be possible, the guarantor states had to agree on the change. The Basic Articles of the Constitution have both a national and international character because of the references from the constitution to Zurich, Guarantee, and Alliance Treaties and references from these treaties to the Constitution. Thus, the making, change, abolishment and implementation of Cypriot constitution were internationalized.²³

The Constitution did not emphasize a Cypriot nation or public, instead it particularly refers to the Greek and Turkish communities. While the Greek community comprised "all citizens of the Republic who are of Greek origin and whose mother tongue is Greek or who share the Greek cultural traditions or who are members of the Greek-Orthodox Church,"²⁴ the Turkish community comprised "all citizens of the Republic who are of Turkish origin and whose mother tongue is Turkish or who share the Turkish cultural traditions or who are Moslems."²⁵ In the third subsection of the Article 2, the remaining population of the Republic had individually been allowed to choose one of these communities to participate in.

The Communal Chambers were formed regarding the divided histories of the communities. The Chambers have both executive and legislative powers which are shared with the House of Representatives and Ministries. Thus, the Republic is compared to the federal states because of the fact that the real balance was between Community Chambers and the institutions at the center in a similar situation to the balance between the executive and legislative branches in federal states.²⁶ This federation was basically on a communal basis, but there were also some regional regulations in the Constitution such as the creation of separate municipalities for the Turkish inhabitants in the five largest towns of the Republic (Nicosia/Lefkosha, Limassol, Famagusta/Gazimagusa, Larnaca and Paphos).²⁷

²² The Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus, Article 182-1: "The Articles or parts of Articles of this Constitution set out in Annex III hereto which have been incorporated from the Zurich Agreement dated 11th February, 1959, are the basic Articles of this Constitution and cannot, in any way, be amended, whether by way of variation, addition or repeal."

²³ Kudret Özersay, *Kıbrıs Sorunu, Hukuksal Bir İnceleme*, (Ankara: ASAM Yayınları, 2002), p.56.

²⁴ The Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus, Article 2-1.

²⁵ The Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus, Article 2-2.

²⁶ Özersay, *Kıbrıs Sorunu, Hukuksal Bir İnceleme*, p.56.

²⁷ The Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus, Article 173-1 (the continuation of the separate municipalities would have been decided by the President and the Vice-President of the Republic within four years according to the same Article).

The political division in Cyprus was not just insular and it linked the divided communities to the 'motherlands', namely Turkey and Greece. Hence, the independence era was even closer to the Ottoman millet system as it once again connected the local populations of the islands to their millet centers in Greece and Turkey. According to the Constitution, the official languages were, naturally, Greek and Turkish.²⁸ Although the Republic had its own flag of neutral design and color, "the Communal authorities and institutions shall have the right to fly on holidays together with the flag of the Republic either the Greek or the Turkish flag at the same time".²⁹ "The Greek and the Turkish Communities shall have the right to celebrate respectively the Greek and the Turkish national holidays".³⁰ Moreover, each of the Greek or Turkish Communities had the right to receive subsidies from the Greek or the Turkish Government for institutions of education, culture, athletics and charity belonging to communities respectively.³¹ Also "where either the Greek or the Turkish Community considers that it has not the necessary number of schoolmasters, professors or clergymen for the functioning of its institutions, such Community shall have the right to obtain and employ such personnel to the extent strictly necessary to meet its needs as the Greek or the Turkish Government respectively may provide".³²

The political order built by the founding treaties and the constitution did not endure very long. While the violence was continuing in Cyprus, three guarantor states and two communities declared their demands at a conference in London. President Makarios proposed minority rights for Turks and the Turkish side claimed that the intercommunal violence (mostly stemming from EOKA's targeting of island's Turkish population) proved that the two communities should be physically separated. These opposing demands naturally could not meet on a middle ground and no agreement was reached in London.

²⁸ The Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus, Article 3-1.

²⁹ The Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus, Article 4-3.

³⁰ The Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus, Article 5.

³¹ The Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus, Article 108-1.

³² The Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus, Article 108-2.

1974 military operation: From enosis to taksim

On April 21, 1967 a group of colonels took over power in Greece and overthrew the elected government. As the junta intervened in Cypriot politics by sending a death squad after President Makarios and attempted to replace him with Samson, Turkey stepped in. The 1974 Turkish military operation following the coup in Cyprus changed the Cypriot politics dramatically. It created two de facto political authorities in the island for the first time in its history. The extent of communal self-government increased in an unprecedented way.

The Turkish Cypriots proclaimed the Turkish Federated State of Northern Cyprus in 1975 and Rauf Denktaş was elected President. In 1983, Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus was declared to the world (yet, has still not recognized by any country except for Turkey). Its main two differences from the Republic of Cyprus formed in 1960 were its secular character and nearly mono-ethnic demographic structure. It was designed as a democratic and secular republic according to its constitution of 1985.³³

The Citizenship Law which was accepted by the Republican Assembly of the TRNC during its session on May 21, 1993 enabled a migration flow from Turkey to island. Turkish Cypriots, thus, tried to compensate for their demographic disadvantage vis a vis the Greek Cypriot community.

“Persons who have made investment ... and have performed or likely to perform, extraordinary services in science, politics and cultural sectors; ... who have taken part in 1974 Peace Operation and their spouses and children; and the widows and children of those killed in the Peace Operation; ... who have rendered services after August 1, 1958 in the cadres of the Turkish Resistance Organization in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus”³⁴ shall become citizens of the TRNC without requiring the satisfaction of conditions such as residence or good conduct under previous paragraphs.

The Turkish Cypriot economy, after the division of the island, had problems despite the economic aids of Turkey. Turkish immigrants from Anatolia to the island created an intra-communal division in the island’s Turkish population: Anatolian rooted Turks and native Turkish Cypriots. Turkish

³³ The Constitution of TRNC, Article 1.

³⁴ The Citizenship Law of the TRNC, Article 9/1.

Cypriots began to underline their Cypriot identity to differentiate themselves from the immigrants from Anatolia.³⁵ The CTP (Republican Turkish Party, *Cumhuriyetçi Türk Partisi*), the first opposition party of Turkish Cypriots, which has existed in the political arena since 27 December 1970, became the voice of resentments against the immigrants.

While the intra-communal dissent was increasing particularly in the northern part of the island, Kofi Annan, the General Secretary of the UN, demanded a meeting of the sides in Cyprus without any preconditions in a report presented to the UNSC on June, 22, 1999. The United Nations Security Council drew up the general solution framework consisting of unique sovereignty, unique citizenship, and unique representation in the international arena in the decision of 1250 and invited the sides of the problem to start the negotiations in the decision of 1251. Although the Turkish side voted in favor of the Annan Plan in the referendum of 24 April 2004, the Greek side rejected it with 76 percent of votes and joined the European Union one month later.

With the failure of Annan's initiative and ongoing attempts since then, the two alternatives for a solution in the Cyprus problem are partition or a novel formula for reintegration. Reintegration has been tried but has had no success up to now. A unified and unitary state is not acceptable in any form by Turkish Cypriots and does not have an institutional predecessor in the island. A reintegration with a confederal structure is not accepted by Greek Cypriot political parties. Reintegration models on the basis of federalism keep failing. No matter which option is chosen, both sides still rely on the dualistic identity structure, which can easily be traced back to the millet system. It seems like the new regime of ruling diversity in Cyprus will have to comply with the legacy of the millet system in one way or another.

³⁵ Necati Kızılyürek, *Doğmamış Bir Devletin Tarihi, Birleşik Kıbrıs Cumhuriyeti*, (İstanbul: İletişim, 2002), p.20.

Theorizing continuity

Then, the question becomes how such a continuity could exist despite numerous critical junctures (e.g., devastating wars, coups, revolutions, boundary changes) experienced in Cyprus. This question requires an analysis of the institutional continuity both in terms of formal and informal institutions of bi-communal design. As outlined above in the discussion of path dependency, the rational choice institutionalism approach focuses more on the 'strategic' role of institutions than historical institutionalism's focus on path dependency and sociological institutionalism's stress on the internalization of institutions.³⁶ For rational choice institutionalism, institutions are accepted to be a strategic context of arrangements that allocate de jure political power,³⁷ games and equilibria of games,³⁸ and solution for collective action problems.³⁹ A clear demonstration of this approach could be seen in North's definition of institutions as "ex ante agreements over cooperation among politicians,"⁴⁰ which "facilitate exchange among bargaining parties" and "reduce uncertainty by creating a stable exchange structure". In other words, institutions are the "rules of the game of a society, or, more formally, are the humanly devised constraints that structure human interaction",⁴¹ and instrumental products serving for "the interests of maximizing the wealth or utility of principals."⁴²

Historical institutionalism and sociological institutionalism go one step further in assigning a constitutive role to institutions. Hence, such a synthesis does not only accommodate for the individual actors' commitment to the bi-communal design, but also stresses the bounded nature of change due to the boundedness of the political repertoire. This emphasis on path dependence can explain why such deep social structural changes in Cyprus did not

³⁶ According to the historical institutionalist approach, institutions shape not only strategies for given preferences, but also shape the preferences, interests, goals, and/or objectives, see Kathleen Thelen and Sven Steinmo, "Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Perspective", Kathleen Thelen and Sven Steinmo, "Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis", (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).

³⁷ Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson, *Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).

³⁸ Kenneth Shepsle, "Studying Institutions: Some Lessons from the Rational Choice Approach", *Journal of Theoretical Politics* Vol. 1, No. 2 (1989).

³⁹ James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, *The Calculus of Consent*. Vol. 3, (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1962); Mancur Olson, *Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic Growth*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982).

⁴⁰ Douglass C. North, "Institutions and a Transaction-Cost Theory of Exchange", James E. Alt and Kenneth Shepsle, "Perspectives on Positive Political Economy" (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1990), p.182.

⁴¹ Douglass C. North, "The New Institutional Economics and Third World Development", John Harris, Janet Hunter and Colin M. Lewis, "The New Institutional Economics and Third World Development", (London: Routledge, 2003), p. 54.

⁴² Douglass C. North, *Structure and Change in Economic History*, (New York: Norton, 1981), p. 202.

lead to rupture in the bi-communal design of the island politics. It also tells us why institutions remain sticky for long periods of time even though they operate inefficiently, for instance, due to the increasing intra-diversity within the communities. In a nutshell, political change is often bounded, because institutions do not only shape strategies as predicted by rational choice institutionalism, but also preferences. Those in charge of institutions resist change to protect the status-quo from which they drive their privileges. Further, as seen by rational choice institutionalists, political change occurs rare for it is thought to be costly given the uncertainty of alternatives.

Nevertheless, a fruitful analysis of institutional legacy of the millet system in Cyprus needs more than rational calculations of the involved actors vis a vis the incentives and constraints they face. As often argued by the institutionalist school, change never occurs from scratch but is often bounded. Even the deep ruptures and replaced regimes can leave their legacies behind. Cyprus could keep the institutional legacy of the millet system despite devastating wars, coups, and sharp regime changes throughout its history.

Concluding Remarks

Cyprus has long relied on the legacy of the Ottoman millet system in its dealing with diversity. Its sticky and resilient institutional design relying on and enforcing bi-communality (Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots) may not be the best possible regime. It might even be producing a number of inefficiencies in the political and economic landscape of the island. It might also be too slow to respond to a number of popular demands. Nevertheless, the institutional legacy of the Ottoman millet system could overcome all these problems and persist until today in one way or another.

This article saw the roots of the minority policies in Cyprus in the historical legacy of the millet system. The change toward a different model of ruling diversity is not impossible, but extremely unlikely given the rational, cultural, and historical bases of the millet system-like designs in Cyprus. Hence, there still seems to be no alternative to the bi-communality of the island in negotiating for its future politics. Given the resistance of current institutional legacy in Cyprus, the change can only be possible with deeper exogenous shocks or a long chain of small steps that might take unpredictable length.

Select Bibliography

- Acemoğlu, Daron and James Robinson, *Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
- Alptekin, Hüseyin, "Millet System is Alive: Path-dependency in Turkish and Cypriot Minority Incorporation Patterns", APSA 2010 Annual Meeting Paper, (2010).
- Basis for a Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Problem, revised version of Annan Plan, (2003), <2003http://www.tcea.org.uk/Documents/Annan26022003.doc>
- Brubaker, Rogers, *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany*, (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1992).
- Bryant, Rebecca, "An Education in Honor", Vangelis Calotychos, "Cyprus and Its People", (Colorado: Westview Press, 1998), pp. 53-69.
- Buchanan, James M. and Gordon Tullock, *The Calculus of Consent. Vol. 3*, (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1962).
- Cassia, Paul Sant, "Religion, Politics and Ethnicity in Cyprus during the Turkokratia (1571–1878)", *European Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 27, No. 1 (1986), pp. 3-28.
- Calotychos, Vangelis, "Interdisciplinary Perspectives: Difference at the Heart of the Cyprus Identity and Its Study", Vangelis Calotychos. "Cyprus and Its People" (Colorado: Westview Press, 1998), pp. 1-32.
- Chandra, Kanchan, and Steven Wilkinson, "Measuring the Effect of Ethnicity", *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol. 41. No. 4-5 (2008), pp. 515-563.
- Citizenship Law of the Republic of Cyprus, (1993), <http://www.uniset.ca/naty/trnc_en.htm>
- Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus, (1960), <http://www.cyprus.gov.cy/cyphome/govhome.nsf>
- Constitution of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, (1985), <http://www.cm.gov.nc.tr/servet/cons/consin.htm>
- Cyprus Treaty of Alliance, (1960), <http://www.cypnet.com/ncyprus/history/repulic/try-alliance.html>
- Cyprus Treaty of Guarantee, (1960), <http://www.cypnet.com/ncyprus/history/repulic/try-guarantee.html>
- Dietzel, Irene and Vasilios N. Makrides, "Ethno-Religious Coexistence and Plurality in Cyprus under British Rule (1878–1960)", *Social Compass*, Vol. 56, No. 1 (2009), pp. 69-83.
- Kenanoğlu, Macit, *Osmanlı Millet Sistemi*, (İstanbul: Klasik, 2004).
- Kızılyürek, Necati, *Milliyetçilik Kıskaçında Kıbrıs*, (İstanbul: İletişim, 2002).
- _____, *Doğmamış Bir Devletin Tarihi, Birleşik Kıbrıs Cumhuriyeti*, (İstanbul: İletişim, 2005).

- Kurtaran, Uğur, "Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Millet Sistemi", *Kafkas Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitü Dergisi*, Vol. 1, No. 8 (2011), pp. 57-71.
- Lijphart, Arend, "Consociational Democracy", *World Politics*, Vol. 21 No. 2 (1969): 207-225.
- North, Douglass C., "The New Institutional Economics and Third World Development", John Harris, Janet Hunter and Colin M. Lewis, "The New Institutional Economics and Third World Development", (London: Routledge, 1995), pp. 17-26.
- _____, "Institutions and a Transaction-Cost Theory of Exchange", James E. Alt and Kenneth Shepsle, "Perspectives on Positive Political Economy" (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1990), pp.182-194.
- _____, *Structure and Change in Economic History*, (New York: Norton, 1981).
- Olson, Mancur, *Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic Growth*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982).
- Özersay, Kudret, *Kıbrıs Sorunu, Hukuksal Bir İnceleme*, (Ankara: ASAM Yayınları, 2002).
- Parekh, Bhikhu, *Rethinking Multiculturalism*, (New York: Palgrave, 2000).
- Shepsle, Kenneth, "Studying Institutions: Some Lessons from the Rational Choice Approach", *Journal of Theoretical Politics*, Vol. 1, No. 2 (1989), pp. 131-147.
- Thelen, Kathleen, "Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics", *Annual Review of Political Science*, Vol. 2, No.1 (1999), pp. 369-404.
- Thelen, Kathleen and Sven Steinmo, "Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Perspective", Kathleen Thelen and Sven Steinmo, "Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis", (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 1-32.
- Treaty of Establishment of the Republic of Cyprus, (1960), <<http://www.cypnet.com/.ncyprus/history/republic/try-establishment.html>>
- Wolfe, James H., "Cyprus: Federation Under International Safeguards", *Publius: The Journal of Federalism*, Vol. 18, No. 2 (1988), pp. 75-89.
- Zarocostas, John, "Cyprus", Mohammed Ayoob, "Conflict and Intervention in the Third World", (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1980), pp. 107-135.

IRANIAN STRATEGIC CULTURE

Abstract

Strategic culture can explain foreign policy option of a country when realist theory cannot give meaning to why that country acted in a particular way. Iranian strategic culture is, in general, assumed to be understood by focusing on Shi'ism. However, this paper shows that Shi'ism is instrumentally used by the Iranian regime. Iran by taking into account the geographical and political factors acts along its national interests. Religion is useful for the regime in order to gather the support of the people and legitimizing the chosen policy option. The paper will analyze this by looking deeply into the literature on strategic culture, foreign policy-making procedures in Iran and specific foreign policy decisions since the revolution in 1979.

Keywords: strategic culture, Shi'ism, Iran, foreign policy

Ayşe İrem Aycan

Özer

Doktora Öğrencisi, Boğaziçi
Üniversitesi Uluslararası
İlişkiler Bölümü.

Ortadoğu Etütleri

Volume 8 , No 2
December 2016
pp. 44-67

İRAN STRATEJİK KÜLTÜRÜ

Özet

Stratejik kültür, realist teori bir ülkenin niçin belirli bir şekilde hareket ettiğini açıklayamadığı durumlarda o ülkenin dış politika kararlarına anlam vermek için kullanılabilir. İran'ın stratejik kültürünün, genel olarak Şiilik üzerinden anlaşılabilir olduğu düşünülmektedir. Ancak, bu makale Şiilik'in İran rejimi tarafından araçsal olarak kullanıldığını göstermektedir. İran, coğrafi ve politik faktörleri dikkate alarak ulusal çıkarları doğrultusunda hareket etmektedir. Din ise, halk desteğini toplamak ve politika tercihlerini meşru- laştırmak amacıyla rejim tarafından kullanılmaktadır. Bu makale, 1979'daki devrimden bu yana, İran'daki dış politika karar alma prosedürlerini ve belirli dış politika kararlarını inceleyerek İran'ın stratejik kültürünü derinlemesine analiz edecektir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Stratejik kültür, Şiilik, İran, Dış Politika

الثقافة الاستراتيجية للإيران المختصر

يمكن استخدام الثقافة الاستراتيجية من أجل إطفاء المعني على تصرفات البلد في السياسات الخارجية في الأحوال التي لا يمكن للنظريات الواقعية تفسير سبب قيام البلد بالتصرف وفق شكل معين في موضوع ما. ويعتقد بأن الثقافة الاستراتيجية لجمهورية إيران يمكن فهمها من على المذهب الشيعي بشكل عام. ولكن هذا البحث يوضح لنا بأن المذهب الشيعي يتم استخدامه من قبل الجمهورية الإيرانية على أنه وسيلة. إن إيران تتحرك وفق مصالحها القومية مع الأخذ بعين الاعتبار العوامل الجغرافية والسياسية. أما الدين فإنه يتم استخدامه من أجل حشد دعم الشعب وكسب المشروعية للخيارات السياسية. إن هذه المقالة تقوم على التدقيق في نظام اتخاذ القرارات في السياسة الخارجية للجمهورية الإيرانية وبعض القرارات المتخذة في السياسة الخارجية منذ تاريخ الثورة في عام 1979 لتقوم بدراسة الثقافة الاستراتيجية للجمهورية الإيرانية بعمق.

الكلمات المفتاحية: الثقافة الاستراتيجية، المذهب الشيعي، إيران، السياسة الخارجية

Introduction

This paper makes comprehensive research of strategic culture, which takes as its starting point the derivation of the term and continues with how different generations of strategic culture understood and used the concept. When realist reasoning fails to make sense of state behavior, strategic culture offers an alternative explanation with its focus on the role of physical-political geography on a country's culture of security. While providing a thorough discussion on the first, second and third generation of scholars studying strategic culture, I will express my own opinions about their critiques and also review the strategic culture of Iran in particular. Later, I will discuss the impact of geographical, political, and religious factors on Iranian strategic culture.

The general assumption both in political and academic circles that see Iran as motivated by Shiite Islam is not enough to explain why Iran is supporting Sunni groups like Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Hamas. It also cannot explain how Iran can act along with Russia in the Syrian conflict if it is solely motivated by Shiism. In this research paper, this will be the problem I am going to deal with. My main research question is to what extent Iranian foreign policy is shaped by the strategic culture where Shiism occupies a central position. I will argue that Iran's state ideology is primarily influenced by Shiism, secondly by the political isolation of Iran by the world and also in the region which brings it closer to Russia and the Syrian regime. This, as a result, forms its strategic culture which manifests itself in Iran's strategy of arming and sending Shiite foreign warriors to fight wars that will benefit Iranian interests in the Middle East. This strategy is not merely motivated by Shiism but equally importantly by lack of allies in its region. In this paper, I will argue that Iranian strategic culture owes its existence to all these pressing geographical, and political factors on top of religious factors. The period I will be looking at starts with the Iranian revolution which is a critical juncture in Iran's vision of the world and its approach to national security. It ends in recent times in order to take a closer look at Iranian strategic culture in the Syrian civil war.

Academically and security-wise this topic is significant since Iran, on the one hand, is center of attention in the world politics as was the Soviets during the Cold War which led to the emergence of the concept of strategic culture in the first place. On the other hand, its geographical proximity to Turkey makes its strategic culture important for Turkey's security and interests in the region.

In order to learn more about Iranian strategic culture, I am going to look at the literature specific to Iran and conduct semi-structured interviews with experts.

Literature Review on Strategic Culture

In the US, the Foreign Morale Analysis Division of the Office of War during World War II invested in cultural anthropologists to work on the national character of Germany and Japan.¹ Later during the Cold War, scholars started to take an interest in the effect of culture on national security policies. First, Sidney Verba and Gabriel Almond introduced the term political culture into scholarly discussions in the 1960s.² It was used to explain state behavior as systemic approaches seemed insufficient. Other than the international environment, identities, beliefs, values, and norms of society had an impact on the political system. However, this was neglected by the realist theory. While the discussions were going on, so was the Cold War struggle. Snyder prepared a report for Deputy Chief of Staff Research and Development Department in which he brought together concepts of security policies and culture and coined the term strategic culture in 1977 in order to interpret the Soviet military strategy.³ The search for an alternative approach to Soviet military strategy stemmed from the impossibility of reconciling Kremlin's way of thinking and acting with that of rational choice theory.⁴

The term has been in use for quite some time. However, there is still heated debate over its definition and its potential to explain state actions among different generations of strategic culture. When Jack L. Snyder used his framework, he pointed out that nuclear doctrines of the US and Soviets differed depending on different cultural contexts of each side, which were shaped by their unique historical, political and organizational settings.⁵ His concept of strategic culture means, "the sum total of ideas, conditioned emotional responses, and patterns of habitual behavior that members of a national strategic community have acquired through instruction or imitation and share with each other with regard to nuclear strategy."⁶ As can be seen, by the cul-

¹ Michael C. Desch, "Culture Clash: Assessing the Importance of Ideas in Security Studies", *International Security*, Vol.23 No.1, (1998), pp. 144-145.

² Jeffrey, Lantis, "Strategic Culture and National Security Policy", *International Studies Review*, Vol.4, No.3, (2002), p. 90.

³ Lantis, p. 93.

⁴ Lawrence Sondhaus, *Strategic Culture and Ways of War*. (Routledge, 2006), pp. 1-3.

⁵ Lantis, p. 94.

⁶ Jack Snyder, *Soviet Strategic Culture: Implication for Limited Nuclear Operations*. Santa Monica, CA, Rand R-2154-AF, (Rand Corporation, 1977), p. 8.

ture he refers to the areas that are concerned with strategy, not to culture in its broader sense. This perceptual lens of strategic culture shows that Soviets' adoption of an offensive, preemptive use of force was due to its history of insecurity, which made it take a unilateral approach to damage limitations.⁷ In contrast, Americans opted for a cooperative and defensive approach.⁸ Gray in his evaluation of two countries concluded that Americans belong to a monochronic culture that views things simply while Soviets belong to a polychronic culture that sees the complexity and interconnectedness of everything.⁹ Not being cognizant of this dichotomy, the US looked at the Soviets as if it was a similar unit, and ignored its national styles of strategy. Their realism hence comes short of seeing the difference between the American and Soviet ways of thinking and acting, since for them the states are like units acting in the same international structure which is the basic realist approach to state action in the anarchic, international environment.

The question that American strategists had in mind was would the Soviets respect the rules of the game, if two sides agreed on limited nuclear conflict.¹⁰ According to Snyder, Soviet statesmen and strategists are not culture-free game theorists and even if they were, game theory does not provide the best solution to the problems of complex nature.¹¹ Hence, Snyder suggests that so as to answer such a question we should not see Soviet leaders as mere players of the Red team "but as bureaucrats and politicians who have been socialized into a strategic culture that is in many ways unique and who have exhibited distinctive stylistic predispositions in their past crisis behavior."¹²

Since the Soviet regime was a closed system, which had no free press and no bureaucrats who would publicly exclaim their private thoughts, neither words nor deeds would have given the true intention of the Soviets.¹³ The American strategy was developed by civilian intellectuals whereas the Soviet strategy was developed by professional military officers who are predisposed to think in terms of military effectiveness.¹⁴ Having civilian strategists was not something historically established in the Soviet example, but it was

⁷ Lantis, p. 94; Snyder p. 2.

⁸ Snyder, p. iii.

⁹ Colin S. Gray, "Strategic culture as context: the first generation of theory strikes back", *Review of International Studies*, Vol.25, No.1, (1999), p.67.

¹⁰ Snyder, p. 2.

¹¹ Snyder, pp.4-6.

¹² Snyder, p. 2.

¹³ Snyder, p. 5.

¹⁴ Snyder, pp. 6-7.

for Americans. So there is no convincing rationale to think of Soviet strategic thought in isolation from military effectiveness and war-fighting as they did not acknowledge the idea of mutually assured destruction as did the Americans.¹⁵ The position taken by countries cannot be understood without paying attention to the lessons they draw from historical experiences, which in return propel them into “a process of strategic enculturation.”¹⁶

By identifying these historical and organizational factors, the strategic culture approach attempts to explain the origins and continuing vitality of attitudes and behavior that might otherwise seem to American observer inscrutable, wrong-headed, or peculiar.¹⁷

Similarly, according to Ken Booth, it was not possible to isolate ideas and values that are shaped by one’s cultural conditioning about which he warns the strategists.¹⁸ By pointing out the historical differences between the US and USSR, the fallacy Snyder draws our attention to was the assumption that there is only one type of universal strategic rationality that is adopted by each state in every situation. For Snyder “culture is a residual” concept that can explain outcomes unless there is no concrete way to make sense of the action.¹⁹ Epiphenomenal strategic culture, if we are to use the classification of John Glenn, does challenge the ahistorical and acultural assumptions of realism.²⁰ For this reason, Snyder’s report suggests that since realism cannot explain Soviet behavior towards nuclear strategy, it can be better understood by observing that it is “favorably inclined towards unilateral damage limitation strategies than towards cooperative one.”²¹ Hence, he warns American policymakers to not to rest assured that the Soviets would follow American formulated rules which predicted mutual restraint on nuclear arms race.²²

After Snyder’s strategic culture was studied by scholars such as Colin Gray, and David Jones who are placed into the category of the first generation by Alastair Iain Johnston, they continued the legacy of Snyder by looking at the Soviet strategic way of thinking, which owes its difference to variation in macro-environmental variables.²³ According to Jones, the Soviet strategy

¹⁵ Alastair Iain, Johnston, “Thinking about Strategic Culture”, *International Security*, Vol.19, No.4, (1995), p. 36.

¹⁶ Gray, p. 60.

¹⁷ Snyder, p. v.

¹⁸ Ken Booth, *Strategy and Ethnocentrism*, (Routledge Revivals, 1979), p. 16; Sondhaus, p. 3.

¹⁹ Snyder, p. 4.

²⁰ John Glenn, “Realism versus Strategic Culture: Competition and Collaboration?” *International Studies Review*, Vol. 11, No. 3, (2009), p. 533.

²¹ Snyder, p. v.

²² Snyder, p. v.

²³ Johnston, p. 36.

is molded by two constants: one of them is relatively new, and it is the dogmatism of Marxist-Leninist ideology. The second one is the deeply rooted multinational empire which shall not go unnoticed because even though the Soviets are new compared to the long-lived Russian Czarist Empire, its strategic/military culture continues to be influenced by its past.²⁴ Even though both are representative of the first generation, Gray and Jones have differences of opinion. Jones claims that the search of strategic culture in a country's peculiar history is defying the "ethnocentric limitations" of analysts trying to figure out the Soviet way of thinking.²⁵ However, Gray maintains that as developing strategy requires working on human beings, cultural reductionism and ethnocentrism are inevitable.²⁶ Both of them have a point, but if a culture has so important of an impact on the actions of a state, one should not avoid calculating it when forming a counter strategy.

Whereas Gray and Jones are the first generations, Johnston is mistaken when assuming that they continue the legacy of Snyder because in certain ways they differ in their approach to strategic culture. Snyder as a strategist who was writing in the heydays of the Cold War was more restricted by the perceptions and expectations of his country's administration. Moreover, the time and the iron curtain might have prevented him from seeing the full picture of the strategic culture of the Soviets. When Jones is looking at the Soviet strategic culture, he looks far back in history without being limited by the 20th-century experiences of Russians as opposed to Snyder. Although accepting that strategic culture can change, Gray acknowledges that this change is slow hence looking at the recent history alone is insufficient.²⁷ Therefore, the contribution of the first generation to the general study of strategic culture is broader and more exhaustive than that of Snyder.

On the other hand, Gray's interpretation of strategic culture and Johnston's definition started a debate between the two in the literature. On the idea of how culture shapes actions Gray and Johnston held different views. According to Gray culture is not only composed of ideas and traditions but it also tells something about preferred modes of operation.²⁸ He underlines that culture is a combination of ideas and behavior. On the contrary, Johnston sees

²⁴ David R. Jones, *Soviet Strategic Culture*. In *Strategic Power: USA/USSR*, (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1990), p. 35.

²⁵ *ibid.*

²⁶ Gray, p. 60.

²⁷ Gray, p. 52.

²⁸ Gray, p. 51.

culture and behavior as separate entities. For him “culture consists of shared assumptions and decision rules that impose a degree of order on individual and group conceptions of their relationship to their social, organizational or political environment.”²⁹ Johnston presents culture as “ideational milieu which limits behavioral choices.”³⁰ Gray criticizes Johnston for isolating cultural and behavioral patterns, for the sake of studying the effect of former on the latter.³¹ So the problem and the rift between them stem from their understanding of culture, what they include into and exclude from the definition of it. Johnston’s interpretation of culture causes him to misunderstand and misrepresent the nature of the subject. He claims that strategic culture may exist as context but may not turn into behavior.³² But the problem with this identification is that if culture may not cause any measurable behavior as he claims, how do we know about it? Even when the culture is being rhetorically used to justify the means by political elites, it carries weight with it. It might lead to policy outcomes that can be empirically observed or stay at the discursive level and point to what is aimed by the politicians.

Apart from the first generation, Johnston introduced the second generation of strategic culture that concentrates on the rhetorical usage of culture. He said that theirs is an ambiguous instrumentality because the real reason why leaders do something and the justification they present for their actions are different.³³ For instance, Bradley Klein says that strategic culture is being used to gain political hegemony by creating a popular reason to use violence.³⁴ It means that there is an ideal reason put forth by the political elites to make it acceptable for their political opponents whereas the other side of the coin depicts the real picture that serves the political interests of those elites. So according to Klein’s understanding strategic culture is more than the military style of the particular state. It is ways in which a state constructs the image of the enemy in a way to legitimize its use of power against it. Snyder, in his *Myths of the Empire* highlights how state bureaucracies use the security myth through expansion to justify their policies.³⁵ This is done

²⁹ Johnston, p. 45

³⁰ Johnston, p. 46.

³¹ Gray, p. 53.

³² Johnston, p. 55.

³³ Johnston, p. 39

³⁴ Bradley S. Klein, “Hegemony and Strategic Culture: American Power Projection and Alliance Defence Politics”, *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 14, No. 2, (1988), pp: 136-140.

³⁵ Jack Snyder, *Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition*, (Cornell University Press, 1991), pp: 1-2-41-58.

to convince the population and sometimes the international public. Snyder calls it traditional explanations for overexpansion, which corresponds in a way to the “ambiguous instrumentality” of Johnston.³⁶ Snyder goes on to say, “In fact, statesmen pick and choose among the available lessons of history until they find one that fits the strategy that they want, for other reasons, to adopt.”³⁷ So it is searched for justifying the operational strategy in foreign policy. Security literature has abundant resources that make clear references to the role of political elites and interests groups who use their power to manipulate the political and social conditions in a way to make them serve their interests.³⁸ When Glenn mentions this group, he states that their emphasis is on the contingent use of strategic culture by “interpreting historical events, national symbols, key strategists, national myths, etc. for instrumental ends according to the situation they find themselves in.”³⁹

One of the biggest traps of studying strategic culture would be assuming that it takes over realist theories. Johnston criticizes the first generation of strategic culture on the grounds that they believe strategic culture leads to a particular state behavior.⁴⁰ He claims that security communities have several strategic cultures, which can be even contradictory but the first generation does not see that.⁴¹ That is why he labels them mechanical determinists. However, Gray does not look for an overly deterministic strategic culture that sideline alternative explanations. He says that strategic culture is only “useful when one does not ask too much of it.”⁴² Colin Dueck similarly highlights that culture should not be taken as a substitute for but rather as a supplement to realist theories of strategic choice.⁴³ Desch underlines the role of culture in the same way prior to Dueck by stating:

I argue that when cultural theories are assessed using evidence from the real world, there is no reason to think that they will relegate realist theories

³⁶ Snyder, p. 2.

³⁷ Snyder, p. 14.

³⁸ As these arguments are not directly revolving around the strategic culture, it would be whole new discussion to start them in this paper. But to see relevant debates regarding military-industry complex, ruling classes, elites, and lobbies and how they affect the military strategy of a country see: United Nation Group of Consultant Experts, Economic and Social Consequences of the Arms Race, In Thee, Marek (ed.), Armaments, Arms Control, and Disarmament: a Unesco Reader for Disarmament Education, (Paris: Unesco Press, 1981) pp. 40-57; Ali L. Karosmanoğlu, & Mustafa Kibaroğlu, Post-Cold War Defense Reform: Lessons Learned in Europe and the United States. East West Institute, Brassey's, (New York; 2003); P. W. Singer, Corporate Warriors: The rise of the privatized military industry, (Cornell University Press, 2007); J. Paul Dunne, Military Keynesianism: An Assessment, Peace Economics and Peace Science, (2011).

³⁹ Glenn, p. 537.

⁴⁰ Johnston, p. 37.

⁴¹ Johnston, p. 38.

⁴² Gray, p. 57.

⁴³ Glenn, p. 526.

to the dustbin of social science history. The best that can be made for these new cultural theories is that they are sometimes useful as a supplement to realist theories.⁴⁴

Johnston's obsession with classifying different generations seems to push him to look for differences that would set this generation apart from the rest. However, on the side of the scholars who study strategic culture, I do not see any attempt to relegate or negate realist explanations. On the contrary, their efforts to find a place for strategic culture in security studies were valuable and got there right on time, when realist logic remained incapable of making sense of the states' behavior. Corresponding to the time of the inter-paradigm debate of the 70's it was seen that what cannot be explained by one paradigm can find meaning under another.⁴⁵ Hence, the place of strategic culture in security studies is significant as it contributed to new synthesis and shook the monopoly of realist-liberal ideas in the field of international relations.

Even though Johnston is wrongfully critical of the first two generations in the way that he and others in his generation handle the strategic culture, they differ from the first two generations. He claims that by excluding behavior as an element from the culture, they keep clear of the tautological traps of the first generation.⁴⁶ Also, the cultural values they are concerned about do not date back to old times on the contrary to what the second generation argues; instead they are rooted in recent experience. By doing so, Johnston tries to rescue culture from its traditional status.⁴⁷ Elizabeth Kier adds that political-military culture depends on the changes in domestic political context and states will adjust their military response accordingly.⁴⁸ As claimed by this group culture either provides policy-makers with a restrained set of options, or it acts like opticals that modify the appearance and viability of alternatives.⁴⁹ A considerable amount of the work on strategic culture is deterministic Johnston says, because the researcher takes a specific set of assumptions and goes back in time to find similar ones.⁵⁰ As a result, the researcher concludes that he found a strategic culture. At this point, intervenes by saying there

⁴⁴ Desch, p. 141.

⁴⁵ Ole Wæver, "The Rise and Fall of the Inter-Paradigm Debate." *International Theory: Positivism and Beyond*, (1996), p. 150.

⁴⁶ Johnston, p. 41.

⁴⁷ Johnston, p. 44.

⁴⁸ Elizabeth Kier, *Culture and Military Doctrine: France between the Wars*. *International Security*, Vol. 19, No. 4, (1995), p. 93.

⁴⁹ Johnston, p. 42.

⁵⁰ Johnston, p. 50.

were some other historical strategic assumptions, where did they go?⁵¹ Why are we not seeing a continuity with them? There are two answers we can give to these questions. The first is, strategic culture changes over time by adding new things to its baggage through new experiences but this change is gradual, not rapid. The second is, strategic culture is not the one and only explanation for a state's actions. On the contrary just as it is emphasized by Snyder, Gray, Desch, Dueck, and Basrur, it only contributes to realist theories by filling the void existence of which cannot be explained by realists.

Ideas about war and strategy are deeply influenced by the physical and geographical environment one is placed in and molded. Because this environment shapes the culture and culture in return gives context to act within. Historical and geographic conditions determine in a peculiar way what a nation or a security community has to face when trying to sustain its security.⁵² A good example of thinking is US Navy Officer General Mahan. He was a citizen of a country located between two oceans and a general in the navy who was educated to prioritize naval power. He might be thinking realistically, but the parameters he is thinking within are drawn by naval dimensions and the unique historical experiences his country had gone through. According to him greater the naval power, greater the worldwide impact of a country would be. A general of a land-locked country would not think so. His view also reflected the logic of Britain, a country, which had done everything in its power to protect its colonies overseas. Having geographical ease of accessing waterways and also the physical power to send its navy to long distances coupled with fulfilling its "obligation" to India, the jewel of the crown, contributed the British strategic culture. Russian strategic culture would not be comparable to the British one for instance as Britain is an island while Russia is surrounded more by land than by sea, and Britain mastered in naval power while Russia's priority was land forces. The very reason why Napoleon had to retreat from Moscow as Russians burnt down the city should be searched for in Russian strategy and culture versus those of Napoleon armies which could not foresee what was going to happen. So "the idea of war, interference, and strategy are influenced by physical and political geography."⁵³

⁵¹ *ibid.*

⁵² Jones, p. 35; Gray, p. 51

⁵³ Gray, p. 58.

Research Design

Methodology

My study relied on the literature related to first, second, and third generations of strategic culture and Iranian foreign policy. By doing so, I assessed the role of the strategic culture in Iranian foreign policy, and what are the variables that shaped Iran's strategic culture. In order to understand it, I analyzed alternative explanations that try to give meaning to Iranian foreign policy decisions. Since Iranian strategic culture literature diverges from the general literature due to its peculiar characteristics such as Iran's religion itself,⁵⁴ Shi'ite Islam,⁵⁵ and Persian civilization⁵⁶ that bolster national cultural superiority I will be analyzing the role of these variables on Iran's strategic culture.

The research method of this paper will be process-tracing. As Jack Goldstone had suggested process-tracing is a useful method in explaining "macrohistorical phenomena."⁵⁷ Since strategic culture is macrohistorical too that tries to figure out long-term trends and patterns in Iran's approach to its national security, process-tracing will be a helpful method in understanding the Iranian strategic culture. My unit of analysis will be both the state and individual leaders whose understanding and interpretations will be influencing the policies which are determined by strategic culture. I will be analyzing Iran's foreign policy to assess its strategic culture. So as to check my arguments, I will use semi-structured interviews as a secondary source of information which I have conducted with the three academics, a researcher, and a journalist working on the related subjects of security, the Middle East, and foreign policy. Hence, it will be qualitative research.⁵⁸

⁵⁴ Anthony C. Cain, *Iran's Strategic Culture and Weapons of Mass Destruction*. (Maxwell Paper, 2002).

⁵⁵ Cain; Gregory F. Giles, *The crucible of radical Islam: Iran's leaders and strategic culture*. Know Thy Enemy: Profiles of Adversary Leaders and Their Strategic Cultures, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: USAF Counterproliferation Center, (2003); Kamran Taremi, *Iranian Strategic Culture: The Impact of Ayatollah Khomeini's Interpretation of Shiite Islam*. Contemporary Security Policy, Vol. 35, No. 1, (2014).

⁵⁶ Giles; Lantis.

⁵⁷ Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, "Process Tracing and Historical Explanation." *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*, (MIT Press, 2005), p. 206.

⁵⁸ All interview transcripts are provided in the Appendix. Some of the interview questions were prepared beforehand to set the parameters within which the conversation will take place. Others were added during the interviews as the answers or comments of the interviewee required further explanations. Hence, semi-structured interviews freed this research from the limitations of fixating questions. I also rarely did skip some questions during the interviews as the earlier answers of the interviewee clearly indicated the answer to that following question. During the interviews, I preferred not to use voice recorder but took notes, extended and organized them later. There are also disadvantages of relying on interviews as a method. It is hard to convince people into talking and especially into sparing time for doing an hour-long interview. It is specifically the case when you want to resort to the knowledge of informed people who are generally really busy. It also takes time to prepare a good set of questions and review them with an advisor in order to prevent asking leading questions. I took the verbal consent to use the information provided during the interview. In terms of the ethical concerns in my design, I prefer not to use the names of my interviewees in order to provide their confidentiality.

Conceptualization

Lantis, Gray, Desch, Kier, Johnston and many others acknowledge the different effect of culture in leading to use force among different states situated in the same international system. However, Lantis' quotation from Rosen combined with Gray's understanding of strategic culture provides a good and comprehensive definition of it, which will be convenient for my study of Iranian strategic culture:

Beliefs and assumptions that frame ... choices about international military behavior (Lantis, 2002, p. 105) and the ideas of interference and strategy as a response to the events happening in physical and political geography by political or religious ideology, and by familiarity with, and preference for, particular military technologies.⁵⁹

The use of strategic cultural components like the religion by politicians in a populist way so as to convince the public is referred to as ambiguous instrumentality by Johnston which will be the second way through which I will analyze Iran's strategic culture.⁶⁰

In his article titled Iranian Strategic Culture: The Impact of Ayatollah Khomeini's Interpretation of Shiite Islam (2014) Kamran Taremi states Islam is influencing the national security objectives of Iran.⁶¹ He claims that Shiite Islam affects both the worldview and action plan of Iran by giving it a specific route to follow in foreign policy.⁶² It is arming Shiite mercenaries it recruits from Afghanistan to fight wars in Syria to help the Assad regime.⁶³ However, Iran is not only supporting Shia in the region. It is also behind some Sunni groups like Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and it can act along with Russia which is neither about religion nor about the sect. That means that Shi'ism is being accompanied by other variables like religion and the normative environment in shaping the strategic culture of Iran. Sending Shi'ite warriors to fight wars in the Middle East, the evidence of support for non-Shiite groups, and working in collaboration with Russia in Syria which is the outcome of the normative conjuncture are how I will operationalize the term strategic culture.

⁵⁹ Gray, p. 58.

⁶⁰ Johnston, p. 39.

⁶¹ Taremi, p. 20.

⁶² Taremi, p. 19.

⁶³ Sune E. Rasmussen, and Zahra Nader, Iran covertly recruits Afghan Shias to fight in Syria. The Guardian, retrieved July 30, 2016, from <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jun/30/iran-covertly-recruits-afghan-soldiers-to-fight-in-syria>

Iranian Strategic Culture

Looking at the Iranian history, the Shiite identity is something that sets it apart from other Muslim countries of the region. It marks even the earlier history of Iran that goes back to the time of Safavid dynasties. However, before the Islamic Revolution in 1979 Iran was being run by a secular, and authoritarian shah regime. Hence, the revolution was a turning point as Iranian domestic and foreign policies have taken quite a different turn since then. Islam started to be taken as all-embracing for life and for a government which left no faith in the existing fundamental law because of its secular nature. Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the rhetoric used and policies pursued by the Iranian leaders all show a sectarian inclination. In that respects, in order to understand the Iranian strategic culture, it is important to assess how influential Shi'ism is in shaping the foreign policies.

With the revolution, Ayatollah Khomeini became the most prominent figure in Iranian politics as he is the ruling jurisprudent whose "interpretation of Islam is adopted as the state ideology."⁶⁴ So he has not only a religious authority but also a political one. This generally accepted rule assumes that Iran is acting according to Islam in every decision it makes. Although Ayatollah Khomeini says the final word even regarding the military issues, he does not make those decisions without being informed by military commanders on military developments.⁶⁵ It shows that Iran does not act solely on religious motivations but takes interests of the country into account before reaching a conclusion. Moreover, we see a stretched and warped understanding of Islam under Khomeini. According to traditional Shia understanding, ulema should not take part in politics. Because until the resurrection of the Mehdi, involving in politics means being a part of earthly affairs which cannot be fair.⁶⁶ Early on, the clerical circle around Khomeini including the authority of the time Ayatollah Burujirdi was against intervening in temporal political affairs.⁶⁷ However, Khomeini challenged this Shiite belief system after the death of Burujirdi and turned to politics which would establish a system with Islamic jurisprudence against secular modernization his country under Shah

⁶⁴ Taremi, p. 5.

⁶⁵ *ibid.*

⁶⁶ Hasan Kösebalaban, Lecture on Modern Sources of Islamism, retrieved from Istanbul Sehir University Islam and Politics in the Middle East Class, (2016).

⁶⁷ Ray Takeyh, *Guardians of the Revolution: Iran and the World in the Age of the Ayatollahs*. (Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 13.

regime.⁶⁸ He said that waiting is unnecessary and one can establish a legitimate just rule before Mehdi comes. In that respects, the revolution showed a modified understanding of Shiism which was not seen beforehand.⁶⁹

After the revolution, Iranian foreign policy went through changes which severely affected its relations with its former friends and foes. The close ties with the US during the Shah regime turned to animosity and military, and diplomatic alliances with Israel terminated. Moreover, Iran assigned the Israeli Embassy in Tehran to the use of the Palestinian Liberation Organization.⁷⁰ Earlier alliances with sheikhdoms of Gulf came to an end, and they also started to fear Iran's export of revolution. In the defensive sense, an Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC) was established in order to protect the regime from alternative revolutionary groups and the supporters of the shah.⁷¹ Moreover, the members of this group which is also known as Pasdaran were chosen among pious Muslims and ardent supporters of the new regime.⁷² Since IRGC is the military institution of Iran, its formation, and religious character is also representing the strategic culture of Iran.⁷³ Taremi refers to the religious, ideological character of the IRGC which fight not to "protect the territorial integrity of the country but to safeguard the Islamic revolution."⁷⁴ I will measure Iranian strategic culture through four categories which are sectarianism, Pan-Islamism, Persian civilization, and normative international/regional environment.

Sectarianism

Although Shi'ism is said to be embedded deeply in Iran's strategic culture there is no consensus over Shiism being a real motivation behind foreign policy behavior or just a rhetorical tool to keep the Shi'ites united.⁷⁵ Cain explains in detail how the system of governance and appointment of individuals to political positions is determined by the religious authority, *velayet-e faqih*, who is also in charge of affairs of the state.⁷⁶ Being appointed as the

⁶⁸ Takeyh, pp. 13-14.

⁶⁹ Kösebalaban.

⁷⁰ Taremi, p. 9.

⁷¹ Gregory D. McDowall, Clerics and commanders an examination of the evolution of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps' role in the political economy of Iran, (2011), p. 1.

⁷² Taremi, p. 10

⁷³ *ibid.*

⁷⁴ *ibid.*

⁷⁵ Cain; Giles; Taremi.

⁷⁶ Cain, p. 142.

supreme leader of Iran for life, the power to declare war and peace rests with him. Also since Ayatollah is deciding whether or not someone can run in the elections, he is not expected to let someone against his mindset run in the first place (Interview 5). Besides, “if Hamaney had not let it even the international agreement easing the embargo would not be signed” (Interview 5). That is how influential the Shia authority over foreign policy. Making foreign policy attached to Shi’ite belief and codes are also followed by all leaders (Interview 4).

Moreover, there is the Council of Guardians duty of which is to decide whether the decisions of the Parliament and President are Islamic.⁷⁷ Apart from the shadow of Supreme Leader’s over the formal political institutions, highest officials of the Intelligence Ministry are graduates of a pioneering theological school in Qom which again makes religion an important factor in preparing security strategies for the country.⁷⁸

On the other hand, some see Shi’ism only as a useful tool and façade for real political interests (Interview 1-2-3-4). Shi’ism is most obviously seen in Iran’s strategy of maintaining paramilitary forces beyond its territories. There are militant groups like Haşd-i Şabi, Houthi militias in Yemen and Quds Brigades which fight on behalf of Iran in the region. Iran is using these proxies to balance against the policies of the US, Saudi Arabia, and Israel in the region (Interview 1-2-5). With the help of the militia forces, it managed to become the most significant actor in Syrian politics (Interview 1).

Adopting a different approach to the effect of Shi’ism in Iranian strategic culture, Giles claims that practice of taqiyyeh (hiding one’s true intentions to protect itself against Sunni Islam and other enemies) in Shi’ism makes the professed intentions of Iran’s leader questionable.⁷⁹ So, what the leader defends publicly or in front of the international community may not represent his genuine objectives. Iran did not use Shi’ism before or after the Islamic Revolution as a source of foreign policy decision making (Interview 1-4). Moreover, there is a significant regional reality that makes Shi’ism even more crucial and useful. “Iran is the only support center for Shi’ites in the region. It has a monopoly (Interview 3).” It is similar to Papacy call a crusade in that regard. “Crusades were not just related to Christianity but also motivated by material expectations. They used that motivation for getting what they want

⁷⁷ *ibid.*

⁷⁸ Cain, p. 145.

⁷⁹ Giles, p. 147.

materially (Interview 1).” In one case Christianity, in another case, Shi’ism was a smokescreen before the real political objectives according to this view. Rather than providing tangible incentives, one can reduce transaction costs by using a sectarian language (Interview 3).

Pan-Islamism

Shi’ism is not the only thing that comes to minds when one is talking about Iran and its political character. Islam can look like a point of reference at first glance when the empirical cases like anti-Israeli stance and support given to non-Shi’ite groups are considered. Also looking at the inception of the revolution which was a strong reaction against a highly secular regime, it is possible to see the call for an Islamic regime. A famous slogan during the revolution was “Istiqlal, Azadi, cumhur-u Islami” another version of which was “Neither Western nor Eastern, inqilab-e islami⁸⁰”. It was the case during the revolution, but “it did not change. It still represents where Iran is situated in the world and the region (Interview 2).” Islamic ideology was presented as a variable that defines Iranian strategic culture by Cain (2002) and Mahdi Mohammad Nia (2012). For Cain, Iran’s policy choices cannot be thought in isolation from religion. Cain states “The Iranian theocracy filters its interaction with the international community through the lens of Koranic law” which is a constitutional requirement.⁸¹ During the Iran-Iraq War, Khomeini condemned the use of chemical weapons basing his argument on Islam’s prohibition against the use of poison.⁸² However, Cain adds that it was an instrumental use of Islamic law since the reaction came only after the international community’s failure to take any action against Iraq.⁸³ Even this case indicates practical usage of the concept by Iranian leaders.

Nia, on the other hand, refers to the use of Islamic unity as a foreign policy discourse in order to establish a just global system in alliance with other Muslim countries.⁸⁴ However, it was predominantly used during the first years of the revolution as it was more consistent with the political conditions of the time.⁸⁵ The change of language from Islamic to a sectarian one was about the changing needs of Iran (Interview 3-4). Also, it can be argued whether Pan-Islamism was just a shield or a real goal they were trying to reach

⁸⁰ Interviewee 2 referred to this as : Ne şarkî ne garbî inqilab-ı İslamî

⁸¹ Cain, p. 5.

⁸² ibid.

⁸³ ibid.

⁸⁴ Mahdi Mohammad Nia, “Discourse and Identity in Iran’s Foreign Policy”. Iranian Review of Foreign Affairs, Vol. 3, No. 3, pp. 37-48.

⁸⁵ Nia, p. 49

(Interview 5). Iran is taken as a country that uses Islamic rhetoric as a foreign policy tool just as any other country would use what is instrumental in order to expand its zone of influence.

“Islam is not the real cause of its foreign policy behavior. Israel is number one enemy of Iran, so to speak. But for 30 years there is no reactionary policy towards Israel, no direct conflict between these two countries. In 2007, Iran set up Forces for Quds. They did not do anything for Quds but fought for Assad (Interview 1).”

Moreover, Iran’s support for Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad is also taken as a part of its anti-Israeli rhetoric rather than a sign of Islamic unity. It is a political maneuver to be on the side of such Sunni groups (Interview 1-4-5). In this case, having a common enemy, Israel, forms a unity of purpose between Iran and these groups (Interview 1-2-3-4). Furthermore, they are also not favored by Saudi Arabia which is a key player in the region against whom Iran is trying to counterbalance. However, to say that Iran is giving this support just out of religious concerns would be wrong. “Inside Palestine, there are many Sunni groups but Iran is supporting only the ones that are most compatible with Iranian foreign policy goals (Interview 2).” By forming an ideological tie with them around a shared enemy and connecting through giving arms, Iran is increasing its zone of influence in the region (Interview 5). It is just a *sui generis* alliance between Iran and its associates rather than long-term cooperation (Interview 1). This shows that Iran’s cooperation with such groups is pure *realpolitik*.

Persian Civilization

Instead of merely focusing on sect or religion, Gregory Giles’ book chapter on Iran’s Leaders and Strategic Culture (2003) analyzes Iran’s cultural superiority through looking at 3000 years old Persian civilization. Iran as the sole owner of this cultural legacy has a unique identity and pride according to Giles.⁸⁶ Before converting to Islam, Iranians were Persian. Also, Iran choosing Shi’ism was the result of a desire for differentiation of a deeply-rooted civilization (Interview 5). Iranian culture with its language, customs, and history are effective over Iran’s strategic culture (Interview 4-5). In addition, being invaded over centuries during the Persian Empire makes Iranians view foreigners with suspicion which affect their foreign policy decision making and let “artifice, flattery, dissembling, and treachery to become standard for sur-

⁸⁶ Giles, p. 146.

vival."⁸⁷ That is also why Giles says the country is so prone to explain random events with conspiracies.⁸⁸

Lantis (2006) see Iranian strategic culture not something that develops only out of religious influences. He also takes into account historical, cultural and geographical variables while explaining Iran's approach to building nuclear weapons.⁸⁹ In a later version of the article Lantis draws the attention of the reader to how high-level of personal appeals during the Obama administration led to negotiations over the nuclear issue.⁹⁰ Conversely, earlier "efforts to dissuade and deter potential enemies from developing nuclear weapons have largely been unsuccessful."⁹¹ Obama's secret letter to Ayatollah Khamenei to improve relations in that respect is interpreted as a tailored deterrence which enabled the US to reach out to a country that has a strong national cultural identity which could not be done before.⁹²

Normative International/Regional Environment

The changing regional environment also provides a rationale behind the change of language from an Islamic to a sectarian one. Nia says the nature of normative international environment plays an important role as well.⁹³ Fighting a war with Iraq for eight years and seeing all the Arabs on the other side apart from Syria renders using a pan-Islamist language meaningless (Interview 3). However, a sectarian pan-Shi'ite language can be supported by action. "Pan-Islamist language has no real reflection anymore (Interview 3)." Nia also claims that the international environment can push Iranian foreign policy towards moderation or radicalization depending on the kinds of policies the West follows towards Iran.⁹⁴ According to this view, the confrontational language during the Bush administration encouraged Iran even more to continue uranium enrichment program.⁹⁵ Later on, the attacks on Afghanistan and Iraq which are in close proximity to Iran stimulated it to take up arms to

⁸⁷ *ibid.*

⁸⁸ *ibid.*

⁸⁹ Jeffrey S. Lantis, *Strategic culture: From Clausewitz to constructivism*. In *Strategic Culture and Weapons of Mass Destruction*, (Springer, 2006), p. 30.

⁹⁰ Jeffrey S. Lantis, *Strategic Culture and Tailored Deterrence: Bridging the Gap between Theory and Practice*, *Contemporary Security Policy*, Vol. 30 No. 3, (2009), p. 473.

⁹¹ Lantis, 2006, p. 30.

⁹² Lantis, 2009, p. 47.

⁹³ Nia, p. 30.

⁹⁴ *ibid.*

⁹⁵ Nia, p. 54.

protect itself from spreading the invasion to its land.⁹⁶ Because Iran started to become suspicious of US intentions which might include an invasion of Iran afterward (Interview 1-2). Moreover, the motivation behind the prevention efforts against any possible American aggression in Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen is its own defensive concerns (Interview 2).

On the other hand, the time of the Shah regime before the revolution put Iran into an inferior position to the US. Shah was seen as the puppet of the US by especially the opposition in Iran. Hence, after the revolution, the US became the major enemy due to the historical events between the two countries. "The US is using patron-client relations in its contact with other countries. Because of that after the revolution, they did not want to take the US as a respondent. However, they were open to dialogue with any other country that is willing to treat Iran equally (Interview 2)." If these are taken into account, it is possible to see the clear effect of what is happening "in physical and political geography" on strategic culture.⁹⁷

Conclusion

Discussing the literature on strategic culture has shown that international political behavior and military strategy of a country is shaped by its strategic culture which is influenced by that country's religious and political ideology, by its nation's deep historical roots and by the normative international/regional environment. Specifically, in the case of Iran, Shi'ism is seen as the prime mover behind its foreign policy decisions. There are also claims about Iran's policies being motivated by unifying Pan-Islamic inclinations. However, my study suggests that the influence of religion and sect is being used as a tool of legitimacy and to elicit support from the public, from the Shi'ites, and the Muslims according to the situation the state faces. My results strongly show that Pan-Islamic language which was used especially during the early years of the Islamic Republic and sectarian rhetoric that has been in use since the collapse of Pan-Islamism is justifying the operational strategy of the country. Iran does not follow an Islamic or a sectarian route when it might hurt its national interests. Its selective support of only particular Sunni groups in Palestine is evidence of that. Whenever sectarianism or Islamic unity is used

⁹⁶ Liu Yongtao, *Discourse, Meanings and IR Studies: Taking the Rhetoric of "Axis of Evil" As a Case*, *CONfines de relaciones internacionales y ciencia política*, Vol. 6, No. 11, (2010), p. 104.

⁹⁷ Gray, p. 58.

as framing the foreign policy, it cloaks the real objectives which cannot be justified by using a blunt, aggressive expansionist language. Hence, rather than being the real driving force behind international political moves, the power of these concepts comes from their ambiguous instrumentality since Iran is using these frames whenever they are applicable to use. Iran acting along with Russia in the Syrian crisis is an example of that which cannot be explained by religion or sect.

One thing that has emerged as a result of this research is the power of Persian roots in shaping the strategic culture which proved to be more powerful than Islam or Shi'ism. The long historical process that goes back to earlier centuries left a legacy of a deep sense of insecurity to Iranians since their land had been invaded by foreigners many times. The recent history of the region also served to keep those memories vivid with the invasion of Afghanistan, and Iraq. Their insecurity and the fear of being the next soil to be invaded pushed them to assume a more proactive role in the case of Syria. Besides, being the only Shi'ite and Persian country in the region and perceptions about Iran's revolutionary agenda by many Arab countries of the Gulf makes Iran feel surrounded by hostile regimes and alone.

In short, the roots of Persian civilization and the normative environment are more in connection in shaping the Iranian strategic culture. They also can be said to be more influential since Iran's defensive concerns in highly turbulent geography are reinforcing its fear and insecurities since it does not have a strong ally and left out of the international and regional system. Moreover, acting with such motivations do not run counter to Iran's national interests. On the contrary, following a religious or a sectarian policy without paying attention to its results on Iranian national interests would not be a logical action for a state. Hence, use of such framings is the resort only when they can be a good cover for national objectives.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Alastair Iain Johnston. Thinking about Strategic Culture, *International Security*, Vol. 19, No. 4, (1995).
- Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, "Process Tracing and Historical Explanation." Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences, (MIT Press, 2005).
- Ali L. Karaosmanoğlu, & Mustafa Kibaroglu, Post-Cold War Defense Reform: Lessons Learned in Europe and the United States, East West Institute, Brassey's, (New York: 2003).
- Anthony C. Cain, Iran's Strategic Culture and Weapons of Mass Destruction, (Maxwell Paper, 2002).
- Basrur, R. M. (2001). Nuclear Weapons and Indian Strategic Culture. *Journal of Peace Research*, 38(2), 181–198. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343301038002004>
- Bradley S. Klein, Hegemony and Strategic Culture: American Power Projection and Alliance Defence Politics. *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 14, No. 2, (1988).
- Colin S. Gray, Strategic culture as context: the first generation of theory strikes back. *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 25, No. 1, (1999).
- David R. Jones, Soviet Strategic Culture. In *Strategic Power: USA/USSR*, (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1990).
- Elizabeth Kier, Culture and Military Doctrine: France between the Wars, *International Security*, Vol. 19, No. 4, (1995).
- Firoozeh Papan-Matin, The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, *Iranian Studies*, Vol. 47, No. 1, (1989).
- Gregory D. McDowall, Clerics and Commanders an Examination of the Evolution of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps' Role in the Political Economy of Iran, (2011).
- Gregory F. Giles, The crucible of radical Islam: Iran's leaders and strategic culture. Know Thy Enemy: Profiles of Adversary Leaders and Their Strategic Cultures, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: USAF Counterproliferation Center, (2003).
- Hasan Kösebalaban, Lecture on Modern Sources of Islamism, retrieved from Istanbul Sehir University Islam and Politics in the Middle East Class, (2016).
- J Paul Dunne, Military Keynesianism: An Assessment, *Peace Economics and Peace Science*, (2011).
- Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition, (Cornell University Press, 1991).

- Jack Snyder, *Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition*, (Cornell University Press, 1991).
- Jack Snyder, *Soviet Strategic Culture: Implication for Limited Nuclear Operations*. Santa Monica, CA, Rand R-2154-AF, (Rand Corporation, 1977)
- Jack Snyder, *The Concept of Strategic Culture: Caveat Emptor*. In *Strategic Power: USA/USSR*, (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1990).
- Jeffrey S. Lantis, *Strategic Culture and National Security Policy*. *International Studies Review*, Vol. 4, No. 3, (2002).
- Jeffrey S. Lantis, *Strategic Culture and Tailored Deterrence: Bridging the Gap between Theory and Practice*, *Contemporary Security Policy*, Vol. 30 No. 3, (2009).
- Jeffrey S. Lantis, *Strategic Culture: From Clausewitz to Constructivism*, in *Strategic Culture and Weapons of Mass Destruction*, (Springer, 2006).
- Jeremy Black, *Rethinking Military History*, (Psychology Press, 2004).
- John Glenn, *Realism versus Strategic Culture: Competition and Collaboration?* *International Studies Review*, Vol. 11, No. 3, (2009).
- K. P. O'Reilly, *A Rogue Doctrine?: The Role of Strategic Culture on US Foreign Policy Behavior*. *Foreign Policy Analysis*, Vol. 9, No. 1, (2013).
- Kamran Taremi, *Iranian Strategic Culture: The Impact of Ayatollah Khomeini's Interpretation of Shiite Islam*. *Contemporary Security Policy*, Vol. 35, No.1, (2014).
- Ken Booth, *Strategy and Ethnocentrism*, (Routledge Revivals, 2014).
- Lawrence Sondhaus, *Strategic Culture and Ways of War*, (Routledge, 2006).
- Liu Yongtao, *Discourse, Meanings and IR Studies: Taking the Rhetoric of "Axis of Evil" As a Case*. *CONfines de relaciones internacionales y ciencia política*, Vol. 6, No. 11, (2010).
- Mahdi Mohammad Nia, *Discourse and Identity in Iran's Foreign Policy*, *Iranian Review of Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 3, No. 3, (2012).
- Michael C. Desch, *Culture Clash: Assessing the Importance of Ideas in Security Studies*, *International Security*, Vol.23 No.1, (1998).
- Ole Wæver, "The rise and fall of the inter-paradigm debate." *International Theory: Positivism and Beyond*. (1996).
- P. W. Singer, *Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry*, (Cornell University Press, 2007).
- Ray Takeyh, *Guardians of the Revolution: Iran and the World in the Age of the Ayatollahs*. (Oxford University Press, 2009).

Steve Smith, Ken Booth, & Marysia Zalewski, *International Theory: Positivism and Beyond*. (Cambridge University Press, 1996).

United Nation Group of Consultant Experts, *Economic and Social Consequences of the Arms Race*. in Thee, Marek (ed.), *Armaments, Arms Control, and Disarmament: a Unesco Reader for Disarmament Education*, (Paris: Unesco Press, 1981).

OBAMA DÖNEMİ ABD'NİN ORTADOĞU POLİTİKASI: ARAP BAHARI SÜRECİNDE DEMOKRATİK SÖYLEM VE EYLEM

Özet

Bu çalışmada ABD'nin Arap Baharı sürecinde demokrasi teşvik stratejisi analiz edilmektedir. ABD politikasının temel sütunlarından biri olan demokrasi fikri geçmişten bugüne dış politika yapımında belirleyici olmuştur. Nitekim ABD'nin kırk dördüncü başkanı Barack Obama'nın siyasal retoriğinde de demokrasi önemli bir bileşen olarak yerini almıştır. Öte yandan Arap Baharı ülkelerine yönelik Obama'nın ortaya koyduğu demokrasi söylemini eyleme dönüştürmekteki başarısızlığına dikkat çekilmiş, ancak bununla birlikte Obama'nın söz konusu başarısızlığının nedenleri ise göz ardı edilmiştir. Bu değerlendirmede karar verme teorileri çerçevesinde Obama'nın Arap Baharı ülkelere yönelik dış politikasında demokrasinin rolüne odaklanılmaktadır. Dış politika karar alma sürecinde dış politika öğrenme ve çerçeveleme yaklaşımlarından faydalanılarak bu çalışmada, Libya, Mısır ve Suriye örnekleri merkezinde Obama'nın Arap Baharı sürecinde izlediği politika açıklanmaya çalışılmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: ABD, Obama, Dış Politika, Karar Alma yaklaşımı

Mustafa Cüneyt Özşahin

Dr., Necmettin Erbakan
Üniversitesi Uluslararası
İlişkiler Bölümü

Ortadoğu Etütleri

Volume 8 , No 2
December 2016
pp. 68-95

THE MIDDLE EAST POLICY OF THE USA DURING OBAMA ERA: DEMOCRATIC RHETORIC AND ACTION DURING THE ARAB SPRING PERIOD

Abstract

This study investigates the US democracy promotion strategy in the Arab Spring. The idea of democracy, as a pillar of American politics, has played an important role in foreign policy making from past to present. As a matter of fact, democracy was also a major element in the political rhetoric of Barack Obama, the forty fourth president of the USA. Nevertheless, the gap between Obama's democracy discourse toward Arab countries and his failure to turn this rhetoric into action was often highlighted. However, the reasons behind Obama's failed democracy promotion has so far been overlooked. This evaluation focuses on the role of democracy in Obama's foreign policy toward Arab Spring countries within the framework of decision making theories. Drawing from theories of foreign policy learning and framing in foreign policy decision making process, this study aims to explain the Obama's policy during Arab Spring centering on Libya, Egypt and Syria cases.

Keywords: USA, Obama, Foreign Policy, Decision Making Approach

سياسة الولايات المتحدة في الشرق الأوسط في عهد أوباما

مرحلة الربيع العربي: حديث الديمقراطية وأفعالها

نيهاش زواتي نجى فطصم

صنخلملا

نقوم في هذا البحث بتحليل استراتيجية تشجيع الديمقراطية من قبل الولايات المتحدة في مرحلة الربيع العربي. إن فكر الديمقراطية كان عنصرا مؤثرا جدا في تحديد سياسة الولايات المتحدة الخارجية سيما أنه من أعمدة سياسات الولايات المتحدة الأساسية. بالتالي كانت الديمقراطية تمتلك مكانة مهمة جدا في الخطاب السياسي الرئيس الأمريكي الرابع والأربعين باراك أوباما. ومن ناحية أخرى لفت الانتباه إلى أن حديث الديمقراطية الذي وجهه أوباما لثورات الربيع العربي تبعه فشل كبير لأوباما في تنفيذه على أرض الواقع، ومع هذا فإنه تم تجاهل الأسباب التي منعت أوباما من تطبيق حديثه عمليا وأدت إلى فشله. وفي هذا التقييم فإن سياسة أوباما تجاه بلدان الربيع العربي تتركز على دور الديمقراطية في نطاق نظريات اتخاذ القرار. إن البحث والاستفادة من تعلم السياسة الخارجية و تأطيرها في مرحلة اتخاذ قرارات السياسة الخارجية يقوم بالعمل على توضيح السياسة التي اتبعها أوباما في مرحلة الربيع العربي في أمثلته في كل من سوريا وليبيا ومصر.

الكلمات المفتاحية: الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية، السياسة الخارجية، أوباما، منحه اتخاذ القرار

Giriş

44. Amerikan başkanı Barack Hüseyin Obama, iç politikada olduğu kadar dış politikada da tartışmalı bir figür oldu. Obama dönemi dış politikasının bir bütün olarak ABD dış politikası içerisinde konumlandırması zor bir aralığa karşılık gelmektedir. Zira Bush sonrası dönemde demokrat bir başkan olarak Obama'nın iktidara yürüyüşü, ABD dış politikasında yenilenme umutlarının zirve yaptığı bir döneme karşılık gelmektedir. Buna karşın ilk günden beri Obama'nın takip ettiği dış politikanın anlamlandırılmasına yönelik yoğun bir entelektüel mesainin harcanmış olduğundan bahsedilebilir. Söz konusu kafa karışıklığının en büyük sebebi ise kendi dönemi içerisinde dış politikasında süreklilik arz eden bir örüntüden bahsedilmesinin oldukça zor olmasıdır.¹ Bu çerçevede dış politik retoriğe hâkim olan demokratik vurguya karşın özellikle Arap Baharı sürecinde ve sonrası dönemde Obama açısından söylem ve eylem arasında ciddi bir gerilimin ortaya çıktığına şahitlik edildi. Bu bağlamda Obama dönemi ABD'nin gerek Libya'da gerekse de Mısır ve Suriye'de ABD politikasının sac ayaklarından biri olan demokrasi teşvik söylemi ile uyuşmamaktadır. ABD politikasının bu anlamda uzun süre kurucu değerleri olarak anılan farklı dönemlerde gerek demokrat gerekse de cumhuriyetçilerce dile getirilen demokratikleşme retoriği Obama döneminde eyleme dönüşmemiştir. Bu çalışmada ABD'nin demokrasi söyleminin farklı Ortadoğu ülkelerine yönelik dış politikada neden etkisiz kaldığı anlaşılma-ya çalışılacaktır. Bir diğer deyişle, bu düzlemde, Ortadoğu'da Arap isyanları sürecinde ve sonrasında demokratikleşme merkezli söylem-eylem açığının kaynaklarına değinilecektir.

Çizilen bu çerçevede ilgili literatürden faydalanılarak ABD'nin Ortadoğu politikası özelinde demokrasi söylemi masaya yatırılacaktır. Bu amaçla dış politika karar alma yaklaşımı ve demokratikleşme literatürleri harmanlanarak bir inceleme sunulmaktadır. Seçilen ülke örnekleri üzerinden demokrasi söyleminin ne ölçüde hayata geçirildiği ve eyleme dönüştüğünün değerlendirildiği bu çalışmada, baskın demokrasi söyleminin realize edilememesinin nedenleri dış politika karar verme sürecinden ön plana çıkan kimi amillerle ilişkilendirilmektedir. Özetlemek gerekirse bu çalışma kapsamında Obama'nın Ortadoğu'ya yönelik demokrasi söyleminin eyleme dönüşmemesi iki temel nedene bağlanmaktadır: Bunlardan ilki Bush döneminin dış poli-

¹ Bkz. Hasan B. Yalçın, "Obama Stratejisi ve Ortadoğu," Akademik Ortadoğu, 9 no.2, (2015), s.56.

tikada yarattığı travma ve olumsuz bakiyenin telafi edilmeye çalışılmasıdır. Obama iktidarı bu anlamda motivasyonları arasında demokratikleşmenin de bulunduğu Bush dönemi askeri müdahaleciliğin sonuçlarını dikkate alarak dış politika stratejisini bu deneyimden faydalanarak yeniden dizayn etmiştir. Bu bağlamda ABD dış politikasında teorik olarak cari dış politika kararlarının geçmiş dış politik kararlarının sonuçlardan bağımsız olmadığı bir öğrenme sürecinin altı çizilmektedir. Bu öğrenme sürecinin doğal sonucu ise her ne olursa olsun askeri maceracılıktan uzak durmak olmuştur. İkinci olarak ise Arap isyanları sürecinde ve sonrasında ilgili ülkelerde sair aktörlerin pozisyonlarını değerlendirirken karşılaşılan muayyen güçlükler Obama'nın eylemsizliğinin kaynaklarından bir diğeri olarak sunulabilir. Bir başka deyişle ABD'li karar vericilerin Suriye, Mısır ve Libya'da Arap isyanlarında devrimci ve statükocu blokların demokratik niteliklerine yönelik algıları ve zaman içinde değişen değerlendirmeleri demokratikleşmeyi gözetten bir dış politikanın tesisine ket vurmuştur. Sorunların tehditler mi yoksa demokrasi çerçevesinde mi şekillendiği dış politika çıktısında belirleyici olmuştur. Bu nedenle özetle aktörlere yönelik algı, inanç ve fikirlerin dış politika yapımında kesin biçimde belirleyici bir rol oynadığı iddia edilmektedir.

Yukarıda çizilen çerçevede öncelikle geçmişten bugüne ABD'nin dış politikasında kurucu bir rol üstlenen demokrasi retoriğinin tarihi gelişimi masaya yatırılmaktadır. Gerçekleştirilen analizin ikinci kısmında ise Obama'yı seleflerinden ayıran eylemsizliği yukarıda değinilen dış politika karar alma süreci yaklaşımından mülhem iki farklı faktör çerçevesinde anlaşılmaya çalışılmaktadır: Dış politik öğrenme ve çerçeveleme (*framing*) kuramları. Son bölümde ise Obama döneminin ABD dış politikası içerisindeki yeri değerlendirilmekte ve Arap Baharı ülkeleri üzerinde dönemin genel bir muhasebesi sunulmaktadır. Bu doğrultuda dış politikada geçmiş pratiklerin yarattığı baskı ile medyanın ve politika yapımcıların ilgili ülkelere yönelik değerlendirmeleri Arap Baharı sürecinde ve sonrasında dış politika karar verme mekanizması anlamlandırılmaya çalışılmaktadır.

Demokrasi Söylemi ve ABD Dış Politikasının Dönüşümü

İlgili literatür incelendiğinde ABD dış politikasında güç dağılımının gereği yapısal zorunluluklar dışında materyal olmayan faktörlerin yani inançların ve ideaların belirleyici etkilere sahip olduğuna ilişkin güçlü bir dama-

rın varlığından bahsedilebilir². Kuşkusuz Amerikan dış politikasına yönelik temel meselelerin dış politika analizinde hararetle tartışılan aktör merkezli ve sistem merkezli teoriler ayrımından³ bağımsız düşünülmesi mümkün değildir. Bu kapsamda ABD dış politikasının iç politik kökenlerine ilişkin pek çok çalışmanın varlığından bahsedilmesi mümkündür. Kuşkusuz bu tartışma çerçevesinde değerlendirilebilecek ABD tarihinin yadsınamaz bir parçası olan demokrasi ideali de dış politikanın kurucu bir bileşeni olmuştur. Bir başka deyişle, ABD'nin demokrasi söyleminin arka planı büyük ölçüde ABD'nin kendi tarihi ve sosyolojisinden kaynaklanmaktadır.⁴ Her ne kadar ABD'nin demokrasi söyleminin sahiciliği geçmişte de muhtelif eleştirilerin hedefi olsa da neredeyse her dönemde dış politikanın mihver kavramlarından biri olmayı sürdürmüştür. ABD verdiği bağımsızlık savaşı sırasında ve sonrasında kendi kimliğini özgürlük ve demokrasi değerleri çerçevesinde kurgulamıştır. Nitekim henüz XIX. Yüzyılda Filipinler'e yönelik müdahaleler bir demokrasi vurgusu ile gerçeklik kazanmıştır.⁵ Öte yandan demokrasinin özellikle kendi kaderini tayin ilkesi çerçevesinde seslendirilmesi ABD tarihinde bir dış politika ekolünün de kurucusu olarak Woodrow Wilson'a atfedilmiştir. Ikenberry'nin liberal büyük strateji (*liberal grand strategy*) olarak adlandırdığı siyasetin başlangıcına ilişkin bu döneme işaret edilebilmektedir.⁶ Bununla birlikte ABD'nin İran'dan Şili'ye ve Endonezya'ya uzanan muhtelif coğrafyalarda örtük operasyonlar yoluyla otoriter yönetimlere verdiği destek, ABD açısından demokrasi söyleminin inandırıcılığını ciddi biçimde sarsmıştır⁷. ABD'nin demokrasi teşviği girişimleri arasında savaşlar, demokrasi kriterine bağlı dış yardımlar ve münhasıran demokratikleşme amaçlı yardımlar olarak

² Konuyla ilgili kapsamlı bir tarama için bkz. Daniel W. Drezner, "Values, Interests, and American Grand Strategy," *Diplomatic History*, 29, no 3 (2005), s.429-432.

³ Sistem merkezli analizlere karşı aktör merkezli olanlara ilişkin şu çalışmalara bakılabilir. Bkz. Valerie M Hudson, "Foreign Policy Analysis: Actor-Specific Theory and the Ground of International Relations," *Foreign policy analysis* 1, no. 1 (2005), s.1-30; Juliet Kaarbo, "A Foreign Policy Analysis Perspective on the Domestic Politics Turn in IR Theory," *International Studies Review* 17, no. 2 (2015), s.189-216; Joe D. Hagan, "Domestic Political Explanations in the Analysis of Foreign Policy," Laura Neack, Jeanne A. K. Hey ve Patrick J. Haney (Edt.), *Foreign Policy Analysis: Continuity and Change in Its Second Generation*, ed. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1995), s.117-143.

⁴ G. John Ikenberry, "America's Liberal Grand Strategy: Democracy and National Security in the Post-War Era," Micheal Cox, G. John Ikenberry ve Takashi Inoguchi (Edt.), *American Democracy Promotion: Impulses, Strategies, and Impacts*, (New York: Oxford University 2000), s.103-126.

⁵ Tony Smith, *America's Mission: The United States and the Worldwide Struggle for Democracy* (New Jersey, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012), 36-59.

⁶ G John Ikenberry, "Why Export Democracy?," *The Wilson Quarterly*, Vol. 23, no. 2 (1999), s.56-65.

⁷ David P. Forsythe, "Democracy, War, and Covert Action," *Journal of Peace Research* 29, no. 4 (1992), s.385-395.

sıralanabilir.⁸ Soğuk Savaş yıllarının hemen başında Truman'ın Bush dönemine uzanacak demokrasi söyleminin temelini attığı kaydedilmektedir.⁹ Öte yandan demokrasi teşviğinin bir parçası olarak kalkınma yardımlarını başkanı Kennedy'e ve ABD Uluslararası Kalkınma Yardımları ajansına (USAID) kadar götürmek mümkündür.¹⁰ Bununla birlikte özellikle Ronald Reagan tarafından demokratikleşme söylemi ve demokrasi ihracı fikri ABD dış politikasında kurumsallaştırılmaya çalışılmıştır. Bu çerçevede başta NED (Ulusal Demokrasi Vakfı) olmak üzere çok sayıda sivil toplum /düşünce kuruluşunun bu dönemin mahsulü olduğu ifade edilebilecektir.¹¹

Önemli bir kavşak olarak Soğuk Savaş sonrası dönemde ise özellikle post-komünist Doğu Avrupa ülkelerini serbest pazara teşvik etmenin yanı sıra demokrasilere dönüştürmeye dönük sivil toplum merkezli (aşağıdan-yukarıya) ve devlet merkezli (yukarıdan-aşağıya) çözümler üretilmiştir.¹² Bu dönemde Soğuk Savaş sonrasında liberal-demokrasinin zaferi reel politika tasdik edildiği gibi¹³, akademiya içerisinde demokratikleşme teşviki literatürünü de bünyesinde barındıran liberal teorinin Soğuk Savaş sonrası dünyanın- anlaşılmasında/açıklanmasında görece üstün bir konum edindiği iddiası da dillendirilmiştir.¹⁴ Soğuk Savaş sonrasında özellikle Clinton iktidarında demokrasi teşviki adından sıklıkla söz ettiren bir kavrama dönüşmüştür. Öyle ki Clinton dönemi demokratik değerlerin ve ABD çıkarlarının uyduğu ve demokrasi teşvikinin neredeyse tüm sorunlar için bir çözüm olduğunun deklare edildiği bir zaman dilimine tekabül etmektedir.¹⁵

Öte yandan demokrasi vurgusunun özellikle dış politikada en yoğun şekilde ifade edildiği dönem ise kuşkusuz 11 Eylül saldırısı sonrasıdır. George W. Bush iktidarı terörün üstesinden gelmek amacıyla demokrasiyi tek geçer-

⁸ Dawn Brancati, "The Determinants of Us Public Opinion Towards Democracy Promotion," *Political Behavior* 36, no. 4 (2014): , s.707.

⁹ Eric Patterson, "Obama and Sustainable Democracy Promotion," *International Studies Perspectives* 13, no. 1 (2012), s.27-28.

¹⁰ Thomas Carothers, "Aiding Democracy Abroad: The Learning Curve," (Washington: Carnegie Endowment, 2011), s.20-21.

¹¹ Thomas Carothers, "The Ned at 10," *Foreign Policy*, no. 95 (1994), s.123-138.

¹² Karen E Smith, "Western Actors and the Promotion of Democracy," Alex Pravda ve Jan Zielonka (Edt.), *Democratic Consolidation in Eastern Europe: Volume 2: International and Transnational Factors*, (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), s.36-37.

¹³ Bu konuda öncü bir çalışma için bkz. Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2006).

¹⁴ Charles W Kegley Jr, "The Neoidealist Moment in International Studies? Realist Myths and the New International Realities: Isa Presidential Address March 27, 1993 Acapulco, Mexico," *International Studies Quarterly* 37, no. 2 (1993), s. 131-46.

¹⁵ Thomas Carothers, "Democracy Promotion under Clinton " *The Washington Quarterly* 18, no. 4 (1995), s.13.

li çare olarak kucaklanmış, bu dönemde Ortadoğu'nun demokratikleşmesi için Genişletilmiş/Büyük Ortadoğu projesi hayata geçirilmiştir.¹⁶ Nitekim ABD'nin bölgeye yönelik bu tanımlaması aynı zamanda askeri müdahaleciliğin de meşruiyet zeminini teşkil etmiştir.¹⁷ Bununla birlikte demokrasi teşviği hususundaki bir kısım çalışmalar, demokrasilerin barışçıl olması retoriğinin ötesinde demokrasi dışındaki yönetimlere karşı saldırgan olabileceği gerçeğini "demokrasinin karanlık yanı" olarak isimlendirmişlerdir.¹⁸ Bu kapsamda mesela Monten, Bush doktrinin kurucu sac ayaklarından birini teşkil eden demokrasi teşviki fikrinin bir taraftan ABD milliyetçiliğinin diğer taraftan Birleşik devletlerin güç arayışının bir bileşkesi olarak değerlendirmektedir.¹⁹ Bu çerçevede George D. Bush tarafından oldukça agresif biçimde seslendirilen ve devlet inşası projesi ile eş zamanlı olarak yürütülen tepeden inme siyasa bir süre sonra ciddi eleştirilere maruz kalmıştır..²⁰ Zira güç kullanarak rejim değişiklikleri gerçekleştirme çabası ABD açısından ilerleyen yıllarda belirginleşecek olan öngörülemeyen bir takım sonuçlar doğurmuştur. Bu çerçevede G.W.Bush'un stratejisi bölgesel anlamda demokratik bir dalga yaratmak bir yana ABD'nin stratejik çıkarlarına ve bölgesel prestijine hanel getirecek bir dönüşüme neden olmuştur.²¹ Öyle ki Ortadoğu'da bölgesel istikrarsızlığa kapı aralayacak sekteryarizmin temel nedeni olarak genellikle 11 Eylül sonrası ABD müdahaleciliği gösterilmektedir.²²

Daha yakın zamanlarda ABD dış politikasında ayrıcalıklı bir yer edinen gerek entelektüel birikimi gerekse de siyahi kimliği ile öne çıkan Obama'nın politik söyleminde de demokrasi önemli bir yer edinmiştir.²³ Obama'nın demokrasi vurgusunun özellikle 2009'un ikinci yarısından itibaren eyleme

¹⁶ Patterson, "Obama and Sustainable Democracy Promotion," s.35; Ahmet Nuri Yurdusev, "The Greater Middle East Initiative and Democracy in Muslim States: A Turkish Perspective " Korean Journal of Defense Analysis 18, no. 2 (2006), s.73-94.

¹⁷ Fulya Gökcan ve Aylin Güney, "The 'Greater Middle East' as a 'Modern' Geopolitical Imagination in American Foreign Policy " Geopolitics 15, no. 1 (2010), s.22-38.

¹⁸ Lothar Brock, Anna Geis ve Harald Müller, "Introduction: The Theoretical Challenge of Democratic Wars," Anna Geis, Lothar Brock ve Harald Müller (Edt.), Democratic Wars: Looking at the Dark Side of Democratic Peace, (London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2006). Konuyla ilgili tarihsel sosyoloji çerçevesinde teorik bir tartışma için bkz. Michael Mann, The Dark Side of Democracy: Explaining Ethnic Cleansing (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

¹⁹ Jonathan Monten, "The Roots of the Bush Doctrine: Power, Nationalism, and Democracy Promotion in Us Strategy," International Security 29, no. 4 (2005),s.112-156.

²⁰ David Chandler, "Back to the Future? The Limits of Neo-Wilsonian Ideals of Exporting Democracy," Review of International Studies 32, no. 3 (2006), s.475-494.

²¹ Jeremy Pressman, "Power without Influence: The Bush Administration's Foreign Policy Failure in the Middle East," International Security 33, no. 4 (2009), s.149-179; Francis Fukuyama ve Michael McFaul, "Should Democracy Be Promoted or Demoted?," The Washington Quarterly 31, no. 1 (2008), s.23-45.

²² Daniel Byman, "Sectarianism Afflicts the New Middle East," Survival 56, no. 1 (2014), s.79-100.

²³ Patterson, "Obama and Sustainable Democracy Promotion," s.26.

geçirildiğinden bahsedilebilecektir.²⁴ Nitekim Obama'nın Kahire söylevi Ortadoğu'ya bakışını ve demokrasiye yönelik anlayışını sarih bir biçimde ortaya koymaktadır.

“Son yıllarda demokrasi promosyonu ile ilgili bir tartışma var ve bu tartışma büyük ölçüde Irak'taki savaşa ilgili. Açık söylemek gerekirse: hiçbir hükümet sistemi bir ulus tarafından diğerine dayatılmamalı, dayatılmaması gerekir... Ancak bu benim hükümetlerin insanların iradelerini yansıtacağına bağlılığımı azaltmıyor. Her ulus kendi insanların geleneğine uygun olarak bu prensibe kendisi hayat verir. Amerika herkes için en iyinin ne olduğunu bilemez, tıpkı barışçıl bir seçimin sonucunun ne olacağını bilemeyeceğiniz gibi. Ancak tüm insanların istek duydukları bazı şeyler olduğuna yılmaz bir inancım var: aklındakini söyleyebilmek ve nasıl yönetildiğiyle ilgili söz söylemek; hukuk devleti ve adaletin eşit, şeffaf ve insanlardan çalmayan hükümet; seçtiğin gibi yaşama özgürlüğü. Bunlar sadece Amerikan fikirleri değil, bunlar insan hakları. Ve bunun için bunları her yerde destekleyeceğiz.”²⁵

Bununla birlikte, Obama'nın demokrasi söyleminin ne ölçüde eyleme dönüştüğü, Obama'nın demokrasiyi anlamlandırma biçiminin Ortadoğu politikasında nasıl sonuçlar doğurduğu yoğun biçimde tartışılmıştır. Bu çalışma çerçevesinde Arap İsyancı sürecinde Obama'nın demokrasi söylemi ile eylemi arasındaki makasın açılmasının nedenleri dış politika karar alma yaklaşımına atıfla araştırılmaktadır.

Obama'nın Demokratik Karnesi: Devamlılık mı Dönüşüm mü?

Obama'nın dış politikası, bir bütün olarak değerlendirildiğinde pek çok alanda George W. Bush döneminin bir restorasyonu olduğu, bununla birlikte özellikle belirli konularda bir devamlılığı da barındırıyordu.²⁶ Obama'nın ilk döneminde izlediği siyasetin G.W.Bush'dan farklı olarak büyük oranda daha uzlaşmacı bir temelde kurgulandığı iddia edilebilecektir. Obama'nın siyasetine bir bütün olarak bakıldığında ise 43. Devlet başkanı George W. Bush'un yarattığı büyük imaj kaybının telafisine odaklanılmış olduğu söyle-

²⁴ Thomas Carothers, *Democracy Policy under Obama: Revitalization or Retreat?* (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2012), s. 15.

²⁵ “Remarks by the President at Cairo University, 6-04-09”, 4 Haziran 2009, <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-cairo-university-6-04-09>, Erişim Tarihi: 17 Mayıs 2015.

²⁶ Thomas Carothers, *Democracy Policy under Obama: Revitalization or Retreat?*, s.5-6; Patterson, “Obama and Sustainable Democracy Promotion,” s.26

nebilir. Yine bu çerçevede Obama'nın başkanlığında özellikle ilk döneminde ABD'nin ikili ilişkilerini tamire yöneldiğinin ifade edilmesi yanlış olmaz. Muhtelif coğrafyalarda izlenen dış siyaset ABD'nin söz konusu tamir ve yeniden yapılandırma stratejisinin bir yansıması olarak değerlendirilebilecektir. Kimilerince Obama bu çerçevede uluslararası siyasette "uzlaştırmacı" kimliğiyle temayüz etmiştir.²⁷ Obama'nın Rusya ile ilişkilerde geçmişin tüm yükünü geride bırakmayı öngören "reset" söylemi büyük ölçüde bu yenilenmenin ifadesidir.²⁸ Yine benzer bir siyaset Küba ile ilişkilere de damgasını vurmuştur. Bir Karayipler ülkesi olan Küba ile ilgili uzun süren gerilim Obama döneminde sonlanmış ve hızlı bir "normalleşme" yaşanmıştır.²⁹ Öte yandan Obama döneminde Amerikan dış politikasına yansıyan bir diğer kritik adım, İran ile yaşanan yakınlaşmadır. Pek çoklarınca 2015 yılında İran ile ABD arasında varılan nükleer anlaşma ikili ilişkilerde önemli bir kırılma noktasıdır.³⁰ Yine Obama'nın Ortadoğu'ya yönelik bir diğer dış politika adımı, ABD'nin Irak'tan çekilmesine yöneliktir.³¹ Tüm bu yaşanan gelişmeler ışığında ilgili literatür Obama'nın söz konusu politikaları bir yönüyle en radikal biçimde G.W. Bush döneminde uygulanan güç kullanımını da içeren ABD'nin kararlı demokrasi promosyonu programının sekteye uğratılması veya geriletilmesi olarak okunmuştur.³² Yine bu kapsamda otoriter/totaliter nitelikteki söz konusu ülkeler ile yeniden tesis edilen ilişkilerin yanında Obama'nın Arap Baharı sürecini yönetme biçimi de bir takım eleştirileri beraberinde getirmiştir. Özellikle Arap Baharı sonrası Mısır'da karşı devrim sürecinde yaşanan kafa karışıklığı, Suriye'de iç savaşa dönüşen rejim karşıtı hareketlerin desteklenmesinde ve Libya'da insani müdahale sonrasında izlenen izolasyonist siyaset, Obama'nın vurgulamaktan çekinmediği ABD'nin demokrasi söylemini zedeleyen gelişmeler olarak addedilmiştir. Bu çerçevede-

²⁷ Colin Dueck, "The Accommodator: Obama's Foreign Policy," Policy Review, no. 169 (2011), s.13-28. Obama'nın izlediği stratejiyi izolasyonizm kapsamında değerlendiren bir çalışma için bkz. Yalçın, "Obama Stratejisi ve Ortadoğu", s.55-79.

²⁸ Jeffrey Mankoff, "The Tricky Us-Russia "Reset" Button," Council on Foreign Relations 18 (2009), <https://www.cfr.org/expert-brief/tricky-us-russia-reset-button>, Erişim Tarihi: 10 Mayıs 2016

²⁹ William M LeoGrande, "Normalizing Us-Cuba Relations: Escaping the Shackles of the Past," International Affairs 91, no. 3 (2015), s.473-488.

³⁰ Thomas Friedman, "Obama Makes His Case on Iran Nuclear Deal," The New York Times , 14 Temmuz 2015, <https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/15/opinion/thomas-friedman-obama-makes-his-case-on-iran-nuclear-deal.html>, Erişim Tarihi: 16 Ocak 2016.

³¹ Yalçın, "Obama Stratejisi ve Ortadoğu", s.59; Missy Ryan ve Matt Spetalnick, "U.S. to pull out of Iraq after nearly 9 years of war", Reuters, 21 Ekim 2011, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iraq-usa-obama-idU5TRE79K4LR20111021>

³² Obama döneminde güvenlik ve demokrasi ikilemine dair bkz. Henry R Nau, "Obama's Foreign Policy," Policy Review, no. 160 (2010), s.30-35.

de Ortadoğu örneği üzerinde ABD dış politikasından demokrasi söylemi ve söz konusu söylemi destekleyecek eylem arasındaki makasın hızla açıldığına dikkat çekilmektedir. Öte yandan bütüncül bir analiz ile Obama'nın demokrasi teşviğine yönelik dış politika tercihleri büyük oranda bilişsel kimi saiklere dayanan karar alma sürecinin bir sonucu olarak değerlendirilebilecektir.

Dış Politika ve Karar Alma Mekanizması: Bir Çerçeve Arayışı

Dış politika karar vericilerden bağımsız soyut bir süreç olarak işlememektedir.³³ Devletlerin aktör ve zaman değişkenlerinden azade mutlak rasyonel aktörler olduğu tezi genellikle eleştirilmiştir. Karar vericilerin dış çevreyi anlamlandırma süreci bir bakıma alınan kararların niteliğine de tesir etmektedir. Bu nedenle de sorunun tanımlanması önem kazanmaktadır. Eğer sorun tanımı içerisinde belirsizlikleri barındırmaktaysa karar alma süreci daha da komplike hale gelmektedir. Jervis'in altını çizdiği gibi karar alma süreci bu durumlarda algılar ve bazen de yanlış algılardan bağımsız değildir.³⁴ Öte yandan bizatihi sosyal gerçekliğin inşa edilmiş olması halinin giderek daha güçlü bir biçimde vurgulanması doğru ve yanlış algı kavramlaştırılmalarının bizatihi kendisini de bir hayli bulanıklaştırmaktadır.³⁵ Bu nedenlerle olayların çerçevenme biçiminin dış politika da giderek önemli bir hale geldiğinin söylenmesi yanlış olmayacaktır. Mintz ve De Rouen, çerçevelemeyi elitlerin başvurduğu bir çeşit "pazarlama" stratejisi olarak değerlendirmiştir.³⁶ Chong ve Druckman, çerçevelemeyi "bir konu hakkında belirli bir kavramlaştırma veya bir konu hakkında fikirlerine yeniden yön verme süreci" olarak tanımlamaktadır.³⁷ Kuşkusuz karar vericilerin meseleleri nasıl çerçevelediği çerçeveleme sürecine tesir eden aktörlerin etkisinden bağımsız düşünülmemelidir. Nitekim karar alma süreci, çekirdek aktörlerin sorunları farklı çerçevelerde ele alma ve kabul ettirme mücadeleleri olarak okunabilecektir.³⁸ Bunun yanı

³³ Karar alma sürecine ilişkin kapsamlı bir değerlendirme için bkz. Richard C Snyder, Henry W Bruck ve Burton Sapin, "Decision-Making as an Approach to the Study of International Politics," Richard C. Snyder, Valerie M. Hudson, Derek H. Chollet ve James M. Goldgeier (Edt.), *Foreign Policy Decision-Making (Revisited)*, (NewYork: Springer, 2002), s.76-89.

³⁴ Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976).

³⁵ Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, Cambridge Studies in International Relations (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

³⁶ Alex Mintz ve Karl DeRouen Jr, *Understanding Foreign Policy Decision Making* (Newyork: Cambridge University Press, 2010), s.149.

³⁷ Dennis Chong ve James N. Druckman, "Framing Theory," *Annual Review of Political Science* 10, no. 1 (2007), s.104.

³⁸ Jean A Garrison, "Framing Foreign Policy Alternatives in the Inner Circle: President Carter, His Advisors, and the Struggle for the Arms Control Agenda," *Political Psychology* 22, no. 4 (2001), s. 775-807; Zeev Maoz, "Framing the National Interest: The Manipulation of Foreign Policy Decisions in Group Settings," *World Politics* 43, no. 1 (1990), s. 77-110.

sıra çerçeveleme bir diğer taraftan karar vericilerin toplum nezdinde karara yönelik bir meşruiyet oluşturma girişimi olarak da değerlendirilebilmektedir.³⁹ Çerçeveleme sürecinde dış politikaya yönelik en önemli aktörlerden birini de kuşkusuz medya teşkil etmektedir. Bu bağlamda medya çalışmaları çerçevelemeye ilişkin literatür içerisinde önemli bir yeküne sahiptir. Bu kapsamda medyanın çerçeveleme faaliyetlerinin de karar vericiler ve dış politika çıktısı üzerinde belirleyici bir rol oynadığı iddia edilebilecektir.⁴⁰

Karar alıcıların bilişsel süreçlerinde belirleyici olan bir diğer önemli konu ise geçmiş dış politik kararların sonuçlarının lider üzerinde bıraktığı etkidir. Karar vericilerin geçmiş deneyimlerden edindikleri tecrübeler dış politika davranışlarını şekillendirmektedir. Çünkü sorunun tanımlanmasında ve devamında çözüm geliştirme noktasında geçmiş deneyimlerin bıraktıkları izler dış politika yapıcılar açısından önem taşımaktadır. Söz konusu literatür bu bağlamda büyük oranda “siyasal öğrenme” sürecinin etkilerine yoğunlaşmaktadır.⁴¹ Öyle ki Mintz ve DeRouen’e göre karar verme sürecinde geçmiş deneyimden elde edilen bilgi ve analogiler bir “kısayol” işlevi görürler.⁴² Bununla birlikte politik öğrenme süreci bazı durumlarda başarılı örneklerin tekrarı iken⁴³ kimi durumlarda ise karşılaşılan başarısızlıklardan ders alma ve yeni bir siyaset arayışı biçiminde gerçekleşmektedir.⁴⁴ Özellikle başarısızlıkların yarattığı travmalar bir sonraki dış politika kararını belirleyici şekilde etkileyebilmektedir. Geçmiş hadiseler ile kurulan analogi zor ve karmaşık olan dış politika karar alma sürecini daha anlaşılır kılmaktadır. Nitekim özellikle ABD üzerine yapılan çalışmalar, Münih anlaşması başta olmak üzere pek çok tarihsel olayın ilerleyen yıllarda karar verme sürecini etkilediğini vur-

³⁹ Sara Bleich, “Is It All in a Word? The Effect of Issue Framing on Public Support for Us Spending on HIV/AIDS in Developing Countries,” *Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics* 12, no. 2 (2007), s. 120-132; William G. Jacoby, “Issue Framing and Public Opinion on Government Spending,” *American Journal of Political Science* 44, no. 4 (2000), s. 750-67; Neophytos G. Loizides, “Elite Framing and Conflict Transformation in Turkey,” *Parliamentary Affairs* 62, no. 2 (2008), s. 278-297.

⁴⁰ Robert M Entman, *Projections of Power: Framing News, Public Opinion, and Us Foreign Policy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004); Robert Entman ve Andrew Rojecki, “Freezing out the Public: Elite and Media Framing of the U.S. Anti-Nuclear Movement,” *Political Communication* 10, no. 2 (1993), s.150-173.

⁴¹ Jack S. Levy, “Learning and Foreign Policy: Sweeping a Conceptual Minefield,” *International Organization* 48, no. 2 (2009), s. 279-312; Colin J. Bennett ve Michael Howlett, “The Lessons of Learning: Reconciling Theories of Policy Learning and Policy Change,” *Policy Sciences* 25, no. 3 (1992), s.275-294 ; Annika Brändström, Fredrik Bynander ve Paul ‘t Hart, “Governing by Looking Back: Historical Analogies and Crisis Management,” *Public Administration* 82, no. 1 (2004), s.191-210.

⁴² Mintz ve De Rouen Jr, *Understanding Foreign Policy*, s.103.

⁴³ David P Dolowitz ve David Marsh, “Learning from Abroad: The Role of Policy Transfer in Contemporary Policy-Making,” *Governance* 13, no. 1 (2000), s.5-23.

⁴⁴ James I. Walsh, “Policy Failure and Policy Change: British Security Policy after the Cold War,” *Comparative Political Studies* 39, no. 4 (2006), s. 490-518.

gulamıştır.⁴⁵ Kuşkusuz karar verme sürecine ilişkin yukarıda çizilen çerçeve ve demokrasi teşviki araçları olan yardımlardan askeri müdahalelere geniş bir hat boyunca uzanan dış politika davranışları ile yakından bağlantılıdır. Zira karar vericiler demokratik teşvik hedefine matuf eylemin gerekliliğini ve şeklini, sorun tanımının ve karar verme sürecinin sonunda belirlemektedir. Bu nedenle karar vericilerin sosyal gerçekliği anlama biçimi, olaylar ve aktörlere yükledikleri anlamlar, kurdukları analogiler ve bir bütün olarak geçmişe yönelik değerlendirmeleri dış politika çıktısı açısından belirleyici bir niteliğe haizdir.

Obama İktidarının Ortadoğu Politikasında İki Kısıt: Geçmişin Yükü ve Şimdinin Yorumlanması

Obama'nın özellikle olumlu sinyallerle başladığı genel olarak Ortadoğu siyaseti ve daha özelden Arap Baharı sürecinde başarılı bir sınav ortaya koymadığı sıklıkla dile getirilen bir iddia niteliğindedir. Her şeyden önce İran ve Küba gibi ülkelere yönelik Obama yönetiminin kucaklayıcı tavrı, başta yakın çalışma arkadaşları olan demokratlar olmak üzere çeşitli kesimlerden tepki almıştır.⁴⁶ Öte yandan Arap Baharı sürecinde pek çok ülkenin demokratikleşme çabalarına yönelik destek veya demokratik gerilemeye yönelik tepkiler sınırlı olmuştur. Zira kimi durumlarda Obama iktidarı cereyan eden kimi demokrasi ihlallerine sessiz kalmayı yeğlemiştir. Arap Baharına ilişkin olumlu retorik, ilgili coğrafyada kritik anlarda atılması gereken adımlarla desteklenmemiştir. Nitekim bir bütün olarak değerlendirildiğinde Obama dönemi dış politika teşviki girişimlerinin tüm Ortadoğu ülkeleri açısından bir bütünlük arz etmediği iddia edilebilecektir.⁴⁷

Ortadoğu politikasında Obama'nın iki temel kısıt nedeniyle demokrasi teşviki konusunda ikircikli bir tavır takındığı iddia edilebilecektir. Dış politi-

⁴⁵ Andrew J. Taylor ve John T. Rourke, "Historical Analogies in the Congressional Foreign Policy Process," *The Journal of Politics* 57, no. 2 (1995), s.460-468; Yuen Foong Khong, *Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the Vietnam Decisions of 1965*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992). Konuya dair ayrıntılı bir literatür taraması için bkz. Mintz ve DeRouen Jr, *Understanding Foreign Policy*, s.103-114.

⁴⁶ Julie Hirschfeld Davis ve Ashley Parker, "Menendez's Views on Cuba and Iran Show Rifts With Obama", *The New York Times*, 5 Şubat 2015, <https://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/06/us/politics/senator-robert-menendez-obama-cuba-iran.html>, Erişim Tarihi: 2 Ocak 2016.

⁴⁷ Charles W. Dunne, "Democracy Promotion: Obama's Mixed Record," 19 Kasım 2014, <https://www.mei.edu/publications/democracy-promotion-obamas-mixed-record>, Erişim Tarihi: 22 Mayıs 2016. ; Thomas Carothers, *Democracy Policy under Obama: Revitalization or Retreat?* (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2012), s. 6.

ka karar alma sürecine tesir eden ve karar denklemini deęiřtiren bu iki faktör řu řekilde ortaya koyulabilir: Öncelikle Bush döneminin militarizme bel baęlayan Ortadoęu politikasının yarattığı bölgesel tahribat Obama'nın pasif politikasının altında yatan nedenlerden biri niteliğindedir. Başkanlığı sürecinde Obama'nın karşı karşıya kaldığı en büyük handikap G.W. Bush döneminden tevarüs eden olumsuzluklar ile nasıl mücadele edileceğiydi.⁴⁸ Bir taraftan Irak müdahalesinin ardından İran'ın bölgede kazandığı etkinlik dięer taraftan ise bölgede terörizmin zemin bulması ABD'yi bölgede zor durumda bırakan gelişmeler olarak ortaya çıkmıřtı.⁴⁹ Bunun yanında ABD'nin küresel düzeyde ve daha özelde Ortadoęu'da aldığı kamuoyu desteęi kaygı verici boyutlara düşmüřtür.⁵⁰ Tüm bu gelişmeler Bush demokrasisinin dayandığı demokrasi retoriğine yaslanan askeri müdahaleciliğin bir sonucu olarak deęerlendirilerek ABD akademisinin çeřitli mahfillerinde eleřtiri konusu edilmiřtir. Öte yandan Obama'nın askeri müdahale seęeneğini gündeminden kaldırmasına karşın demokrasi söylemini tümüyle reddetmediğine dikkat çekmek gerekmektedir.⁵¹ Dięer bir deyiřle demokrasi retorięi Obama döneminde özellikle Ortadoęu özelinde tümüyle ortadan kalkmamıřtır. Bununla birlikte Obama, evrensel demokrasinin asgari müştereklerine dikkat çekmesine karşın barıř yanlısı olduęu ve zor kullanımının karşısında olduęunu zikretmekten geri durmamıřtır⁵².

İkinci olarak Obama'nın özellikle Arap Baharı sonrasında Ortadoęu'da çatıřan aktörlerin demokratik niteliğine yönelik algısı sürecin anlamlandırılmasında büyük bir öneme haizdir. Bir başka deyiřle Ortadoęu siyasetinde olaylar ve aktörleri çerçeveleme biçimi dıř politika çıktısı açısından önem kazanmaktadır. Dıř politikanın iç politik kaynaklarına karar verme yaklařımı baęlamında deęinilen bu çalışmada politika üretim sürecinin karar vericilerin olayları ve aktörleri nasıl çerçevelediğinden masun olmadığı iddia edilmektedir. Dolayısıyla demokrasi teřvikine yönelik dıř politika davranıřının da biliřsel bir boyut taşıyan karar verme sürecinin sonucu olduęu kabul edilmektedir. Bu çalışma kapsamında ABD karar vericileri nezdinde Arap

⁴⁸ Nau, "Obama's Foreign Policy," s.28-29.

⁴⁹ Byman, "Sectarianism Afflicts the New Middle East.", s.79-100.

⁵⁰ "Global Public Opinion in the Bush Years (2001-2008)", 18 Aralık 2008, <http://www.pewglobal.org/2008/12/18/global-public-opinion-in-the-bush-years-2001-2008/>, Eriřim Tarihi: 21 Mayıs 2015.

⁵¹ Carothers, Democracy Policy under Obama: Revitalization or Retreat?, s. 12.

⁵² Mark Moyar, "Leaving Behind "Leading from Behind"," Hoover Institution-Strategica, no. 36 (2016), <https://www.hoover.org/research/leaving-behind-leading-behind>, Eriřim Tarihi: 30 Kasım 2016.

İsyanlarında özellikle Müslüman Kardeşler merkezli hareketlerin demokratik niteliğinin medya ve karar vericiler nezdinde algılanma biçiminin dış politika çıktısına etki ettiği iddia edilmektedir. Obama açısından en büyük güçlüklerden biri Arap Baharı sürecinde aktörlere ve olayları nasıl doğru biçimde anlamlandırılacağı olmuştur. Nitekim akademide vurgulanan Arap Baharı sürecinin bir demokratikleşme dalgası olarak mı bölgesel olarak giderek güçlenen İslamcı aktörlerin bölgede kurumsallaşmasının yaratacağı tehlike olarak mı değerlendirileceği konusu iki farklı çerçeve olarak karar vericilerin önünde yer almıştır.⁵³ Özellikle şiddet eğilimli cihatçı hareketler üzerinden yürütülen tartışmalar ABD kamuoyu ve dolayısıyla karar vericiler nezdinde tesirler doğurmuştur. Bu doğrultuda Arap baharının çerçevelenme süreci demokratikleşme merkezinde değil jeopolitik ve güvenlik kaygıları etrafında okunmuştur.⁵⁴ Bu çalışmada demokrasi teşviki girişimleri merkezinde Obama'nın politikaları farklı Ortadoğu ülkeleri çerçevesinde analiz edilmeye çalışılacaktır. Bu doğrultuda Mısır, Libya ve Suriye örnekleri üzerinde Obama'nın Arap Baharı sürecini nasıl yürüttüğü ve bu politikanın bir bütün olarak ABD dış politikası için ne anlama geldiği tartışılacaktır.

Otokrasiden İç Savaşa Libya

ABD-Libya ilişkileri kuruluşundan itibaren sorunlu olagelmıştır. Özellikle Libya-Sovyet temasının hız kazanmasına müteakip olarak ilişkiler, Reagan döneminde hızla bozulmuş, ABD Libya'ya yönelik bir boykot başlatmıştır. Öyle ki çeşitli havaalanlarında gerçekleştirilen terör eylemleri ve 1986 yılında Berlin'de ABD askerlerinin bombalı saldırı ile öldürülmesi ile başlayan ABD- Libya gerilimi uzun süre hız kesmeksizin sürmüştür.⁵⁵ Müteakiben, ABD Trablus ve Bingazi'de bir takım hedefleri bombalamıştır.⁵⁶ 1988 yılını ise her iki ülke açısından krizin zirveye tırmandığı yıl olarak tanımlamak yanlış olmayacaktır. Zira bu tarihte 103 nolu Pan-Am uçağının düşürülmesi tarihe Lockerbie faciası olarak kazınacaktır.⁵⁷ Lockerbie faciasıyla dibe vuran

⁵³ Arap Baharının zaman içerisinde böylesi bir dönüşüm geçirdiği vurgulanmıştır. Michael J. Totten, David Schenker ve Hussain Abdul-Hussain, "Arab Spring or Islamist Winter? Three Views," *World Affairs* 174, no. 5 (2012), s.23-42.

⁵⁴ Nau, "Obama's Foreign Policy.," s.30-35.

⁵⁵ Festus Ugboaja Ohaegbulam, "US Measures against Libya since the Explosion of Pan Am Flight 103," *Mediterranean Quarterly* 11, no. 1 (2000), s.115.

⁵⁶ Yahia H. Zoubir, "Libya in US Foreign Policy: From Rogue State to Good Fellow?," *Third World Quarterly* 23, no. 1 (2002), s. 32-33;

⁵⁷ Geoff Simons, *Libya: The Struggle for Survival* (London: Palgrave, MacMillan, 1996), s.3-6; Ohaegbulam, "US Measures against Libya since the Explosion of Pan Am Flight 103," s.111-135.

ABD- Libya münasebetleri 1999 yılı ile beraber düzelme eğilimi göstermiş, 2003 yılında Libya'nın Lockerbie eyleminin faillerini teslim etmesi; kitle imha silahlarının üretiminin durdurulması ve denetiminin sağlanması garantisıyla ikili ilişkiler iyileşme eğilimi göstermiştir.⁵⁸

Obama iktidarı, Libya ile ilişkilerde böylesi bir tarihsel bagaj devralmıştır. Arap Baharı sürecinde Libya ile ilişkiler farklı ve mecraya girmiştir. Libya'ya yönelik Obama yönetiminin tavrı bir bütün olarak düşünüldüğünde uçuşa yasak bir bölge oluşturulması ve demokrasinin sözlü tavsiyesi ile sınırlı kalmıştır. Buna karşın Kaddafi'nin muhaliflere karşı kitlesel bir kıyım girişebileceği riski, Obama yönetimini harekete geçirmiştir. BM'nin 1973 sayılı kararı ile gerçekleştirilen NATO operasyonu dengeleri Kaddafi aleyhine değiştirmiştir.⁵⁹ Bununla birlikte operasyon sonrasında ABD Libya'da istikrarı sağlayacak anayasal bir yönetimin kurulmasına yönelik gerekli adımları atmakta imtina etmiştir.⁶⁰ Obama'nın Libya'da yaşadığı en büyük ikilem ABD'nin bölgeye yönelik kalıcı bir müdahalesinin Libya'da yeni bir Irak sendromu yaratma tehlikesi olmuştur. Öyle ki ABD büyükelçisinin linç edildiği görüntülerin medyaya yansması⁶¹ karar vericiler nezdinde Libya'da ABD karşıtlığının aldığı boyutları gözler önüne sermiştir. Nitekim başkanlık sürecinin sonunda verdiği demeçlerde Obama, Libya'da yaşananlara yönelik pişmanlığını ortaya koymaktan çekinmeyecektir.⁶² Bir bütün olarak düşünüldüğünde ABD kamuoyu, ülkelerinin Libya'da yaşanan bir iç savaşın içine çekilmesine yönelik kaygılarının yanı sıra başta İslamcı gruplar olmak üzere bölgesel aktörlerin demokratik niteliklerine yönelik kuşklarını da ortaya koymaktan geri durmamıştır. Tüm bu nedenler göz önüne alındığında ABD'nin Libya başta olmak üzere farklı Arap ülkelerinde yaşanan gelişmeler karşısında net bir pozisyon almak hususunda başarısız olduğu iddia edilebilecektir.

⁵⁸ Bruce W. Jentleson ve A. Whytock Christopher, "Who 'Won' Libya?: The Force-Diplomacy Debate and Its Implications for Theory and Policy," *International Security* 30, no. 3 (2005), s.47.

⁵⁹ Sarah Brockmeier, Oliver Stuenkel ve Marcos Tourinho, "The Impact of the Libya Intervention Debates on Norms of Protection," *Global Society* 30, no.1 (2016), s.115-117.

⁶⁰ Alan J Kuperman, "Obama's Libya Debacle: How a Well-Meaning Intervention Ended in Failure," *Foreign Affairs*, 94, no.2, (2015), s.66-77; Frederic Wehrey, "Why Libya's transition to democracy failed", *Washington Post*, 17 Şubat 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/02/17/why-libyas-transition-failed/?utm_term=.92f969ca06db, Erişim Tarihi: 17 Mayıs 2016.

⁶¹ Olaya dair ayrıntılar için bkz. Dan Robinson, "Obama Condemns Libya Attack that Killed US Ambassador" *VOA News*, 12 Eylül 2012, <https://www.voanews.com/a/us-ambassador-3-others-killed-in-libya-attack-/1506222.html>, Erişim Tarihi: 15 Mayıs 2015.

⁶² "President Obama: Libya aftermath 'worst mistake' of presidency", *BBC*, 11 Nisan 2016, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-36013703>, Erişim Tarihi: 20 Mayıs 2016.

Demokrasiden Cuntaya Mısır

Kuşkusuz Mısır, ABD'nin Ortadoğu'da en istikrarlı ortaklarından biri olmuştur. Mısır ve İsrail'in temellerini teşkil ettiği Camp David düzeni, ABD açısından uzun yıllar özenle korunmaya çalışılmıştır. Enver Sedat ile başlayan ikili ilişkiler⁶³ Arap Baharı süreciyle sekteye uğramıştır. Mübarek'in, Obama'nın uzun süreli reform taleplerini yerine getirmekte yetersiz kalması sonucunda ABD hükümeti mevcut Mısır yönetiminin uzaklaştırılmasından yana bir tavır almıştır. Öte yandan örneğin Obama'nın Mısır'da resmi otoritelerce tanınmayan sivil toplum kuruluşlarına yardımlarını kesmesi⁶⁴ dış politika yapımcılarının yaşadığı kafa karışıklığını gözler önüne sermektedir.

Devrimin başarıya ulaşması ve Müslüman Kardeşlerin iktidara taşınması sonrasında da benzer bir kafa karışıklığı sürmüştür. Öyle ki Mısır'da yaşanan karşı devrim sürecini anti-demokratik bir müdahale olarak nitelendirmekten kaçınmaları dikkat çekmektedir. Bu çerçevede özellikle Dış İşleri Bakanı John Kerry'nin konuya ilişkin değerlendirmeleri büyük öneme sahiptir. Konuyla ilgili Kerry'nin ortaya koyduğu ipucu niteliğinde iki açıklamadan bahsedilebilir. Bunlardan ilki Kerry'nin 3 Temmuz darbesi sonrasında yaşanan sürecin darbeden çok "demokrasinin yeniden tesisi" olduğu iddiası dış politikanın dümeninde oturanların olayları yorumlama biçimine yönelik bir ipucu olarak değerlendirilebilecektir.⁶⁵ Yine Kerry, "devrimi İslamcılar çaldı" açıklaması ile Mısır'da politik aktörlere yönelik bakış açısını ve süreci okuma biçimini açık bir biçimde ortaya koymaktadır.⁶⁶ Yine benzer şekilde başkan Obama ise 3 Temmuz hadisesini bir "darbe" olarak nitelendirmekten uzak durmuştu.⁶⁷ Dalacoura'un aktardığı gibi Obama darbe ertesinde askeri cuntaya "sivil yönetime dönüşü", Müslüman kardeşler için ise "toplum-

⁶³ İlişkilerin gelişimine dair bkz. Duncan L. Clarke, "US Security Assistance to Egypt and Israel: Politically Untouchable?". Middle East Journal 51, no. 2 (1997), s.200-214.

⁶⁴ Carothers, Democracy Policy under Obama: Revitalization or Retreat?, s.13.

⁶⁵ Michael R. Gordon ve Kareem Fahim, "Kerry Says Egypt's Military Was 'Restoring Democracy' in Ousting Morsi", New York Times, 1 Ağustos 2013, <https://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/02/world/middleeast/egypt-warns-morsi-supporters-to-end-protests.html>, Erişim Tarihi: 12 Mayıs 2015.

⁶⁶ Catherine Chomiak, "Kerry: Egyptian revolution 'stolen' by Muslim Brotherhood", NBC News, 3 Kasım 2015, <https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/kerry-egyptian-revolution-stolen-muslim-brotherhood-flna2D11629787>, Erişim Tarihi: 18 Mayıs 2015.

⁶⁷ Dan Roberts, "US in bind over Egypt after supporting Morsi but encouraging protesters", The Guardian, 3 Temmuz 2013, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/03/egypt-obama-us-mohamed-morsi-crisis>, Erişim Tarihi: 2 Haziran 2015.

sal konsensüs oluşturmayı" salık vermiştir.⁶⁸ ABD, darbe sonrası aralarında ABD vatandaşlarının da bulunduğu tutuklamalara karşı sessiz kaldığı gibi askeri yardımların sürdürülmesi yönünde bir politika izlenmesini de uygun bulmuştur.⁶⁹

Öte yandan Amerikan medyasının da Mısır'da devrim ve karşı devrim sürecine yönelik okumaları ve olayları çerçeveleme biçimlerinin politika yapımcıların bakış açısına tesir etmiş olması muhtemeldir.⁷⁰ Öyle ki Mısır'da Müslüman Kardeşler'in siyasal İslam fikri ve demokrasi hedefi arasındaki gerilimin altı sıklıkla çizilmiştir.⁷¹ Fisk'e göre Obama'nın yaşanan hadiseleri darbe olarak nitelendirememesinin ardında darbenin arkasında toplumsal bir destek olduğu düşüncesi yatmaktadır.⁷² Daha teorik düzeyde, ABD'nin de içerisinde yer aldığı Batı ülkelerin kimi durumlarda seçilmiş aktörlerin demokrasi adına içerisinde darbelerinde olduğu yöntemlerle tasfiyesine yeşil ışık yakabildiğine odaklanan bir takım çalışmalara rastlamak mümkündür.⁷³

Kaosun Coğrafyası Suriye

ABD-Suriye ilişkileri ilk yıllarından bu yana bir oranda gerilim içerisinde olmuştur. Suriye'nin bağımsızlığının ardından ABD destekli General Zaim darbesi taraflar arasındaki güvensizliğin nedenleri ve ilişkilerin geleceği hakkında ipuçları sunmaktadır.⁷⁴ Yine taraflar arasındaki ilişkilere zarar veren bir diğer kriz Lübnan'da konuşlanan ABD güçlerine yönelik saldırılarda Hafız Esad'ın etkisi olduğu iddiasından kaynaklanmıştır.⁷⁵ İlerleyen yıllar-

⁶⁸ Katerina Dalacoura, "Coup D'etat or Liberation? Us-Egypt Relations after the Fall of Mohamed Morsi," International Affairs at LSE, 8 Temmuz 2013, http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/81598/1/Coup%20d%E2%80%99etat%20or%20liberation_%20US-Egypt%20relations%20after%20the%20fall%20of%20Mohamed%20Morsi%20_%20International%20Affairs%20at%20LSE.pdf, Erişim Tarihi: 15 Mayıs 2016.

⁶⁹ Dunne, "Democracy Promotion: Obama's Mixed Record." , 19 Kasım 2014, <https://www.mei.edu/publications/democracy-promotion-obamas-mixed-record>, Erişim Tarihi: 22 Mayıs 2016.

⁷⁰ Müslüman Kardeşler'e yönelik medyanın üstlendiği söz konusu role ilişkin bir diğer değerlendirme için bkz. Yalçın, "Obama Stratejisi ve Ortadoğu", s.68.

⁷¹ Andrea L. Guzman, "Evolution of News Frames During the 2011 Egyptian Revolution: Critical Discourse Analysis of Fox News's and Cnn's Framing of Protesters, Mubarak, and the Muslim Brotherhood," Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly 93, no. 1 (2016), s.80-98.

⁷² Robert Fisk, "When is a military coup not a military coup? When it happens in Egypt, apparently", The Independent, 4 Temmuz 2013, <https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/comment/when-is-a-military-coup-not-a-military-coup-when-it-happens-in-egypt-apparently-8688000.html>, Erişim Tarihi: 10 Mayıs 2015.

⁷³ Ozan O. Varol, "The Democratic Coup D'état," Harvard International Law Journal, 53 no.2 (2012), s.292-356. Konuyla ilgili Türkiye örneği üzerinden bir değerlendirme için bkz. Gökhan Bozbaş, "Batı'nın Demokrasi Paradoksu, 'Demokratik Darbe' Kavramsallaştırması ve 15 Temmuz Darbe Kalkışması," Muhafazakâr Düşünce 13, no. 49 (2016), s.73-90.

⁷⁴ Douglas Little, "Cold War and Covert Action: The United States and Syria, 1945-1958," Middle East Journal 44, no. 1 (1990), s. 55-58.

⁷⁵ Eyal Zisser, "Syria and the United States: Bad Habits Die Hard," Middle East Quarterly 10, no. 3 (2003), s.34

da Suriye'nin gerek ABD'nin terör listesinde yer alan örgütleri desteklemesi gerekse de 2003 yılında ABD'nin Irak müdahalesine yönelik tepkisi taraflar arasındaki gerilimin sürmesinin zeminini teşkil etmiştir.⁷⁶ Öte yandan Arap Baharı sürecinde ABD'nin Suriye konusunda kararlı ve net bir dış politika izlediğini söylemek mümkün değildir. Nitekim Suriye politikasında söylem incelendiğinde 2015 yılı gibi geç bir tarihte bile "Esat gitmeli" ifadesini seslendirmektedir.⁷⁷ Barack Obama buna karşın "kırmızı çizgi" olarak kabul ettiği kimyasal silah kullanımında bile dengeleri değiştirecek aktif bir müdahaleden geri durmuştur.⁷⁸ Bununla birlikte Suriye politikasının birkaç aşamadan müteşekkil olduğu ifade edilebilecektir. İlk aşamada Esat hükümetinin meşruiyeti tanınmamakta ve uzaklaştırılması arzulanmakta iken ikinci aşamada el Kaide ve DAES'in Suriye'de etkin aktörler haline gelmesi önceliğin terör tehdidi olarak belirlenmesini beraberinde getirdi. Kuşkusuz Obama'nın bu noktada en büyük handikabı doğru değerlendirmeler yapmanın giderek zorlaştığı bir ortamda politika üretme zorunluluğuydu. Zira DAES'in varlığı otoriter bir güç olarak Esad'ın gidişini ikinci plana atmıştır.⁷⁹ Ayrıca Obama'nın Suriye'ye yönelik aktif müdahale fikrine direnmesinin arkasında bölgedeki aktörlerden kaynaklı belirsiz durumun varlığının Esat sonrası Suriye'nin "aşırıılık için bir kurtarılmış bölge" haline dönüşmesi endişesi yatmaktadır.⁸⁰ Kuşkusuz ABD medyasının ve karar vericilerinin bir kısmının da yoğun bir şekilde altını çizdiği güvenilmez muhalefet temasının karar vericilerin nezdinde bir takım etkiler yaratmış olması muhtemeldir.

⁷⁶ Ibid., s. 33-35.

⁷⁷ Colleen McCain Nelson, "Obama Says Syrian Leader Bashar al-Assad Must Go", The Wall Street Journal, 19 Kasım 2015, <https://www.wsj.com/articles/obama-says-syrian-leader-bashar-al-assad-must-go-1447925671>, Erişim Tarihi: 25 Mayıs 2016.

⁷⁸ Gregg Jaffe, "The problem with Obama's account of the Syrian red-line incident", The Washington Post, 4 Ekim 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2016/10/04/the-problem-with-obamas-account-of-the-syrian-red-line-incident/?utm_term=.3d290ca8af1d, Erişim Tarihi: 25 Mayıs 2016; Yalçın, "Obama Stratejisi ve Ortadoğu", s.58.

⁷⁹ Simon Tisdall, "US changes its tune on Syrian regime change as Isis threat takes top priority", The Guardian, 25 Ocak 2015, <https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/jan/25/us-syrian-regime-change-isis-priority>, Erişim Tarihi: 12 Mayıs 2016.

⁸⁰ Ewen, McAskill, "Obama: post-Assad Syria of Islamist extremism is nightmare scenario", The Guardian, 22 Mart 2013, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/mar/22/obama-syria-assad-syria-extremists>, Erişim Tarihi: 15 Mayıs 2015.

Sonuç

Obama döneminden demokrasinin dış politikada üstlendiği role ilişkin tartışmalar eksik olmamıştır. Nitekim pek çok kişi Obama'nın dış politikasının tutarsızlığına vurgu yaparken demokrasi teşvikinin Obama politikasında sınırlı bir yer edinmesine yönelik teorik bir çerçeve sunulmamıştır. Ortadoğu'da Obama'nın Irak'tan çekilmesi ve İran'a yönelik barışçıl tutumu Obama'nın askeri çözümleri dış politika repertuarında yer bulmadığının işareti olarak kabul edilmiştir. Buna karşın başlangıçta Obama tarafından kucaklanan ve demokratikleşme adına olumlu bir adım olarak görülen Arap Baharı'na yönelik zaman içerisinde umulan düzeyde destek sağlanmadı. Demokrasi teşviki noktasında Arap Baharı sürecinde gerekli araçların neden kullanılmadığının araştırıldığı bu çalışmada, dış politikada karar alma yaklaşımlarından faydalanılmıştır. Kuşkusuz Arap Baharı sürecinde Obama'nın demokratikleşmeye yönelik siyasetinin doğru anlaşılması dış politika karar alma sürecinde etkili aktörlerin ve medyanın yoğun etkisi göz önüne alınmaksızın mümkün değildir. Obama'nın demokratikleşmeye yönelik siyasetinin seçilmiş Arap ülkeleri etkileşimleri çerçevesinde ele alındığı bu analizde Libya, Mısır ve Suriye üç örnek ülke olarak değerlendirilmiştir.

Her şeyden önce kapsamlı bir kara müdahalesi ve müteakip devlet inşası Bush döneminde ortaya çıkardığı olumsuzluklar göz önüne alınmış ve Obama tarafından geçerli seçenekler olarak düşünülmemiştir. Bu nedenle demokrasi teşviki siyasetinde kapsamlı bir askeri müdahale gündeme getirilmemiştir. Kuşkusuz Libya ve Suriye bu durumun tipik örnekleridir. Bunun yanında başta Mısır olmak üzere ele alınan tüm ülkelerde İslamcı aktörler ABD'li karar vericilerce demokratikleştirici güçler olarak değerlendirilmemiş, bu nedenle ilgililer dış politika geleneğinin kurucu bir bileşeni olan demokratik teşvik konusunda kararlı adımlar atmaktan büyük ölçüde imtina etmiştir. Sonuç olarak gerek Bush döneminin yarattığı olumsuz mirasın Obama yönetimi üzerinde bıraktığı etki, gerekse de ilgili ülkelerdeki İslamcı aktörlerin demokratik niteliklerine yönelik algı, Obama döneminde demokrasi teşviki konusunda etkili kararlar alınmasının önüne geçmiştir. Özellikle DAESH ve El Kaide gibi örgütlerin varlığı bölgede demokratik niteliklere sahip aktörlerin bu yapılardan ayrıştırılmasını zorlaştırmıştır. Bu çerçevede aktörlerin demokratik nitelikleri medya ve dış politika yapımcılar nezdinde karar

vericilerin dış politika tercihlerinde belirleyici çerçeveler görevini üstlenmiştir. Bu çalışma sonuçlara odaklı makro siyasetten ziyade süreçlere odaklı bir yaklaşım çerçevesinde Obama dış politikasının şekillendiğini ve karar alma sürecinin dış politika çıktısına etki ettiğini savunmaktadır.

Extended Abstract

This study investigates the US democracy promotion strategy during the Arab Spring. The idea of democracy, has played an important role in foreign policy making throughout history as a pillar of American politics. It could also be argued that democracy was also a major element in the foreign policy rhetoric of Barack Obama, the forty-fourth president of the USA. Obama's stance vis a vis the Middle Eastern nations during the Arab Spring was quite ambitious, but the gap between Obama's democracy rhetoric toward Arab countries and his failure to turn this rhetoric into action is often commented on. However, the reasons behind Obama's failed democracy promotion toward the Middle East during the Arab Spring has so far been overlooked. This study focuses on the role of democracy in Obama's foreign policy toward Arab Spring countries within the framework of decision-making theories. The paper is divided into three sections: a short evaluation of democracy promotion in the US policy throughout history, the review of related decision making theories and the provision of case studies to account for the US foreign policy during the Arab Spring. In order to explicate the relevance of democracy in Obama's foreign policy, democracy promotion in US foreign policy and research on foreign policy decision making are included as two distinct literature reviews. This study based on qualitative analysis relying on data derived from mostly secondary sources including books, articles, reports and newspapers.

Basically, this work emphasizes two theoretical points to account for the US foreign policy toward the Arab Spring countries during Obama's tenure. First, it is argued that the G. W. Bush heritage left an indelible mark on the US foreign policy makers which prevented them from taking steps towards democratization of the region. This means that despite Obama's pro-democratic rhetoric, he failed to develop a foreign policy in the Middle East based on protecting democracy due to the burden of the past. The negative consequences of Bush's aggressive foreign policy impinged on Obama's foreign

policy decision-making process. Hence, this study contends that theories of foreign policy learning provide a framework to understand the US strategy. Obama's reluctance to extend regime building to a working democracy or tolerance toward the Egyptian military rule following the coup d'état are cases in point. Similarly, Obama hesitated to launch an extensive military offensive against the Assad government which is known for its autocratic proclivity and infringements on human rights during the Syrian civil war. Second, Obama and his inner circle viewed the developments in Arab countries as not being democratic revolutions particularly in the later stages of the Arab Spring. In this regard, the democratic credentials of the Muslim Brotherhood were questioned extensively in the region. For example, it can be inferred that Obama's silence over the coup d'état in Egypt arose from the presence of anti-Muslim Brotherhood (MB) protests against lack of political and civil rights. Ambivalence in distinguishing between moderate and radical elements coincided with the rise of ISIS became very hard for US decision-makers to discern such movements in Libya and Syria. Taking into account all of these factors, the viewpoint of the Arab Spring as a democratic revolutionary movement changed substantially in the following years. This means that it is widely believed that rising sectarianism and inter-societal hatred dashed the hopes of political transformation in the Arab world and thus the Arab Spring turned sour. Against this backdrop, this study aims to employ framing theories as a second insight to account for the US foreign decision-making process during the Arab Spring. Overall, drawing from theories of foreign policy learning and framing in the foreign policy decision-making process, this study seeks to explain Obama's policy during the Arab Spring centering on Libya, Egypt and Syria cases.

Kaynaklar

- Bennett, Colin J. ve Michael Howlett. "The Lessons of Learning: Reconciling Theories of Policy Learning and Policy Change." *Policy Sciences* 25, no. 3 (1992): 275-94.
- Bleich, Sara. "Is It All in a Word? The Effect of Issue Framing on Public Support for Us Spending on Hiv/Aids in Developing Countries." *Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics* 12, no. 2 (2007): 120-32.
- Bozbaş, Gökhan. "Batı'nın Demokrasi Paradoksu, 'Demokratik Darbe' Kavramsallaştırması Ve 15 Temmuz Darbe Kalkışması." . *Muhafazakâr Düşünce* 13, no. 49 (2016): 73-90.
- Brancati, Dawn. "The Determinants of Us Public Opinion Towards Democracy Promotion." *Political Behavior* 36, no. 4 (2014): 705-30.
- Brändström, Annika, Fredrik Bynander, and Paul 't Hart. "Governing by Looking Back: Historical Analogies and Crisis Management." *Public Administration* 82, no. 1 (2004): 191-210.
- Brock, Lothar , Anna Geis, ve Harald Müller, "Introduction: The Theoretical Challenge of Democratic Wars," Anna Geis, Lothar Brock, and Harald Müller (Edt.), *Democratic Wars: Looking at the Dark Side of Democratic Peace*, London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2006.
- Brockmeier, Sarah, Oliver Stuenkel ve Marcos Tourinho, "The Impact of the Libya Intervention Debates on Norms of Protection," *Global Society* 30, no.1 (2016): 113-133.
- Byman, Daniel. "Sectarianism Afflicts the New Middle East." *Survival* 56, no. 1 (2014): 79-100.
- Carothers, Thomas. "Aiding Democracy Abroad: The Learning Curve." Carnegie Endowment, 2011.
- — —. *Democracy Policy under Obama: Revitalization or Retreat?* Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2012.
- — —. "Democracy Promotion under Clinton ". *The Washington Quarterly* 18, no. 4 (1995): 13-25.
- — —. "The Ned at 10." *Foreign Policy*, no. 95 (1994): 123-38.
- Chandler, David. "Back to the Future? The Limits of Neo-Wilsonian Ideals of Exporting Democracy." *Review of International Studies* 32, no. 3 (2006): 475-94.
- Chomiak, Catherine. "Kerry: Egyptian revolution 'stolen' by Muslim Brotherhood", *NBC News*, 3 Kasım 2015, <https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/kerry-e>

- gyptian-revolution-stolen-muslim-brotherhood-flna2D11629787, Erişim Tarihi: 18 Mayıs 2015.
- Chong, Dennis ve James N. Druckman. "Framing Theory." *Annual Review of Political Science* 10, no. 1 (2007): 103-26.
- Clarke, Duncan L. "Us Security Assistance to Egypt and Israel: Politically Untouchable?" *Middle East Journal* 51, no. 2 (1997): 200-14.
- Dalacoura, Katerina. "Coup D'etat or Liberation? Us-Egypt Relations after the Fall of Mohamed Morsi." *International Affairs at LSE*, 8 Temmuz 2013, http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/81598/1/Coup%20d%E2%80%99etat%20or%20liberation_%20US-Egypt%20relations%20after%20the%20fall%20of%20Mohamed%20Morsi%20_%20International%20Affairs%20at%20LSE.pdf , Erişim Tarihi: 15 Mayıs 2016.
- Davis, Julie Hirschfeld ve Ashley Parker, "Menendez's Views on Cuba and Iran Show Rifts With Obama", *The New York Times*, 5 Şubat 2015, <https://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/06/us/politics/senator-robert-menendez-obama-cuba-iran.html>, Erişim Tarihi: 2 Ocak 2016.
- Dolowitz, David P. ve David Marsh. "Learning from Abroad: The Role of Policy Transfer in Contemporary Policy-Making." *Governance* 13, no. 1 (2000): 5-23.
- Drezner, Daniel W. "Values, Interests, and American Grand Strategy," *Diplomatic History*, 29, no 3 (2005): 429-432.
- Dueck, Colin. "The Accommodator: Obama's Foreign Policy." *Policy Review*, no. 169 (2011): 13-28.
- Dunne, Charles W. "Democracy Promotion: Obama's Mixed Record." , 19 Kasım 2014, <https://www.mei.edu/publications/democracy-promotion-obamas-mixed-record>, Erişim Tarihi. 22 Mayıs 2016.
- Entman, Robert M. *Projections of Power: Framing News, Public Opinion, and Us Foreign Policy*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004.
- Entman, Robert, ve Andrew Rojecki. "Freezing out the Public: Elite and Media Framing of the U.S. Anti-Nuclear Movement." *Political Communication* 10, no. 2 (1993): 155-73.
- Forsythe, David P. "Democracy, War, and Covert Action." *Journal of Peace Research* 29, no. 4 (1992): 385-95.
- Fisk, Robert , "When is a military coup not a military coup? When it happens in Egypt, apparently", *Independent*, 4 Temmuz 2013, <https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/comment/when-is-a-military-coup-not-a-military-coup-when-it-happens-in-egypt-apparently-8688000.html>, Erişim Tarihi: 10 Mayıs 2015.

- Friedman, Thomas, "Obama Makes His Case on Iran Nuclear Deal," *The New York Times*, 14 Temmuz 2015, <https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/15/opinion/thomas-friedman-obama-makes-his-case-on-iran-nuclear-deal.html>, Erişim Tarihi: 16 Ocak 2016.
- Fukuyama, Francis. *The End of History and the Last Man*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 2006.
- Fukuyama, Francis ve Michael McFaul, "Should Democracy Be Promoted or Demoted?." *The Washington Quarterly* 31, no. 1 (2008): 23-45.
- Garrison, Jean A. "Framing Foreign Policy Alternatives in the Inner Circle: President Carter, His Advisors, and the Struggle for the Arms Control Agenda." *Political Psychology* 22, no. 4 (2001): 775-807.
- "Global Public Opinion in the Bush Years (2001-2008)", 18 Aralık 2008, <http://www.pewglobal.org/2008/12/18/global-public-opinion-in-the-bush-years-2001-2008/>, Erişim Tarihi: 21 Mayıs 2015.
- Gökcan, Fulya ve Aylin Güney. "The 'Greater Middle East' as a 'Modern' Geopolitical Imagination in American Foreign Policy ". *Geopolitics* 15, no. 1 (2010): 22-38.
- Guzman, Andrea L. "Evolution of News Frames During the 2011 Egyptian Revolution: Critical Discourse Analysis of Fox News's and Cnn's Framing of Protesters, Mubarak, and the Muslim Brotherhood." *Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly* 93, no. 1 (2016): 80-98.
- Hagan, Joe D. "Domestic Political Explanations in the Analysis of Foreign Policy," Laura Neack, Jeanne A. K. Hey ve Patrick J. Haney (Edt.), *Foreign Policy Analysis: Continuity and Change in Its Second Generation*, ed. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1995: 117-143.
- Hudson, Valerie M. "Foreign Policy Analysis: Actor-Specific Theory and the Ground of International Relations." *Foreign policy analysis* 1, no. 1 (2005): 1-30.
- Ikenberry, "America's Liberal Grand Strategy: Democracy and National Security in the Post-War Era," Micheal Cox, G. John Ikenberry ve Takashi Inoguchi (Edt.), *American Democracy Promotion: Impulses, Strategies, and Impacts* New York: Oxford University 2000: 103-126
- — —. "Why Export Democracy?." *The Wilson Quarterly* (1976-) 23, no. 2 (1999): 56-65.
- Jaffe, Gregg. "The problem with Obama's account of the Syrian red-line incident", *The Washington Post*, 4 Ekim 2016, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/>

- post-politics/wp/2016/10/04/the-problem-with-obamas-account-of-the-syrian-red-line-incident/?utm_term=.3d290ca8af1d, Erişim Tarihi: 25 Mayıs 2016
- Jacoby, William G. "Issue Framing and Public Opinion on Government Spending." *American Journal of Political Science* 44, no. 4 (2000): 750-67.
- Jentleson, Bruce W. ve A. Whytock Christopher. "Who "Won" Libya?: The Force-Diplomacy Debate and Its Implications for Theory and Policy." *International Security* 30, no. 3 (2005): 47-86.
- Jervis, Robert. *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976.
- Kaarbo, Juliet. "A Foreign Policy Analysis Perspective on the Domestic Politics Turn in IR Theory." *International Studies Review* 17, no. 2 (2015):189-216.
- Kegley Jr, Charles W. "The Neoidealist Moment in International Studies? Realist Myths and the New International Realities: Isa Presidential Address March 27, 1993 Acapulco, Mexico." *International Studies Quarterly* 37, no. 2 (1993): 131-46.
- Khong, Yuen Foong. *Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the Vietnam Decisions of 1965*. (N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1992).
- Kuperman, Alan J. "Obama's Libya Debacle: How a Well-Meaning Intervention Ended in Failure." *Foreign Affairs* 94 (2015): 66-77.
- LeoGrande, William M. "Normalizing US-Cuba Relations: Escaping the Shackles of the Past." *International Affairs* 91, no. 3 (2015): 473-88.
- Levy, Jack S. "Learning and Foreign Policy: Sweeping a Conceptual Minefield." *International Organization* 48, no. 2 (2009): 279-312.
- Little, Douglas. "Cold War and Covert Action: The United States and Syria, 1945-1958." *Middle East Journal* 44, no. 1 (1990): 51-75.
- Loizides, Neophytos G. "Elite Framing and Conflict Transformation in Turkey." *Parliamentary Affairs* 62, no. 2 (2008): 278-97.
- Michael Mann, *The Dark Side of Democracy: Explaining Ethnic Cleansing* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
- Mankoff, Jeffrey. "The Tricky Us-Russia "Reset" Button." *Council on Foreign Relations* 18 (2009), <https://www.cfr.org/expert-brief/tricky-us-russia-reset-button>, Erişim Tarihi: 10 Mayıs 2016
- Maoz, Zeev. "Framing the National Interest: The Manipulation of Foreign Policy Decisions in Group Settings." *World Politics* 43, no. 1 (1990): 77-110.

- Ewen, McAskill, "Obama: post-Assad Syria of Islamist extremism is nightmare scenario", *The Guardian*, 22 Mart 2013, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/mar/22/obama-syria-assad-syria-extremists>, Erişim Tarihi: 15 Mayıs 2015.
- McAskill, Ewen . "Obama: post-Assad Syria of Islamist extremism is nightmare scenario", *The Guardian*, 22 Mart 2013, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/mar/22/obama-syria-assad-syria-extremists>, Erişim Tarihi: 15 Mayıs 2015.
- Mintz, Alex ve Karl DeRouen Jr. *Understanding Foreign Policy Decision Making*. Newyork: Cambridge University Press, 2010.
- Monten, Jonathan. "The Roots of the Bush Doctrine: Power, Nationalism, and Democracy Promotion in Us Strategy." *International Security* 29, no. 4 (2005): 112-56.
- Moyar, Mark. "Leaving Behind "Leading from Behind"." *Hoover Institution-Strategica*, no. 36 , 31 Ekim 2016, <https://www.hoover.org/research/leaving-behind-leading-behind>, Erişim Tarihi: 30 Kasım 2016.
- Nau, Henry R. "Obama's Foreign Policy." *Policy Review*, no. 160 (2010): 27.
- Nelson, Colleen McCain . "Obama Says Syrian Leader Bashar al-Assad Must Go", *The Wall Street Journal*, 19 Kasım 2015, <https://www.wsj.com/articles/obama-says-syrian-leader-bashar-al-assad-must-go-1447925671>, Erişim Tarihi: 25 Mayıs 2016.
- Ohaegbulam, Festus Ugboaja. "Us Measures against Libya since the Explosion of Pan Am Flight 103." *Mediterranean Quarterly* 11, no. 1 (2000): 111-35.
- Patterson, Eric. "Obama and Sustainable Democracy Promotion." *International Studies Perspectives* 13, no. 1 (2012): 26-42.
- "President Obama: Libya aftermath 'worst mistake' of presidency", *BBC*, 11 Nisan 2016 , <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-36013703>, Erişim Tarihi: 20 Mayıs 2016.
- Pressman, Jeremy. "Power without Influence: The Bush Administration's Foreign Policy Failure in the Middle East." *International Security* 33, no. 4 (2009): 149-79.
- "Remarks by the President at Cairo University, 6-04-09", 4 Haziran 2009, <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-cairo-university-6-04-09>, Erişim Tarihi: 17 Mayıs 2015.
- Robinson, Dan. "Obama Condemns Libya Attack that Killed US Ambassador" *VOA News*, 12 Eylül 2012, <https://www.voanews.com/a/us-ambassador-3-others-killed-in-libya-attack-/1506222.html>, Erişim Tarihi: 15 Mayıs 2015.

- Ryan Miss ve Matt Spetalnick, "U.S. to pull out of Iraq after nearly 9 years of war", *Reuters*, 21 Ekim 2011, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iraq-usa-obama-idUSTRE79K4LR20111021>
- Simons, Geoff. *Libya: The Struggle for Survival*. London: Palgrave, MacMillan, 1996.
- Smith, Karen E. "Western Actors and the Promotion of Democracy." Alex Pravda ve Jan Zielonka (Edt.), *Democratic Consolidation in Eastern Europe: Volume 2: International and Transnational Factors*. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2001.
- Smith, Tony. *America's Mission: The United States and the Worldwide Struggle for Democracy*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2012.
- Snyder, Richard C, Henry W Bruck ve Burton Sapin, "Decision-Making as an Approach to the Study of International Politics," Richard C. Snyder, Valerie M. Hudson, Derek H. Chollet ve James M. Goldgeier (Edt.), *Foreign Policy Decision-Making (Revisited)*, New York: Springer, 2002: 21-152
- Taylor, Andrew J., and John T. Rourke. "Historical Analogies in the Congressional Foreign Policy Process." *The Journal of Politics* 57, no. 2 (1995): 460-68.
- Tisdall, Simon. "US changes its tune on Syrian regime change as Isis threat takes top priority", *The Guardian*, 25 Ocak 2015, <https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/jan/25/us-syrian-regime-change-isis-priority>, Erişim Tarihi: 12 Mayıs 2016.
- Totten, Michael J., David Schenker ve Hussain Abdul-Hussain. "Arab Spring or Islamist Winter? Three Views." *World Affairs* 174, no. 5 (2012): 23-42.
- Varol, Ozan O. "The Democratic Coup D'état." *Harvard International Law Journal* 53 (2012): 291.
- Walsh, James I. "Policy Failure and Policy Change: British Security Policy after the Cold War." *Comparative Political Studies* 39, no. 4 (2006): 490-518.
- Wehrey, Frederic. "Why Libya's transition to democracy failed", *Washington Post*, 17 Şubat 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/02/17/why-libyas-transition-failed/?utm_term=.92f969ca06db, Erişim Tarihi: 17 Mayıs 2016.
- Wendt, Alexander. *Social Theory of International Politics*. Cambridge Studies in International Relations. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999.
- Yalçın, Hasan B. "Obama Stratejisi ve Ortadoğu," *Akademik Ortadoğu*, 9 no.2, (2015): 55-79.

Yurdusev, Ahmet Nuri. "The Greater Middle East Initiative and Democracy in Muslim States: A Turkish Perspective ". *Korean Journal of Defense Analysis* 18, no. 2 (2006): 73-94.

Zisser, Eyal. "Syria and the United States: Bad Habits Die Hard." *Middle East Quarterly* 10, no. 3 (2003): 29-37.

Zoubir, Yahia H. "Libya in Us Foreign Policy: From Rogue State to Good Fellow?". *Third World Quarterly* 23, no. 1 (2002): 31-53.

HAÇLILARI BEKLERKEN: HATIRALARI ÇERÇEVESİNDE BERNARD LEWIS'İN DÜŞÜNSEL VE SİYASAL PORTRESİ*

Özet

Bernard Lewis Türkiye’de daha çok *Modern Türkiye’nin Doğuşu* başlıklı çalışmasıyla bilinmektedir. Yaşamı boyunca çeşitli vesilelerle Türkiye’yi ziyaret eden ve belli çevrelerde Türk - Türkiye dostu olarak bilinen Lewis esasen kendisini bir İslâm dünyası / Ortadoğu araştırmacısı-tarihçisi olarak tanıtmaktadır. Dünyadaki ana akım tarafından da Ortadoğu tarihçilerinin ve İslâm araştırmalarının duayeni, en tecrübelisi ya da büyük üstadı olarak anılmakta ve hatırlanmaktadır. Lewis’in bu biçimde anılması onun akademik anlamda ciddi çalışmaları olarak değerlendirilebilecek *Modern Türkiye’nin Doğuşu*ya da *Tarihte Araplar* gibi metinlerinden kaynaklanmamakta, önemsenmesi daha sonraki bir döneme, 11 Eylül sonrasında yayınladığı ajitatif metinlerin yayınlanmasını takip eden yıllara rastlamaktadır. Akademik metinlerinin yanı sıra kaleme aldığı Müslüman Öfkesinin Kaynakları gibi çalışmaları Medeniyetler Çatışması gibi güncel tartışmalara kaynaklık etmektedir. Bush yönetiminin Ortadoğu’ya yönelik politikalarının belirlenmesinde oldukça etkili olan Lewis Arap dünyasına bakışı dolayısıyla Edward Said tarafından yaşayan oryantalistlerin en önemlilerinden birisi olarak nitelenmiştir. Makalede bu tartışmalar Lewis’in Tarihçinin Notları başlığıyla yayınlanan hatıraları çerçevesinde ele alınmıştır. Bu makalede 80 yaşından sonra bir anda Orta Doğu-İslâm çalışmalarında duayenliğe terfi ettirilen Bernard Lewis’in düşünsel angajmanlarını analiz etmeye çalışacağım.

Anahtar kelimeler: Bernard Lewis, Ortadoğu, Medeniyetler Çatışması, Araplar, oryantalizm.

Öner Buçukçu

Arş. Gör. Afyon Kocatepe
Üniversitesi Sosyoloji
Bölümü

Ortadoğu Etütleri

Volume 8 , No 2
December 2016
pp. 96-113

* Bu makale, 7-9 Mayıs 2015 tarihlerinde Bursa Büyükşehir Belediyesi tarafından düzenlenen “Ortadoğu’yu Yazmak” bilimsel programında sunulmuş olan bildirinin düzenlenmiş halidir.

WAITING FOR THE CRUSADERS: INTELLECTUAL AND POLITICAL PORTRAIT OF BERNARD LEWIS IN HIS MEMORIES

Abstract

Bernard Lewis is mostly known for his study entitled *The Emergence of Modern Turkey* in Turkey. Visiting Turkey on several occasions during his lifetime and primarily known among certain circles as a friend of Turks and Turkey, Lewis introduces himself as Islamic world/Middle East scholar-historian. He is remembered and commemorated by the mainstream current in the world as the veteran, most experienced or great master of Middle Eastern and Islamic studies historians. That Lewis is mentioned in this way does not result from books such as *the Emergence of Modern Turkey* or *the Arabs in History* which can be considered as serious works in academic terms; attention upon him comes with the agitative texts he published in the post 9/11 period. His studies such as *the Roots of Muslim Rage* as well as his academic texts lay the groundwork for current discussions such as the Clash of Civilizations. Lewis, who was very influential in determining the Bush administration's policies towards the Middle East, was regarded as one of the most crucial orientalists who still lived by Edward Said because of his view of the Arab world. In the article, these debates are discussed within the framework of Lewis's memoirs published under the title of "Notes on a Century: Reflections of a Middle East". In this article, I will try to analyze the intellectual engagement of Bernard Lewis, who was suddenly promoted as the master in the Middle East and Islam studies after the age of 80.

Keywords: Bernard Lewis, Middle East, Clash of Civilizations, Arabs, Orientalism.

في انتظار الصليبيين

صورتته الفكرية والسياسية لبرنارد لويس في إطار ذكرياته

يعرف برنارد لويس في تركيا عبر عمله الذي سماه "ولادة تركيا الحديثة". زار لويس تركيا مرات عديدة في مناسبات مختلفة، ويعرف في بعض الأوساط على أنه صديق للتترك/لتركيا. ويعرف لويس نفسه بأنه مؤرخ وباحث في الشرق الأوسط و العالم

الإسلامي. ويعرف بأنه أبرز الباحثين في الشرق الأوسط و العالم الإسلامي من قبل هذا الوسط نفسه. وإن هذا الوصف الذي يعرف به لويس لا ينتج بشكل كبير من أعماله تحت عنوان ”ولادة تركيا الحديثة“ و ”لعراب في التاريخ“. فإننا نرى بأن شهرته الزائدة بدأت مع نشره لمقالات ونصوص تحريضية بعد أحداث الحادي عشر من أيلول 11 سبتمبر. وإلى جانب نصوصه الأكاديمية فإن عمله الأكاديمي تحت عنوان مصادر الغضب الإسلامي يعتبر مصدرا ومرجعا لأحد مواضيع النقاش الحديثة ألا وهو ”صراع الحضارات“. لويس، كان له دور كبير ومؤثر في السياسات التي قام بها بوش تجاه الشرق الأوسط كما أن إدوارد سعيد اعتبره من أهم المستشرقين المعاصرين نتيجة نظرته إلى العالم العربي. وإن النقاشات في هذا المقال تدور حول الأخطاء الموجودة في مؤلفه تحت عنوان ”ملاحظات المؤرخ“. سأبدأ في هذه المقالة بتحليل التشابكات الفكرية الخاصة برنارد لويس الذي تم ترقيعه ليصبح أستاذ الباحثين في الشرق الأوسط و الإسلام بعد أن تجاوز الثمانين من عمره.

الكلمات المفتاحية: برنارد لويس، الشرق الأوسط، صراع الحضارات، العرب، لاستشراق.

Giriş

Bernard Lewis Türkiye’de daha çok *Modern Türkiye’nin Doğuşu*¹ başlıklı çalışmasıyla bilinmektedir. Yaşamı boyunca çeşitli vesilelerle Türkiye’yi ziyaret eden ve belli çevrelerde Türk - Türkiye dostu olarak bilinen Lewis esasen kendisini bir İslâm dünyası / Ortadoğu araştırmacısı-tarihçisi olarak tanıtmaktadır. Dünyadaki ana akım tarafından da Ortadoğu tarihçilerinin ve İslâm araştırmalarının duayeni, en tecrübelisi ya da büyük üstadı olarak anılmakta ve hatırlanmaktadır. Lewis’in bu biçimde anılması onun akademik anlamda ciddi çalışmaları olarak değerlendirilebilecek *Modern Türkiye’nin Doğuşu* ya da *Tarihte Araplar* gibi metinlerinden kaynaklanmamakta, önemsenmesi daha sonraki bir döneme, 11 Eylül sonrasında yayınladığı ajitatif metinlerin yayınlanmasını takip eden yıllara rastlamaktadır. Bu yazıda seksen yaşından sonra bir anda Orta Doğu-İslâm çalışmalarında duayenliğe terfi ettirilen Bernard Lewis’in düşünsel angajmanlarını analiz etmeye çalışılacaktır.

Bilindiği üzere Edward Said *Oryantalizm* isimli metninde Lewis’i çağdaş oryantalistlerin en önemlisi olarak değerlendirerek düşünsel angajmanına ilişkin değerli bir çerçeve çizmişti.² Edward Said sadece batı üniversitelerinde değil Türkiye’de de yoğun biçimde okunan bir entelektüel. Onun *Şarkiyatçılık / Oryantalizm* metninin Türkiye’de ilk önce İslâmî kimliği daha baskın Pınar yayınlarından şimdilerde ise çok farklı bir düşünsel geleneğin temsilcisi durumunda bulunan Metis yayınlarından neşrediliyor olması ülkemizdeki yaygınlığına ilişkin bir fikir verebilir. Hele akademide Ortadoğu çalışmalarında Edward Said’in metni yaygın biçimde okunmakta ve okutul-

¹ Çalışmanın orijinal halinin ilk baskısı 1961 yılında Oxford University Press’ten *the Emergence of Modern Turkey* başlığıyla neşredilmiştir.

² Edward Said, *Şarkiyatçılık*, çev. Berna Ülner (İstanbul, Metis Yayınları, 2008), 329-334.

maktadır. Bununla birlikte Said'in tezleri etrafında ciddi bir tartışmaya girdiği Bernard Lewis üzerine eleştirel manada ciddi analizlerin sayısının oldukça sınırlı olduğu, vurgulanması gereken bir durumdur.

Türk akademisi bu tartışmaya suskun kalmaya devam ededursun Lewis'in *Tarih Notları* başlığıyla yayınlanan hatıratının en ilgi çekici bölümlerinden birisini de Edward Said'le girdikleri Oryantalizm tartışmasına hasredilen bölüm oluşturmaktadır.³ Bu bölümde Lewis öncelikle Şarkiyatçı kavramının "nesnel-bilimsel" bir kavram olduğunu, son derece objektif bir kullanımın söz konusu olduğunu kavramın şeceresini aktararak kanıtlamaya çalışmaktadır. Bir mülakatında ise kendisini Şarkiyatçı olarak adlandırdığı için Edward Said'e teşekkür etmektedir. Tarihçiye göre olgularla yorumlar arasındaki açığı o kadar genişletir ki Said'in cehaletinin nerede bitip hilekârlığının nerede başladığı belirsizdir. Oryantalizmin bir şarlatanlık olduğu iddialarını tasdik eder gözükten bir yazarın,⁴ *Modern Türkiye'nin Doğuşu* başlıklı bir kitabın Fransızca tercümesinin "İslâm ve Laiklik" adıyla basılması sonrasında neden böyle bir başlık tercih ettiklerini sorduğu Fransız yayıncıdan "İslâm satar, Türkiye satmaz" cevabını anlamlandıramaması doğal karşılanabilir.⁵

Bernard Lewis: "Tarihçi Özgür Ülkede Doğmalı"

Bernard Lewis 1916 İngiltere doğumludur. Hem anne tarafından hem de baba tarafından Yahudi asıllıdır. Anneannesi Rusya'dan ABD'ye evlenmek üzere gönderilmiş ancak o ABD'ye gitmek yerine İngiltere'de kalarak Lewis'in dedesi ile evlenmiştir. İbranceyi ve Yahudi şeriatını çocukluğunda ailesinden ve hahamlardan öğrenmiştir. Ortadoğu üzerine çalışmaya üniversitede karar vermiş ve Arapçayı üniversitede öğrenmiştir. Akademide başladığı esnada İkinci Büyük Savaş patlak vermiş ve Lewis de Britanya ordusuna katılmıştır. Savaş sırasında Britanya istihbaratı için hem merkezde hem de sahada çeşitli faaliyetlerde bulunmuştur. Savaşın bitiminde Londra University'deki görevine dönmüş ve 1974'te ABD'deki Princeton University'ye geçişine kadar bu üniversitede bulunmuştur.⁶ 1974'de geçtiği Princeton'dan 1986 yılında emekli olmuş ve esas ününü borçlu olduğu metinleri bu tarihten sonra üretmiştir.

³ Bernard Lewis, *Tarih Notları-Bir Ortadoğu Tarihçisinin Notları* (İstanbul, Arkadaş Yayınları, 2014), 302-324.

⁴ Bernard Lewis *Tarih Notları-Bir Ortadoğu Tarihçisinin Notları*, 306.

⁵ Bkz. Bernard Lewis, *İslam et laïcité*. (Paris: Fayard, 1988)

⁶ A. L. Tibawi, *Krizdeki Oryantalizm*, Çev. Ahmet Rana vd. (İstanbul: Yöneliş Yayınları, 1998) 153.

Bernard Lewis'in *What Went Wrong? (Yanlış Giden Neydi?)* ve *İslâm'ın Siyasal Söylemi* gibi son dönem metinlerinde üzerinde durduğu konuların başında Batı toplumunun İslâm toplumundan farklılığı gelir. Özellikle tarihçinin Yanlış Giden Neydi? başlıklı metni birçok açıdan eleştirilebilir. Öncelikle ifade edilmesi gereken metnin "yanlış giden" önermesiyle bir de doğru kategorisi yarattığı; İslâm toplumlarını yanlış takip eden tarafta kendisini de doğrunun tarafında kodlaması; bir biçimde hiyerarşik ve buyurgan bir üslup oluşturmuş olmasıdır. Bu buyurgan üslubunun arkasında Lewis'in batılı bir akademisyen olmasının payı büyüktür.

Kendisini tanıtırken "özgürlüğün tadını çıkararak ve özgürleştirilmeye ihtiyaç duymayan" ülkelerde doğmuş ve yaşamış olması dolayısıyla atalarına teşekkür ediyor olması dikkat çekicidir.⁷ Bir yerde dünyanın farklı bölgelelerini barbarlıktan kurtarıp medenileştiren, tiranlık ya da otoriter yönetimlerden kurtarıp özgürleştiren Britanya İmparatorluğunun bir parçası olmaktan gurur duyduğunu ifade etmektedir.⁸ Lewis'in Britanya İmparatorluğu'nu tarihteki en insanî siyasal örgütlenmelerden birisi olarak değerlendirdiği söylenebilir. Bu bağlamda Lewis Gandhi'nin Britanya'ya karşı kazandığı başarıyı da "demokratik ve medeni" Britanyalılara nisbet etmektedir. Hatta Britanya emperyalizminin tahribatlarını göstermek üzere Britanya sömürgelelerinden öğrencilerin Britanya'ya gelmelerini, Britanya'dan doktora derecesi almalarını "demokratik emperyalizm" olarak adlandırmaktadır.⁹ Lewis'in bu tespitlerinden hareket ettiğimizde, diğer metinlerini okumaksızın onun Orta Doğu'da kolonyalizm karşıtı hareketlere mesafeli yaklaştığı tahmininde bulunabiliriz.

Lewis Orta Doğu tarihi ile ilgilenmeye başlamasında Hamilton Gibb'in büyük payı olduğunu söylüyor. İlginçtir H. A. R. Gibb'in öğrencisi olan ve onun sayesinde Orta Doğu ile ilgilenmeye başlayan Bernard Lewis de ilerleyen dönemlerde I. Büyük Savaş'ta Britanya ordusuna hizmet eden hocası gibi Britanya ordusunda görev alacaktır. Orta Doğu ile ilgilenmeye başladığı dönemde hocası olan bir diğer isim olan Louis Masignon'un da Birinci Büyük Savaş'ta Arap Lawrence ile birlikte Kudüs'e giren kuvvetlerin içerisinde yer almış olması ilginç bir ayrıntı olarak not edilebilir.

⁷ Bernard Lewis, Tarih Notları-Bir Ortadoğu Tarihçisinin Notları, 7

⁸ Bernard Lewis, Tarih Notları-Bir Ortadoğu Tarihçisinin Notları, 118

⁹ Bernard Lewis, Tarih Notları-Bir Ortadoğu Tarihçisinin Notları, 185

Lewis'in Fransa'daki bir diğer hocasının Adnan Adıvar olması tarihçinin Türkiye ilgisinin de başlangıcı olarak değerlendirilebilir. Bu durumu hem Türkiye'de hem de uluslararası basında yayınlanan röportaj ve makalelerinde defalarca ifade etmiştir. Hatıratında da Adnan Bey'le oldukça iyi anlaştıklarını, iyi bir dostluk kurduklarını ifade etmektedir. İlginç olan hatıratında Adnan Bey'den sair zamanlarda bahsettiğinden daha az bahsetmiş olmasıdır. M. Kemal'le yaşadıkları düşünsel karşıtlık dolayısıyla Halide Edip Hanım ve Adnan Bey'in sürgünde yaşamak zorunda kalmalarının Lewis'in Kemalist döneme bakışında eleştirel bir kırılma yaratmadığı söylenebilir. Lewis 2011'de Cumhuriyet gazetesinden Elçin Poyrazlar'a verdiği mülakatta Türkiye'ye yönelik algısının şekillenmesinde ülkeye pek çok batılının yaptığı gibi Batıdan değil de Doğudan girmesinin etkili olduğunu, yani Türkiye'ye Suriye'den girmesinin etkili olduğunu ve Türklerin başarılarının büyüklüğünü bu sayede anladığını ifade etmektedir.

Tarihçinin Türkiye ile irtibatının önemli bir bölümü İkinci Büyük Savaş esnasında Britanya ordu istihbaratına hizmet ettiği günlere dayanmaktadır. Bu dönemde hatıratına kaydettiği önemli hususlardan birisi Türkiye'nin o dönem Londra'daki Büyükelçisi Tevfik Rüştü Aras'la yapılan bir görüşmeden aktardığı notlardır.¹⁰ Lewis'in hatıratında bazen ilginç anekdotlar da paylaştığı İngiliz İstihbaratı için çalıştığı yılları anlatan "Savaş Yılları" başlıklı bölümde birçok önemli olabilecek şeyi hatırlamadığını belirtmesi ya da daha samimi bir ifadeyle ettiği yemin dolayısıyla anlatmasının mümkün olmadığını belirtmesi hatıratında devamlı uyguladığı otosansürün belirgin biçimde gözükmesini sağladığı söylenebilir. Ancak bu noktada söylenmesi gereken Lewis'in Dünya Savaşı yıllarında kazandığı istihbarat tecrübesini hayatının ilerleyen yıllarında da devam ettirdiğidir.

Bu noktada iki ilginç örnek ufuk açıcı olabilir. İlki doğruluğu ya da yanlışlığı tartışmalı olan WikiLeaks belgelerinden. Henry Kissinger'a ait olduğu ileri sürülen diplomatik yazışmalardan 21 Ocak 1974 tarihli bir dokümanda gözükken ABD Büyükelçisinin notudur. O yıl İsrail, Arap yarımadasındaki ülkeler ve Mısır'ı ziyaret eden Bernard Lewis hakkında merkeze şöyle bir bilgi gönderiyor: "Farkettik ki Lewis Arap-İsrail uyuşmazlığında Londra'daki büyükelçilikler arasında (Arap devletlerinin büyükelçilikleri ve İsrail büyü-

¹⁰ Bernard Lewis, Tarih Notları-Bir Ortadoğu Tarihçisinin Notları, 57

kelçiliği kastediliyor) iyi bir irtibat noktası.” Bir diğer örnek ise Türkiye’yi yakından ilgilendiriyor. Wall Street Journal’da 2000’li yılların başlarında yayınlanan bir makalede 1990’lı yıllar boyunca gelişen İsrail-Türkiye ilişkilerinde Türkiye’deki askerî bürokrasi ile oldukça yakın ilişkileri olan Bernard Lewis’in önemsenmesi gereken katkısına vurgu yapılıyor.¹¹

Soğuk Savaş Yıllarında Kalan Tarihçi

Bernard Lewis’in tarihsel olguları yorumlamasında etkili olan en önemli unsurlardan birisi Soğuk Savaş yıllarını da yaşamış olmasıdır. Soğuk Savaş’ın uluslararası sistemi bir öteki üzerine inşa eden anlayışı yıkıldığında Lewis’in yeni bir öteki inşa eden *Medeniyetler Çatışması* tezini desteklemesi anlaşılabilir. Lewis ilk okumaları esnasında Müslüman âlimlerin ve siyasetçilerin Batıdan İslâm’a gelen eleştirileri kınamaya daima hazır olmalarına rağmen Sovyetler’de İslâm karşıtı çalışmalara ses çıkarmamalarını hayretle tespit ettiğine dair ifadeleri özellikle Orta Doğu olarak adlandırılan coğrafyadaki emperyalist geçmişi görmezden gelmesinin örneklerinden birisi olarak not edilebilir. Belki de Lewis’in bu unutkanlığı Arap dünyasındaki kolonyal geçmişi önemsemesinden kaynaklanmaktadır.

Lewis’in Orta Doğu’yu ele alırken yaklaşımındaki sakatlığın veçhelerinden birisinin Soğuk Savaş zihniyeti olduğu söylenebilir. Bu durum zaman zaman Arapların sadakatinden duyulan şüphe dolayısıyla Orta Doğu çalışmalarının önem kazanması ve Sovyetler’in bölgede bir rakip olarak belirmesi gibi argümanlarda da gözlemlenmektedir. Hatıratında bahsettiği Sovyetlerdeki XXV. Şarkiyatçılar Kongresi’ne dair gözlemleri bu bağlamda önemli veriler sağlamaktadır.¹² Bir başka anekdot olarak Lewis’in Mısır’da esnafla sohbetlerini aktardığı bölüm kaydedilebilir. Yazara göre Mısır’ı ineğe benzeten esnaflardan birisi SSCB sömürüsü yerine İngiliz sömürüsünü tercih ettiklerini şu cümlelerle ifade etmektedir: “Britanyalılar süt istiyorlardı Ruslar ise et istiyorlar”.¹³

Bernard Lewis Soğuk Savaş sonrası dünyayı oldukça derinden etkileyen *Medeniyetler Çatışması* tezini oldukça önemsemektedir. Bilindiği üzere bu

¹¹ Staff, Waldman. A Historian’s Take on Islam Steers U.S. in Terrorism Fight. 2004. <https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB107576070484918411>

¹² Bernard Lewis, Tarih Notları-Bir Ortadoğu Tarihçisinin Notları, 148-152

¹³ Bernard Lewis, Tarih Notları-Bir Ortadoğu Tarihçisinin Notları, 227

tezi Soğuk Savaş sonrası döneme ilişkin bir uluslararası ilişkiler çözümlemesi olarak sunan Samuel Huntington'dan önce kavramı kullanan kişi de Bernard Lewis'tir.¹⁴ Lewis'e göre Huntington zamanın en büyük sorunlarından birisini daha iyi anlamayı sağlayacak gerçek bir katkı yapmıştır.¹⁵ Çağdaşlaşan ve dolayısıyla sekülerleşen Hıristiyanlar artık dinin dünyevi iktidar talebini kabul etmiyor. Hıristiyanlar kendilerini din üzerinden tanımlamıyorlar. Hıristiyanlığın da bu bağlamda ciddi dönüşümler geçirdiği söylenebilir. Diğer taraftan Müslümanlar kendisini din ve dinî medeniyet üzerinden tanımlamaya devam ediyor. Bu noktada Lewis'in sık sık Ayetullah Humeyni'den "İslâm ya siyasettir ya da hiçbir şey" alıntısını yapması dikkat çekicidir.¹⁶

İslâm toplumlarını küresel çapta öteki olarak kodlamaya çalışan Lewis'in argümantasyonunda İslâm ve Hıristiyanlık arasındaki bu farklılık önemli yer tutmaktadır. Lewis'in çeşitli metinlerinde İslâm toplumlarının geri kalışına ilişkin çıkardığı çerçeve temel olarak iki başlıkta toplanabilir. İlki İslâm'da politika ile dinin içiçe geçmiş olmasıdır. Batı en başından itibaren laiktir zira Hıristiyanlıkta zaten tanrı ve Sezar arasında iktidar alanları paylaşımı olmuştur.¹⁷ Ama İslâm'da böyle değildir. Bu çerçevede laiklik (ve elbette demokrasi) Judeo-christiandır.

Lewis'in bu çözümlemesi ona sonraki dönemde "İslâm'ın Dönüşü" temalı metinleri hazırlama imkânı sağlamış gözükmektedir. Yazar bu fikrinin gelişim evresinde Müslüman nüfusun yoğunlukta olduğu ya da hatırı sayılır ölçüde bulunduğu ülkelere gerçekleştirdiği ziyaretlerinden notları da Müslümanların aklî melekelerinin ve medenî-ticarî kabiliyetlerinin gelişmemişliğini imâ ederek çeşitli vesilelerle kaydetmeye devam etmektedir. *Turkish Policy Quarterly* dergisine 2012 yılında verdiği mülakatta Filistinli bir entelektüelden büyük bir gururla şu alıntıyı yapmakta da bir sakınca görmemiştir: "Diyor ki Ortadoğu'da herhangi bir Arabın ortalama bir hayat yaşayabileceği ve kamusal hizmetlerden faydalanabileceği tek yer ikinci sınıf bir vatandaş olarak yaşadığı İsrail'dir."

¹⁴ Bkz. Bernard Lewis, Lewis, Bernard. "The Roots of Muslim Rage". The Atlantic Magazine. September 1990. <https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1990/09/the-roots-of-muslim-rage/304643/>

¹⁵ Bernard Lewis, Tarih Notları-Bir Ortadoğu Tarihçisinin Notları, 293

¹⁶ Bernard Lewis, Tarih Notları-Bir Ortadoğu Tarihçisinin Notları, 264

¹⁷ Bu fikirlerin derli toplu bir ifadesi için Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Relations'da katıldığı toplantının kayıtlarına bakılabilir: <https://www.carnegiecouncil.org/studio/multimedia/20100506-faith-and-power-religion-and-politics-in-the-middle-east>. Bir başka kısa kayıt: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XS-p6unJp3g>.

Tarihçi İran İslâm Devrimi'ni de Soğuk Savaş mantığı ile değerlendirmekte ve devrimin esas kökenlerini Medeniyetler Çatışmasında aramaktadır. Bu yaklaşıma göre İran'da yükselen anti-Amerikancılık Amerika'nın belirli politikalarının neticesi değil Sovyet propagandasının ve bu propagandanın ABD'yi Hıristiyanlığın ileri karakolu olarak kodlamasının bir neticesidir (Lewis, 1990). Bu analizi yapan ve özellikle 1990'lı yılların ortalarından itibaren ABD yönetimleriyle iyi ilişkiler geliştirmiş olan tarihçinin örneğin Musaddık Darbesinin İran toplumunda yarattığı hayal ve onur kırıklığının üzerini bilinçli biçimde örttüğünü söyleyebiliriz. Ama İran Devrimi'nin olumlu katkısı (!) kendisinin 1960'ların ortasından itibaren dikkatini çeken siyasal İslâm'a Washington'ın da dikkatinin yönelmesidir.

Bir Araştırma Nesnesi Olarak Araplar

Tarihçinin Orta Doğu toplumlarıyla bir arada bulunurken neler hissettiği onun bu toplumları ele alırken nasıl bir perspektif geliştirdiğine dair veriler sağlayabilir. Bu çerçevede biraz uzun olmak pahasına aşağıdaki alıntının yapılması kaçınılmaz gözükmektedir

Yerel köyden bir rehber vermişlerdi. Bir ara ihtiyacımı gidermem gerekti ve rehberimden beni en yakın tuvalete götürmesini istedim. Hayretler içerisinde o tür bir şey olmadığını söyledi. "İhtiyacınızı nerede gideriyorsunuz" diye sordum. Elini tarlalara doğru sallayarak cevap verdi. Bunu duymaktan görünür bir şekilde mutsuz olmuştum ve o an rehberin aklına bir fikir geldi. Kaleyı gösterdi ve "Bu yeri inşa edenler de Frenklerdi ve muhtemelen bir W. C. de koymuşlardır. Hadi gidip bakalım". Aslında haklıydı, Haçlılar hayatı kolaylaştıran bu temel şeyi unutmamışlardı ve bunun için onlara minnettardım.¹⁸

Yazarın bu tavrı hayatının sonraki dönemlerini anlatırken de devam etmektedir. Örneğin Ürdün'de adı İbranice olan bir yerin geçmişte bir Yahudi yerleşim birimi olduğuna dair ismi dışında ne tür kanıtlar olduğu sorusuna aldığı bu yerleşim birimindeki insanların daha beyaz ve daha akıllı oldukları cevabını da büyük bir keyifle kaydetmektedir.¹⁹ Bir başka yerde ise "İslâm hukukçuları paranın kokusunu alırlarsa her şeye izin verirler, sizin biliminize onların dindarlığından daha çok güveniyorum" diyen bir Pakistanlıyı

¹⁸ Bernard Lewis, Tarih Notları-Bir Ortadoğu Tarihçisinin Notları, 52

¹⁹ Bernard Lewis, Tarih Notları-Bir Ortadoğu Tarihçisinin Notları, 384

okuyucularına aktarmaktadır.²⁰ İstihbarat için çalıştığı yıllara dair bir takım önemli ayrıntıları hatırlamayan yazarın bu derece ilginç hususları hatırlaması hakikaten dikkat çekicidir. 2002 yılında Charlie Rose'un sorularına verdiği yanıtlardan birisinde FKÖ lideri Arafat'ın eylemini şu şekilde değerlendirmektedir: "Arafat'tan terörizmi bırakmasını istemek Tiger'dan golfü bırakmasını istemek gibi bir şey..."²¹

Tarih Siyasete Dahil

Bernard Lewis'in Washington'ın siyasal İslâmın yükselişi realitesine dikkatini yöneltirken zaman zaman Lewis'in istediği gibi caydırıcı bir söylem düzeyinden ziyade uzlaşmacı bir yol izlemesinden rahatsızlık duyduğunu gözlemliyoruz. Örneğin ABD Başkanı Carter'ın Humeyni'ye hitaben yazdığı mektubuna "bir inanandan diğerine" cümleleriyle başlamasının İranlıları ABD ile düşman olmanın dost olmaktan daha kârlı ve güvenli bir yöntem olduğuna ikna ettiğini iddia etmektedir.²²

Birinci Körfez Krizi ile başlayan Lewis'in politik serüveninin tarihçinin spekülâtif metinlerinin muhtevasının daha iyi anlaşılmasını sağladığı söylenebilir. Irak'ın Kuveyt'i işgal etmesi sonrasında yaşananların dönemin karar vericileri tarafından yanlış değerlendirildiğini ifade eden Lewis özellikle Saddam'la gerçek bir mağlubiyeti dikte edecek teslimiyet resmi yerine karşılıklı bir ateşkes yanılmasına hatta Saddam'ın cesaretlenmesine sebebiyet veren tavrı eleştirmektedir. Bu tavra benzer tavırların oğul Bush döneminde de devam ettiğine kâni olan Lewis hatıratında da dönemin Ulusal Güvenlik Danışmanı Stephen Hadley'e gönderdiği bir e-postayı okuyucuyla paylaşarak İran'a yönelik daha caydırıcı ve sert tedbirler alınmasını nasıl önerdiğini aktarmaktadır.²³

Bu noktada Lewis'i 1990'lı yıllar ve 2000'li yıllar boyunca gündemde tutan ve Lewis Doktrini olarak anılan görüşler üzerinde de durmakta fayda var. Lewis Doktrini ABD'yi Orta Doğu'da askerî genişlemeye çağıran, ABD'nin geleneksel Orta Doğu politikasından keskin bir sapmayı ifade eden yaklaşım-

²⁰ Bernard Lewis, Tarih Notları-Bir Ortadoğu Tarihçisinin Notları,141

²¹ Rose, Charlie. <https://charlierose.com/videos/16030>

²² Bernard Lewis, Tarih Notları-Bir Ortadoğu Tarihçisinin Notları, 284

²³ Bernard Lewis, Tarih Notları-Bir Ortadoğu Tarihçisinin Notları,376

di.²⁴ Doktrin ABD'yi bir özgürleştirme misyonuna, yeni bir "Beyaz Adamın Yüğü" seferberliğine davet ediyordu. Buna göre ABD'nin askerî yayılması Orta Doğu'daki demokratik rejimlerin kurulması sürecini hızlandıracak ve bu rejimlerin sağlam bir alt yapıya sahip olmasını kolaylaştıracaktı. Doktrin aslında ilk kez Irak'ta test edildi. Ancak Lewis, ilk testin başarısızlığından olacak 2005'de katıldığı bir radyo programında ilk testin Kuveyt'in işgali sonrası Saddam Hüseyin rejimine yönelik operasyon olduğunu ve ne kadar başarılı olduğunun görüldüğünü iddia etti.²⁵

Tarihçinin politik geçmişinde Arap-İsrail Barış Süreci ve İsrail-Filistin uzlaşmazlığına ilişkin de enteresan notlar bulunmaktadır. 1970'lerde Menachem Begin'in başlattığı Camp David Sürecinde de 1990'larda başlayan Oslo Sürecinde de Lewis ismi daima ön plandadır. Anılarında özellikle Yom Kippur Savaşı'nın "muzaffer" İsraili komutanı General Yariv'i hümanizmin zirvelerine çıkardığı satırlar dikkat çekicidir. Bu bölümde Filistin'in Arapların davası olmaktan çıkıp Filistinlilerin davası olma halini alışına ilişkin Lewis Mısırlı bir arkadaşına referansla ilginç bir ifade nakletmektedir: "Yeterince uzun süre Mısır, Arap dünyasının kan bankası oldu. Bu Arap saçmalığı yeter. Mısır'ı düşünmek zorundayız".²⁶ Lewis'e göre eğer bir İsrail-Filistin barışı olacaksa bu İsrail'e rağmen değil İsrail sayesinde olacaktır. Bununla birlikte Lewis barış müzakereleri konusunda pek de yapıcı değildir. Annapolis görüşmelerinden hemen önce yayınladığı makalede Araplar İsrail açısından yaşamsal öneme sahip taleplerinden yani toprak taleplerinden vazgeçemedikleri sürece İsrail'in masaya oturması için herhangi bir sebep ya da barış için herhangi bir şans göremediğini ifade etmiştir.²⁷ Her fırsatta tarihçinin tarafsızlığına vurgu yapan Lewis'in bu tarafsız tutumu, tartışmalı WikiLeaks belgelerine göre ABD'li diplomatlara dahi fazla gelmiş olacak ki İsrail basınının görüşmelere ilişkin tepkisini merkeze aktaran bir personel Lewis'e katıldığını ifade etmekle birlikte kendisini şöyle bir not düşmek zorunda hissetmiştir: "Yine de diplomasi en iyi seçenek..."

²⁴ Hirsh, Michael. "The Lewis Doctrine". 20th February 2005. <https://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/magazine/thelewisdoctrine>

²⁵ Bkz. Duffy, Michael. "Bernard Lewis on the Middle East". 2005. <https://www.abc.net.au/radio-national/programs/counterpoint/bernard-lewis-on-the-middle-east/3446438#transcript>

²⁶ Bernard Lewis, Tarih Notları-Bir Ortadoğu Tarihçisinin Notları,240

²⁷ Bkz. Bernard Lewis, "On the Jewish Question". 2006. <https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB119604260214503526>

Tarihçinin Soykırım Girişimcisi Olarak Portresi

Bernard Lewis'i Türkiye'de tartışılmaz, eserlerini de klasik haline getiren hadise 1915 Olayları dolayısıyla kullandığı ifadeler yüzünden Fransa'da yargılanmasıdır denilebilir. Lewis Fransa'da yargılanması tazmin edilmek istenircesine Türkiye tarafından Uluslararası Atatürk Barış Ödülü ve TÜBA tarafından yaklaşık 50000 dolarlık para ödülü ile taltif edilmiştir. Yazar bu 50000 dolarlık ödülü kabul etmediğini aktarmaktadır. Türkiye'nin Ermeni olayları dolayısıyla yoğun bir bilimsel üretim baskısı altında olduğu dönemde Lewis'in çıkışı Türkiye için iyi bir can simidi olmuştur. Ancak hatıratında Lewis'in bu çıkışının Yahudilerin Avrupa'da yaşadıkları *holocaustu* bir biçimde ayırıştırmak ve eşsizleştirmek kastıyla yaptığı anlaşılmaktadır.

Lewis'in Ak Parti iktidarı dönemine ve yarattığı Türkiye'ye ilişkin tespitleri de hayli ilgi çekicidir. Örneğin 1990'larda İsrail ve Türkiye arasında kurulan askerî stratejik ilişkilerde azımsanmayacak payı olduğu iddia edilen Lewis o tarihlerde İsrail ve Türkiye'yi, bölgede Arap olmayan ve dolayısıyla demokrasinin başarılı olduğu topraklar olarak göstermektedir. Aradan yıllar sonra verdiği bir mülakatta ise AK Parti'nin nihaî hedefinin İslâmî demokrasi diye adlandırdıkları şey olduğunu, bu demokrasi anlayışının tek yönlü sokak olduğunu diğer bir ifadeyle demokrasi yoluyla gelinip demokrasi yoluyla gidilmemesi anlamına geldiğini iddia etmektedir.²⁸

Birçok yerde tarihçinin işinin geçmiş olduğunu, gelecek üzerine fikir yürütmemesi gerektiğini ifade eden Lewis söz konusu Türkiye olunca bunun cazibesine dayanmamış ve o dönem İran'da çok ses getiren Yeşil Hareketin ABD tarafından desteklenmesi gerektiğini savunarak Türkiye'nin de hızla İslâmleştikten bahisle ilerleyen 10 yılda Türkiye ve İran'ın yer değiştireceği tahmininde bulunmuştur. O kadar ki Lewis Türkiye'deki askerî rejimleri AK Parti rejiminden daha demokratik (ve elbette daha medeni) bulmaktadır. Şöyle diyor:

(...) En çarpıcı olan Ordunun her müdahalesinden sonra herkes askerî bir rejim olacağını düşündü ama her seferinde ordu anayasal görevleri çerçevesinde demokrasiyi savunmak adına hareket etti, hiçbir zaman askerî rejim kurmadı.²⁹

²⁸ Elçin Poyrazlar, "AKP'nin Hedefi İslâmî Demokrasi-Bernard Lewis'le Mülakat". Cumhuriyet Gazetesi. 17 Ocak 2011

²⁹ Elçin Poyrazlar, a.g.m.

Türkiye'nin Orta Doğu ile tarihi ve kültürel bağlarını ön plana çıkararak bölge siyasetinde daha görünür olmasından da oldukça rahatsız gözükmektedir Lewis. Turkish Policy Quarterly'e verdiği mülakatta iyi bir Türk dostu olduğunu ispatlamak maksadıyla şu tespitte bulunmaktadır: “[Orta Doğudan bahsediyor] Bence Türkiye batmaya başlayan bir şirkete çok fazla yatırım yapmamalı.”³⁰

“Sen Bir Garip Arap, Demokrasi Neyine”

Arap Baharı olarak adlandırılan süreci de değerlendiren Bernard Lewis bölgede yaşananları tehlikeli gelişmeler olarak değerlendirmiştir. Burada hatıratından biraz uzun bir alıntı yapmamız kaçınılmaz gözüküyor (Metin olduğu gibi alınmış, tashih edilmemiştir):

(Bölge için Ö.B.) Tamamen özgür bir seçime –bu tür bir şeyin olabileceğini varsayarak-güvenmiyor ve bundan kaygı duyuyorum; çünkü dini partiler çok önemli bir üstünlüğü sahipler. (...) Batı tarzı seçimlere doğru ani bir girişim, bölgenin sıkıntılarını bir çözüm olmaktan ziyade, sorunun tehlikeli bir şekilde şiddetlenmesine yol açıyor ve İslami hareketlerin bu yanlış hareketi sömürmeye hazır olmalarından korkuyorum. Tamamen özgür ve adil seçimlerde Müslüman partilerin kazanma şansı çok yüksek. Daha iyi bir gidişat, demokrasinin, genel seçimler yoluyla değil de, sivil toplum vasıtasıyla ve yerel kurumların güçlendirilmesiyle tedrici gelişim olacaktır.³¹

Bernard Lewis'e göre bağımsız seçimler politik süreçlerin en son noktasıdır ve Arap dünyasında Batı tarzı seçim süreçlerinin olumlu neticeleneceğine ya da Arap dünyasının geleceğine olumlu katkı yapacağına olan inanç yanılığdan ibarettir. 2 Nisan 2011'de Wall Street Journal'a verdiği mülakatta Arap Devrimlerini yorumlarken şöyle der Lewis: “Tiranların hükmü verildi. Gerçek soru yerlerine neyin geleceği”.³² Bu yaklaşım Lewis Doktrini ile uyum göstermektedir. Daha önce de ifade edildiği gibi Lewis ABD'nin askerî kontrolü altında Orta Doğu'da demokrasilerin kök salması gerektiğine inanmaktadır. Arapların gerçek bir demokrasi deneyimine hazır olmadıklarını ise aynı mülakatında Müslüman Kardeşler örneği üzerinden ortaya koy-

³⁰ TPQ. “Interview with Bernard Lewis”. Turkish Policy Quarterly. Vol: 10. No: 4. 2012. p. 42.

³¹ Bernard Lewis, Tarih Notları-Bir Ortadoğu Tarihçisinin Notları, 389.

³² Bkz. Bari Weiss, “The Tyrannies Are Doomed”. 2005. <https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748703712504576234601480205330>

maktadır. Mısır'da gerçekleştirilecek serbest bir seçim sonucunda Müslüman Kardeşlerin iktidara geleceğinin kesin olduğunu dile getiren Lewis bunun tehlikeli bir durum olduğunu ve Batı'nın sanki kendi değerleri Arap Dünyasında yayılıyorymuş gibi pazarlanan süreçteki ilüzyona Müslüman Kardeşler'in (2006 yılında yayınladığı bir makalede aşağı yukarı aynı cümleler HAMAS için sarfedilmişti) kim olduğunu ve ne yapmak istediğini akıldan tutarak inanmaması gerektiğini iddia etmiştir. Lewis katıldığı bir radyo programında da Arap dünyasındaki gelişmeleri yorumlarken "Müslüman Kardeşler ve onlarla bağlantılı örgütlerin İslâm dünyasını devralmaları kesinlikle bir felaket olacaktır" ifadesini kullanmaktadır. Lewis'i okuduktan sonra Batı dünyasının Sisi darbesine verdiği tepkinin düşünsel arka planı hakkında biraz daha sağlıklı fikir yürütülebiliyor galiba.

Daha önce *Müslüman Öfkesinin Kökenleri* başlıklı makalesiyle Medeniyetler Çatışması tezinin arka planının oluşmasına katkı sağlayan Lewis'in çeşitli vesilelerle Müslüman öfke ve hıncının sebeplerine ilişkin dikkat çekici analizler yapmaktadır. Örneğin Lewis'e göre Müslüman dünyasında şiddete (terörizm demiyor) meyyal gençlerin ortaya çıkmasının sebebi batı tarzı geçici cinsel ilişkinin var olmaması, diğer bir deyişle Müslüman dünyadaki gençlerin cinsel açlığıdır. Bu cinsel açlığı bastırmak isteyen gencin önünde evlenmek ya da fahişelerle birlikte olmak dışında seçenek yoktur. Evlenemeyen ya da fahişelerle bir arada olacak kadar parası olmayan Müslüman gençler cennetteki huriler vaadine aldanıp bir intihar bombacısına dönüşebiliyorlar.

Sonuç

Lewis'in İslâm, Araplar ve Orta Doğu üzerine metinlerinde bunun gibi oldukça fazla sayıda yüzeysel İslâm bilgisinden çıkarımlar bulunabilir. Örneğin Lewis'e göre kölelik "masum" batı toplumuna İslâm tarafından ihraç edilmiştir. Kölelik kurumunun gerçek suçlusu Batılılar değil müslümanlardır. Hal böyle olunca Lewis ABD'deki siyahların kendilerini köle olarak satanlara değil de köle olarak kullananlara neden bu kadar hıncı dolu olduklarını anlayamadığını iddia etmektedir. Lewis'e göre İslâm'ın geri kalmasının arkasındaki en önemli sebeplerden birisi de kölelik kurumudur. İslâm dini köleliği bir biçimde kurumsallaştırmış ve teşvik etmiştir.

Tarihçi İstihbarat servisinde çalışmış olmanın ve savaşta kazanan tarafta bulunmanın verdiği duyguyla olacak hatıratında bir yerde eleştirdiği “medeniyet kibrini” yazın hayatının bütününe yaymış bulunuyor. Bir başka deyişle bir tarihçiden ziyade Rudyard Kipling’in Beyaz Adamın sırtına yüklediği yükü henüz indirmemiş gergin ve provakatif bir misyon siyasetçisiyle karşı karşıyayız. Bu siyasetçi kâh Filistin’e bir barışın “İsrail’in doğası dolayısıyla gelebileceğini” iddia ediyor kâh İslâm dünyasında İslâmî hareketlerin iktidara gelme ihtimalleri dolayısıyla özgür seçimlerin gerçekleştirilmemesi, kendisi açık açık söylemese de bölgedeki tiranların, diktatörlerin desteklenmesi tavsyesinde bulunuyor.³³

Bu metne hazırlanırken Bernard Lewis hakkında Türkiye’deki sosyal bilimcilerin kanaatleri üzerine de araştırma yaptım. Örneğin Emre Kongar dünyada yaşayan iki büyük İslâm tarihçisinden birisi olarak Bernard Lewis’i gösteriyor. İlber Ortaylı ise Ocak 2004 tarihli Popüler Tarih dergisinde 1915 Olaylarını soykırım olarak nitelemeyen Bernard Lewis’i “bilgin” olarak niteliyor. Bir sosyal bilimci diyebilir miyiz bilmiyorum ama ülkenin Halil İnalçık ve İlber Ortaylı ile birlikte en popüler tarihçisi Murat Bardakçı ise Haber Türk gazetesine Şubat 2015’te Lewis’in hatıratı dolayısıyla yazdığı bir metinde tarihçi nasıl olur Lewis’e bakın mealinde cümleler sarf etmiştir. Örnekler çoğaltılabilir. Lewis’in ölümünden sonra yazılan metinler de bu bâbda zikredilebilir. İlginç olan husus Lewis’in Türkiye’de 1990’lı yıllardaki görüşleri dolayısıyla hiç tartışılmamış olması; İslâm’ın Siyasal Söylemi, Yanlış Giden Neydi? gibi metinlerinin farkında olunmamasıdır.

³³ Bu metin hazırlanırken kitap hakkında Türkiye’de yazılmış kritiklere bakıldığında Akif Emre’nin Yeni Şafak gazetesinde yayınladığı Bir Şarkiyatçının İdeolojik Portresi metni bir köşe yazısı için oldukça etraflı eleştiriler ihtiva etmektedir. Ayrıca Murat Bardakçı’nın Haber Türk gazetesinde kitabı okumadan ya da göz gezdirilerek hazırlanmış izlenimi övgü metni (ki Tarihin Arka Odası programında da kitabı yaklaşık cümlelerle tanıtmış) ve Toplumsal Tarih dergisinin Mart sayısında Akın Öge tarafından kaleme alınan, dergi girişinde eleştirel bir dil vaad edilen ancak metne dair etraflıca bir özetin ötesine geçemeyen metin dışında kritik bulunmamaktadır.

Extended Abstract

In Turkey, Bernard Lewis mostly known by his work, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey* (1970). Who visited Turkey on several occasions during his lifetime and was known as a Turcophile, Lewis substantially introduced himself as a researcher and historian of Islam and Middle East. Also he is known and remembered by mainstream in the World, as the veteran, most experienced and master of Middle Eastern historians and Islamic researchers. Mentioning him in this wise doesn't based on his serious academic studies such as *The Emergence of Modern Turkey* or *Arab in History*. In fact he has been noticed after September 11th and following years by his agitational texts. In this article Bernard Lewis' intellectual engagements would be analyzed whom promoted to being a veteran of Middle Eastern and Islamic researchs.

As known, Edward Said portrayed Bernard Lewis as the most important contemporary orientalist and drew a valuable framework on his intellectual engagements in his book, *Orientalism*. However, it's noteworthy that Said had serious discussions about his thesis but the number of critical analyzes on Bernard Lewis is quite limited.

Bernard Lewis' political background also included interesting notes on the Arab-Israeli Peace Process and Israeli-Palestinian conflict. His name is always at the forefront of Camp David Process in 1970s and Oslo Process in 1990s. Especially it is remarkable that General

Yariv, "victorious Israeli commander" of Yom Kippur War, defined as a huge humanist in his memoir book. According to Lewis if there will be a Israeli-Palestinian peace, it will be through the agency of Israel, can't occur despite Israel. However, Lewis is not very constructive in peace negotiations. In his article published just before Annapolis meeting, he expressed that there is no reason for Israel to sit on the table or any chance for peace unless Arabs give up their land demands which is vital important for Israel. These words can be regarded as extreme claims that many diplomats don't attend. In WikiLeaks documents, an American diplomat preferred to drop the following against Lewis's views: "Yet diplomacy is the best option."

After his trial in France because of his expressions about 1915 Armenian Events, in Turkey, Bernard Lewis became an unquestionable person and his works accepted as classics. He was honored and 50000 American Dollars awarded by International Atatürk Peace Prize and Turkish Science Academy

for his views about Armenian Problem. He said that he rejected these awards. In terms of international relations, his opinions were attributed a great value and importance in Turkey. However in his memoir, it is clear that these views aimed to distinguish and make Holocaust unique for European Jews not to exculpate Turkey about 1915 Events.

Bernard Lewis' views and determinations about Justice and Development Party period are also quite interesting. For example in the 1990s it is claimed that he has an important role on military strategic relations established between Israel and Turkey. At that time Lewis demonstrated Israel and Turkey as non-Arab countries and therefore successful democratic regimes. In an interview he gave after many years, argues that the ultimate goal of the Justice and Development Party is what they called "Islamic Democracy". And also he claims that this understanding of democracy is a one-way street, in other words, it means coming to power by democracy but not losing power through democracy. It is noted here that he commented on Israel's interests in the Middle East.

Bernard Lewis, who previously contributed with his article titled "Roots of Muslim Rage" to the formation of the *Conflict of Civilizations* thesis, on various occasions, he makes remarkable (!) analyzes on the causes of Muslim rage. For example according to him in *Muslim World*, the reason for the emergence of young people prone to violence is the absence of western style transient sexual intercourse, in other words, the sexual hunger of Muslim youth. He argues that there is no option except marrying or being with prostitutes for the young person who would like to suppress this sexual hunger. Young Muslims who cannot be married or have enough money to be with prostitutes could easily become a suicide bomber. Because these young people are fooled by the promise of houris in the heaven. Although persuasion power of this explanation can be accepted as controversial, it is effective in Western societies. His becoming a vetera researcher of Middle East and Muslim societies is about changing of the World conjuncture. In this article Bernard Lewis's views about Middle East and Turkey and interest of Turkish Academy and media on these views are evaluated with a critical perspective.

Kaynaklar

- Duffy, Michael. "Bernard Lewis on the Middle East". 2005. <https://www.abc.net.au/radionational/programs/counterpoint/bernard-lewis-on-the-middle-east/3446438#transcript> (Son Erişim: 22.06.2016).
- Hirsh, Michael. "The Lewis Doctrine". 20th February 2005. <https://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/magazine/thelewisdoctrine> (Son erişim: 22.06.2016).
- Lewis, Bernard. *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*. London and New York: Oxford University Press. 1961.
- Lewis, Bernard. *İslam et laïcité*. Fayard: Paris. 1988.
- Lewis, Bernard. "The Roots of Muslim Rage". *The Atlantic Magazine*. September 1990. Online olarak: <https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1990/09/the-roots-of-muslim-rage/304643/> (Son erişim: 01.06.2016).
- Lewis, Bernard. *İslâm'ın Siyasal Söylemi*. Çev. Ünsal Oskay. İstanbul: Düşün Yayınevi. 1993.
- Lewis, Bernard. *Tarihte Araplar*, Çev. Hakkı Dursun Yıldız. İstanbul: Anka Yayınları, 2001.
- Lewis, Bernard. *What Went Wrong?*. New York: Oxford University Press. 2002.
- Lewis, Bernard. "On the Jewish Question". 2006. <https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB119604260214503526> (Son erişim: 25.06.2016).
- Lewis, Bernard. *Tarih Notları-Bir Ortadoğu Tarihçisinin Notları*. Çev. Çağdaş Sümer, İstanbul: Arkadaş Yayınevi, 2014.
- Poyrazlar, Elçin. "AKP'nin Hedefi İslâmî Demokrasi-Bernard Lewis'le Mülakat". *Cumhuriyet Gazetesi*. 17 Ocak 2011.
- Rose, Charlie. <https://charlierose.com/videos/16030> (Son erişim: 25.06.2016).
- Said, Edward. *Şarkiyatçılık*. Çev. Berna Ülner. İstanbul: Metis Yayınları. 2008.
- Staff, Waldman. A Historian's Take on Islam Steers U.S. in Terrorism Fight. 2004. <https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB107576070484918411> (Son erişim: 15.06.2016).
- Tibawi, A. L. *Krizdeki Oryantalizm*, Çev. Ahmet Rana vd. İstanbul: Yöneliş Yayınları. 1998.
- TPQ. "Interview with Bernard Lewis". *Turkish Policy Quarterly*. Vol: 10. No: 4. 2012. pp. 29-42.
- Weiss, Bari. "The Tyrannies Are Doomed". 2005. <https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748703712504576234601480205330> (Son erişim: (Son erişim: 23.06.2016).

ISLAMIC FINANCE AND VOLUNTARILY FINANCIAL EXCLUSION IN MIDDLE EASTERN COUNTRIES

Abstract

This paper empirically investigates the association of increasing the supply of Islamic banking services and voluntarily financially excluded groups. Due to the structure of the data, we use ordinary least square estimations to assess the association between Islamic banking and voluntarily financial exclusion. In the meantime, as the modification of the results in the literature, this paper aims to assess the mechanisms by which the association of Islamic finance and financial exclusion in Muslim dominant countries. The results suggest that improving the arguments in the literature, we find a relatively stronger association between Islamic banking and financial inclusion in both country samples.

Keywords: Financial Inclusion, Islamic Finance, and Microfinance

JEL Classification: G20, G21, G28

Recep Yorulmaz

Dr., Ankara Yıldırım Beyazıt
Üniversitesi Maliye Bölümü

Ortadoğu Etütleri

Volume 8 , No 2
December 2016
pp. 114-137

İSLAMİ FİNANS VE ORTA DOĞU ÜLKELERİNDE GÖNÜLLÜ MALİ DIŞLAMA

Özet

Bu makale, İslami bankacılık hizmetlerinin arzının artırılması ile gönüllü olarak finansal anlamda dışlanmış grupların arasındaki bağı deneysel olarak incelemektedir. Verilerin yapısı nedeniyle, İslami bankacılık ile gönüllü finansal dışlanma arasındaki ilişkiyi değerlendirmek için en küçük kareler yöntemini kullanıyoruz. Aynı zamanda, literatürdeki sonuçların değişimi olarak, bu makale önde gelen Müslüman ülkelerde İslami finans ve finansal dışlanma arasındaki bağ aracılığıyla mekanizmaları değerlendirmeyi amaçlamaktadır. Sonuçlar, literatürdeki argümanların iyileştirilmesiyle her iki ülke örneğinde İslami bankacılık ile finansal katılım arasında nispeten daha güçlü bir ilişki bulunduğunu gözler önüne sermektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Finansal katılım, İslami Finans ve Mikrofinans

JEL Sınıflandırma: G20, G21, G28

التمويل الإسلامي والتهميش المالي الإرادي في بلدان الشرق الأوسط

الملخص

إن هذا البحث يقوم بدراسة الرابط والعلاقة بالاعتماد على التجربة بين زيادة عرض البنوك الإسلامية والمجموعات المهمشة إراديا في المجال المالي. وإننا نستخدم طريقة المربعات الصغرى لدراسة العلاقة بين البنوك الإسلامية والمجموعات المهمشة إراديا في المجال المالي، وفي نفس الوقت نعمل عبر هذا البحث من حيث التغيير في نتائج على تقييم الآليات عبر العلاقة والرابط بين البنوك الإسلامية والتهميش المالي في الدول الإسلامية المتقدمة. ومع تحسين الوسائط في الادب المالي فإن النتائج تضع أماننا واقع أن العلاقة بين البنوك الإسلامية والمساهمة المالية أقوى في مثال كلا البلدين.

الكلمات المفتاحية: المساهمة المالية، التمويل الإسلامي والتمويل المصغر

التصنيف: G20, G21, G28


Introduction

In recent years, there has been increasing concern about financially excluded groups who have limited or even no access to formal financial services in societies. Poor and disadvantaged groups, who are considered as socially excluded, live without any access to formal financial services. Generally, they are denied by the formal financial systems. Therefore, as described in European Commission¹, financial exclusion and social exclusion are strongly associated with each other.

Financial exclusion can be described with two main factors, which are voluntary and involuntary exclusion as seen in Figure 1. These factors are important in terms of determining the reasons for financial exclusion. Scholars mainly consider involuntarily excluded groups in order to measure the financial inclusiveness in an economy and ignore voluntarily excluded groups. The reason is that these groups have a chance to use formal financial services tools but prefer not to use these services. They claim that these types of groups do not require any further policy actions². However, in this paper, it is assumed that voluntarily excluded groups need to be considered as important as involuntarily excluded groups in order to enhance greater financial access and financial inclusiveness in the economy.

¹ Financial services provision and prevention of financial exclusion: European Commission (Commission of The European Communities, 2008)

² Finance for All? Policies and Pitfalls in Expanding Success, A World Bank Policy Research Report: World Bank Group (World Bank, 2008) Available from: <http://www.myilibrary.com?id=119146>.

Figure 1. Factors of Financial Exclusion

Source: The World Bank (2008) *Finance for All: Policies and Pitfalls in Expanding Access*, A World Bank Policy Research Report, World Bank, Washington, DC, USA

Religious barriers are considered one of the most important reasons for voluntary exclusion, particularly among Muslim groups because of the Islamic rules on finance. Since Islamic Law (*Shari'a*) forbids any interest gain from financial transactions and most of the formal financial institutions lack Islamic Law-compliant financial services, these kinds of groups face religious barriers to use formal financial services and voluntarily choose not to use them. Therefore, these groups need specific targeting regulations to involve in the financial system. This would also imply that self-exclusion is considered the reason for direct banking exclusion in developing and low-income countries with predominantly Muslim population³.

Since little empirical research has been done to examine the association between financial exclusion and Islamic finance in the literature so far, this study will empirically fill this gap. In doing so, following Global Financial Development Report⁴; Demircug-Kunt et al.⁵; and Naceur et al.⁶, this paper aims to contribute to the literature by empirically examining the link between Islamic finance and voluntarily financial exclusion, which is determined by

³ Elaine Kempson, "Policy Level Response to Financial Exclusion in Developing Economies: Lessons for Developing Countries", Paper for Access to Finance: Building Inclusive Financial Systems, May 30-31 2006, World Bank, Washington DC.

⁴ Global financial development report: (World Bank, 2014). Available from: <http://alltitles.ebrary.com/Doc?id=10809087>.

⁵ Asli Demircug Kunt and Leora Klapper, "Measuring Financial Inclusion: Explaining Variation in Use of Financial Services across and within Countries", *Brookings Papers on Economic Activity* (The Brookings Institution, 2013), p. 279-321.

⁶ ?

lack of access to formal financial services. Furthermore, as the modification of the results in the literature and so that one of the main contributions of this paper, we subdivide Islamic banking products to assess the mechanism by which the impact of Islamic finance on financial exclusion occurs.

This paper is conducted as follows: Section 2 identifies the Islamic finance and some basic Sharia-compliant products. Section 3 explains related work on the association between Islamic finance and financial inclusion. Section 4 determines the indicators and their sources. Section 5 indicates methodology of the paper. Section 6 presents the empirical results of the models performed in this paper, and finally section 7 concludes the paper.

Sharia-compliant Financial Products and Islamic Finance Institutions

The main aspects of the Islamic finance, which relies on Shari'a, are social justice, equitable allocation of resources among people, and inclusion. In other words, the fundamental factor of the Islamic economic system is economic growth along with social justice, which is also known as inclusive economic growth. This system aims for all members in society to have equal opportunities.

The Islamic perspective on financial inclusion has two dimensions: First, Islamic Law promotes financial inclusion through risk-sharing contracts, which are the best alternative to conventional finance. Second, it also promotes financial inclusion through particular redistribution of the wealth instruments among all groups in the economy⁷. Risk-sharing financial instruments can be classified as Shari'a-compliant microfinance, SME financing and micro insurance, and Shari'a-compliant deposits and/or savings accounts, which operate under *Mudaraba* (profit sharing) in order to provide broader access to finance. This also means more financial inclusion. These instruments can be referred to as profit and loss sharing principles in all types of financial transactions. Risk-sharing financial instruments, as classified above, operate under profit-sharing principle wherein there is no interest gain for account owners, but rather they share the overall profit or loss of the Islamic financial institution⁸.

Furthermore, redistributive instruments are explained as Zakah, Sadakat, Qard-al-hassan, and Waqf, which target the disadvantaged and underprivileged in order to eradicate poverty and enhance social justice in society.

⁷ Patrick Imam and Kangni Kpodar, *Is Islamic banking good for growth*, (Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund, 2015), <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/cat/longres.aspx?sk=42871.0>.

⁸ Asli Demirguc Kunt and Leora Klapper, "Measuring Financial Inclusion: Explaining Variation in Use of Financial Services across and within Countries", *Brookings Papers on Economic Activity* (The Brookings Institution, 2013), p. 279-321

These redistributive instruments are considered as the mandated levies. In other words, the social and economic risks of the poor are faced by the privileged ones in society⁹.

Since not all countries with predominantly Muslim population engage in the Islamic economic system and Shari'a, the redistributive instruments above remain peoples' voluntary choices and cannot be controlled or tracked by the policymakers of such countries. For example, there is no way with which the annual amount of Zakah in the Republic of Turkey as a secular country can be tracked. Therefore, in most countries, redistributive instruments are not considered as tools for Islamic financial institutions. Risk-sharing products are the main objectives of the Islamic financial institutions across the world.

Related Work

The concerns about the groups with limited access to financial services and those considered financially excluded have been increasing recently. Financial exclusion, which is the absence of physical banking services, causes low community investment, unemployment, and poverty in the economy¹⁰. In doing so, researchers have been giving more attention to the causes of financial exclusion and financial service provision developments which are organized to eradicate financial exclusion¹¹.

Mohieldin, Iqbal, Rostom and Fu¹² argues that if they are applied in true spirits, Islamic Law-compliant financial services may lead to overall wealth distribution among people in society from the rich segment to the poor. This redistribution results in poverty reduction and the elimination of income inequality in that economy. Hence, in order to increase levels of access or reduce the financial exclusion rates, policymakers should provide different sets of Islamic financial instruments in Muslim dominant population countries.

Muslims are less likely to use formal financial services such as having a bank account and saving at a formal financial institution than non-Muslims. Differently, they are less likely to use Islamic law-compliant banking services

⁹ Mahmoud Mohieldin and Zamir Iqbal and Ahmed Rostom and Xiaochen Fu. The Role of Islamic Finance in Enhancing Financial Inclusion in Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) Countries. (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 2011) Available from: <http://proxy.library.carleton.ca/login?url=http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/workingpaper/10.1596/1813-9450-5920>.

¹⁰ Thorsten Beck and Asli Demirgüç-Kunt and Ross Levine, "Finance, inequality and the poor", *Journal of Economic Growth*, 12, March 2007, p. 27-49.

¹¹ Sharon Collard and Elain Kempson and Claire Whyley, *Tackling financial exclusion: An area-based approach*, (Bristol, UK: Policy Press, 2001)

¹² Ibid.

in some countries¹³. Therefore, lack of access to Islamic law-compliant financial services is considered one of the most important causes of low banking penetration and, as a result, financial inclusion, particularly in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) regions where the financial inclusion rates are the lowest in the world¹⁴. Hence, Muslim households and SMEs may choose to stay outside the financial system because of the Islamic law on finance around the world. These exclusion rates tend to be high in religiously conscious Muslim population regions.

The specific studies examining the association between financial exclusion and Islamic finance are rare in the literature. However, there are various particular studies conducted on the participatory preferences of the clients of Islamic financial institutions, in order to determine the importance of the religious reasons behind choosing and preferring such institutions. For instance, Ozsoy, Gormez, and Mekik¹⁵ stated that the reasons why arbitrarily chosen sample clients from the province of Bolu in Turkey prefer Islamic financial institutions are service quality, trust, and religious reasons, respectively. This result can be interpreted as the structure of Islamic financial institutions, which are different from the traditional Islamic Law-compliant financial institutions in the world. Intuitively, the results from the countries that have traditional Islamic banking institutions support this argument.

For example Gerrard et al.¹⁶ in Singapore, Metawa et al.¹⁷ in Bahrain, Naser et al.¹⁸ in Jordan, Othman et al.¹⁹ in Kuwait, Wakhid et al.²⁰ in Indonesia, Gait et al.^{21,22} in Libya, and finally Lee et al.²³ in Pakistan found that religious rea-

¹³ Asli Demircuc-Kunt and Douglas Randall and Leora Klapper, *Islamic Finance and Financial Inclusion Measuring Use of and Demand for Formal Financial Services among Muslim Adults*, (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 2013) <http://proxy.library.carleton.ca/login>.

¹⁴ Wafica Ali Ghoul, "The Dilemma Facing Islamic Finance and Lessons Learned from the Global Financial Crisis", *Journal of Islamic Economics, Banking and Finance*, 7, p. 57-76.

¹⁵ ?

¹⁶ Philip Gerrard and J. Barton Cunningham, "Islamic Banking: A Study in Singapore" *International Journal of Bank Marketing*, 15 (6), p. 204-216.

¹⁷ Saad A. Metawa and Mohammed Almossawi, "Banking Behaviour of Islamic Bank Customers: Perspectives and Implications", *International Journal of Bank Marketing*, 16 (7), p. 299-313.

¹⁸ Kamal Naser and Ahmad Jamal and Khalid Al-Khatib, "Islamic banking: a study of customer satisfaction and preferences in Jordan", *International Journal of Bank Marketing*, 17(3), p. 135-151.

¹⁹ AbdulQaqi Othman and Lynn Owen, "Adopting and Measuring Customer Service Quality (SQ) in Islamic Banks: A Case Study in Kuwait Finance House" *International Journal of Islamic Financial Services*, 3 (1), p. 1-26.

²⁰ Slamet Ciptino Wakhid and Soviyanti Efrita, "Adapting Islamic Banks' Carter Model: An Empirical Study in Riau's Syariah Banks, Indonesia", *Pesat*, 2, p. 120-127.

²¹ Alsadek Gait, A., & Philip, G., & Vidhan G. (2009a). *Attitudes, Perceptions and Motivations of Libyan Retail Consumers toward Islamic Methods of Finance*. St Lucia, Australia, University of Queensland. Available from: <http://hdl.handle.net/10072/31929>.

²² Alsadek Gait, *Libyan Attitudes towards Islamic Methods of Finance: An Empirical Analysis of Retail Consumers, Business Firms and Banks*, Griffith University. Department of Accounting, Finance and Economics. Available from: <http://www4.gu.edu.au:8080/adt-root/public/adt-QGU20100615.104528>.

²³ Kun-ho Lee and Shakir Ullah, "Customers' attitude toward Islamic Banking in Pakistan", *International Journal of Islamic and Middle Eastern Finance and Management*, 4 (2), p. 131-145.

sons are the most important reasons why some clients prefer using Islamic banking services. Furthermore, Karakaya et al.²⁴ and Okumus²⁵, using all Islamic finance institutions in Turkey, found that religious beliefs are the most important reason behind the preference of using Islamic banking services.

Furthermore, The World Bank Global Financial Development Report²⁶ concludes that the emergence of Islamic banks has a significant impact on the financial access of the households and small and medium-scaled firms. For example, this report suggests that there is an inverse and significant association between the size of Islamic financial institutions and the proportion of firms identifying access to finance in OIC countries. Moreover, the increasing number of Islamic banks has a positive influence on the operations of small-scaled firms. This paper follows the theory behind their work, and tests the association between financial access and Islamic finance for both all countries from different backgrounds and Muslim dominant countries, separately.

Similarly, Naceur et al.²⁷ suggests that in Organization for Islamic Cooperation (OIC) member countries, where levels of financial inclusion are lower and the extent of exclusion from formal financial system because of religious reasons share are greater, Islamic banking is an effective factor for financial inclusion. They find evidence that the presence of Islamic banking activities is associated with higher levels of banking credits by households and firms in OIC member countries.

Data & Methodology

Following the traditional way in the literature, financial exclusion is determined by the opposite term of financial inclusion in this paper. In order to examine this association between in Muslim dominant countries and other countries separately, we use two different samples of countries in the regression models. The first set of regression models is run for 118 countries from different geographic and economic backgrounds around the world. The second set of regression models is run for Middle Eastern countries to analyze

²⁴ Aykut Karakaya and Osman Karamustafa, "The Role of Customer Features on the use of Technology Intensive Financial Products in Banks", *Active Bankacılık ve Finans Dergisi*, 38, p. 1-6.

²⁵ H. Şaduman Okumus, "Interest-Free Banking in Turkey: A Study of Customer Satisfaction and Bank Selection Criteria" *Journal of Economic Cooperation*, 26 (4), p. 51-86.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ ?

the association between financial inclusion and Islamic finance. Because of the data limitations of other countries for Islamic banking products, we cannot use Middle Eastern country interaction terms in the all countries regression models. Moreover, because of the nature of data we average the values of financial inclusion index and Islamic banking products for the period from 2004 to 2011 in this section.

Meanwhile, we examine this association in terms of both conventional banks and other financial institutions such as microfinance institutions separately in this section. Hence, there are two proxies of financial inclusion are used as the dependent variable to examine the effects of the Islamic financial institutions on financial inclusion. The multidimensional financial inclusion index, which is constructed by Yorulmaz²⁸, is used as the proxy of commercial bank base financial inclusion.

Regarding the access indicator from other financial institutions, we follow the same process by using the residuals after differentiating the all-financial institutions indicator from formal financial institutions indicator. 'The percentage of adults that have an account at a formal financial institution' variable, which contains accounts in credit unions, post offices, and other financial institutions such as cooperative or microfinance institutions, is constructed from the World Bank's Global Financial Inclusion Database.

Following the literature, we first use Islamic banking dummy and number of Islamic banks variables in the regression models²⁹. These variables are constructed from Global Financial Development Report 2014 database. Moreover, in order to assess the mechanisms by which the impact of Islamic finance occurs, we use services of Islamic banks separately in the models. This would help us to assess the different channels of the real association between Islamic finance and financial access in both country types. Bringing a broader aspect on the impact of Islamic finance on financial access into the literature, this analysis is one of the main contributions of this paper.

In this regard, following the previous studies, we use the ratio of Islamic banking assets to GDP, the ratio of Islamic bank deposits to GDP, and the ratio of Islamic loans to GDP as the *mudaraba* services of Islamic banks. These variables are also used as the measures of the development of Islamic ban-

²⁸ Recep Yorulmaz, "An analysis of constructing global financial inclusion indices", *Borsa Istanbul Review*. 18, p. 248-258.

²⁹ Thorsten Beck and Aslı Demirgüç-Kunt and Ross Levine, "Finance, inequality and the poor", *Journal of Economic Growth*, 12, March 2007, p. 27-49. Ayesha K. Khan and Tarun Khanna, *God, Government and Outsiders: The influence of Religious Beliefs on Depositor Behavior in an Emerging Market*, (Harvard: Harvard Business School, 2010)

king in the literature³⁰. Furthermore, the ratios of *zakah* and *murabahat* services to GDP variables are also used to assess the mechanisms of this impact. Finally, following Imam and Kpodar³¹, we use the capital-asset ratio of Islamic banks as the robustness check of the results in terms of capitalization measure of Islamic banks. All these indicators above are constructed from *Bankscope* database.

Furthermore, following the literature, we use some other control variables such as ‘the percentage of adults citing religious reasons for not having an account at a formal financial institution’, ‘the percentage of religiosity of a country’, and ‘the percentage of Muslim population’ variables in this section. These variables are used to determine the impact of Islamic financial institutions on financial access in the economies in terms of the levels of religiosity and Muslim population. These variables are constructed from the Global Financial Development Report 2014 database. Meanwhile, ‘the percentage of Muslims’ variable’ is constructed from Demirguc-Kunt, Klapper, and Randall³².

Finally, following Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Merrouche³³, log GDP per capita as the proxy of income growth and private credits to GDP ratio as the proxy of financial development variables are used to control the results of the models. These variables are used to control the results in terms of country’s income growth and financial development levels and the World Bank’s World Development Indicators database is used to construct these indicators.


³⁰ Patrick Imam and Kangni Kpodar, *Is Islamic banking good for growth*, (Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund, 2015), <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/cat/longres.aspx?sk=42871.0>.

³¹ *Ibid.*

³² *Ibid.*

³³ Thorsten Beck and Asli Demirgüç-Kunt and Ouarda Merrouche, “Islamic vs. conventional banking: Business model, efficiency and stability”, *Journal of Banking and Finance*, 37, p. 433-447.

Figure 2. Correlates of Financial Inclusion proxies against Islamic Banking products



In particular, starting clockwise from the upper left corner, the first sets of graphs show the number of Islamic banks against access to conventional banks and other financial institutions for the average of years from 2004 to 2011. The second sets of graphs explore the Islamic banking loans to GDP ratio against access to financial services from both institutions. The third one shows the Islamic banking total assets to GDP ratio against the proxies of financial inclusion. Finally, the last sets of graphs explore the Zakah % of GDP for the countries against access to financial services from both institutions. The data show that all the products of Islamic financial institutions above negatively associated with conventional bank base access, while they are positively associated with access from other financial institutions. There are some common outlier countries in the data such as Turkmenistan, Nigeria, Niger, and Afghanistan as it can be seen from the graphs. As the robustness check we will extract these countries from the data and rerun the estimation models to assess the impacts of outliers.

Adopting the arguments and methodologies in Global Financial Development Report³⁴, Demirguc-Kunt et al.³⁵, and Naceur et al.³⁶ this paper assesses the link between Islamic finance and financial exclusion using OLS regressions. Furthermore, as the modification of the results in the literature, we use Islamic banking products to assess the mechanism by which the impact of Islamic finance on financial exclusion occurs. This additional analysis is one of the main contributions of this paper.

Following the studies in the literature, this paper begins by investigating the OLS models to explore the linkage between financial exclusion and Islamic finance. These models are used for both sets of the samples above. The basic regressions are conducted as follows:

$$Y_i = \alpha + \beta' X_i + \varepsilon_i \quad (1)$$

Where Y_i is the dependent variable, X represents the vector of explanatory variables as explained above and ε_i is the usual stochastic term.

There are two different proxies of financial inclusion as the dependent variables with two different regressions. These two proxies of financial inclusion are used in all regression models for all empirical models. Regarding the Islamic banking access, we first use the number of Islamic financial instituti-

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ ?

ons in the relevant countries and Islamic banking dummy variables to assess the impact of Islamic finance on financial access in this paper.

Empirical Results

All Countries Sample

Table 1 confirms that higher levels of the indicators of Islamic finance are significantly associated with lower levels of conventional bank base financial access, even after controlling for levels of religiosity indicators and macro-economic stability variables as GDP per capita and private credit to GDP ratio. The Islamic banking products also negatively and significantly enter in the estimation models, except for deposit accounts. Since, we regress Islamic banking products in separate regression equations because of the high correlations amongst them, these results are accurate. Changing the explanatory variables changes coefficient and significance of some key control variables such as Muslim population and no account due to religious reasons indicators as the proxy of religiosity. Overall, results show that Islamic banking in all countries sample negatively and significantly associated with conventional bank base access, and the country specific control variables do not alter these results.

In particular, these results show that higher levels of specific Islamic banking products such as loans, and total assets percentage of GDP, stronger capitalization ratio of Islamic banks, and higher levels of percentage of zakah and murabahat transactions are associated with lower conventional bank access in the sample countries. Meanwhile, percentage of Islamic banking loans, assets, and deposits ratio variables, which are also considered as Islamic banking growth indicators, are found significantly and negatively associated with commercial bank outreach and the access to and use of commercial banking services in this section.

Furthermore, the levels of religiosity indicators such as percentage of Muslim population, religiosity, people have no account due to religious reasons are negatively associated with commercial bank base access. As explained above, religiosity indicators have negative and statistically significant association with financial inclusion, which is measured with commercial bank based access indicators. This result also supports the assumption that this paper relies on, which is the suggestion that the more religious (Islamic) people are; the less they use financial services. Hence, the impact of religious

indicators on people's preferences might explain the results of Islamic banking and its products above.

These results support the arguments in the literature, as Ghoul³⁷ argued that lack of access to Islamic financial institutions is one of the main reasons behind having low levels of financial access. Similarly, most researches on the literature such as Gerrard et al.³⁸, Metawa et al.³⁹, Naser et al.⁴⁰, Othman et al.⁴¹, Wakhid et al.⁴², Gait et al.⁴³, and Lee et al.⁴⁴ argued that religious beliefs are the most important reasons behind clients choosing Islamic banking services, which may decrease the level of access to financial services from conventional banks. Furthermore, as Karakaya et al.⁴⁵ and Okumus⁴⁶ stated, religious beliefs as being a Muslim are the most important reason behind the preference of using Islamic banking services in Turkey. Therefore, Muslim clients prefer to use Islamic financial services more, rather than conventional banking services.

However, when we rerun the regressions on the access indicator of other financial institutions, results are different with some exceptions. Islamic banking dummy and number of Islamic banks indicators along with Islamic banking products are positively and significantly associated with access from microfinance institutions, credit unions, and post offices services. Similarly, changing the main explanatory variables in each regression changes the coefficients and significance of some key control variables. In particular, significance of the proxies of religiosity change when we change the Islamic banks products for each regression. However, the results of economic growth and financial development proxies remain similar for each regression equation.

These results hold even after controlling for religiosity indicators and macroeconomic country specific factors. Unlike the previous regression results, % of Muslim population and % of religiosity variables significantly and positively enter the models. Furthermore, the indicators of Islamic banking growth are found significantly and positively associated with outreach of microfinance institutions, cooperatives, and post offices in this section.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

Table 1. Cross-Country OLS Estimation of the Impact of Islamic Finance on Financial Inclusion in All Countries Sample

The first dependent variable is the financial inclusion index for model specifications (1) to (8). The second dependent variable is other financial institutions access indicator for model specifications (9), to (16). Regression equations are determined in the methodology section above. We use Islamic banking dummy and number of Islamic banks to assess the impact of Islamic finance on financial inclusion. In addition to this, improving the works in the literature, we add Islamic banking products to examine the mechanism behind this impact in this paper. Because of the high correlations amongst these products, we regress them one at a time in the regression equations. Furthermore, we add percentage of Muslim population, religiosity, and people have no account due to religious reasons indicators to control for the levels of religiosity in countries. Finally, GDP per capita and private credits/GDP indicators are used to control the results in terms of income growth and financial development levels of countries respectively. Robust Standard Errors are clustered by country. **, *, and * show significance levels at 1, 5, 10 % respectively.

| Dependent Variable | Financial Inclusion Index (Commercial Bank Access) | | | | | | | | Other Financial Institutions (Access from Microfinance Institutions) | | | | | | | |
|-------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------|---------------------|----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------|----------------------|-----------------------|----------------------|---------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) | (11) | (12) | (13) | (14) | (15) | (16) |
| Islamic Banking dummy | -0.040** (0.020) | | | | | | | | 0.181** (0.437) | | | | | | | |
| Number of Islamic Banks | | -0.009* (0.002) | | | | | | | | 0.002* (0.015) | | | | | | |
| Islamic Banking Loans% | | | -0.002* (0.001) | | | | | | | | 0.057* (0.043) | | | | | |
| Islamic Banking Assets % | | | | -0.003 (0.001) | | | | | | | | 0.010* (0.054) | | | | |
| Islamic Banking Deposits % | | | | | 0.001* (0.0001) | | | | | | | | 0.003 (0.025) | | | |
| Islamic Banking Capital Ratio | | | | | | -0.004 (0.015) | | | | | | | | 0.078* (0.079) | | |
| Zakah % | | | | | | | -0.010* (0.016) | | | | | | | | 0.089* (0.077) | |
| Murabahat % | | | | | | | | 0.011* (0.016) | | | | | | | | 0.013* (0.091) |
| Religiosity % | -0.001 (0.001) | 0.001 (0.001) | -0.001* (0.0001) | -0.002 (0.0007) | -0.001 (0.0008) | -0.004* (0.005) | -0.004 (0.005) | -0.003 (0.005) | -0.011* (0.007) | -0.011 (0.009) | 0.016** (0.007) | 0.013* (0.007) | 0.014* (0.007) | 0.012* (0.007) | 0.014** (0.007) | 0.014* (0.007) |
| Muslim % | -0.054* (0.030) | -0.041* (0.032) | -0.042* (0.031) | -0.034 (0.029) | -0.036* (0.030) | -0.265* (0.150) | -0.265 (0.156) | -0.228* (0.167) | 0.275** (0.537) | -0.311* (0.670) | 0.258** (0.538) | 0.138** (0.562) | 0.210 (0.573) | 0.130** (0.467) | 0.232** (0.534) | 0.136* (0.724) |
| No Account due to Religious reasons | 0.001 (0.001) | 0.001 (0.001) | -0.001* (0.0006) | -0.0001* (0.001) | -0.0001 (0.001) | -0.002* (0.003) | -0.0003 (0.003) | 0.0006 (0.003) | 0.001 (0.015) | 0.001 (0.021) | 0.007 (0.014) | 0.004* (0.015) | 0.006 (0.015) | 0.007 (0.015) | 0.007 (0.015) | 0.004 (0.019) |
| GDP per capita growth | 0.002* (0.002) | 0.001*** (0.010) | 0.001*** (0.0001) | 0.0002*** (0.0002) | 0.0004*** (0.0006) | 0.0002*** (0.0005) | 0.0002*** (0.001) | 0.006*** (0.001) | 0.006*** (0.001) | 0.0005* (0.0004) | 0.003*** (0.0006) | 0.0001*** (0.0004) | 0.0001*** (0.004) | 0.001*** (0.004) | 0.0001*** (0.004) | 0.0001*** (0.004) |
| Private Credits/GDP | 0.001*** (0.003) | 0.001** (0.001) | 0.001*** (0.0002) | 0.002*** (0.0002) | 0.001*** (0.0002) | 0.004*** (0.001) | 0.004*** (0.001) | 0.004*** (0.001) | 0.018*** (0.005) | 0.018*** (0.004) | 0.017*** (0.004) | 0.017*** (0.004) | 0.017*** (0.004) | 0.018*** (0.004) | 0.017*** (0.004) | 0.017*** (0.004) |
| Constant | 0.079 (0.080) | -0.104 (0.085) | 0.090 (0.084) | 0.093* (0.082) | 0.092* (0.083) | -2.301*** (0.530) | -2.304*** (0.531) | -2.280*** (0.525) | 1.682*** (0.134) | 1.819*** (0.138) | 5.972*** (0.723) | 5.794*** (0.690) | 5.856*** (0.715) | 5.656*** (0.684) | 5.867*** (0.697) | 5.803*** (0.750) |
| R-squared | 0.479 | 0.505 | 0.657 | 0.655 | 0.649 | 0.533 | 0.534 | 0.536 | 0.414 | 0.409 | 0.504 | 0.485 | 0.484 | 0.514 | 0.490 | 0.485 |
| Number of Observations | 53 | 52 | 51 | 51 | 51 | 51 | 51 | 51 | 53 | 53 | 52 | 52 | 52 | 52 | 52 | 52 |

Table 2. Cross-Country OLS Estimation of the Impact of Islamic Finance on Financial Inclusion in Middle Eastern Countries Sample

The first dependent variable is the financial inclusion index for model specifications (1) to (8). The second dependent variable is other financial institutions access indicator for model specifications (9), to (16). Regression equations are determined in the methodology section above. We use Islamic banking dummy and number of Islamic banks to assess the impact of Islamic finance on financial inclusion. In addition to this, improving the works in the literature, we add Islamic banking products to examine the mechanism behind this impact in this paper. Because of the high correlations amongst these products, we regress them one at a time in the regression equations. Furthermore, we add percentage of Muslim population, religiosity, and people have no account due to religious reasons indicators to control for the levels of religiosity in countries. Finally, GDP per capita and private credits/GDP indicators are used to control the results in terms of income growth and financial development levels of countries respectively. Robust Standard Errors are clustered by country. ***, **, and * show significance levels at 1, 5, 10 % respectively.

| Dependent Variable | Financial Inclusion Index (Commercial Bank Access) | | | | | | | | Other Financial Institutions (Access from Microfinance Institutions) | | | | | | | | |
|-----------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------------------------------------------------------------------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|--------|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) | (11) | (12) | (13) | (14) | (15) | (16) | |
| Islamic Banking dummy | -0.035* | | | | | | | | 0.180* | | | | | | | | |
| Number of Islamic Banks_OIC | | -0.001* | | | | | | | | 0.012* | | | | | | | |
| Islamic Banking Loans%_OIC | | | -0.002 | | | | | | | | 0.058* | | | | | | |
| Islamic Banking Assets %_OIC | | | | -0.004* | | | | | | | | -0.011 | | | | | |
| Islamic Banking Deposits %_OIC | | | | | 0.002* | | | | | | | | 0.005* | | | | |
| Islamic Banking Capital Ratio_OIC | | | | | | -0.002 | | | | | | | | 0.079 | | | |
| Zakah %_OIC | | | | | | | -0.002* | | | | | | | | 0.090* | | |
| Murabahat %_OIC | | | | | | | | -0.008 | 0.002** | | | | | | | 0.014* | |
| Religiosity_OIC % | 0.0002 | 0.0002 | -0.0005* | -0.0005* | -0.0005 | -0.0006* | -0.0006 | -0.0006 | -0.0006 | 0.012 | 0.011 | -0.017* | 0.014* | 0.015* | 0.012 | -0.014* | 0.013* |
| Muslim_OIC % | -0.055* | -0.041* | -0.042* | -0.035 | -0.037* | -0.044* | -0.045 | -0.039* | 0.175* | 0.121* | 0.150* | 0.038* | 0.320* | 0.030* | 0.132* | 0.045* | |
| No account religious reasons_OIC | -0.001* | 0.0004 | -0.0001* | -0.0007* | -0.0001 | -0.0003 | -0.0002 | 0.0001* | 0.001 | 0.002 | 0.007 | 0.005 | 0.005 | 0.008* | 0.008 | 0.005 | |
| GDP per capita growth_OIC | 0.0002** | 0.001** | 0.0007** | 0.0006** | 0.0006** | 0.0001** | 0.0003** | 0.0005** | 0.0001 | 0.002 | 0.0002 | 0.0002* | 0.0002* | 0.0002** | 0.0002* | 0.0002 | |
| Private Credits/GDP_OIC | 0.001** | 0.0008** | 0.001*** | 0.0009** | 0.001*** | 0.001*** | 0.001*** | 0.001*** | 0.018* | 0.017** | 0.018*** | 0.018*** | 0.018*** | 0.019*** | 0.018*** | 0.018*** | |
| Constant | 0.072 | 0.104* | 0.091* | 0.094* | 0.093* | 0.086* | 0.084* | 0.088* | 0.670*** | 0.850*** | 0.572*** | 0.794*** | 1.456*** | 1.650*** | 1.365*** | 1.815*** | |
| R-squared | 0.066 | 0.071 | 0.049 | 0.050 | 0.051 | 0.050 | 0.050 | 0.051 | 0.189 | 0.234 | 0.151 | 0.054 | 0.315 | 0.154 | 0.197 | 0.250 | |
| Number of Observations | 418 | 515 | 657 | 656 | 650 | 644 | 642 | 645 | 410 | 410 | 505 | 481 | 485 | 515 | 491 | 455 | |

As the robustness of the results we run the regressions omitting the outliers in the data. However, the results hold even omitting the outliers for both proxies of financial inclusion. These results are also consistent with literature. These results support the argument in Naceur et al.⁴⁷ that Islamic banking is associated with greater levels of financial inclusion, in terms of access

⁴⁷ Ibid.

from other financial institutions. In particular, adding the Islamic banking products into the regressions, our results improve their work by exploring the mechanism by which the impact of Islamic banking occurs. The results of regressions for the second proxy of financial inclusion are consistent with the literature. For instance, as Ghoul⁴⁸ argued that increasing the access of Islamic financial services may also increase the levels of banking penetration in the economy.

Middle Eastern Countries Sample

As seen in Table 2, Islamic banking dummy variable and the number of Islamic financial institutions significantly and negatively enter the model for commercial bank base financial inclusion. Regarding the Islamic banking products, they are found negatively and significantly associated with commercial bank base access except for Islamic banks deposits and murabahat variables. In particular, Islamic bank deposits percentage of GDP and percentage of murabahat variables positively and significantly enter the regression models for commercial bank base financial inclusion. However, Islamic banking loans and total capital ratio variables do not enter significantly in the regressions.

The positive association of deposits and murabahat transactions of Islamic banks with conventional banks in Middle Eastern countries can be explained as the nature of some Islamic financial institutions. Murabahat transactions, which are profit and loss sharing transactions, have the major share amongst Islamic banking products. Furthermore, most of the Islamic financial institutions contain commercial banking services, which mostly use retail deposit as the major funding source. Thus, in countries like Kuwait and Qatar, where Islamic banks are the major financial obstacle, Islamic banking murabahat and zakah transactions have positive association with conventional banking outreach.

Meanwhile, since percentage of Islamic banking loans, assets, and deposits ratio variables are also considered as Islamic banking growth indicators, we can interpret their association here as the impact of Islamic banking growth on commercial banking outreach in Mid-East countries. In doing so,

⁴⁸ Ibid.

in Mid-East countries, Islamic banking growth is found significantly and negatively associated with commercial bank outreach and the access to and use of commercial banking services in this section.

These results hold even after controlling for levels of religiosity indicators and macroeconomic country specific factors into the regression models. Accordingly, percentage of religiosity, percentage of Muslim population, percentage of people having no account due to religious reasons variables significantly and negatively associated with commercial bank base access in the regression models. Furthermore, income growth and financial development indicators are found positively and significantly associated in the models.

These results suggest that in Muslim dominant countries, higher levels of usage of Islamic financial products and higher levels of religiosity associated with lower commercial bank access. However, there are some exceptions for specific Islamic banking products such as percentage of murabahat and deposits in the regression models. As explained the details above, higher levels of these components of Islamic banks are associated with higher levels of commercial bank access.

In particular, percentage GDP of Islamic banking deposits, murabahat transactions, and zakah transactions are found positively and significantly associated with access from other financial institutions such as microfinance institutions, cooperatives, and post offices. However, Islamic banking total assets and total capital ratio variables are found insignificant. Meanwhile, as the proxies of Islamic banking growth, Islamic banking deposits percentage of GDP is found significantly and positively associated the outreach of microfinance institutions, cooperatives, and post offices.

The negative association of Islamic banking total assets with other financial institutions can be explained as the same reason we have given above. Therefore, the close link between some Islamic banks and conventional banking services, which rely on retail deposit as the major funding source, might also explain this negative association. In the meantime, in consistent with our results in this section, in countries like Kuwait and Qatar, where Islamic banks are the major financial obstacle, Islamic banking murabahat and zakah transactions more likely to have positive association with other financial institutions outreach.

Furthermore, the levels of religiosity variables such as percentage of Muslim population, religiosity, and people having no account due to religious reasons are found significantly and positively related with access from other financial institutions variable in the regression models. Finally, the macroeconomic control variables GDP per capita growth and private credits to GDP significantly and positively enter the models in this section. Overall, higher levels of Islamic finance components associated with higher levels of access from microfinance institutions, cooperatives, and post offices. The specific products of these financial institutions that are offered in the Muslim dominant countries can explain these results. Meanwhile, the results of the indicators of religiosity indicators in this section support this argument.

Overall, the absolute values of Islamic banking proxies and products are relatively higher in the commercial bank access regressions using all countries sample. In this regards, we might suggest that these results imply economically substantial impacts. For example, Islamic banking dummy variable's smallest coefficient in the commercial bank base access regressions for Middle Eastern countries sample is -0.001. Meanwhile, the mean and standard deviation amounts of commercial bank base access are 0.024 and 0.009, respectively. In this regard, the size of coefficients imply that if Islamic banking dummy and/or Islamic banking deposits indicators were used in all countries sample, their low levels of the impact on commercial bank base access would be larger. The amount of association between Islamic finance and other financial institutions outreach seem similar in case of both all countries and Mid-East samples.

These results are economically expected, as well as meaningful. In the meantime, they are consistent with literature. As argued in the study The World Bank Global Financial Development Report⁴⁹, the emergence of Islamic banks has a significant impact on the financial access of the households and small and medium scaled firms. Furthermore, as Demirguc-Kunt, Klapper, and Randall⁵⁰, argued that Muslims are less likely to use formal financial services such as having a bank account at a formal financial institution than non-Muslims. This may explain the negative association between financial inclusion and the percentage of Muslims in the model.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

Moreover, as the one of the main contributions of this paper, modification and improvement of the results in Naceur et al.⁵¹ and Demirguc-Kunt, Klapper, and Randall⁵², we explore the mechanisms by which the impact of Islamic finance occurs on financial exclusion by subdividing the services of Islamic banks. We assess these services separately in both all countries and Muslim dominant countries samples to explain the mechanisms of the impact. Meanwhile, we improve their arguments by finding relatively stronger association between Islamic banking and financial inclusion using financial inclusion measures by Yorulmaz⁵³. However, our results only explore the degree of association between variables rather than mitigating endogeneity concerns and/or causal relationships.

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ Ibid.

Conclusions

Regarding the impact of Islamic finance on voluntarily financial exclusion, we find evidence that higher levels of Islamic finance is associated with lower levels of conventional bank base financial access in both all countries and Middle Eastern countries. We find evidence that Islamic bank loans, deposits, and total assets percentage of GDP explain the impact of Islamic finance on conventional bank access in all countries. Meanwhile, Islamic bank loans, deposits, capital ratio, zakah, and murabahat percentage of GDP variables explain this impact in Middle Eastern countries. On the other hand, as one of our contributions to the literature, we find evidence that Islamic banking growth indicators are significantly associated with lower levels of commercial bank outreach and the access to and use of commercial banking services in both all countries and Mid-East countries samples.

Moreover, regarding the access from microfinance institutions, credit unions, and post offices services as the proxy of financial inclusion, we find evidence that Islamic bank indicators significantly associated with higher levels of access from other financial institutions in both all countries and Mid-East countries samples. Assessing the mechanisms of this impact, we find evidence that Islamic bank deposits, total assets, total capital ratio, zakah, and murabahat transactions % of GDP variables explain the impact of Islamic finance on access from other financial institutions in both all countries and Mid-East countries samples.

As discussed above, the impact of Islamic finance is relatively stronger in Mid-East countries since the effects of religiosity are stronger in Muslim dominant countries. In this regard, governments and policymakers should consider providing more *Shariah*-compliant financial services, removing caps of interest rates, and strengthening customer protection rules for religious clients to bring voluntarily excluded groups into the financial systems. Moreover, in order to combat with voluntarily financial exclusion, Middle Eastern countries governments should extend access to various *Shariah*-compliant financial services through existing channels of Islamic banks.

At this point, the term of 'Institutionalization' emerges as a need for Islamic redistributive instruments not only in Mid-East countries but also in worldwide. Starting from building and developing legal infrastructure of nation-wide specific institutions for such instruments above would facilitate

redistribution of wealth among people to achieve the target of economic and social justice and poverty alleviation. Finally, developing worldwide specific institutions of Islamic redistributive instruments would be a long-term target for policymakers. Since the analysis on the association between financial access and Islamic banking is rare in literature, this paper may stimulate more research in this area. The actual effects of Islamic finance on the involuntarily exclusion in different countries from different backgrounds still need to be explored like showing time trend with broader data and more indicators. Therefore, future works may concentrate on exploring this association using different strategies.

References

- Beck, T., Demirgüç-Kunt, A., & Merrouche, O. (2013). Islamic vs. conventional banking: Business model, efficiency and stability. *Journal of Banking and Finance*, 37, 433-447.
- Beck, T., Demirgüç-Kunt, A., & Levine, R. (2007). Finance, inequality and the poor. *Journal of Economic Growth*, 12, 27-49.
- Collard, S., Kempson, E. & Whyley, C. (2001). *Tackling financial exclusion: An area-based approach*. Bristol, UK, Policy Press.
- Commission of The European Communities. (2008). *Financial services provision and prevention of financial exclusion*. European Commission.
- Demirgüç-Kunt, A. & Maksimovic, V. (1998). Law, Finance, and Firm Growth. *The Journal of Finance, American Finance Association*, 53(6), 2107-2137.
- Demirguc-Kunt, A. & Klapper, L. (2013). Measuring Financial Inclusion: Explaining Variation in Use of Financial Services across and within Countries. *Brookings Papers on Economic Activity*, p. 279-321.
- Demirguc-Kunt, A., Randall, D., & Klapper, L. (2013). *Islamic Finance and Financial Inclusion Measuring Use of and Demand for Formal Financial Services among Muslim Adults*. Washington, D.C., The World Bank. <http://proxy.library.carleton.ca/login>.
- European Commission, & Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. (2008). *Handbook on constructing composite indicators methodology and user guide*. Paris, OECD. Available from: <http://site.ebrary.com/id/10251719>.
- Gait, A., & Philip, G., & Vidhan G. (2009a). *Attitudes, Perceptions and Motivations of Libyan Retail Consumers toward Islamic Methods of Finance*. St Lucia, Australia, University of Queensland. Available from: <http://hdl.handle.net/10072/31929>.

- Gait, A. (2009b). *Libyan Attitudes towards Islamic Methods of Finance: An Empirical Analysis of Retail Consumers, Business Firms and Banks*. Griffith University. Department of Accounting, Finance and Economics. Available from: <http://www4.gu.edu.au:8080/adt-root/public/adt-QGU20100615.104528>.
- Gerrard, P. & Cunningham, J. (1997). Islamic Banking: A Study in Singapore. *International Journal of Bank Marketing*. 15 (6), 204-216.
- Ghoul, W. A. (2011). The Dilemma Facing Islamic Finance and Lessons Learned from the Global Financial Crisis. *Journal of Islamic Economics , Banking and Finance*. 7, 57-76.
- Imam, P., & Kpodar, K. (2015). *Is Islamic banking good for growth*. [Washington, D.C.], International Monetary Fund. <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/cat/longres.aspx?sk=42871.0>.
- Iqbal, Z., & Mirakhor, A. (2012). *An introduction to Islamic finance theory and practice*. Singapore, John Wiley & Sons (Asia). Available from: <http://public.eblib.com/choice/publicfullrecord.aspx?p=693367>.
- Karakaya, A. & Karamustafa, O. (2004). The Role of Customer Features on the use of Technology Intensive Financial Products in Banks. *Active Bankacılık ve Finans Dergisi*, 38, 1-6.
- Kempson, E. (2006). 'Policy Level Response to Financial Exclusion in Developing Economies: Lessons for Developing Countries', Paper for *Access to Finance: Building Inclusive Financial Systems*, May 30-31 2006, World Bank, Washington DC.
- Khan, A. K., & Khanna, T. (2010). *God, Government and Outsiders: The influence of Religious Beliefs on Depositor Behavior in an Emerging Market*. Working Paper. Harvard Business School.
- King, R. G., & Levine, R. (1993). *Finance and growth: Schumpeter might be right*. Washington, DC (1818 H St., NW, Washington 20433), Country Economics Dept., World Bank.
- Lee, K. & Ullah, S. (2011). Customers' attitude toward Islamic Banking in Pakistan. *International Journal of Islamic and Middle Eastern Finance and Management*, 4 (2), 131-145.
- Metawa, S. A. & Almossawi, M. (1998). Banking Behaviour of Islamic Bank Customers: Perspectives and Implications. *International Journal of Bank Marketing*, 16 (7), 299-313.
- Mohieldin, M., Iqbal, Z., Rostom, A., & Fu, X. (2011). *The Role of Islamic Finance in Enhancing Financial Inclusion in Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) Countries*. Washington, D.C., The World Bank. Available from: <http://proxy.library.carleton.ca/login?url=http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/workingpaper/10.1596/1813-9450-5920>.

- Naser, K., Jamal, A., & Al-Khatib, K. (1999). Islamic banking: a study of customer satisfaction and preferences in Jordan. *International Journal of Bank Marketing*, 17(3), 135-151.
- Okumuş, H. Ş. (2005). Interest-Free Banking in Turkey: A Study of Customer Satisfaction and Bank Selection Criteria. *Journal of Economic Cooperation*, 26 (4),51-86.
- Othman, A. & Owen, L. (2012). Adopting and Measuring Customer Service Quality (SQ) in Islamic Banks: A Case Study in Kuwait Finance House. *International Journal of Islamic Financial Services*, 3 (1), 1-26.
- Wakhid, S. C. and Efrita, S. (2007). Adapting Islamic Banks' Carter Model: An Empirical Study in Riau's Syariah Banks, Indonesia. *Pesat*. 2, 120-127.
- World Bank. (2008). *Finance for All? Policies and Pitfalls in Expanding Success. A World Bank Policy Research Report*. World Bank Group. Available from: <http://www.mylibrary.com?id=119146>.
- World Bank. (2014). *Global financial development report*. Available from: <http://alltitles.ebrary.com/Doc?id=10809087>.
- Yorulmaz, R. (2018). An analysis of constructing global financial inclusion indices. *Borsa Istanbul Review*. 18, 248-258.

KİTAP İNCELEMESİ

Yoel Guzansky, *The Arab Gulf States and Reform in the Middle East: Between Iran and the "Arab Spring"* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015)

ISBN: 978-1-137-46783-6

Yoel Guzansky bu kitapta Suudi Arabistan ve diğer Körfez ülkelerini, bu ülkelerin karşılaşmak zorunda oldukları güvenlik tehditlerini ve bunu yaparken hangi yolları kullandıklarını anlatmaktadır. Körfez ülkelerinin tehdit algılamalarını, bu ülkelerin İran ile ilişkileri temeline oturtmaktadır. Ayrıca, bölge ülkelerinin ABD ile ilişkilerine ve Arap Baharı'nın neden olduğu bölgesel gelişmelere verilen tepkiler de incelenmektedir.

Kitabın giriş bölümünde "savunmacı monarşiler" başlığı altında genel bir tarihsel arkaplanın yanında, kitabın takip ettiği teorik çerçeve çizilmektedir. Birinci bölümde "Körfez'de çatışma ve işbirliği" konusunun anlatıldığı kitapta, ikinci bölümde tek tek ülkelerin özel durumları incelenmektedir. Sırasıyla tüm Körfez ülkelerinin İran ile ilişkilerine değinen yazar, Suudi Arabistan, Kuveyt, Katar, Birleşik Arap Emirlikleri, Bahreyn, Umman ve Yemen sırasını takip etmektedir. Ardından üçüncü bölümde, Arap Baharı'nın Körfez ülkelerinin istikrarını nasıl etkilediği sorusuna cevap aranmaktadır. Dördüncü ve son bölümde ise yazar "düşmanımın düşmanı dostum mudur?" sorusu altında Körfez ülkelerinin İsrail ile olan ilişkilerinin dinamiklerinin nasıl şekillendiğinin resmini çizmektedir.

Birinci bölümün ana temasını Britanya'nın bölgenin düzen kurma görevini ABD'ye devretmesinin ardın

Gökhan Erel

Doktora Öğrencisi, ODTÜ
Uluslararası İlişkiler
Bölümü, Araştırma Asistanı,
ORSAM

Ortadoğu Etütleri

Volume 8 , No 2
December 2016
pp. 138-142

dan bölge dinamiklerinin nasıl etkilendiği konusu oluşturmaktadır. ABD'nin bölgede dengeyi kurmaya çalışırken bölge ülkeleri ile ilişkilerini Körfez ekonomisine atfettiği önem çerçevesinde tanımlamasının üzerinde durulmaktadır. Körfez bölgesi, küresel petrol rezervlerinin yüzde 47'sine ve küresel gaz rezervlerinin yüzde 42'sine sahip bir bölgedir. Bu istatistikler hem Ortadoğu'nun hem de Körfez bölgesinin dünya piyasalarındaki önemini göstermektedir. Guzansky, Körfez ülkelerinin birbirine benzediğini savunmaktadır. Nüfuslarının sınırlı olması, mütevazı ve deneyimsiz ordulara sahip olmaları, büyük ekonomik kaynaklara sahip olmaları bu ülkelerin benzerliklerini oluşturmaktadır. Bu ortak özelliklerden dolayı Körfez ülkelerinin kırılğan bir yapıda olduğu ve bu sebepten Batılı ülkeler ile ittifak yapmak durumunda oldukları belirtiliyor.

İkinci bölümün temel konusu ise Sünni Arap monarşileri tarafından kurulan Körfez İşbirliği Konseyi (KİK)'in bölgedeki istikrar ve işbirliğine katkısıdır. Yazar, KİK'in kurulmasının temel nedeninin 1979 İran İslam Devrimi'nin ve bunu takip eden İran-Irak savaşının yarattığı güvenlik tehditleri olduğunu not etmiştir. Bu tehditlerin ortak bir şekilde karşılanması gerekliliği KİK'in temel kuruluş nedeni olarak sunulmaktadır. Fakat yazar, kuruluşunun üzerinden neredeyse 40 yıl geçmiş olmasına rağmen KİK'in halen ortak bir dış politika ve savunma politikası üzerinde anlaşamadığını belirtmektedir.

Burada ülkelerin teker teker incelenmesine geçilmektedir. Suudi Arabistan'a bakıldığında İran'ın bölgedeki en önemli ideolojik ve jeostratejik rakibi olduğu görülmektedir. Kuveyt'in İran'dan tehdit algılamasının sebebi ise kendi içinde barındırdığı Şii nüfustur. Katar'ın pozisyonuna bakılırsa bağımsız bir dış politika gütmeye çalışan ülkenin aynı zamanda ülkesindeki aşırı unsurları temizlemeye çalıştığı vurgulanmaktadır. BAE'ye bakıldığında, İran ile ilişkilerinin İran'ın işgal ettiği üç adanın yarattığı gerginliğin unutulmadığını ve bunun yanında Dubai emirliği özelinde büyük bir ticaret hacmine sahip olduğu vurgulanmaktadır. Bahreyn ise barındırdığı Şii çoğunluk ve küçük hacmi sebebiyle, İran'dan en büyük tehdit algılayan ülke olarak görülmektedir. Bahreyn ayrıca 2011 ayaklanmalarının sebebi olarakta İran'ı göstermektedir. Yemen'in durumuna bakıldığında ise 2011 ayaklanmaları sonucunda Ali Abdullah Salih'in görevini, yardımcısı Abdurrahman Mansur Hadi'ye devrettiği ve ülkedeki çatışma ortamından İran destekli Husi milislerinin ve El-Kaide örgütünün fraksiyonlarının yararlandığı belirtilmektedir.

Üçüncü ve dördüncü bölümlerde, KİK üye ülkelerinin içerideki ve bölgedeki istikrarsızlıklara nasıl cevap verdikleri ele alınmaktadır. Dördüncü bölümde ise Körfez ülkelerinin İsrail ile ilişkilerindeki son dönem yaklaşma ele alınmaktadır. Yazar özellikle 2011 sonrasında Suudi Arabistan, Katar ve İsrail arasında bir yaklaşma olduğunu vurgulamaktadır. Bu yaklaşmanın temel sebebi İran'ın askeri kapasitesinin kullanarak bölgesel hegemonya kurmasının engellenmesidir.

ABD-KİK ilişkilerinin değişen dinamiği

Yazar, Körfez ülkelerinin tarihsel olarak kendi güvenliklerinin sağlanması için bölge-dışı bir büyük güce ihtiyaç duyduklarını vurgulamaktadır. Britanya'nın bölgeden 1970'li yılların başında çekilmeye başladığında, Körfez ülkelerinin Britanya askeri varlığının bölgede kalması konusunda baskı yaptıkları belirtilmektedir. Özellikle bir büyük gücün korumasının eksikliği, Körfez ülkelerinin güvenlik endişelerini artırmaktadır. Fakat ABD, Körfez ülkelerinin bu endişelerini gidermek amacıyla Bahreyn'de 5. Filosunu demirlemiş ve Katar'a da büyük bir askeri üs kurmuştur. ABD'nin 1990'lardan sonra Körfez ülkeleri ile ilişkilerinin, Körfez ülkelerinin tehdit algıladığı iki ülke olan İran ve Irak'ın "çifte kuşatılması" (dual containment) ile tanımlandığı vurgulanmaktadır. Çifte Kuşatma politikasının da 2003 yılında ABD'nin Irak işgali ile sona erdiği belirtilmektedir. 2009 yılında başlayan Obama dönemi ile birlikte de ABD'nin İran'ı dengeleme amacı dahilinde Körfez ülkelerinin askeri yeteneklerinin artırılması politikasından bahsedilmektedir. Bunu sağlamanın en önemli yolunun ise Körfez ülkelerinin Amerikan silahlarına olan erişimi gösterilmektedir. Yazara göre, Suudi Arabistan, BAE ve Kuveyt'in en büyük çekincelerinden biri, ABD'nin enerji bağımsızlığına ulaşması ve böylece Körfez'deki müttefiklerine ihtiyacı kalmamasıdır. Bölüm sonunda verilen en önemli mesaj ise Körfez bölgesinin İran karşısında istikrarının ve güvenliğinin sağlanmasında hiç bir ülkenin ABD'den daha istekli olmadığıdır.

Körfez İşbirliği Konseyi'nde Artan Güvenlik İşbirliği

Kitap KİK'in kurulduğundan beri kağıt üzerindeki görevlerini güçlü bir şekilde yerine getiremediğinden bahsetmektedir. Yazara göre KİK içerisinde kendi egemenliğini artırmak isteyen Suudi Arabistan'ın girişimleri diğer Körfez ülkeleri tarafından dirençle karşılanmaktadır. Bu anlamda yazar 2011 yılındaki Riyad Deklarasyonu'nu örnek vermektedir. Riyad Deklarasyonu

tam ekonomik ve politik entegrasyon öngörmekteydi. Yazar, KİK'i işlevinin öngörüldüğü gibi olmadığını ve artan oranda sadece Arapların birlik gösterisinin yapıldığı bir arenaya dönüştüğünün altını çizmektedir.

Yazar temel anlamda KİK içerisinde savunma işbirliğinin birden fazla aktör sebebiyle beklenenden yavaş ilerlediğini belirtmektedir. Bu faktörler arasında, İran başta olmak üzere komşu ülkeleri uyarma korkusu, egemenliğin korunması ve milli ordular ve yabancı müttefikler edinme gibi diğer savunma yollarına başvurulması konusu yer almaktadır. KİK içerisinde travma yaratan en önemli gelişmelerden birisinin de Irak'ın Kuveyt'i işgali olduğu vurgulanmaktadır.

"Körfez Ülkeleri ve İran" bölümünde Guzansky, KİK üye ülkelerinin İran ile ilgili olarak algıladıkları güvenlik tehdidinin farklılaştığı için İran'a karşı ortak bir güvenlik stratejisi oluşturulamadığından bahsetmektedir. Suudi Arabistan-İran ilişkilerinin bölge için büyük önem arzettiğinin vurgulanmasının yanı sıra, iki ülkenin ABD ile ilişkisi, mezhepsel boyut ve Suriye ve Irak üzerinden şekillendiğinin altını çizmektedir. Kuveyt-İran ilişkilerine dair en temel argüman ise, Kuveyt'in ülkesinde barındırdığı Şii nüfusu sebebiyle İran'dan tehdit algılamasıdır. Kuveyt'in özellikle 2011 yılında ABD askerlerinin Irak'ı kısmi olarak terketmesinin akabinde Irak'tan da tehdit algılandığı belirtiliyor. Katar-İran ilişkilerine bakıldığında ise, Katar'ın modern tarihinde takip ettiği diplomatik bağımsızlık stratejisinin bazı durumlarda KİK üye ülkelerinden ayrılmasına sebep olduğu belirtiliyor. Suudi Arabistan ile olan karmaşık ilişkisi, İran tehdidinin yarattığı güvensizlik ve ABD desteği ile Katar'ın İran'dan Taliban'a Fetih'ten Müslüman Kardeşler'e ve Hamas'a kadar bir çok aktör ile görüşme gerçekleştirmesi, Katar'ı farklı bir dış politika çizgisine taşımaktadır. BAE'ye bakıldığında ise, farklı emirliklerin İran ile değişik boyutlardaki ticari ilişkilerinin İran'a bakış açılarını belirlediğinden bahsediliyor. Bahreyn ise İran'dan 1981 yılındaki darbe girişimini desteklemesi ve ülkedeki 1994-1999 yılları arasındaki Şii ayaklanmasından sorumlu olması sebebiyle tehdit algılamaktadır. Bahreyn'in bölgesel anlamda İran'dan belki de en fazla tehdit algılayan ülke olması, Bahreyn'i Suudi Arabistan'ın yakınında olmaya itmiştir. Umman-İran ilişkilerine bakıldığında da, Körfez ülkelerinden İran ile en fazla askeri ilişkiye sahip olan ülkenin Umman olduğu vurgulanmaktadır.

Sonuç olarak, Guzansky, Körfez bölgesindeki gelişmelerin küresel güvenliği, refahı ve istikrarı etkileyebilecek kapasitede olduğunu belirtmektedir. Bölgede Suudi Arabistan, Umman, Katar, Kuveyt, BAE, Bahreyn ve

Yemen'in bölgede bazı konularda İran ile işbirliği içinde olduklarını fakat büyük oranda İran tehdidini karşılamak için oluşturulan KİK kimliğinden vazgeçmeden bunu yapmak istediklerini vurgulamaktadır. Modern tarihlerinin büyük kısmında "güvenlik talep eden" bir konumda bulunan Körfez ülkelerinin kurduğu KİK'in temel güvenlik temayüllerine bakıldığında dışarıdan gelen tehditlerin oranının artmasıyla, KİK içerisinde savunma politikası ve dış politika bağlamında işbirliğinin arttığı vurgulanmaktadır. Buna rağmen, KİK ülkelerinin dış politika ve savunma işbirliğinin, ekonomik işbirliğindeki seviyeye ulaşamadığı belirtilmektedir.

Genel Hususular

Ortadoğu Etütleri, Ortadoğu çalışmalarına yoğunlaşmış bir düşünce kuruluşu olan Ortadoğu Araştırmaları Merkezi (ORSAM) tarafından basılı ve e-dergi olarak yayınlanan hakemli bir siyaset, uluslararası ilişkiler ve fikir dergisidir.

Yılda iki kez yayınlanmaktadır.

Ortadoğu Etütleri'nin amacı, Türkiye'de sosyal bilimlerde Ortadoğu çalışmalarının gelişimini teşvik etmek ve uluslararası alanda Ortadoğu literatürüne nitelikli katkılar yapılmasına imkân sağlamaktır.

Ortadoğu Etütleri'nde yayınlanan çalışmalardaki değerlendirmeler, ORSAM'ın kurumsal görüşünü yansıtmamaktadır.

Yayın Koşulları

Ortadoğu Etütleri'nde yayınlanacak makalelerin, uluslararası ilişkiler bağlamında Ortadoğu coğrafyasıyla ilgili siyaset, siyasi tarih, uluslararası hukuk ve iktisat gibi konuları kapsaması beklenmektedir. Ortadoğu literatürüne katkı sağlayacak nitelikte kavramsal çerçevesi sağlam, özgün, eleştirel bakış açısı getiren, çözümlenmeli araştırma ve incelemelere öncelik verilmektedir.

Yayın dili Türkçe, İngilizce ve Arapça'dır.

Makalelerde anlatım dilinin düzgün olması, düşüncelerin doğru bir mantık örgüsü içinde ifade edilmesi, referansların uygun biçimde kullanılması, varsayımların güçlü biçimde desteklenmesi, konuyla ilgili literatüre nüfuz edilebilmiş olması gerekmektedir.

Kitap değerlendirmeleri/incelemelemleri, makale biçiminde hazırlanmış olmaları halinde kabul edilmektedir. İncelenen kitabın bir kopyasının, makul bir sürede iade edilmek üzere, Editör'e ulaştırılması gerekmektedir.

Makaleler yayınlanmadan önce yazarlarla eser sözleşmesi akdedilmektedir.

Telif ödemeleri, derginin yayınlanmasından en geç bir ay sonra yapılmaktadır. Ayrıca, yazarlara dergiden 5 kopya verilmekte, derginin ulaştırılmasında fayda gördükleri kurumlar/kişilerle ilgili sundukları notlar dikkate alınabilmektedir.

Biçimsel Esaslar

- Makalelerin dili Türkçe ya da İngilizce olmalıdır. İngilizce makalelerde imla ve noktalama kuralları açısından İngiltere İngilizcesi'nin kullanılması tercih sebebidir. Yazıların uzunluğu 4000-8000 kelime aralığında olmalıdır.
- Çalışmanın hazırlanmasında takip edilmesi gereken sıra şöyledir: Başlık, öz (abstract), anahtar kelimeler, asıl metin, ekler, notlar, referanslar (kaynakça), tablolar (başlıklarıyla birlikte müstakil sayfalarda), şekil açıklamaları (liste halinde), özet (summary).
- Öz bölümü (abstract) ortalama 150 kelime uzunluğunda olmalıdır. Türkçe makalelerin İngilizce özeti de sunulmalıdır.
- Makalelerde 6 ila 10 anahtar kelime bulunmalıdır. Türkçe makalelerin İngilizce anahtar kelimeleri de sunulmalıdır.
- Özetler (summary) 400 kelime uzunluğunda olmalı ve yalnızca İngilizce hazırlanmalıdır.
- Makale sahiplerinin, Editör aksini belirtmedikçe bir özgeçmişlerini sunmaları istenmektedir.
- Görsellerin yüksek çözünürlüklü olması ve siyah-beyaz baskıya elverişli olmaları gerekmektedir. Renkli görsellerin siyah-beyaz baskılarında ortaya çıkabilecek tutarsızlıklar dikkate alınmalıdır. Materyalin en uygun çözünürlükte olduğundan emin olunmalı ve metin içine yerleştirilmeden bilgisayar ortamında ayrı bir dosya olarak olarak iletilmelidir.
- Anadili İngilizce veya Türkçe olmayan yazarların makalelerini göndermeden önce, metinlerini dil

konusunda ehil bir uzmana okutmaları ve düzelttirmeleri gerekmektedir. Yoğun dilbilgisi ve anlatım hatası olan metinler değerlendirilmeye alınmamaktadır.

- Latin alfabesi kullanılan dillerde isim orijinal haliyle verilmektedir. Diğer dillerde yazılan isimler ise İngilizce veya Türkçe transliterasyonu ile kullanılmalıdır.

Dipnot Yazım Kuralları

Dipnotlar açıklayıcı olmalı ve mümkün olduğunca sık kullanılmalıdır. Dipnotlar makale içinde birbirlerini takip edecek şekilde artan rakamlar ile numaralandırılmalı ve metin sonunda yer alan ve açıklamaları içeren liste ile örtüşmelidir. Söz konusu listelerde kitap, makale ve metinlere dair verilen referanslarla uyumluluk ve isimler ile önemli sıfatların baş harflerinin büyük harf ile yazılması önemlidir. Aşağıdaki uygulamalı örneklerin dikkatle incelenmesi tavsiye edilir:

Kitaplar

Norman Stone, Kitabın Adı, (London: Basic Books, 2007), s. 67.

Norman Stone (ed.), Kitabın Adı (London: Basic Books, 2007), s. 67-9.

Norman Stone ve Sergei Podbolotov, Kitabın Adı (London: Basic Books, 2005), s. 99. Takip eden referanslar: Kıvrımlı, Kitabın Adı, s. 99.

Dergiler ve Makaleler

Norman Stone, "Makale Başlığı", Dergi Adı, Cilt. #, Sayı. # (Ay, Yıl), s. #. Takip eden referanslar: Kıvrımlı, "Makale Adı", s. #.

Derleme Kitap Makaleleri

Norman Stone, "Makale Adı", Hakan Kıvrımlı, "Kitap Adı" (London: Crimea Publis-hing Co., 2000), s.100.

Resmi Belgeler

Meclis Zabıtları: TBMM Yayınları (Meclis Yayınları, 1988, V), 111.

Tezler

E. Beytullah, "The Crimean Khans' relations with the Arab Amirs", yayınlanmamış doktora tezi, Bilkent University, 1999, Bölüm 5, s.44.

Tekrarlar

Dipnotlarda uygun yerlerde "ibid." ibaresi kullanılmalı, ancak bu ibare önceki bilginin birden fazla kaynağa dayandığı durumlarda kullanılmamalıdır.

İletişim / Makale Önerileri

Makaleler yılın her döneminde editöre ulaştırılabilir.

Önerilmek istenen çalışmalar için öncelikle Yayın Koşulları'nın dikkatle okunması tavsiye edilir.

Yazarların çalışmalarını elektronik posta yoluyla adresine göndermesi tercih edilmektedir.

Makaleler ve diğer sorular, info@orsam.org.tr adresine ulaştırılabilir.

Telif Hakları

Dergideki tüm yazıların telif hakları ORSAM'a ait olup, 5846 Sayılı Fikir ve Sanat Eserleri Kanunu uyarınca kaynak gösterilip yapılacak makul alıntılar ve yararlanma dışında, hiçbir şekilde önceden izin alınmaksızın kullanılmaz, yeniden yayınlanamaz.

Yazarlar dergiye sundukları makalelerine ait yayın haklarının tamamını yayıncıya devrettiklerini kabul ederler. Yazarlar makalelerini eğitim amaçlı olarak veya özel kullanım için çoğaltma hakkına sahiptirler. Ancak makale, Ortadoğu Etütleri'nin yazılı izni olmaksızın internet üzerinden yayınlanmak veya benzeri gibi yollarla çoğaltılamaz.