

Report No: 8
THE BLACK SEA INTERNATIONAL
Report No: 1, December 2009

ABKHAZIA FOR THE INTEGRATION OF THE BLACK SEA

CENTER FOR MIDDLE EASTERN STRATEGIC STUDIES
THE BLACK SEA INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR RESEARCH AND DIALOGUE



ABKHAZIA FOR THE INTEGRATION OF THE BLACK SEA

**ORSAM Report No: 8
The Black Sea International Report No: 1**

December 2009

© 2009

Content of this report is copyrighted to TEPAV-ORSAM. Except reasonable and partial quotation and exploitation under the Act No. 5846, Law on Intellectual and Artistic Works, via proper citation, may not be used or re-published without prior permission by TEPAV-ORSAM. Assessments expressed in this report reflect only the opinions of its authors and do not represent the institutional opinion of TEPAV-ORSAM.



TEPAV

The Economic Policy Research Foundation of Turkey (TEPAV) is an independent, non-governmental and non-partisan think-tank, established in October 2004.

A “trust fund” has been formed through the generous support of The Union of Chambers of Turkey (TOBB) to finance TEPAV. This financial set up is being applied for the first time in Turkey and guarantees the non-partisan structure and independence of the foundation.

TEPAV intends to increase the knowledge content of policy discussions in Turkey. The goal of TEPAV research is to remove the gap between academic research and policy implementation. To this end, scholarly research conducted at TEPAV will lead to concrete policy proposals.

The foundation has three research institutes:

Economic Policy Research Institute - EPRI
Economic Stability Institute - ESI
International Policy Research Institute - IPRI

Those institutes represent the inter-disciplinary nature of TEPAV research.

TEPAV makes its findings and analysis generally available through its publications. It also contributes to the development of the policy discussions with its events.

Güven Sak, the Director of TEPAV is a professor of Public Economics. The main author of this background paper, Burcu Gültekin Punsmann is a foreign policy analyst at TEPAV.



CENTER FOR MIDDLE EASTERN STRATEGIC STUDIES (ORSAM)

Center for Middle Eastern Strategic Studies (ORSAM) was established in November 2008 and specifically concentrated on Middle Eastern and Eurasian studies. ORSAM’s studies are sponsored by The Turkmeneli Cooperation and Culture Foundation.

ORSAM’s View of the Middle Eastern and Eurasian World

In fact, both the Middle Eastern and Eurasian territories are harbors to several relevant problems. But neither the Middle East and Eurasia, nor its people should be convicted to adopt an image that is identified with negative complications. With the support of their people, Middle Eastern and Eurasian states do have the potential to stimulate their interior dynamics and to launch a peaceful mobilization for development. To show respect to the people’s will to live together, to show respect to the sovereign rights of the states and essential rights and freedoms of the individuals, are the principals of building domestic and international peace. In this context, Turkey must continue to make contributions for the prosperity of her near surroundings.

ORSAM’s Studies as a Think-Tank

In order to adopt an appropriate approach towards regional developments, ORSAM provides the public opinion and the decision-making units with guiding information about international politics, consistent with the perceptions regarding the Middle East and Eurasia. It presents ideas involving alternative options. In order to present efficient solutions, ORSAM encourages studies of capable researchers and intellectuals of different disciplines. Having strong organizational capabilities, ORSAM encourages the development of relevant Middle Eastern and Eurasian literature domestically & internationally and supports the sharing of knowledge and ideas with the Turkish and international public by welcoming statesmen, bureaucrats, academics, strategists, businessmen, journalists and NGO representatives to Turkey. www.orsam.org.tr

Contents

Executive Summary.....	5
1. Turkey rediscovers Abkhazia	7
1.1. <i>Rediscovering the geography</i>	7
1.2. <i>The Abkhazian Diaspora in Turkey</i>	10
1.3. <i>The Basharan College</i>	14
2. The isolation of Abkhazia: from the CIS embargo to the Russian Federation’s unilateral lifting of the sanctions, 1996-2008.....	14
2.1. <i>Abkhazia at a glance</i>	15
2.2. <i>The years of strict maritime and land embargo, 1996-2001</i>	15
2.3. <i>Progressive unilateral lifting of the isolation regime, 2001-2008</i>	16
3. The economic integration process with the Russian Federation.....	20
3.1. <i>Progressive revivalism with the easing of the isolation</i>	20
3.2. <i>The new legislative framework set after the recognition of Abkhazia by the Russian Federation</i>	21
4. Abkhazia’s economic relations with Turkey	25
4.1. <i>Turkish-Abkhazian trade at a snapshot through the lens of a repatriate Abkhazian businessman from Turkey</i>	25
4.2. <i>Mining sector : coal mines</i>	26
4.3. <i>Perspective of a Turkish businessman from Trabzon</i>	26
5. Abkhazia’s integration with Black Sea Region: pragmatism over formalism, integration over isolation	27
5.1. <i>Questioning the embargo and blockade</i>	27
5.2. <i>The role of Turkey in ending Abkhazia’s isolation</i>	30
5.3. <i>The importance of in-land transportation links</i>	32

Dr. Burcu Gültekin-Punsmann: Punsmann holds an MA in Political Studies and a PhD in International Economics from the *Institut d'Etudes Politiques de Paris (Sciences-Po Paris)*. She worked from May 2003 to April 2009 with the London based international peacebuilding NGO, *International Alert*, within the *Caucasus Business and Development Network (CBDN)* project which seeks to explore economy-related peace building opportunities in the Southern Caucasus region. She drafted briefings and reports in 2007-2008 for the *European Parliament* Directorate General External Policies of the Union on the Black Sea Synergy, energy security, Turkish-Armenian Relations, minority issues, Analysis of the Instrument for Pre-Accession to Candidate and Potential Candidate Countries, Analysis of the EU's Aid to Armenia and Georgia. She worked in 2006-2008 as a post-doctoral research fellow at the *Center for European Studies at the Middle East Technical University* in Ankara. She received the *NATO Manfred Wörner Fellowship in 2004-2005* and acted as the principal investigator of the NATO financed project "Bridging Perceptions of Security, Integrating the Black Sea Region". She worked in 2000-2002 in the Contemporary Turkey, Black Sea, Caucasus research programme of the Istanbul based *French Institute for Anatolian Studies*. Dr Burcu Gültekin-Punsmann is currently working as a Foreign Policy Analyst at the Economic Policy Research Foundation of Turkey (TEPAV).

Argun Başkan: Başkan obtained MA in International Relations and European Studies from the *University of Kent (UK)* as a recipient of the EU Commission's *Jean Monnet Scholarship*. He is currently a research assistant and a PhD candidate at the Department of International Relations, *Middle East Technical University (Turkey)*. He took part in several activities of the *International Alert's Caucasus Business and Development Network (CBDN)* project in Turkey and Caucasus. His research interests cover international energy politics, EU-Russian Federation relations and Caucasus.

Kemal Tarba: Tarba was born in 1984 in Gagra, Abkhazia. After graduating from *Basharan Turkish College* started his studies at the Faculty of Economic and Administrative Sciences, department of Political Sciences and International Relations at the *Bogazici University*, Istanbul, Turkey. He received in 2003 the award of the 'Future European Delegate' at the *Galatasaray University 'Euroforum'*. He has been since 2004 a member of the "UNITED" Network against racism, fascism and discrimination. He worked in 2006-2007 as the Assistant Project Coordinator of the *Caucasus Business and Development Network (CBDN)*, Turkey project. He is currently working at the *GR department of ENKA's Moscow-City project*.

Foreword

'*Abkhazia for the Integration of the Black Sea*' is the first issue of the newly launched background papers collection. Our aim is to generate data and provide substance and insights to on-going policy and public debates in and around Turkey. This first background paper on Abkhazia is analyzing processes and dynamics from local and regional perspectives in a defined timeframe. It is the fruit of a collaborative effort. By bringing the basic facts on the ground into the debate the paper advocates for the need for engagement policies towards Abkhazia.



Burcu Gültekin Punsmann
with Argun Başkan
and Kemal Tarba

ABKHAZIA FOR THE INTEGRATION OF THE BLACK SEA

Executive Summary

The break-up of the Soviet Union had far-reaching consequences on Turkey's close neighborhood. The business minded population of the Turkish Black Sea cities, helped by the geographical and cultural proximity, started penetrating into their rediscovered neighborhood. In the 90's, Abkhazia rose as a major destination for people and commodities originating from the Turkish Black Sea coast. A bus connection was established between Trabzon and Sukhum¹. Some 3000 Turkish businessmen, most of them of ethnic Abkhazian origin, left in the early 90's for Sukhum. The establishment of a direct maritime connection between Sukhum and Trabzon in 1994 sustained a continuous flow of passengers. A ferry called Ritza operates twice a week between Trabzon and Sukhum till 1996. The ferry was usually fully booked.

Turkish businessmen of the Black Sea coast and members of the Diaspora recall that the journeys were comfortable and enjoyable. Chains of forced and sometimes semi-voluntary mass migrations formed the present day North Caucasian Diaspora in Turkey. Today, there are more Abkhazians in Turkey than in Abkhazia and more North West Caucasians than in the North West Caucasus. The Georgian-Abkhaz war helped to transform the Diaspora into a political factor in the context of relations between Turkey and Abkhazia. A modern, post-Cold War wave of cultural and political awareness has been developing among the Diaspora sustained by the increased cultural, political and economic relations with Abkhazia.

In 1996, as a result of the CIS decision, the unrecognized republic was virtually cut off from the outside world. The dire situation of the war-ruined economy was further exacerbated by the Russian-Georgian maritime and land blockade which caused a total economic and social disruption. Turkey responded positively to the CIS call for imposing economic sanctions on Abkhazia and canceled direct cruises between the ports of Trabzon and Sukhum in 1996. Today the maritime link between Turkey and Abkhazia is officially closed. Turkey is justifying its compliance with the isolation regime by respect for the territorial integrity of Georgia.

Economic sanctions are policy tools used by governments to constrain business activity across borders with intended policy outcomes. The economic sanctions against Abkhazia are punitive as they denounce the "*destructive position of the Abkhaz side*" and purposeful since they aim at settling the conflict, securing the return of refugees and IDPs and restoring the territorial integrity of Georgia.

1 Cities and regions are named in this report accordingly to the current local use

Conforming to the embargo decision becomes a gesture of solidarity with the Georgian government and of attachment to the principle of its territorial integrity. Cooperation is the key factor in ensuring success. Maximum amount of harm was inflicted on the population of Abkhazia during the period of Russian Federation's full cooperation with the embargo decision. Attempts of Turkish businessmen from the Black Sea coast to infringe the sanctions, either guided by profit or moral concerns, could bring a relative degree of relief. However, even during this period characterized by the cooperative stance of Russian Federation and the administration of high damage, the sanctions didn't bring any tangible policy outcome.

Today Abkhazia is fully open on Russian Federation and is integrating at high speed into the Russian economic zone and reaching to a lesser extent the outside world through Russia. It seems hard to imagine how the sanctions could have any more efficiency than what they had in the period when Russia was fully supportive of Georgian decision. Russian Federation started eroding this regime of sanctions in 2001 by easing its regulations on the Abkhaz border. The prohibition for men of military age to cross the border was lifted in 2000, citizens of CIS have been authorized to enter the territory of Abkhazia. In April, 2006, Russian Federation authorized non CIS citizens with a double entry Russian visa to cross into Abkhazia. This measure will facilitate tremendously human to human contacts between Abkhazia and Turkey. More than 70% of the Abkhaz population is holding a Russian passport which basically ensures the freedom of movement. The idea of being locked up inside Abkhazia while other people have the chance to move across the world appears especially to the young generation profoundly unfair.

Russia, at the beginning of the Putin administration in early 2000 has started eroding the sanctions regime against Abkhazia. Administrative units of the Russian Federation started in September 2003 signing cooperation agreements with the Abkhazian authorities. Legal

entities of Russian Federation were authorized to cooperate with appropriate bodies and businesses in Abkhazia. The ambiguity and unpredictability of the Russian approach decreased with its official withdrawal from the sanctions regime in March 2008, which will be followed by the recognition of the independence of Abkhazia. The Russian authorities decided only in March 2008 to give an international visibility to their unilateral lifting of the sanctions. The Russian Foreign Ministry issued a statement on 6 March 2008 announcing the country's withdrawal from the CIS treaty imposing sanctions on Georgia's breakaway region of Abkhazia, citing "*changed circumstances.*"

Georgian officials decried as "immoral and dangerous" Russian Federation's decision to end the economic embargo on Abkhazia and interpreted Russian Federation's move as step towards the formal annexation of Georgian territory. However the legalization process of the economic relations is underway. On the Abkhaz side, much hope is placed in Russian capital to revive abandoned orange groves, tea fields, and vineyards, revamp the region's transportation infrastructure and restore its textile and canning industries. However, the impression that Abkhazia should negotiate the agreements very carefully in order to retain as much of independence as possible is widespread. Abkhazia, emerging slowly from isolation, has started integrating into the Russian Federation's economic zone.

The Adler/Psou has become the main gate for ordinary travelers to Abkhazia, namely tourists, petty traders and Abkhazians from the Diaspora. The integration process with Russian Federation has been transforming the Adler/Psou post into a relatively friendly one, the renovation of the road to Sukhum is facilitating movements. In contrast the administrative border is remaining a ceasefire line, the road crossing the Gali region and connecting to Sukhum is in a very poor condition.

Ending the isolation, opening up Abkhazia and integrating the Black Sea region should be the

priority. Linkage with political issues blurs the overall positive impact of opening communications links. Georgia has a stake in a policy of pro-active engagement with Abkhazia. Past efforts at isolating Abkhazia politically and economically had not gotten Georgia any further in negotiations. However, even during the period characterized by the cooperative stance of Russian Federation and the administration of high damage, the sanctions didn't bring any tangible policy outcome. Observers described the regime of sanctions as counter-productive for the settlement of the conflict. The insistence on retaining the sanctions as a bargaining chip for progress on refugee and IDP return and is ousting completely Abkhazia from the Georgian economic and social sphere. The maritime blockade becomes a symbolical way of defending its territorial integrity which as a matter of fact lets to Abkhazia only one vector of movement. Turkey can play a major role in overcoming the isolation of Abkhazia. However it is unthinkable that Turkey unilaterally decides to resume the direct transportation links with Abkhazia while the Georgian coastguard is keeping on detaining Turkish ships. The connection has to be legalized, or at least formalized.

The opening of the ferry link between Trabzon and Sukhum will be indeed a confidence building measure for the settlement of the conflict. Abkhazians will start looking southward, towards Turkey. Turkish-Georgian borderland is fully open to human and trade interactions. The Sarp/i village once divided by the security fence of the Cold War, is being reunified through intense cross-border cooperation. Adjara is integrating with the Turkish Black Sea coast. The closed village of Gogno is hosting dinners between Turkish and Georgian business partners. Inspired by the European experience, Turkish and Georgian authorities have been working at making the border dividing them meaningless. Turks and Georgians can visit each other without visa. Georgia is currently the only former Soviet country to have waived the visa require-

ment for Turkish citizens. The Batumi airport, which was built and is being managed by the Turkish company TAV is being used for domestic flight connections of Turkish Airlines between Istanbul, Hopa and Artvin. The practices at the Geneva airport have been transferred to Batumi. The Sarp/i border crossing will also start functioning under Swiss standards with a unique customs point. The pragmatism and willingness to cooperate behind the move aiming at transcending the common border should guide Georgian and Turkish efforts to resume the ferry link.

The Trabzon-Sukhum ferry link will allow Abkhazians to have a direct access to a second country. Furthermore, the restoration of the in-land transportation axis has the potential to boost regional integration. The Turkish entrepreneurs from the Black Sea region bitterly recall the time when they could reach Sochi by road through Batumi in 6 hours; the maritime connection takes 12 hours.

1. Turkey rediscovers Abkhazia

1.1. Rediscovering the geography

Before becoming the frontier between the Republic of Turkey and USSR in 1921, the Caucasus had been the contact zone between the Ottoman State and the Tsardom of Russia. This contact was all the more violent because the two big states had fought more than traded over decades. The Caucasus, standing out as a gray area between two rival political entities, had been the area of confrontation, acting as a buffer zone¹. The Ottoman State and the Tsardom of Russia fought eight wars between the two centuries from the XVII century through the early XX century and had for slightly less than two centuries a common border in the Caucasus and had been struggling for domination. This struggle was a continuing march of glory from 1768 through 1878 for the Tsardom of Russia. After the defeat by the Tsardom of Russia in the war of 1768 – 1774, the Ottoman State was forced to sign the treaty of Küçük Kaynarca of 1774, which gave the Tsardom of Russia a foot-

hold on the Northern shores of the Black Sea and allowed the Tsardom of Russia navigation rights in the Black Sea as well as what was interpreted as a right of protection over Ottoman subjects of the Orthodox faith. The Ottoman State was forced to surrender claims of sovereignty over both the Crimea and the Kabarda, eastern part of Circassia. The treaty was ambiguous about the status of the Black Sea coast, which included both Circassian, Abkhazian and Georgian lands. Meanwhile in 1769-70, general Todleben had brought the first organized Russian military force through the Daryal Pass and met the Georgian King Irakli II who ruled the two eastern Georgian kingdoms of Karthli and Kakheti. This expedition marked the beginning of Russian involvement in the affairs of the Caucasus. In 1783 by the Treaty of Georgievsk, Irakli accepted Russian protection. In this same year, Russia annexed the Crimea and large numbers of Crimean Tatars began to emigrate to the Ottoman State.

For the Tsarist army, by far the most difficult area to penetrate militarily was the long Black Sea coast. Geographically, the region was extremely fragmented. The Circassian people who had inhabited these territories kept livestock, farmed and lived in dispersed settlements linked by trails. No major highways existed and no cities developed. The lingua franca of the entire Caucasus was Turkish, and then termed Tatar. It was widely understood among the Circassians on the coast because of regular trade with Ottoman State and contacts with Ottoman administrators². Open war broke out between the Ottoman State and the Tsardom of Russia again in 1787 and lasted until 1791. There was heavy fighting between Russian and Ottoman forces over the fortress of Anapa at the northern end of the Circassian coast. In 1829 in the Treaty of Adrianople, the Ottoman State agreed to give up all positions and claims on the Circassian coast in return for restoration of Kars and Batumi. The treaty of Berlin was signed on 13 July, 1878. It had confirmed substantial changes in the military geography of the Russo- Ottoman frontier. The Rus-

sians had acquired Batumi, Kars and Ardahan. Meanwhile, Tsardom of Russia officially completed its occupation of North Caucasus by 1864 with the fall of Western Circassia. Finally, whole Caucasus, both north and South, was under Tsarist Russian rule in the last decades of the 19th century. Some subsequent local rebellions could not change this new order. The following chaotic era between the fall of the tsarist rule and the rise of the Bolsheviks between 1917-1921 saw a number of ambitious yet short-lived, anti-tsarist, anti-Bolshevik, nationalist and/or "Pan-Caucasian" political entities or movements in Caucasus sometimes in collaboration with the Bolsheviks against the tsarist forces or vice versa.

These entities like "Mountainous Republic of the Northern Caucasus" (MRNC) (May 1918 - June 1921), the Kuban Cossacks' "Kuban People's Republic" (KPR) (February 1918-May 1920) and the "Caucasian Imamate" (Spring 1918), an Islamic state in Dagestan, even aimed to bring several North and South Caucasian nations together within common political frameworks and achieved that goal to some degree. MRNC and KPR received de jure recognition in 1918 by the Ottoman Empire, German Empire, Azerbaijan Democratic Republic, Democratic Republic of Georgia and Ukrainian People's Republic (only KPR). The MRNC offered the Georgians, Armenians and Azerbaijanis to establish a "Caucasian Federation" in 1918. However, South Caucasian leaders, especially Armenians, did not show a real interest in this project. The MRNC and the KPR also sent delegations to the Paris Peace Conference (1919). Additionally, both the tsarist rule and the Bolsheviks had still some local supporters and allies in whole Caucasus as well. The Mensheviks, the anti-Bolshevik wing of the communists, were also especially powerful in Georgia³.

The Moscow Treaty of 1921, which established the Soviet-Turkish border, gave birth to 70 years of relative stability. The opening of "Doğu Kapı"/Akhourian, the first and only border gate

between Turkey and the USSR, dates back to 1927. The gate is located a few kilometers from the Turkish city of Kars and the Armenian city of Gyumri.

The demarcation of the Turkish-Soviet border in the 1920s ran through the village of Sarp/i. Peasants could freely cross the border to tend their farms or visit relatives until 1937 when, after an uprising on the Soviet side, it was sealed by a barbed-wire fence and the local leaders of Turkish origin were sent to Siberia. It used to take two to three months to send a letter from Sarp to Sarpi. To visit one other, villagers had to make an arduous two-day journey through the “Doğu Kapı” border crossing, if permission was granted. The border villages of Sarpi and Gogno were part of the restricted zone. One needed a special permission, propusk, to be allowed to enter the area. Residents of these villages needed as well the propusk to travel even inside Adjara and be allowed afterwards to go back home.

Sarpi was considered as the most sensitive border of the USSR. It was neighboring Turkey and NATO, was the Soviet gateway to the Black Sea and to the warmer seas. A navy academy, important land forces and the naval air service, based in Batumi, were the important components of the Soviet defense system facing the third Turkish army. The Turkish Consulate in Batumi, opened as soon as in 1920, never closed. In 1919, there were 20 consulates in Batumi, all closed except the Turkish consulate.

The special status of the Turkish-Georgian border impeded especially on the development of the Eastern Soviet ports of Batumi and Sukhum. The Turkish-Soviet trade was being conducted through the Russian and Ukrainian ports. As a matter of fact, Batumi and Sukhum lost their external maritime connections and their hinterland became an inward looking region attracting wealthy Soviet tourists. The Soviet Union became their only vista. Nevertheless these hinterlands were prosperous thanks to the tea and citrus fruits productions for the whole Soviet Union, and internal tourism.

The break-up of the Soviet Union had far-reaching consequences on Turkey’s close neighborhood. Turkey discovered in her vicinity a new world that had been separated by an ‘Oriental Iron Curtain’ for 70 years. The end of the bipolar order allowed Turkey to redefine her cross border relations and regain access to the former Southern underbelly of the USSR. The opening of the Sarpi border crossing in 1988 was an historical event. The Adjarians still remember the 17 km long queue starting from the Gogno Fortress to Sarpi, people all over the Soviet Union gathering to Batumi to go into Turkey. The opening of the frontier at Sarpi was warmly anticipated by officials and business people on the Black Sea coast and the Trabzon Chamber of Commerce, in particular, had lobbied hard over the issue. In 1990, a total of 146,000 people crossed into Turkey, mostly to trade or to shop, though some came to visit relatives separated since the early years of the 20th century.

The opening of communication channels with the former Soviet Union transformed Trabzon into a commercial center. The effect of the fall of the Iron Curtain has been particularly significant on the Turkish Black Sea coast. The business minded population of the Turkish Black Sea cities, helped by the geographical and cultural proximity, has been penetrating into their rediscovered neighborhood.

In the 90’s, Abkhazia rose as a major destination for people and commodities originating from the Turkish Black Sea coast. A bus connection was established between Trabzon and Sukhum. Some 3000 Turkish businessmen, most of them of ethnic Abkhazian origin, left in the early 90’s for Sukhum. Abkhazia provides access to markets of South Russia. The hotel “Samshytovaja Roscha” in Pitsunda, still the most luxurious hotel of Abkhazia, was built by a Turkish company: the project, among the first Turkish construction projects in the USSR, started at the end of 80’s and the hotel was inaugurated before the start of the war. Diaspora links are beyond any doubt a major driving force behind

the development of relations with Abkhazia. The establishment of a direct maritime connection between Sukhum and Trabzon in 1994 sustained a continuous flow of passengers. A ferry called Ritza operated twice a week between Trabzon and Sukhum till 1996, date of the CIS embargo decision against Abkhazia. The ferry was usually fully booked. Turkish businessmen of the Black Sea coast and members of the Diaspora recall that the journeys were comfortable and enjoyable.

Before the Georgian-Abkhazian war, local Abkhazian officials were in direct contact with Turkey. The Abkhazian President Ardzinba proposed to the Turkish President, Suleyman Demirel, a few months before the Georgian-Abkhazian war, that Turkey manage the port and custom of Sukhum. A major infrastructure project came also on the agenda: a Transcaucasian highway pass road which would connect Georgia with the republics of the Northern Caucasus and provide the access to the sea for the North Caucasian republics. This highway would give Turkey and other countries of the Middle East a convenient, short way towards Southern Russia.

1.2. The Abkhazian Diaspora in Turkey

History of the Abkhazian Diaspora in Turkey can hardly be separately studied from the general history of the North Caucasian Diaspora in Turkey. In the simplest sense, competition of the British, Ottoman and Russian Empires between the 16th-19th centuries can be pointed as the most influential dynamic influencing the fates of all nations living around the Black Sea and Caucasus with implications lasting until today.

In the case of Abkhazians and other North Caucasians, these centuries meant a lengthy and eventually unsuccessful process of independence wars against the Tsarist Russia and search for balance among the great powers. The year 1860 brought a tragic end to the resistance of the small North Caucasian nations which suffered very serious and even fatal ter-

ritorial and demographical losses. For example, this was the beginning of the end for the small Ubykh nation as a unique ethnic identity and Ubykh language which is today an extinct language.

After the long and bloody Russo-Caucasian War(s) in the 18-19th centuries, different parts or "countries" of the North Caucasus were annexed by the Tsardom of Russia. For example, Abkhazia entered into Russian rule in early 1800s whereas Central and Eastern North Caucasus (Chechnya, Dagestan) was occupied in 1850s. Circassia (also known as "Adyghey") and land of Ubykhs fell around 1860s. Russian military presence in Eastern Circassia (Kabarda, Kabardia or Kabardey) and Ossetia was older.

A high majority of Adyghees and almost all Ubykhs were forced by the Tsarist Russia to migrate to the Ottoman State which found this fresh human source useful to solve some of its own internal demographic and security problems in different problematic and rebelling parts of the Empire like the Middle East, Anatolia and Balkans. A significant portion of the Abkhazians, about at least two-fifth of the then total Abkhazian population, accompanied the other North Caucasians, especially Adyghees and Ubykhs for some political, cultural and religious reasons. Islam was far less "consolidated" in the North Western Caucasus compared to the North East Caucasus but religion was still a source of motivation since Ottoman State seemed attractive as the land of the Caliphate at a time of Christian Russian occupation. Of course, in the case of Abkhazians, this single factor was valid only for those Muslim Abkhazians.

From the Tsarist Russia's point of view, North West Caucasus was more sensitive than the Eastern part for security reasons because the region had access to the Black Sea. Additionally, it had turned out more lengthy and difficult to conquer this part of the Caucasus. If Adyghees, Ubykhs and pro-resistance Abkhazians were allowed to stay on their lands and maintain their traditional socio-political order they

could take support from the Ottoman and even British Empires to rebel against the Tsar in the future. For this reason, only “loyal” or relatively harmless Adyghe, Ubykh and Abkhaz groups were allowed to stay in their homelands. For the same geographical reasons, similar cases of mass exile and migration did not happen in the North East Caucasus which was not less hostile for the new Russian rule but it was easier to control this sub-region which had no risky sea access.

North Caucasian Diaspora in Figures

Chains of forced and sometimes semi-voluntary mass migrations formed the present day North Caucasian Diaspora in Turkey and the Middle East (mainly Syria, Jordan, Israel, Iraq, Kosovo, and Western Thrace). After later and smaller waves of migrations, there also emerged additional North Caucasian Diaspora(s) in Asia, Americas, Africa and Europe. As a part of the wider North Caucasus Diaspora, Abkhazian Diaspora in Turkey was formed under the dynamics of this historical process.

It is estimated that some 2 million North West Caucasians had left their homelands in the late 19th century. First Abkhazian immigrants in Anatolia settled in 150-160 villages. Today their grandchildren are thought to be numbering between 700.000-1.000.000 whereas the figures for the wider North Caucasian Diaspora range between 2 million to 7 million about 90% of which is made up by Adyghe. It is not possible to obtain official data because official census studies do not collect ethnic data in Turkey. In some occasions, Turkish officials (politicians in government or opposition, bureaucrats) use the figures of some 600.000 or 700.000 Abkhazians and 7 million North Caucasians in their press comments and speeches. Even with these figures, there are more Abkhazians in Turkey than in Abkhazia and more North West Caucasians than in the North West Caucasus. This situation also gives an idea about the level of the sharp demographic turmoil that took place in the 19th century North West Caucasus.

With the exception of some villages in Central Anatolia, all Abkhazian villages are located in North Western Turkey close to Istanbul and industrialized areas. Abkhazians are highly urbanized today but still retain contacts with the rural communities.

Not surprisingly, Abkhazian Diaspora in Turkey takes an important part of its power from its close cultural and political relations with the wider North Caucasian Diaspora majority of which is made up by the Adyghe. This is often the case even in terms of ethnonym in the mainstream public discourse. Abkhazians and other non-Adyghe North Caucasians in Turkey like the Ubykh, Ossetian and even sometimes Karachai are often classified under the term of “Circassian” (Cherkess) which is normally a kind of historical second name for the Adyghe. The terms “Circassian” and “(North) Caucasian” practically sound synonymous in Turkey. However, the use of name Circassian is somewhat being limited to the Adyghe in the last years.

Many Abkhazians still take active part in the associations whose members are dominantly Adyghe. Mixed marriages between the two groups are common. Abkhazians who come from the Central Anatolian region of Turkey where many Adyghe and a few Abkhazian villages are located are bilingual in Abkhazian and Adyghe languages. It has to be noted that knowledge of both languages is lower in the younger generations due to the assimilation process and urbanization. Loss of the Abkhazian language is perhaps the most alarming internal problem for the whole diaspora.

Having totally lost their native Ubykh language in the 20th centuries, the small Ubykh community is almost totally extinct and insignificant also as a meaningful separate category that could enjoy its own dynamics as it is either highly Abkhanized, Circassianized or Turkified already. However, they still partly retain their Ubykh identity and ethnonym as a kind of nostalgic value. It is possible to see Ubykhs living

among Abkhazian communities according to Abkhazian social norms and popular culture.

Organization of the North Caucasian Diaspora in Turkey

During the Soviet period, Diaspora Adyghes, Abkhazians and other North Caucasians like Ossetians, Chechens, Kumukh, Lezgis were organized within the general framework of the Caucasian or North Caucasian associations in Turkey. Visiting and communicating with the North Caucasus, which is practically the USSR, was not totally impossible but a very rare and risky experience in the anti-communist Turkey of Cold War years. In addition to the common historical experiences and mentality, these restrictions were forcing the different North Caucasian groups to stay as close as possible under the same organizational frameworks in those days.

As these groups increased their direct contacts with their homelands in the North Caucasus in the Post-Soviet period, they established new and narrower organizations addressing only or mainly Abkhazians and Ossetians etc. Repatriation experiences, business relations, Abkhazian and Chechen wars facilitated the process. A number of transnational organizations like the Abkhaz-Abazin⁴ Congress and the repatriation committee set up in Abkhazia have been working to promote repatriation beside other cultural and political issues. Like all other North Caucasian associations and funds, these Abkhazian associations have folkloric interests such as organizing dance assemblies and community events. The consciousness of NGO mentality and activism is on the rise in the recent years due to the democratization and the EU accession process of Turkey. These associations also maintain some printed and electronic publishing activities in Turkish and provide irregular language classes to teach Abkhazian and the Cyrillic alphabet. In some rare cases, they also provide courses to teach Russian which is found necessary by some individuals to maintain contacts with Abkhazia and North

Caucasus especially for business purposes. In recent years, they are also increasingly engaged in organizing summer camps and touristic tours to enable the children and the youth to visit their homeland Abkhazia.

Political engagement is generally a secondary interest and is dealt by some specific public committees or biggest associations in Istanbul and Ankara. Traditional political activities rise during local and general election periods to lobby for Abkhazian candidates. Mainstream political engagement of the Abkhazians as a community is maintained at a somewhat irregular, informal but still transparent level as straight ethnic political activism is legally and practically discouraged in the domestic politics of Turkey.

In the period of the Georgian-Abkhazian war, the political activism of the Diaspora in the form of lobbying and public relations efforts has become considerably more ambitious and unified. At the wider community level, Adyghes and Abkhazian neighborhoods and villages are often closely located and inter-group social relations are intensive. It is interesting to note that relations between the rural Georgian and Abkhazian communities in the North Western Turkey are peaceful and stable if not highly friendly. Georgian Diaspora has been traditionally living in the North Western and most East Anatolian parts of Turkey around the Turkish-Georgian border. Cultural, demographic and political existence of the Georgian Diaspora is much less ambitious and dynamic compared to the Abkhazian Diaspora despite the wishes and efforts of some local intellectuals and Georgia itself.

The context of the Abkhazian-Georgian war

The Georgian-Abkhazian War (14 August 1992 - 30 September 1993) boosted the solidarity feelings and worries of many Abkhazians and other North Caucasians in Turkey towards their homeland Abkhazia and North

Caucasus in general. Media coverage and other personal contacts through friends and relatives that delivered shocking news to the Diaspora about the attack of the Georgian army in Abkhazia also caused a dramatic fear of genocide of homeland Abkhazians as a modern reminiscent of the events of the 19th century during the Russian advance in the Caucasus. Perestroika and glasnost process in the USSR had already relatively facilitated Diaspora's contacts with Abkhazia and semi-romantic thoughts on repatriation to the homeland were shared by many people. Additionally, a tradition of Diaspora cultural activism was also existent in Turkey, though under restrictions and interruptions brought by assimilation policies and sometimes military interventions like the 1980 military intervention. Given those conditions and expectations, Caucasian-Abkhazian Solidarity Committee (CASC; Kafkas-Abhazya Dayanışma Komitesi), basically a humanitarian aid organization, was established in a meeting of some Abkhazian and other North Caucasian activists, mainly Circassians, in the Istanbul Caucasus Abkhazian Culture Association (İstanbul Kafkas Abhaz Kültür Derneği) on 23 August 1992 to help Abkhazia during the war.

CASC gained a significant importance soon after this date. It evolved into a pro-Abkhazian lobbying organization recognized by both Abkhazian and Turkish authorities. The representative of Abkhazia in Turkey was also hosted by the CASC. During the war, the CASC worked to publicize the Abkhazian cause in Turkey and provide humanitarian aid to Abkhazia through contacts with the president, government, the Turkish National Assembly and the media. It organized Turkey-wide aid campaigns and public meetings in Istanbul, Ankara and Adapazari in 1992. Other North Caucasian associations like Kaf-Der (Caucasian Association – Kafkas Derneği; later Kaf-Fed, Caucasian Federation – Kafkas Federasyonu) actively supported the CASC in its activities. Participation of thousands in these streets meetings surprised not only Turkish officials but also Abkhazians and other North Caucasians themselves. The war

in Abkhazia helped to transform the diaspora into a political factor in the context of relations between Turkey and Abkhazia. In addition to the mainstream humanitarian solidarity and political activism, even a number of young people including some girls went to Abkhazia to fight on the Abkhazian side as volunteers. The process also improved “intra-Diaspora” contacts between the Abkhazian communities in Turkey, Jordan, USA, Europe (mostly Germany) and the CIS countries.

Vladislav Ardzinba, then President of Abkhazia, awarded the Leon Decoration, named after the Abkhazian King Leon who founded the Abkhazian Kingdom in the 8th century, to the CASC for its activities. After the war, Ardzinba sent a permanent representative to the Diaspora in February 1994 and demanded the CASC resume its activities and work as the Official Representation of Abkhazia in Turkey. In the following period the CASC adopted a higher profile. Its activities included maintaining contacts between the Turkish and Abkhazian administrations, taking part in the official Abkhazian-Georgian peace talks brokered by Turkey and having meetings with all foreign delegations in Turkey who were interested in Abkhazian issues. These contacts included meetings with the British ambassador to Georgia, the US ambassadors to the CIS countries and Georgian President Shevardnadze during his visit to Turkey in 2001. The CASC also contacted the EU, OSCE, UN, UNPO and other international bodies for introducing the Abkhazian problems to a broader community. An archive containing all relevant documents on the Abkhazian issue was also set up by the committee. The activities of the Diaspora during the Georgian-Abkhazian were relatively successful to publicize the Abkhazian cause in Turkey but it never developed into a full political impact on Turkish authorities to influence Turkish foreign policy on Georgia. Turkish official policy line maintained to consider the Abkhazian issue as an internal problem of Georgia to the dismay of Diaspora. Nevertheless, this whole process brought a modern, post-Cold

War wave of cultural and political awareness to the Diaspora through increased cultural, political and economic relations with Abkhazia⁵.

1.3. The Basharan College

Basharan College, a private Turkish high school, opened its door in 1995, two years after the end of the war. The college has started provided a decent education under very harsh conditions without water or electricity while the embargo cut communication links with Turkey. Basharan College was in those years the only school in Abkhazia which had computers and where two foreign languages were taught. Teachers had to wait at Adler border for days, sometimes weeks, and bribe the Russian border guards to get out by crossing the Psou River. Today Basharan is a well known educational establishment that has good connections and is supported by the Abkhazian government. Basharan College has become an intermediary in relations with Turkey. Most of the Turkish businessmen involved in Abkhazia have close contact with the college.

Abkhazian Basharan Turkish College was established in Tsandripsh village of Gagra region which is at 15 km from the border with Russian Federation, between the seashore and the mountains. This building has a boarding school, with all necessary facilities and a well established campus life, with refectory dormitory, sport facilities. Students are only males. They enter the college after passing a competitive examination. The curriculum lasts five years. In the first year, students receive intensive bilingual training: Turkish and English languages are the main subjects during the preparatory class. Mathematics and physics classes are in Russian and English, social and human sciences classes in Russian. Students take also Abkhazian and Turkish language and literature classes. Young and active teachers and educators provide a close tutorship and organize a wide range of activities: social clubs, sport facilities, computer center, dance and chorus. Basharan

students are usually very successful at the Olympiads for various classes in Abkhazia.

The effectives are around 200 students, 30-35 graduates every year. The total number of graduates has reached 292. College graduates attend university in Abkhazia and abroad. 64 of them study in Turkey, 150 in Russian Federation, 67 in Abkhazia, and also in Europe (Poland, Italy etc) and the United States. The most popular faculties attended by Basharan graduates are: economic sciences, international relations, tourism, computer engineering, and management. A number of students have graduated from the universities and started their professional life by returning to Abkhazia and starting to work at the business organizations, state institutes, and repatriation committees. Many of them started to work in Russian Federation and one student got involved in academic career. Most of Basharan graduates are professionals, speaking a number of foreign languages, and are highly demanded by the employers. Every year, Basharan College gathers its graduates in one of Sukhum's restaurants. The future plan is to establish a network of Basharan graduates, firstly via internet, then by establishing actual center for the graduates.

Graduates of Basharan, who study in Turkey, serve a sort of bridge between the Abkhazian Diaspora and Abkhazia itself. Though very few in number, the 64 students play an important role: human to human contacts help to break the ice formed by stereotypes between the two communities. Abkhazians of Diaspora, afraid of being totally assimilated, are very aggressive in preserving their culture by organizing themselves in various cultural associations. And these Abkhazian students from Abkhazia who entered prestigious universities in Turkey, and speak foreign languages creates a highly positive impression of the Abkhazian youth⁶.

2. The isolation of Abkhazia: from the CIS embargo to the Russian Federation's unilateral lifting of the sanctions, 1996-2008

2.1. Abkhazia at a glance

The present borders of Abkhazia territory were fixed during the first years of the Soviet Union and delimit an area of 8600 km², bordered by the Caucasus Mountains to the North and the Black Sea to the South, by the Transcaucasus plains to the west and by the region of Krasnodar to the east. Abkhazia, with its Mediterranean climate, is known as a land of plenty in a part of the world where the climate is harsh. This region had always been looked upon with envy: it is the privileged axis of communication between Moscow and the Southern Caucasus, has a long coastline, a natural fortification line, and is rich in agricultural, mining and tourist resources.

During the Soviet times, Abkhazia was one of the most prosperous regions of the former Soviet Union. The national economy was based on agriculture, light industry, mining, electric power production, and tourism. The main agricultural products were citrus fruits, tea, tobacco, olives, figs, nuts, laurel leaf, wine and other beverages, honey, and cheese. Forestry and fishery were also of importance. In the Soviet times, Abkhazia met up to 20% of the USSR's demand for tea. Abkhazian peasants produced more than 120,000 tons of citrus fruits (mostly mandarins), 110,000 tons of tea leaves, up to 14,000 tons of aromatic tobacco, some 14,000 tons of grapes. For the most part, these products were exported. Light industry manufactured copy machines, gas-bags, radios and telephones, mixed feed for cattle, chemical products, textiles, and shoes. There were coal mining and house-building plants besides. Abkhazia's economy was oriented mainly towards the huge Soviet market, its economic cooperation with the rest of Georgia being prominent only in the energy and transport sectors. The subtropical nature of Abkhazia, the high snow-covered mountains and the warm Black Sea used to attract hundreds of thousands of tourists every year. Hotels and sanatoriums could accommodate up to 25,000 visitors at once. The famous mountain lake Ritza was visited by 10,000 tourists daily. The cave at New Athos,

one of the deepest in the world, was seen by 3,000 people a day. The Sukhum monkey depository was visited by 5,000 tourists a day⁷.

Fifteen years after the ceasefire agreement, the lush nature cannot conceal burned and destroyed houses, schools and kindergartens, looted factories, blown-up bridges, roads and tunnels. The majority of the enterprises are at a standstill. In the agricultural sector, many plantations and farms have been destroyed by the war, and their restoration and re-cultivation will need years of work and appropriate levels of investment. Moreover, the plantations in southern Abkhazia are heavily mined. According to official data, the total amount of the overall material damage, caused by the war, is about 11.3 billion USD. In agricultural sector, the production of citrus fruit decreased from 100-120,000 to 30,000 tons, production of tea from 80-100 to 5-6,000 tons, tobacco from 6-7,000 tons to an almost complete disappearance. The industrial capacity was also seriously hit. Before the fall of the Soviet Union up to 500 industrial enterprises were operational on the territory of Abkhazia, which represented a workforce of more than 30,000. Today, the industrial production represents only 5% of the pre-war level. The number of people employed in the industry decreased also almost 10 times: from about 30,000 to 2,500. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the Abkhazian-Georgian war have been devastating for the tourism sector: all activities entirely stopped until the end of the 90's.

2.2. The years of strict maritime and land embargo, 1996-2001

On October 8, 1993, Georgian President Shevardnadze gave up his reservations against his country joining the CIS. In February 1994, Georgia and Russian Federation signed a '*Bilateral Treaty on Friendship and Cooperation*', whose most significant provision was the re-establishment of Russian military bases in Georgia. However, the Georgian parliament refused to ratify the treaty. Georgia's official support for

Russia's military invasion of Chechnya in 1994 brought the two states even closer together.

On January 19, 1996 Council of CIS Heads (CSH) adopted the resolution on "*Measures for the settlement of Conflict in Abkhazia/Georgia*" which imposed economic sanctions on Abkhazia and led to its political isolation. The resolution in its first paragraph condemns "*the destructive position of Abkhaz sides that creates obstacles to the political settlement of the issue and secure returning of refugees and IDPs*" and in its paragraph 6 states that the member states of CIS, without agreement of Government of Georgia, "*will not have economic, financial or transport transactions with Abkhazian Authority*" and "*will not have official contacts with Abkhazian Authority*". In a separate presidential decree adopted on 31 January, 1996, Georgian government declared "*Sukhum, seaport, port points, sea border and Georgian-Russian border in the territory of Abkhazia will be closed for any kind of international transport except the transportation of humanitarian cargoes carried out according to this decree*".

On 19 Sept 2003, the CIS heads of state adopted a statement reaffirming their commitment not to support secessionist regimes and to engage in economic operations or in official contacts with the Abkhaz side without the consent of the Georgian authorities as set out in the resolution adopted by the Council of CIS Heads of State in 1995-1996. It is important to note that there has never been an international embargo imposed on Abkhazia: the CIS decision has never been endorsed by a United Nations Security Council Resolution.

As a result of the CIS decision, the unrecognized republic was virtually cut off from the outside world. The airport was closed for external flights and the railway functioned only within Abkhazia's borders. The seaports were closed for passenger boats, and Abkhaz boats could not leave port to bring goods from Turkey. Special regulations were introduced on the Abkhaz-Russian border that heavily restricted

the cross-border movement of Abkhaz citizens. With many dependent on petty trade across the border, this cut the population off from their main source of economic survival. Men of military age, between 16-65 years, were totally forbidden to cross into the Russian Federation. This pushed women into the economic life. Many started transportation goods across the Psou River, opened shops and kept on developing their activities. The Union of Businesswomen of Abkhazia, chaired by Yulia Gumba, was established during the gloomy years of the total embargo.

The dire situation of the war-ruined economy has been further exacerbated by the Russian-Georgian maritime and land blockade which caused a total economic and social disruption. A small clandestine and seasonal economy of selling mandarins and hazelnuts along the officially closed border provided the bare minimum to survive for a few people.

2.3. Progressive unilateral lifting of the isolation regime, 2001-2008

The Russian Federation started eroding this regime of sanctions in 2001 and eased its regulations on the Abkhaz border. The prohibition for men of military age to cross the border was lifted in 2000, citizens of CIS have been authorized to enter the territory of Abkhazia. In April 2006, Russian Federation authorized non CIS citizens with a double entry Russian visa to cross into Abkhazia⁸. This measure will facilitate tremendously human to human contacts between Abkhazia and Turkey.

The issue of the Russian citizenship

Abkhazians have been carrying Soviet-era passports long after the rest of the former Soviet countries brought in new citizenship documents. After the war, applying for a Georgian passport could hardly be considered an option. This made Russia the only 'outside world' with which Abkhazia could communicate, as the old internal passports remained valid for a while after the collapse of the USSR. Some Abkhazian officials and civil society activists prospect-

ed the possibility that the UN issue temporary international travel documents for Abkhazians until the settlement of the conflict, but to no avail. That would have required Georgian agreement. These requests were turned down. Russian Federation's leadership decided to grant Russian Federation citizenship to people of Abkhaz origin after 2000, the process accelerated after the passage of the new Law on Citizenship by the Russian Duma in April 2002. By end June 2002, an estimated 150,000 people in Abkhazia had acquired the new passports, joining 50,000 who already possess Russian citizenship, 70% of the population became citizens of the Russian Federation⁹. Russian passport issued in Abkhazia are similar to those issued to Russian citizens abroad and do not include Russian residency registration (*propiska*). Motivations for applying for the Russian citizenship are various. Some say they want to receive Russian pension, which is worth around fifty times more than one in Abkhazia. Access to the Russian labor market ranks also among the major motivations. Georgia accuses Russian Federation of attempting to annex Abkhazia: it is true that members of the Duma have been making frequent statements underlying that ethnic Abkhaz with Russian passports are their citizens. Above all, the Russian citizenship has granted Abkhazians the freedom of movement and the emancipation from the status of a stateless person. The idea of being locked up inside Abkhazia while other people have the chance to move across the world appears especially to the young generation profoundly unfair.

Reopening of the Sochi-Sukhum railway

After 12 year interruption, the Sukhum-Sochi-Moscow passenger rail line was reopened on 25 December 2002. Since late 2002, a small-scale railway link was operating between Adler in Russia and Sukhum. However, the poor state of the infrastructure on the Abkhazian side was preventing a full-scale resumption of communications. The railway infrastructure has been restored by the state-run Russian Railway Company. On 10 September 2004, the railway link between Moscow and Sukhum re-opened,

bringing 200 Abkhaz residents to Moscow via Adler¹⁰. The resumption of the railway connection was presented by the Russian Foreign Ministry as beneficial to the entire South Caucasus region, including Georgia and Armenia. Abkhazian entire government and a large crowd turned out at the station to celebrate the reopening of 120 km long railway connection. Children were allowed time off school on December 25 to carry flowers, banners and bring the traditional gifts of bread and salt to welcome the passengers on the first commuter train to travel to Sukhum from Sochi since August 14, 1992, when the Georgian-Abkhaz war broke out, pulled into the station.

In a poll conducted by the Sukhum-based opinion pollster Okno at the end of last year, the resumption of the train link with Russia was vote '*Highlight of the Year 2002*', which led the speaker of the parliament Nugzar Ashuba declare '*the economic isolation of Abkhazia left us in such a state that we are delighted by a commuter train as if we are launching some kind of spaceship*'¹¹.

In downtown Sukhum, stands the small, gleaming white train station. With a waiting room hung with watercolors of Abkhazia, the station is the work of the Sochi Transportation Company which also owns the train operating on the route. The route is operated under a contract with Abkhazia's railway station.

Russian Federation's withdrawal from the CIS treaty imposing sanctions on Abkhazia: March, 2008

Administrative units of the Russian Federation started in September 2003 signing cooperation agreements with the Abkhazian authorities. Legal entities of Russian Federation were authorized to cooperate with appropriate bodies and businesses in Abkhazia. However, Russian Federation didn't declare before March 2008 lifting officially the sanctions. This ambiguity and the absence of official publicity gave a character of unpredictability to the Russian ap-

proach. This was well understood on the Abkhazian side. The events, which occurred in the aftermaths of the Presidential election in October 2004 confirmed fears. The Kremlin refused to recognize official results of the presidential election that gave victory to the opposition candidate Sergey Bagapsh and closed down the border post and the railway connection. The decision, justified as due to the rise in post-election tensions, halted exports of agricultural goods to Russian Federation in the high season of oranges and tangerines sellings which have become a source of income for the majority of people in Abkhazia.

The Russian authorities decided only in March 2008 to give an international visibility to their unilateral lifting of the sanctions. The Russian Foreign Ministry issued a statement on 6 March 2008 announcing the country's withdrawal from the 1996 treaty CIS treaty imposing sanctions on Georgia's breakaway region of Abkhazia, citing "*changed circumstances*." The statement noted that most Georgians who wished to return have done so, and that the primary obstacle to others doing so was Georgia's refusal to agree to the rules for their registration proposed by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees. The statement also said that, unlike Georgia, Abkhazia is "*fulfilling its obligations*" on conflict resolution, and is ready for "*practical steps for strengthening confidence and security in the conflict zone*." Russian Federation called on other CIS members states to follow suit.

Georgian officials decried as "immoral and dangerous" Russian Federation's decision to end the economic embargo on Abkhazia¹² and interpreted Russian Federation's move as step towards the formal annexation of Georgian ter-

ritory. Russia's decision came after a series of harsh statements which followed Kosovo's declaration of independence on 17 February 2008. Georgian experts pointed out to the timing of the decision: the Russian Federation's move was carefully gauged to coincide with the debate at NATO on 6 March on whether to grant Georgia a Membership Action Plan (MAP).

Opening of the airport and the Sochi Olympics

Sukhum's Babushera Airport has been closed since the end of the war. The International Civil Aviation Organization, a UN agency, stated that reopening the airport could result in sanctions against participating airlines. Recently the announcement has been made that the issue of direct air connection with Russian Federation is about to be solved. Abkhaz officials say that the technical arrangements will be completed before the tourist season. The airport is located at about 25 minutes outside of the city center. With its dual runway, it could easily make up for any potential overflow of air traffic experienced by Sochi during holiday period. The Sukhum airport used to be the second most active airport in the USSR. The Sochi airport doesn't have the capacity to accommodate the intense air traffic expected during the Olympic Games. Furthermore, the airport located very close to the mountain range, doesn't offer convenient conditions for air maneuvers. The airport is often being shut down because of weather conditions¹³. The Abkhaz leader Sergey Bagapsh announced on 15 May 2009 after his meeting with Vladimir Putin in Sochi, that the management rights of the airport as well as of the railways would be transferred to Russian Federation for a period of ten years¹⁴.

What has changed for Abkhazia since it was recognized by Russian Federation?

By Kemal Tarba

The most important effect that took place is high resonance that August 2008 events brought about. Politicians, journalists, NGO's, decision makers, ordinary people looked up in Wikipedia to find out what is Abkhazia? Where is it? What is the problem with the region? Researched its background. What are the obstacles for its resolution? Ban Ki-moon learnt how to pronounce /æbkezi ə/, and Condoleezza Rice figured out how to quickly find it on the world map.

Since war with Georgia in 1992-93 Abkhazia has never been mentioned in the news, blogs, political comments that much frequently. 15 years passed with no resulting negotiations involving same people and organizations, hard humanitarian circumstances that were caused by imposed embargo, inability to exercise freedom of movement of goods, capital and people – which is the pillar of economic development. And at once blindness of international community to tiny piece of land suddenly changed into considerate attention. “Abkhazian problem” cannot be ignored any more. People started to speak of it, discussions and elaborations took place. This present report is also, in way, part of the mentioned process.

Besides the so called external factor that is described above, recognition led to some important internal discources that in long term might play significant role in maturing of Abkhazia as a fully fledged state. These processes include euphorical mood among people of Abkhazia that has not been observed since victory in 1993. This process is an important psychological step in the framework of formation of so called national identity. The recognition itself became a catalyzing factor of people not just from Abkhazia but also its Diaspora in Russia and Turkey to unite around the solidified notion of statehood. Another important outcome of the uprising feeling of national identity is the end of long period of disbelief in future, which was the key obstacle for each citizen to make long term plans, whereas now as recognition came from the most influential country in the region, people acquired a guarantee of security of prospects, which resulted in rise in economic activity.

Ten months have passed since 26th August 2008 when Abkhazia was recognized by Russian Federation. However the practical effects are not here yet. The act of recognition assumes that not only state to state relations are to be set, but also citizens should be able to exercise their citizenship rights. Up to current moment, Abkhazia and Russia have signed a number of agreements, embassies were opened, various legal documents on the statehood level became valid, but when it comes to daily life of ordinary people, not much of change in legal sense has actually occurred.

As an example, Abkhazian passports are still not recognized by the Russian customs. When Abkhazians are passing through Psou border, they have to show their Russian passports, and even old Soviet type passports are valid, but not Abkhazian ones. I personally tried to use my Abkhazian passport in Russia. While trying to open a bank account, bank officials could not register it, because there is no “Abkhazia” in the program’s list of the countries. My workplace did not accept to register me according to Abkhazian passport; because in that case I will have to go through registration as a foreign citizen, and Russian immigration service does not yet register Abkhazian passports. All these have taken place on the background of my arguments that Abkhazia was recognized, and by not registering my passport, they contradict with President’s resolution. However, arguing didn’t help. Similarly Russian church did not recognize Abkhazian church as being independent from the Georgian one. As the head of Russian Orthodox church put it out “*President could have recognized Abkhazia, but we do not*”.

On the other hand, there is also progress in this field; as an example from my personal practice, I could buy a flight ticket using my Abkhazian passport (Moscow-Sochi), but most importantly, I managed to register a firm in Russian Federation, which is called “Abkhazia-Export” using my Abkhazian Passport. My next step, would be, probably, to try to get Nicaraguan visa stamping it to my beloved passport.

And it seems like, Russian institutions are sort of confused; conservative ones, such as customs and church still does not recognize Abkhazian passports, but some, such as airline companies, already do. While I was boarding the plane for a Moscow- Sochi flight, airport staff was doubtfully looking at my passport, but suddenly their faces got bright, they congratulated me and wished safe flight.

This summer Abkhazia has been a major touristic destination. For the first time in last 16 years it was hard to find a place on Gagra and Pitsunda beaches. Probably it was not just because of the recognition. The financial crisis increase the interest for cheap destinations. As a result the number of tourists who visited Abkhazia increased significantly in 2009.

3. The economic integration process with Russian Federation

3.1. Progressive revivalism with the easing of the isolation

The progressive lifting of the economic sanctions improved the economic and social conditions. Abkhazia, emerging slowly from isolation, has started integrating into the Russian Federation’s economic zone. The currency used in Abkhazia is the Russian ruble. The

important depreciation of Russian ruble after the financial and economic crisis in 1998, and the progressive easing of the isolation regime, boosted the Abkhazian economy. The devaluation considerably displaced the demand of Russian consumers for Abkhazian products, such as citrus, nuts and persimmon. Furthermore, in 2003 the majority of the population became Russian citizen. The majority of retired persons started receiving Russian pension. Annual payments of the Pension Fund of Russian Federa-

tion to Abkhazia totaled exceeded 20 million USD per year, amounting to more than half of the state budget.

Between 1999 and 2006 the average annual growth rate of foreign trade turnover reached 32%. The annual growth rate of the production has been approximately 20%. Today, the most important export items of Abkhazia are mineral water, coking coal, marble, limestone, granites, cement, copper, lead, zinc, arsenic, gold, silver, and barite. There is considerable trade across the Psou River with Russian Federation and across the Black Sea with Turkey. Currently, Abkhazia's major trade partners are Russian Federation and Turkey. About 60% of imports come from Turkey, 45% of Abkhazian exports are destined for Turkey, and 54% for Russian Federation¹⁵.

Tourism

Due to the depreciation of the Russian ruble, international touristic destinations have become less affordable for middle class Russian tourists. This led to a renewed interest in the Soviet time seaside resorts of the Black Sea. Abkhazia was the cheapest destination, well ahead of Crimea. As a matter of fact, Russian tourists who can't afford trips to Turkey or Egypt – and are willing to sunbathe amid war ruins – have started to return to Abkhazia. In 2008 the total number of tourists who visiting Abkhazia reached 2 million which is 7 times Abkhazian population. There are mainly three types of tourists who come to Abkhazia: tourists that come with a tour, booking their flight and the hotel via touristic agencies, tourists who are called “dykari” (camper) who rent rooms in private houses, and third type of tourists are the ones who actually come to Sochi region and visit Abkhazian sightseeing places (Novy-Afon, Ritza lake, Pitsunda etc) for one day. All three types of tourists feed different segments of Abkhazian economy. First ones pay money to the touristic agencies and hotels (which eventually transforms into taxes), second type of tourists

pay directly to citizens, the price of one “bed” varies from 200 – 400 rubles depending on the season (8-12 USD), these payments are not usually taxed, and third types of tourists contribute to travel and excursion agencies, to the sightseeing places, gift shops and restaurants.

Wine Exports to Russian Federation

The Russian embargo on Georgian and Moldovan wine banned in March 2006 also Abkhaz products from the Russian market. The Abkhaz wine bottles used to be imported to Russian Federation with the Georgian barcode. In 2005, before the ban came into effect, 50 million bottles of Georgian and one million bottles of Abkhaz wine were sold on the Russian market. After the Moldovan wines, in October 2007, the products of the Wines and Waters of Abkhazia, the state monopoly of Abkhazia, were allowed by the Russian *Rospotrebnadzor* to enter the Russian market. Ten sorts of wine¹⁶ and one brandy are currently been imported to Russia under a Russian barcode. The company, Yupshara, established in 2005 is the distributor in Russian Federation of the wines produced by the Wines and Water of Abkhazia¹⁷.

3.2. The new legislative framework set after the recognition of Abkhazia by the Russian Federation

The ‘*Framework Agreement on Cooperation and mutual support between Abkhazia and Russia*’, signed on 17 September 2008 by Dmitry Medvedev and Sergei Bagapsh aims at providing a basis for the officialization of the relations following Russian Federation's decision to recognize Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The agreement provides Russian military guarantee in the event of an attack from Georgia. On 26 January 2009, Russian President, Dmitry Medvedev, appointed Alexander Golovin, as his special envoy for delimitation of “the Russian Federation's state borders with the

Republic of Abkhazia, Georgia and the Republic of South Ossetia. The signature on 30 April 2009 of the *'Agreement between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Abkhazia on joint efforts in protection of the state border of the Republic of Abkhazia'* completed the guarantee scheme: Russian Federation has among other things pledged to help Abkhazia protect its borders, and the signatories have granted each other the right to set up military bases in their respective territories. *"The Abkhaz side, until it forms its own border guard forces, delegates authority for guarding its state borders to the Russian Federation in the interests of ensuring its own security,"* the agreement with Abkhazia reads¹⁸.

About 800 Russian border guards took positions on the 160 kilometer Abkhaz "state border" with Georgia in accordance to the April 30 treaty with Russian Federation. The Russian Border Guard Service creates two departments – one in charge of land border with headquarters in the Gali district and another one in charge of maritime perimeter with headquarters in Gagra. Total of twenty border crossing points will operate, according to the statement released by the Russian Border Guard Service unit in charge of Abkhazia. As soon as the process of structural arrangement is over the Russian border guards will start performing duties at the border with Georgia alongside with the Abkhaz forces¹⁹. The defense cooperation agreement signed on 15 September 2009 allows the Russian Federation to maintain 1700 troops in Abkhazia for 49 years.²⁰ The Russian military headquarters in Abkhazia is to be based in the Black Sea port town of Gudauta. ITAR-TASS reported the decision on that the creation of a base for the Russian Black Sea Fleet in Ochamchira has been reached²¹.

Other agreements are said to be in the process of elaboration. The announcement has been made that Russian embassy will open its door in Sukhum/i in March 2009. According

to the latest information, the Russian Federation mission has opened: it is based in military sanatorium until the construction of the Russian embassy, which apparently is to take two years. There are so far two temporary consulates in Sukhum and Gagra whose main task are to exchange passports of Russian citizens residing in Abkhazia. According to the Russian Foreign Ministry, there are over 120,000 Russian citizens in Abkhazia²².

In addition to security guarantees, the framework agreement should also bring economic advantages²³. Abkhazia hasn't been in the past receiving any substantial direct budgetary support from the Russian Federation. However pension allocations paid by Russian Federation have reached more than half of the annual state budget. Russia signed on 17 March agreements with Sukhum and Tskhinval/i on providing financial assistance with a total amount of 5.16 billion rubles (about USD 149 million) in 2009. The Ministry of Finance of Russia emphasized that despite the cuts that have affected federal budget spending, the volume of financial assistance to Abkhazia and South Ossetia for 2009 would remain as initially planned. 2.36 billion rubles will be allocated to Abkhazia and 2.8 billion rubles to South Ossetia²⁴. The financial aid will cover salaries of public sector employees; allowances for children; pensions; medicines and food²⁵. The Russian media sources reported that 33 medics from the Russian Federal Security Service's Central Hospital arrived in Abkhazia on May 17 "to provide medical service to the local population of Gali, Ochamchira and Tkvarcheli districts." Another group of Russian medics are expected to arrive in Abkhazia on May 23, according to the same report. Russia has also sent about 15 tones of humanitarian aid to Abkhazia, involving equipment for schools and also medicines²⁶. On 12 August 2009, Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin underlined that some \$76 million has been sent to Abkhazia this year to support the republic's budget. Putin said Moscow will provide Abkhazia with the same amount next year as well and will also aid the Abkhaz government in making pension

payments. Putin made the announcement in Moscow ahead of his trip to Abkhazia today, his first since Russia recognized its independence in August 2008.

‘Legalization’ process of the economic relations

Russian and Abkhaz custom authorities are working on the elaboration of a barcode for Abkhazia. This barcode will open up the official custom flow. In the meantime, ironically, the recognition has created impediment to the border trade at Psou. Abkhaz exports to Russian Federation have all but ground to a halt because of the new commercial rules, introduced in March, 2009. Before Russian Federation’s recognition, Abkhazia enjoyed all the trading privileges allotted to members of the Commonwealth of Independent States, CIS, as it was de jure part of Georgia. But since it was recognized by Moscow, it has lost its trade preferences, as it is neither a CIS customs union member in its own right and, in Moscow’s eyes, is no longer part of Georgia. It used to be enough for Abkhaz exporters to show a form known as a CT-1, issued by the Abkhaz chamber of commerce and industry, to be allowed into the Russian Federation market. Exporters must now provide border officials with an international certificate of origin, a so-called form A, to take goods into Russian Federation. Without this, importers are liable to pay hefty customs duties. The turmoil pushed Russian federal customs service to rectify the situation and suspend customs duties on Abkhazia in April²⁷ until Abkhazia is granted most-favored-nation status. Furthermore, it has been announced that the custom treaty under elaboration envisaged the establishment of a customs union.

The agreement on the mutual protection and promotion of investments will set a legal basis for investments and provide wide range of privileges to Russian businesses in Abkhazia. The Russian Federation Ministry of Economic Development plans to open a trade mission in Abkhazia²⁸ to facilitate access to the local

economy for Russian companies. Abkhazia has already a very liberal tax code. Abkhaz authorities stress the importance of Russian investments for the development of the Abkhaz economy and acknowledge the need to create the most favorable conditions for Russian companies and give serious guarantees to the Russian capital²⁹. If the perspective of increased investments is largely welcomed, some local analysts are wary of ceding too much to Moscow. Much hope is placed in Russian capital to revive abandoned orange groves, tea fields, vineyards, revamp the region’s transportation infrastructure and restore its textile and canning industries. However, the impression that Abkhazia should negotiate the agreements very carefully in order to retain as much of independence as possible is widespread.

Russian investments

Russian officials, first among whom the mayor of Moscow, Yuri Luzhkov have been requesting broad opportunities and serious guarantees for Russian investment in Abkhazian economy. Abkhazia has been receiving in these past few years in-kind help from the Moscow municipality and the North Caucasus republics. The governor of the Krasnodar region donated some 60 vehicles to the police. Buses were given to Sukhum municipality by Adygean Republic. The Moscow government, in June 2006, provided 200 000 tons of bitumen to assist road construction. Moscow municipal authorities financed a USD 60 million ‘*Moscow House*’ in Sukhum. The Sukhum-Psou road connection was also financed by Russian sources (USD 3.8 million)³⁰.

On 9 July, 2007, the mayor of Moscow, Yuri Luzhkov signed an agreement on economic cooperation between the municipality of Moscow and Abkhazia. According to preliminary calculations, in 2009 the total package of Russian Federation investments will exceed the amount of 200 million dollars. Since the August war, the Kremlin has been signaling that investing in Abkhazia is a “patriotic” thing to do. Com-

panies in many constituent territories of Russian Federation took interest in doing business in Abkhazia. A dozen memorandums of economic cooperation have been signed between Russian regions and Abkhazia so far. The decision to officially lift the economic sanctions against Abkhazia was a green light to Russian Federation businesses to go to Abkhazia and was interpreted as a guarantee that Russia will defend the interests of the investors.

New regulations in the real estate market will open the possibility for Russian citizens to acquire assets. Only Abkhaz citizens-holders of the Abkhaz passport delivered in Sukhum were allowed to acquire real estate. However, these restrictions were frequently practically overcome by legal arrangements concluded in Sochi with holders of the Abkhaz passport.

Russian investors have been buying up dilapidated seaside resorts in Sukhum, Gagra and Pitsunda and channeling millions of dollars onto their renovation. Intourist and Ritza sanatoriums -Stalin's resort-have been bought on a 25 year long credit by the Russian company Russe Gladiolus, Tkvarcheli by the Therkess company Kogov-Tarant, Sukhum by Zarlis company, Armenia by the Russian Federation Minister of Defense, Cheluskin in November 2003 by the Russian Federation Minister of Transport, and on the same year Gagra Hotel by the city of Krasnodar. In Moscow, Rostov, Nalshik, Tomsk and Ryazan many administrations also seized the economic opportunity in the tourism sector.

The number of Abkhazian-Russian joint-ventures is increasing. Aromat factory for manufacturing packing was set up owing to the Russian company Sinim Gas which helped for this project and bought Tetropak Swedish equipment. Besides, commercial agreements have been signed between private structures from Krasnodar, Stavropol, Kostroma, Tatarstan, Kabardino-Balkaria and the Adyghe Republic. Those investments are made possible notably for the Abkhazian banks (Sperbank - KB Gagra

bank - KB Garant-bank etc.) deal directly with the Russian banks.

On March 2003, Aquafon GSM was officialized by Sukhum's commercial court as the first Abkhazian mobile telephony company. Aquafon GSM is indeed backed by Russian capitals: five investors and one GSM operator. The last one set up the Aquafon's mobile telephony network by installing the first ten relay stations on the Abkhazian shore. Beginning on July 17th 2003, the Russian summer visitors flocking the Abkhazian shore could benefit from the compatibility between Aquafon's network and Megafon's network - one of the three major Russian Federation's GSM operators³¹.

The effect of the Sochi 2014 Olympics

In 2014, Russian Federation will host the XXII Olympic Winter Games in Sochi, just a few miles from the border with Abkhazia. The massive effort required to prepare the city for the Games will be a further factor boosting Abkhazia's economy, with thousands of jobs created just across the border in the construction and service sectors. With the legal agreements in place, Abkhazians will have the right to work in Sochi.

In July 2007, the Russian newspaper Nezavisimaya Gazeta reported that Abkhaz officials expect Russia to invest USD 170 million in a cement factory to provide building materials. In March 2008 after the official lifting of the economic sanctions, the head of the Ministry for Regional Development of Russian Federation, Dmitry Kozak said that Russia saw no hindrance to purchasing building materials and hiring workers from Abkhazia for fulfilling the Sochi project. On 16 May, 2008, the Governor of the Krasnodar region, Alexander Tkachev mentioned the need to organize transportation of different materials from Abkhazia by railroad and signed an agreement between his region and Abkhazia on supplies of building materials for Sochi. The main reason, at least one of the main reasons, behind Russian Federation's deployment of its railroad construction troops in Abkhazia in summer 2008, is said to be the

necessity to link Abkhazia with the Olympic facilities of Sochi³². Abkhazia is likely to be used as a supply center for the Sochi Games. The region's top priorities are supplying construction materials to Sochi -- rock and cement, in particular.

In the northern Abkhaz resort town of Gagra, the Sochi 2014 paraphernalia is already blowing in the breeze. A Russian construction company has started renovating one of Gagra's high-rise Abkhazia Hotel. Abkhazia's real estate market is already beginning to percolate for the Olympics. As sellers take their property off the market in expectation of potentially higher prices closer to 2014, house prices have doubled. Russian companies, meanwhile, are buying land for development not only in Gagra, but also in the nearby seaside resort town of Pitsunda. Temporary villages for some 20,000 Sochi Olympics workers are also on the drawing board for outside Gagra³³.

4. Abkhazia's economic relations with Turkey

Abkhazia's leading exports are tea, citrus, tobacco, scrap metal, timber and hazelnuts. Grain, flour, sugar, butter, potatoes and fuel are its most common imports. In recent years, timber exports to Turkey have dominated total exports by value. Grain and flour are imported from Russian Federation and Turkey. About 60% of recorded imports are from Turkey, with the remaining from Russian Federation. As for registered exports, Russian Federation receives 54% and Turkey 45%. As of 2007, the income received from the trade between Abkhazia and Turkey makes up 30% of Abkhazia's budget. Bud, scrap metal and fish are the main export commodities.

Turkish citizens based in Sukhum have been active in timber trade, regular shipments are said to leave Ochamchira and Sukhum twice a week. The Turkish companies, Konev Ltd. And Kiyak Kardeşler, which have signed agreements with Abkhazia's ministry of economy,

dominate the fishing and fish exports markets. Private Turkish companies that export coal to Turkey primarily work the mines in Abkhazia. Ada Madencilik San Ltd signed an agreement in 2000 to mine the Khudzga pit on Tkvarcheli. Another Turkish firm, Kara Elmas Ltd is involved in the Tkvarcheli coal deposits. At the end of 2001, it renovated a coal enrichment plant in Tkvarcheli that uses coal from the Khudzga pit.

4.1. Turkish-Abkhazian trade at a snapshot through the lens of a repatriate Abkhazian businessman from Turkey

Soner Gogua, is the Deputy Director in the Abkhazian Chamber of Commerce and Head of the unit responsible for Abkhazian-Turkish trade relations³⁴. Being a repatriate Abkhazian businessman from Turkey who came to Abkhazia 15 years ago, he has three companies in Abkhazia today specializing in wood trade and plastic door and window equipments.

Lack of sufficient communication and transportation facilities with Turkey is the worst problem: during the period before the embargo, two cruise ships per week used to connect Abkhazia and Turkey and people were traveling abroad with Soviet passports. Naturally, the international embargo on Abkhazia is the biggest problem especially with regard to relations with Turkey. According to Gogua, what irritates most is the fact that Turkey is not bound by the CIS decisions as a non-CIS country and still keeps pressing the Abkhazians to accept the Georgian plans. He says Abkhazians appreciate the reality that Turkey may have interests in Georgia but the bridge between Turkey and Abkhazia should not be broken down. He stresses that Turkey enjoyed more popularity among the Abkhazians before it began to impose the embargo on Abkhazia. That kind of policy pushes Abkhazia towards the Russian Federation, Gogua warns. In this context, he considers the Russian-Abkhazian relations relatively more harmonious especially after the distribution of the Russian passports

after 2003. Yet he is still optimistic about the Abkhazian-Turkish relations. He proposes that maritime connections should be developed between Turkey and Abkhazia as a concrete step. Additionally, he reminds that a sizeable Abkhazian diaspora lives in Turkey and, hence, the importance of "human contacts" between Turkey and Abkhazia cannot be ignored. He also notes that Turkish and Abkhazian businessmen can find good common opportunities especially in the preparation process for the 2014 Sochi Olympics in sectors such as cement trade with Turkey's black sea region.

As a successful repatriate himself, he underlines the issue of repatriation for Abkhazia and the Abkhazian diaspora whose largest community lives in Turkey since the second half of the 19th century. Diaspora's relations with Abkhazia are perceived as very important for the economic development of Abkhazia. However, Gogua complains that current level of diaspora's overall interest in Abkhazia does not match the level in the days of open war with Georgia.

4.2. Mining sector: coal mines

Interview with T.A., 14 February 2007, Sukhum

T.A. is another Abkhazian repatriate businessman living in Abkhazia for 14 years. His company has rented Tkvarcheli coal mine facilities from the Abkhazian Ministry of Economy in 2001 to pay with royalty rent. Based in Istanbul, Turkey, the company has 250 employees and an office in Sukhum. The company has begun its investment activities in Abkhazia in 2002.

The company invested USD 10 million in equipment. The initial investment program lasted 2.5 years and the exploitation of the Tkvarcheli mine started in 2004. The production level increased from 43.000 tons (2004) to 64.000 tons (2005) and 85.000 tons (2006). At the beginning, 70% of the employees were from Turkey and 30% were locals. As of 2007, 15% are foreigners and 85% locals. Main difficulties to start the enterprise were the lack of

manpower, poor logistics and lack of technical experts. All had to be supplied from Turkey.

The company installed a 10 km long pipeline to bring down the coal as the mine is at 1700 meters height. The coal is carried down from 1700 meters to 500 meters with a hydraulic pipeline system. The mix passing through that plastic pipeline is dust coal composed of 70% water and 30% coal. Coal is transported to the city of Tkvarcheli by trucks. In Tkvarcheli coal output is loaded on train and sent to Ochamchira, an industrial city. Marble, cement and some other products are also transported to Ochamchira on railways. The company has also renovated the Ochamchira port for coal export. The snow level reaches in Tkvarcheli 5 meters. Between January and February, all work stops. The actual active period of the coal mine facility is 8 months during which 1-2 ships depart from Ochamchira port per week. T.A. says they exported 175.000 tons of coal via 90 ship trips in the last period. The ships carry mainly coal and to a lesser extent metals.

The forced take-over of ships and fishing boats 60.000-70.000 away from the coast by Georgian coastguard, is a major source of concern. The Georgian authorities let the ships go after they charge a fine of 200.000 – 300.000 USD. Once, one of his captains lost his life. According to T.A., Turkish authorities recommend Turkish citizens not to visit or make business with Abkhazia. However, they tend to tolerate, though reluctantly, contacts, without taking responsibility for those who will travel to Abkhazia. Yet, T.A. points out to the impossibility to stop people as long as business with Abkhazia is profitable.

4.3. Perspective of a Turkish businessman from Trabzon

Z. I. is a Turkish businessman from Trabzon who has been living in Sukhum for years³⁵. He speaks 6 languages, holds a university degree in mathematics and has previous business experiences in Trabzon, Ukraine, Bulgaria, South-Eastern Turkey and Sahara Africa. Enjoying

the economic liberalization wave of the 1980s in Turkey and the fall of the communist bloc, he set up the first Turkish company in Ukraine in 1990. His companies are based in Trabzon and have an office in Sukhum. Inci's business generally includes food and general consumption goods like flour, sugar, oil, pasta, olives and tomato sauce. According to Inci, imports from Turkey and Russian Federation dominate the market in Abkhazia.

Flour (90%), salt (100%), textile products (60-70%), sugar (70%), electronic house equipments (100%) are the major goods imported from Turkey. His company has a share in that general trade. Z.I. is also undertaking some hotel construction and management businesses in Abkhazia. His company's products, mainly Turkish ones, constantly compete with those imported from the Russian Federation. Yet, tourists from Russian Federation increase his company's business opportunities especially during the summer time. Sochi Olympics open more opportunities for Turkish companies. A hotel project with a capacity of 7000 persons on the Abkhazian-Russian border region is carried out by a Turkish company, he says.

Good local contacts are vital to make business in Abkhazia. Above all, comes trust in Abkhazian partners. Inci thinks that Abkhazia has as much assets as Switzerland but the country which lacks money, wealth and efficient public management. Local workers are not very disciplined or hard-working, he complains. He adds that there are too many public holidays in Abkhazia, 160 days a year.

5. Abkhazia's integration with Black Sea Region: pragmatism over formalism, integration over isolation

5.1. Questioning the embargo and blockade

Economic sanctions are "coercive foreign policy action of a nation in which it intentionally suspends customary economic relations such as trade or financial exchanges in order to

prompt the targeted nation to change its policy or behavior"³⁶. Otherwise they are policy tools used by governments to constrain business activity across borders with intended policy outcomes. Thus, economic sanctions are applied to deny a certain economic advantage to the target country in response to violation of legal rules embodied in international agreement or generally accepted international law.

Proponents of economic sanctions see them as necessary foreign policy to stop aggressing countries from disturbing international peace and security. They can be classified according to their rationale³⁷. *Purposeful* economic sanctions are intended by the sender to inflict economic hardships and thus coerce the target into changing objectionable policies. *Palliative* economic sanctions are imposed to publicly register displeasure with the actions or policies of the target. *Punitive* economic sanctions are intended to inflict harm on the target country without explicit consideration of policy change. *Partisan* economic sanctions are intended to promote parochial commercial or other interests.

Identifying and understanding the underlying rationale(s) for a economic sanction is a critical step in assessing the efficiency of the sanction. The Council of CIS Heads resolution of 19 January 1996 was adopted as a "*Measures for the settlement of Conflict in Abkhazia/Georgia*". The signatories denounced "*the destructive position of Abkhaz sides that creates obstacles to the political settlement of the issue and secure returning of refugees and IDPs*" and decided "*they will not have economic, financial or transport transactions with Abkhazian Authority*" without the agreement of the Georgian government. Georgia stated by issuing a presidential decree that the port points, sea border and Georgian-Russian border in the territory of Abkhazia will be closed for any kind of international transport. The economic sanctions against Abkhazia are punitive as they denounce the "*destructive position of the Abkhaz side*" and purposeful since they aim at settling the conflict, securing the return of refugees

and IDPs and restoring the territorial integrity of Georgia. Conforming to the embargo decision becomes a gesture of solidarity with the Georgian government and of attachment to the principle of its territorial integrity.

Cooperation is the key factor in ensuring success. Maximum amount of harm was inflicted on the population of Abkhazia during the period of Russian full cooperation with the embargo decision. Attempts of Turkish businessmen from the Black Sea coast to infringe the sanctions, either guided by profit or moral concerns, could bring a relative degree of relief. Medecins Sans Frontières in its report of December 2002 drew *'attention to the disastrous consequences of the embargo on the indigent populations'* and denounced the maintenance of *'a form of humanitarian embargo on top of the trade and military embargo'* and urged the international community to pay attention and provide assistance to the population of Abkhazia cut off from the rest of the world and living in precarious conditions³⁸.

In theory there is a difference between economic sanctions and economic warfare, the former represents *"a milder form of coercion employed to coerce or inflict punishment on the selected target"*, the latter represents *"economic coercive measures employed during wars as part of the general military effort to inflict as much havoc, destruction and deprivation as possible"*³⁹. However, both sanctions and siege warfare affect the economies of the target states, creating shortage of food, water, medical supplies. They both lead to a systematic deprivation of a whole city or nation of economic resources. The most harm done is to those who are least able to defend themselves, who represent the least military threat and who are the most vulnerable. Fast, multilateral and comprehensive sanctions are producing devastating results in terms of human and economic costs. The impact of the sanctions imposed on Iraq after the first Gulf War, was so large and the former UN Under-Secretary General Denis Halliday resigned from the UN in protest over a system he

considered *"systematic genocide"*⁴⁰. Sanctions can be instruments which contradict the spirits of the Human Rights Declaration and the principles that guide international law.

However, even during the period characterized by the cooperative stance of Russian Federation and the administration of high damage, the sanctions didn't bring any tangible policy outcome. Observers described the regime of sanctions as counter-productive for the settlement of the conflict. The United Nations Needs Assessment Mission to Abkhazia in February 1998 negatively assessed the blockade. As noted by the Mission, the embargo restrictions *"tend to solidify political positions without encouraging political compromise or facilitating economic integration."* The Mission suggested that these restrictions be eased in the interest of promoting reconciliation and of creating a better negotiating climate. The analyst, Jonathan Cohen noted in a paper published in 1999 *"Trade restrictions cause much hardship in Abkhazia but instead of forcing the Abkhaz to make political concessions, isolation generates a siege mentality that reduces the propensity to compromise". It also contributes to the development of a criminal and national resistance economy that undermines prospects for the entrenchment of the rule of law"*⁴¹.

The Georgian President Shevardnadze appointed Aslan Abashidze as his special envoy for the conflict with Abkhazia in December 2001. The appointment followed Abashidze's official invitation by the special representative of the UN Secretary General, Dieter Boden, to become an active participant in the negotiation process. In order to alleviate the lot of the Abkhazian population, Shevardnadze's appointee for Abkhazia called for the abolishment of the economic sanctions imposed on the self-declared republic. Abashidze's approach to the conflict based on the assumption that a political settlement at the present moment was futile. In order to build the confidence necessary for a final resolution of the conflict, mediation had to focus on economic restoration and oth-

er less disputed issues, such as the resumption of rail communication between Russian Federation and Georgia and the transit of energy resources through Abkhazia. More recently, in January 2005, Irakli Alasania, just a month before being appointed by President Saakashvili as his aid in the Georgian-Abkhaz peace talks, pushed for a policy of pro-active engagement with Abkhazia⁴², pointing out that in the past, Georgia sought to isolate Abkhazia politically and economically but that this isolation had not gotten Georgia any further in negotiations. Today Abkhazia is fully open on the Russian Federation and is integrating at high speed into the Russian economic zone and reaching to a lesser extent the outside world through Russia. It seems hard to imagine how the sanctions could have any more efficiency than what they had in the period when the Russian Federation was fully supportive of Georgian decision. In March 2008, Russian Federation lifted unilaterally the sanctions presenting its decision as a humanitarian gesture. The sanctions were depicted as meaningless which were only good at obstructing the implementation of socio-economic programs in the region and dooming the population to unjustified hardships. Georgian officials denounced Russian Federation's intention to entwine itself so tightly with Abkhazia that the region effectively remains a flash point for Georgia. Tbilisi keeps on insisting on retaining the sanctions as a bargaining chip for progress on refugee and IDP return and is ousting completely Abkhazia from the Georgian economic and social sphere. The maritime blockade becomes a symbolical way of defending its territorial integrity which as a matter of fact lets to Abkhazia only one vector of movement.

Enforcement of the sanctions by Georgia

Maritime connections

The Georgian coastguard detains regularly ships which enter Abkhaz waters or seaports without Tbilisi's permission on the purpose of *'illegal crossing of Georgian territorial waters'* and requires the payment of fines for illegally

shipping goods to Abkhazia⁴³. As explained by the trade flow, most of the ships are connecting the Abkhaz ports of Sukhum and Ochamchira with the Turkish ones. Georgian authorities detected that Abkhazia had maritime connections with mainly Turkey, Russian Federation, Ukraine but also more occasionally with Romania, Moldova, Italy and Spain.

From 1999-2003, the coastguard of Georgia's Border Protection Department detained over 40 ships. In 2002, 11 ships were detained. In 2003, the coastguard arrested 7 ships and a further 8 ships' captains were given official warnings. On 31 July 2003, the Turkish ship Selim 1 was officially auctioned in Tbilisi after the expiry of the legal period for appeal or the payment of fines for illegally shipping goods to Abkhazia. The Turkish liner Şeker Baba 3 was auctioned in June 2003 on the same grounds. It was purchased by residents of Poti for USD 66,700. In July 2004 Georgia fired on a cargo ship approaching Sukhum and threatened to sink any ships, including those carrying Russian tourists entering its waters without permission.

Reportedly Georgian authorities detained 22 vessels in 2004-2006. On 30 October 2006 the coast guard detained a Bulgarian ship whose owner was fined USD 448,000. Two fishing vessels, Russian and Ukrainian on 10 January 2007. The captains were sentenced to two months pre-trial detention. More recently, two other Turkish ships were detained: the ship 'Densa Demet' on 5 April, 2009 and the 'New Star' on 29 April. The later is still being kept of the port of Poti. On 17 August 2009, 'Buket' which is owned by DENSA Tanker was detained outside the Georgian territorial waters and brought to the port of Poti. It was later brought to the port of Batumi to be sold. The captain was sentenced to 24 years in prison on 31 August 2009 and set free on 4 September following the visit of the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ahmet Davutoğlu, to Tbilisi. The attention of the Turkish authorities to the security of its citizens travelling to Abkhazia has increased since these last events⁴⁴.

The Russian Foreign Ministry issued a statement on 3 September 2009 warning Georgia against *'further seizure of cargo ships en-route to Abkhazia by Georgian coast guard may cause serious armed incidents'*⁴⁵. Russia's state-owned Vesti television station reported on 21 September 2009 Russia deployed *Novorossiysk*, a coast guard vessel, to Abkhazia to protect its *"territorial waters"*⁴⁶.

Crossing of Adler/Psou border crossing

Georgia doesn't prevent travels to Abkhazia since the territory is officially within the national borders. Entering Abkhazia from the Russian Federation by crossing the Psou River is considered as illegal since Georgia border guards are not controlling the Adler/Psou border post. The administrative border at Inguri had been officially open until the 2008 August war. However the administrative border is a ceasefire line, militarized with a number of checkpoints, across which occasional shooting incidents might occur. Abkhaz authorities, though more suspicious, used to allow until August, crossings into Abkhazia at Inguri, as long as the traveller had a security clearance. Mainly international NGO workers and officials have been travelling to Abkhazia via Inguri with often the help of UNOMIG⁴⁷.

Besides this, local Georgian of the Gali region located on the Abkhaz side used to cross the ceasefire line. A shuttle service, financed by the European Commission, used to transport locals across the Inguri River. Limited trade was going on across the Inguri River: market traders in Abkhazia used to sell a combination of Russian, Turkish and Georgian products, and it was possible to find small quantities of Abkhaz products in Zugdidi. The Abkhaz leadership closed the administrative border after the 2008 August war which makes it increasingly difficult for the population to maintain family contacts, access necessary health care or sell their products on the other side.

However, the Adler/Psou has become the main

gate for ordinary travellers to Abkhazia, namely tourists, petty traders and Abkhazians from the diaspora. In April, 2006, Russia authorized non CIS citizens with a double entry Russian visa to cross into Abkhazia⁴⁸. This measure facilitated tremendously human to human contacts between Abkhazia and Turkey. Before April 2006, Turkish citizens were either traveling on ships taking the risk to violate the blockade or were trying their chance to cross into Abkhazia by bribing Russian border guards at Adler. The integration process with Russian Federation has been transforming the Adler/Psou post into a relatively friendly one, the renovation of the road to Sukhum facilitated movements. In contrast, the administrative border is remaining a ceasefire line, the road crossing the Gali region and connecting to Sukhum is in a very poor condition.

Crossing into Abkhazia from Russian Federation, considered illegal, is punishable in Georgia. The authors know that some CIS citizens have been annoyed for these reasons by Georgian authorities who seem less strict with the holders of Turkish passports. Today, crossings at Inguri are not anymore an option. The UN Secretary General in his last report⁴⁹ is underlining the need to facilitate the freedom of movement of the local population across the ceasefire line.

5.2. The role of Turkey in ending Abkhazia's isolation

Turkey responded positively to the CIS call for imposing economic sanctions on Abkhazia and canceled direct cruises between the ports of Trabzon and Sukhum in 1996. Officially the maritime link between Turkey and Abkhazia is closed. Turkey is justifying its compliance with the isolation regime by respect for the territorial integrity of Georgia.

Abkhazian Diaspora organizations in Turkish and the business community of the Black Sea

have been actively advocating for the reopening of the maritime link between Trabzon and Sukhum. More recently, to the request for the resumption of the ferry connection has been added the demand for a flight connection between Istanbul and Sukhum. As voiced by the the signature campaign *“for Trabzon-Sukhum marine and Istanbul-Sukhum flight transports, Lift the transportation embargo on Abkhazia!”* launched in November 2008, the need for direct transportation connections are justified because of family, friendship and business links bridging Turkey to Abkhazia. It is also emphasized that the restoration of logistics links will *“make a great contribution to Turkey’s relationship with Abkhazia and other North Caucasian states. Abkhazia, which currently consists of only the Russian Federation border gate, wishes to improve its relations with Turkey and to diversify its contacts with the rest of the world. It is beyond doubt that enabling direct transportation between Turkey and Abkhazia is the most effective way to ally both countries economically, politically, socially and culturally”*.

The government and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Turkey are aware of the beginning of a new order in southern west Caucasus after the 2008 August war.

The number of requests addressed to the Parliament by the intermediary of members of Parliament from the main opposition of the Republican People’s Party (CHP) has increased since the recognition of Abkhazia by Russia. In October 2008, Onur Öymen, deputy of Bursa, requested a written answer by a motion to censure from the Minister of Transportation. In November 2008, Tayfun Süner, a CHP member of Parliament from Antalya addressed the same question to the Ali Babacan, Minister of Foreign Affairs. More recently, on 7 May 2009 Atilla Kart, CHP Member of Parliament from Konya questioned the Prime Minister, Erdogan.

Abkhazian diaspora is generally critical of

the officially pro-Georgian attitude of Turkey. Thanks to the efforts of the diaspora organizations, especially “Kafkas–Abhazya Dayanışma Komitesi” – KADK (the Caucasus–Abkhazia Solidarity Committee), Turkey has started accepting the Abkhazian diaspora as a legitimate interested party in Turkey’s relations with Abkhazia and Georgia. Official Abkhazian policy discourse also makes direct and regular references to the “diaspora factor”. This special position of the Abkhazian diaspora is also acknowledged by Georgia. The Solidarity Committee is a regular attendant and/or follower of all Abkhazian-Georgian talks taking place in Turkey and even the Russian Federation since the early 1990s. Based on the legacy of historically warm and friendly relations between the Turks and the Abkhazians since the Ottoman period and early days of the Turkish Republic, the Abkhazian diaspora has been continuing its efforts to persuade Turkish policy makers to take new if not radical initiatives with regard to Abkhazia. Turkish recognition of the Abkhazian independence is an undisputed priority for the Abkhazian diaspora but given the political realities and patterns of Turkish foreign policy and international diplomacy, the diaspora follows a realistic stance by not ignoring secondary goals such as the facilitation of transport and business contacts between Turkey and Abkhazia. These efforts can be given more chance as constructive and less political steps in Turkey’s relations with Abkhazia and Georgia⁵⁰.

Turkey is generally receptive. Turkish diplomats have been working on the issue of the reopening of the ferry link between Trabzon and Sukhum for a few years with the Georgian authorities. It seems unthinkable that Turkey unilaterally decides to resume the ferry link while the Georgian coast guard is keeping on detaining Turkish ships. The connection has to be legalized, or at least formalized. Georgian and Turkish authorities have been considering the possibility that the ferry makes a stopover in Batumi for the customs procedures before

heading to Sukhum. Turkey is now presenting to the Georgian authorities the opening of the ferry link as a confidence building measure for the settlement of the conflict.

It will indeed be a confidence-building measure since Abkhazians will start looking southward, towards Turkey. Turkish-Georgian borderland is fully open to human and trade interactions. The Sarp/i village once divided by the security fence of the Cold War, is being reunified through intense cross-border cooperation. Adjara is integrating with the Turkish Black Sea coast. The closed village of Gogno is hosting dinners between Turkish and Georgian business partners. Inspired by the European experience, Turkish and Georgian authorities have been working at making meaningless the border dividing them. Turks and Georgians can visit each other without visa. Georgia is currently the only former Soviet country to have waived the visa requirement for Turkish citizens. The Batumi airport, which is built and is being managed by the Turkish company TAV is being used for domestic flight connections of Turkish Airlines between Istanbul and Hopa, Artvin. The practices at the Geneva airport have been transferred to Batumi. The Sarp/i border crossing will also start functioning under Swiss standards with a unique customs point. The pragmatism and willingness to cooperate behind the move aiming at transcending the common border should guide Georgian and Turkish efforts to resume the ferry link.

Turkish Deputy Undersecretary Ambassador Ünal Çeviköz visited Abkhazia on 10 September 2009 on the sidelines of Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu's official talks with Tbilisi. This has been first-ever visit by a high-ranking Turkish diplomat to Abkhazia.

5.3. The importance of in-land transportation links

From the Abkhaz official perspective, ending the isolation should be mainly reached with the establishment of the direct maritime connections. The establishment of direct maritime links should help to develop bilateral relations with neighbors around the Black Sea. The issue of the restoration of in-land transportation links is looked upon with more suspicion since they imply '*transiting*' across Georgia. The idea that '*going through Georgia*' might jeopardize '*independence*' is widespread. Ending the isolation, opening up Abkhazia and integrating the Black Sea region should be the priority. Linkage with political issues blurs the overall positive impact of opening communications links.

The Trabzon-Sukhum ferry link will allow Abkhazians to have a direct access to a second country. Furthermore, the restoration of the in-land transportation axis has the potential to boost regional integration. The Turkish entrepreneurs from the Black Sea region bitterly recall the time when they could reach Sochi by road through Batumi in 6 hours, the maritime connection takes 12 hours. Abkhazia occupies a strategically important position as a land bridge linking Russian Federation and Europe with Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia, as well as with Turkey and the countries of the Middle East. Automobile and railway lines going through Abkhazia can serve as crucially important transit routes for the movement of people and goods. Its three seaports in Sukhum, Ochamchira and Pitsunda, are conveniently situated in the proximity of railway and road lines, and can be used both as passenger and cargo ports. A major infrastructure project comes also on the agenda: a Caucasian highway pass road which would connect with the republics of the Northern Caucasus and provide the access to the sea for the North Caucasian republics. This highway would give Turkey and other countries of the Middle East a convenient, short way towards Southern Russia, North Caucasus and Russia.

The issue of the opening of the railway – the background

Spanning the Inguri River near Zugdidi are the rusty remains of the Sochi-Tbilisi railway bridge: its demolition has meant the severance of economic and communicative ties between Georgia and the territory of Abkhazia, as well as the disruption of rail trade between Armenia and Russian Federation. Talks about reopening the line between Tbilisi and Abkhazia's capital, Sukhum, first started at the end of 90's. The Sochi talks focused on reopening the southern section of the railway line, which would effectively end Abkhazia's isolation.

On 7 March 2003 Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin and Georgia's ex-President Eduard Shevardnadze signed an agreement in Sochi envisaging a "synchronization" of the two processes – the return of the internally displaced persons to Abkhazia's westernmost Gali region and the resumption of the railway connection. The two presidents also agreed to set up two separate bilateral governmental commissions to work over these issues⁵¹. The intensification of trilateral talks after the Sochi agreement brought the perspective in 2004-2005 of a breakthrough in the dispute over the re-opening of the railway link between Abkhazia and its neighbors. Georgia and Abkhazia agreed to conduct a joint study on the feasibility of reopening the railway link. Following preliminary talks, it was agreed a research group which will contain Georgian, Abkhaz and Russian specialists will visit the Zugdidi region of western Georgia and the Gali and Ochamchira regions of Abkhazia to study the state of the railway line⁵².

Economists estimated that it will cost around 65 million USD to fully reopen the railway. Russian Railways estimated that 100 million dollars are needed for its restoration. Most of the railway route is in an appalling condition. It takes around six hours to travel the 130 km between Sukhum and Sochi on a track that has not been repaired since Soviet times. The 80-km stretch south of Sukhum to the western Georgian border is in an even worse condition. Sleepers are rotten, rails are worn out and small stations are entirely dilapidated. After the town of Ochamchira, two-thirds of the way down the Black Sea coast, the railway line has virtually ceased to exist. 60 kilometers of track, between Zugdidi, administrative center of the Georgian region of Samegrelo, and Ochamchira have been removed from the railroad and sold for scrap metal⁵³ and burnt the semi-rotten sleepers as firewood. Even the railway embankment has been cleared away and it is hard to see where the line used to go. According to some estimates, it might take three years to restore this section of the railway.

Economics and Politics

Georgians have been linking the issue of refugee return with that of the railway, while the Abkhazians view the question of restoring railway communications as a purely economic problem which can't be accompanied by political demands. Another stumbling block has been the issue of customs and border posts and the security of railway traffic through Abkhazia as a whole. Previously, the Georgian government insisted it must have the right of inspection on the border crossing between Abkhazia and Russia at the

Psou River – the point that is still internationally recognized as the Russian-Georgian border. Otherwise, went the argument, cargoes would be crossing unauthorized territory without being checked.

There are people who feel the railway could be a threat to national security: Securing and protecting the railroad was Georgian Defense Minister Tenghiz Kitovani's pretext for sending the Georgian National Guard into Abkhazian territory in 1992 while fighting a civil war with forces loyal to deposed Georgian President Zviad Gamsakhurdia.

Milestones

28-29 January 2003: During the informal summit of the heads of states of the CIS in Kyiv on, President Putin and Shevardnadze discussed the re-establishment of the railway link between Sochi and Tbilisi and the return of the internally displaced persons and refugees.

6-7 March 2003: Meeting in Sochi. Two presidents agreed to create working groups that would address the return of refugees and IDP to the Gali district, the reopening of the railway between Sochi and Tbilisi, energy projects, including the modernization of the hydroelectric power station Inguri-CES.

It was understood that the opening of the railway would proceed in parallel with the return of refugees and IDPs. Abkhaz de facto Prime Minister Gennadii Gogulia took part in some of the deliberations in Sochi.

15-16 June 2005: The Russian Federation convened the so-called Sochi working group on the rehabilitation of the Sochi-Tbilisi railway and on the return of refugees and IDPs in Moscow

Decision to form an expert group that would meet to discuss the security and other practical aspects of conducting a technical survey of the Psou-Inguri section of the railway which includes the Inguri Bridge.

2 July 2005: meeting at UNOMIG HQ in Gali. 2 expert-level meetings in Tbilisi and Sukhum. To discuss further the modalities of the technical survey of the Psou-Inguri section of the railway.

Kodori events occurred as the negotiation process was on track

Invasion of an Abkhazian portion by Georgian military, Kodori was under protection according the 1994 agreement, part of the demilitarized zone.

Regional economic impact

All sides acknowledge that the reopening of the railway would transform the economic landscape of the region. This railway line links not only western Georgia and Abkhazia but was, before 1992, the main north-south freight and passenger route between Russian Federation and the Southern Caucasus. In the intervening decade, Armenia was hardest hit by the loss. The restoration of the connection will establish a North-South transport corridor and land bridge to Iran. Plans to revive overland traffic between eastern Turkey and southern Russia through Georgia and Abkhazia have been thwarted by

Abkhazian-Georgian conflict.

The Russian government proposed in November 2004 to create a joint entity of the Russian, Georgian, Armenian, and Azerbaijani railways for operating the South Caucasus Railroad, from the Russian-Georgian border via Abkhazia to Tbilisi, Yerevan, and Baku. The project was envisaging to set up a joint operating company to manage and upgrade the railroad, and a joint bank to finance restoration and upgrading⁵⁴. Letters of intent were signed with the Armenian officials on their countries' participation in the proposed four-country joint company. The announcement that Moscow and Yerevan were going urgently to task an expert group to draw up investment and business plans for the reconstruction of the railroad's Abkhaz and Armenian sections was made.

In Tbilisi, Prime Minister Zurab Zhvania and Economics Minister Kakha Bendukidze signed also a memorandum of understanding on creating expert groups for the project, focusing on restoration of the railroad's Abkhaz section. According to the Russian Transportation Minister Igor Levitin, the memorandum signed with Georgia on 1 November included two issues: the opening of the railway section that links Sukhum to Inguri and the establishment of a new ferry-railway connection between Russian Federation and Georgia⁵⁵. Indeed, Russian Federation and Georgia signed an agreement on opening a direct railway ferry between the Black Sea ports of Poti and Kavkaz. The Poti-Kavkaz ferry is not only important for Russian Federation and Georgia. Armenia, Azerbaijan and Central Asian countries are expected to benefit from the new link. The ferry connection stretches between the Georgian port of Poti and Russia's industrial terminal of Kavkaz. Kavkaz is a main export outlet for crude oil, oil products, and fertilizers. Its location on the Kerch Strait that links the Black Sea to the Sea of Azov makes it a major hub for goods meant to countries of the Mediterranean Sea basin. The connection aimed to provide a direct link between the South Caucasian countries and Russian Federation: access from Poti to South Russia was usually made via the Ukrainian port of Illichivsk located in south of Odessa.

In May 2006, the authorities of Russia, Georgia, Armenia and Abkhazia set up a consortium to restore the railroad. However, the escalation of tensions between Moscow and Tbilisi in the Autumn 2006 prevented the implementation of the project. Moscow seemed to have been striving to resume talks on these agreements. Russia requested that the railroad communication be restored as it suspended its ban on transport links with Georgia in April 2008. The mission of the Russian Railroad Construction Forces in summer 2008, which raised great concern in Georgia as 400 Russian military were deployed for this purpose, is said to have been motivated by the restoration of the railway link between Sukhum and Ochamchira. Sergey Bagapsh announced on 15 May that the management right of the railway would be transferred to Russian Federation for ten years and that Russian Railways would allocate 2 Billion Rubles for the renovation work⁵⁶. As reported by Kommersant in June 2008, the issue of the complete restoration of the railroad and resumption of the communication from Russia towards Georgia and Armenia was again on the agenda. The head of the Georgian Railways assessed the cost of the restoration of the portion of the railroad in Abkhazia at USD 241 million⁵⁷.

Conclusion

Ending the isolation, opening up Abkhazia and integrating the Black Sea region should be the priority. Linkage with political issues blurs the overall positive impact of opening communications links. Georgia has a stake in a policy of pro-active engagement with Abkhazia. Past efforts at isolating Abkhazia politically and economically had not gotten Georgia any further in negotiations. Observers described the regime of sanctions as counter-productive for the settlement of the conflict. Turkey can play a major role in overcoming the isolation of Abkhazia. However it is unthinkable that Turkey unilaterally decides to resume the direct transportation links with Abkhazia. The connection has to be

legalized, or at least formalized. The pragmatism and willingness to cooperate behind the move aiming at transcending the common border should guide Georgian and Turkish efforts to resume the ferry link. Abkhazia occupies a strategically important position as a land bridge linking Russian Federation and Europe with Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia, as well as with Turkey and the countries of the Middle East. A major infrastructure project comes also on the agenda: a Caucasian highway pass road which would connect with the republics of the Northern Caucasus and provide the access to the sea for the North Caucasian republics. This highway would give Turkey and other countries of the Middle East a convenient, short way towards Southern Russia, North Caucasus and Russia.

END NO-

- 1 Price, Philips, "Where Russia and Turkey Meet; Eastern Anatolia, Kars and Ardahan," *The Manchester Guardian*, 14/10/47, "There have been 16 Russo-Turkish wars in history and most of them have involved some military operations on the Asiatic front of Eastern Anatolia and the Caucasus. Hence the importance of this high plateau and watershed where the Euphrates and Tigris rise and other rivers meander into the Caspian."
- 2 Paul B. Henze, « Circassian Resistance to Russia », in Abdurahman Avtorkhanov, Marie Benningsen Broxup (eds), *The North Caucasus Barrier, The Russian Advance Towards the Muslim World*, C. Hurst & Co. UK, 1992
- 3 Sefer Berzeg, *Kuzey Kafkasya Cumhuriyeti [North Caucasus Republic]*, Vol. 1-3, Birleşik Kafkasya Derneği, İstanbul, Turkey, 2003 ; Mustafa Butbay, *Kafkasya Hatıraları [Memoires on Caucasus]*, Türk Tarih Kurumu, Ankara, Turkey, 2007 ; İavus Akhmadov , « Russia and Chechnia: From a Fief to a Federation Subject » , *Central Asia and the Caucasus*, Vol. 2, No. 20, 2003, http://www.ca-c.org/online/2003/journal_eng/cac-02/04.ahmeng.shtml; James B. Minahan, « Kuban Cossacks», *One Europe, Many Nations: A Historical Dictionary of European National Groups*, Greenwood Publishing Group Incorporated, Westport, CT, USA, 2000, pp. 383-387.
- 4 The Abkhazian nation (ethnos) is made up two major sub-groups (sub-ethnos): the 'Apswa' which makes up the major population group in Abkhazia and the 'Ashuwa' or the 'Ashkaraua' (Abazins) which mainly live in the North Caucasus (especially present day Karachai-Cherkess Republic in the RF) where they have migrated from Abkhazia in two migration waves in the 14th and 17th centuries for socio-economic reasons like the scarcity of pasture lands for stockbreeding. The Abazins are sometimes thought be in the (partial) process of an 'ethnogenesis', that is, emerging as a separate ethnos akin but different than the Apswa Abkhazians. The Abazins prefer to use 'Abazin' as their ethnonym rather than the widespread name 'Abkhaz'. In Turkey the Apswa Abkhazians live in north western Anatolia whereas the Abazins are located in Central Anatolia. Compared to the Apswa Abkhazians, the Abazins are relatively "Circassianized" in their etiquette and manners both in the North Caucasus and Turkey and many are bilingual in both Abkhazian (Abazin) and Circassian languages. "Abaza" (pp. 1-5), "Abkhaz" (pp. 6-10) in James B. Minahan, *One Europe, Many Nations: A Historical Dictionary of European National Groups*, Greenwood Publishing Group Incorporated, Westport, CT, USA, 2000; "Abkhaz" (pp. 7-10) in James Minahan, *Encyclopedia of the Stateless Nations: Ethnic and National Groups Around the World*, Vol. 1, Greenwood Publishing Group Incorporated, Westport, CT, USA, 2002, Özdemir Özbay, *Dünden Bugüne Kuzey Kafkasya [North Caucasus from Yesterday Until Today; in Turkish]*, Kaf-Fed Yayınları, Ankara, Turkey, 1995.
- 5 Caucasian-Abkhazian Solidarity Committee (CASC), Kuruluş ve Amacı («Foundation and Objectives «), CASC Website, <http://www.abhazya.org/komite/kurulus-tarihi.html>; Caucasian-Abkhazian Solidarity Committee (CASC), Faaliyetler CASC Website, <http://www.abhazya.org/komite/kurulus-tarihi.html>

- abhazya.org/komite/faaliyetler.html; WRITENET, The North Caucasian Diaspora In Turkey, 1 May 1996, UNHCR Website, <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6a6bc8.html>; Nusret Bas, "The Circassian Diaspora in Turkey", Johnson's Russia List Research and Analytical Supplement, No. 42, May 2008, <http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/2008-93.cfm>.
- 6 Interview with Basharan College Teacher Bilal Taşdemir
- 7 Abkhazia: Economic and Political Situation and Perspectives, Viacheslav CHIRIKBA
- 8 Russian government resolution, no 154, April 2006
- 9 Inal Khashig, Abkhaz Rush For Russian Passports, Caucasus Reporting Service, no 135, 27 June 2002, 'Since 1 June 2002, the public organisation, the Congress of Russian Communities of Abkhazia, has been collecting Abkhazians' Soviet-era travel documents. It has sent them to consular department specially set up by Moscow foreign ministry officials in the city of Sochi, on the Black Sea coast just north of breakaway region. When they have been checked, they are returned with a new page inserted certifying Russian citizenship. In order to cope with the demand, government offices have spent the entire month working to a special regime from early morning to midnight without a break. Huge queues have formed. Villagers have abandoned work in the fields to go to the towns and have their documents processed.
- 10 Giorgi Sepashvili, Resuming Abkhazia Railway Link, Russia Strengthens its Hand Versus Tbilisi, 11 September 2004, Civil Georgia
- 11 Inal Khashig, 'Abkhaz train provokes Georgian anger', Institute for War and Peace Reporting, Caucasus Report Service, no 162, 17 January 2003
- 12 Georgia: Tbilisi Outraged At Moscow Withdrawal From Abkhaz Sanctions Treaty By Ahto Lobjakas 'Bad News', RFE-RL
- 13 Abkhazia prepares for Olympics with a little help from its friends Elizabeth Owen, 29 July 2008, Eurasia Insight
- 14 'Bagapsh: Russia to take over Abkhaz railway, airport', 15 May 2009, Civil Georgia
- 15 Reports written by the Abkhaz economist Beslan Baratelia
- 16 Among other "Псоу", "Анакопия", "Амра", "Апсны", "Радеда", "Диоскурия", "Эшера" и "Лыхны" wines are sold in many supermarkets in Russia together with Russian and CIS wines.
- 17 Kommersant, 17 October 2007
- 18 <http://www.kremlin.ru/text/docs/2009/04/215690.shtml>
- 19 Russian Reports in Troops Deployment Plan in Abkhazia, 20 May 2009, Civil Georgia
- 20 Bagapsh: Agreement to Allow Russia 49 year base stationing, 6 March 2009, Civil Georgia, RFE-RL, Moscow Signs Defense Pacts With Breakaway Georgian Regions , 15 September 2009
- 21 Reports: Russia Plans Navy Base in Ochamchira, 26 January, 2009, Civil Georgia
- 22 ITAR-TASS, 'Russian embassy in Abkhazia may open this March', 10 February, 2009
- 23 Shaun Walker, Moscow is offering Abkhazia a set of economic benefits, on top of a security guarantee, The Christian Science Monitor, 29 September 2008
- 24 In a separate aid package Tskhinvali would receive additional 8.5 billion rubles as part of 10 billion ruble assistance for recovery needs from the August war results. 1.5 billion rubles has already been allocated to reconstruction needs as part of this package late last year, the Russian Finance Ministry said in the statement.
- 25 'Russia pledges USD 149 mln aid for Abkhazia and South Ossetia', Civil Georgia, 17 March 2009
- 26 Russian Reports in Troops Deployment Plan in Abkhazia, 20 May 2009, Civil Georgia
- 27 Anaid Gogorian, 'Russia's gift of recognition hurts Abkhaz traders', IWPR'S Caucasus Reporting Service, No. 491, May 1, 2009
- 28 ITAR-TASS, 'Russia is opening a trade mission in Abkhazia', 11 February 2009
- 29 Russian investments to be of much significance for Abkhaz economy, President of Abkhazia, 08 November 2007, Website of the Presidency
- 30 Figures reported in the Crisis Group Europe Report, No 176, 15 September 2006
- 31 Tarel Gusep, 'Tender offer for Abkhazia', Caucaz.com, 28 February 2005
- 32 Alexander Gabuev, 'Georgia dismayed by the deployment of Russia's railroad construction troops in Abkhazia', 2 June 2008, Kommersant
- 33 Elizabeth Owen, 'Abkhazia prepares for Olympics with a little help from its friends', 29 July 2008, Eurasia Insight
- 34 Interview with Soner Gogua in Sukhum, Abkhazia on 13 February 2007. Gogua was elected as a Member of the Abkhazian Parliament in the March 2007 elections.
- 35 Interview with Zeki Inci in Sukhum, Abkhazia on 14 February 2007.
- 36 Lopez, George A., Cortright David, "Economic Sanctions in Contemporary Global Relations" ed. David Cortright and George A. Lopez, Westview Press, Boulder Colorado, 1995
- 37 Askari, H.G., Forrer J. Teegen, Economic Sanctions: Examining their philosophy and Efficacy, Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003
- 38 Abkhazia, Old and Frail in the Shadow of the Embargo, Medecins Sans Frontieres, December 2002
- 39 Daoudi and Dajani, Economic and Sanctions: Ideals and Experience
- 40 Halliday, Denis J., "The Catastrophe of Sanctions against Iraq", Seattle Times, 19 February 1999

- 41 Jonathan Cohen, "Economic Dimensions", Accord, 1999
- 42 Georgia pushes policy of pro-active engagement with Abkhazia, A EurasiatNet Q&A with Irakli Alasania, Erik A. Miller, 07 January, 2005
- 43 This leads the Abkhaz authorities to denounce the Georgian government for acts of piracy. As highlighted in the article of in IA book for 2003 "In the first half of 2003, such arrests brought USD 274,000 to the state coffers and a further USD 250,000 is expected by the end of the year"
- 44 http://www.kafkasfederasyonu.org/haber/federasyon/2009/300909_disisleri.htm
- 45 Civil Georgia, 3 September, <http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=21423&search=>
- 46 Civil Georgia, 21 September 2009, <http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=21482&search=>
- 47 United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia, established in August 1993 to verify compliance with the ceasefire agreement between the government of Georgia and the Abkhaz authorities in Georgia. UNOMIG's mandate was expanded following the signing by the Parties of the 1994 Agreement on a Ceasefire and Separation of Forces.
- 48 Russian government resolution, no 154, April 2006
- 49 Report of the Secretary General pursuant to Security Council resolutions 1808 (2008), 1839 (2008) and 1866 (2009)
- 50 For the details of political and social dynamics of the Abkhazian diaspora in Turkey see Mitat Çelikpala, "From Immigrants to Diaspora: Influence of the North Caucasian Diaspora in Turkey", *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 42, No. 3, 2006, pp. 423 – 446; Ayhan Kaya, "Political Participation Strategies of the Circassian Diaspora in Turkey", *Mediterranean Politics*, Vol. 9, No. 2, 2004, pp. 221-239; Viacheslav A. Chirikba, "Абхазская община за границей [Abkhazian Community Abroad]", Website of the Apsny Information Agency, http://www.apsny.ru/community/community.php?page=content/community_a/community_a.htm [26.03.2007]; Website of the Caucasus–Abkhazia Solidarity Committee in Turkey, <http://www.abhazy.org>. International (i.e. www.iwpr.net, www.jamestown.org, www.eurasianet.org), Russian (i.e. www.regnum.ru, www.regions.ru) and Georgian media and analysis sources (www.civil.ge, www.interpressnews.ge) provide news and commentaries on the Abkhazian diaspora in Turkey, US and Europe. It is possible to find some additional information in the academical titles on Caucasus and Turkish foreign policy. See for example, Andrew Mango, "Reflections on the Atatürkist Origins of Turkish Foreign Policy and Domestic Linkages" in Alan Makovsky and Sabri Sayarı (eds.), *Turkey's New World: Changing Dynamics in Turkish Foreign Policy*, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Washington, DC, USA, 2000, pp. 9-19.
- 51 Inal Khashig in Sukhum and Margarita Akhvlediani in Tbilisi (CRS No.171, 20-Mar-03)
- 52 Inal Khashig in Sukhum and Giorgy Kupatadze in Tbilisi, Abkhaz Railway – Light at End of Tunnel? (IWPR-CRS No. 297, 27-Jul-05)
- 53 Abkhazia and Georgia: Ready to Ride on the Peace Train?, Paul Rimple, *Eurasia Insight*, 08/05/2005
- 54 Vladimir Socor, Moscow proposes joint operation of South Caucasus railroad, 5 November, 2004
- 55 Jean-Christophe Peuch, Russia/Georgia: Opening Of Ferry Link Expected To Impact Regional Trade, 10 January, 2005
- 56 'Bagapsh: Russia to take over Abkhaz railway, airport', 15 May 2009, Civil Georgia
- 57 Alexander Gabuev, 'Georgia dismayed by the deployment of Russia's railroad construction troops to Abkhazia', 2 June 2008, *Kommer-sant*



THE BLACK SEA INTERNATIONAL



ORTADOĐU STRATEJİK ARAŐTIRMALAR MERKEZİ

MithatpaŐa Caddesi 46/4 Kızılay/Ankara
Tel: 0(312) 430 26 09 Fax: 0 (312) 430 39 48
www.orsam.org.tr, orsam@orsam.org.tr
www.blacksea.org.tr, blacksea@blacksea.org.tr