Arab Spring and the Day After: What Went Wrong for Turkey?

Everything would have been perfect, from Turkey's perspective, if the internal chaos engulfing many Middle Eastern countries for the last three years had come to an end with the victory of those social forces that represent the majority in their countries and strive to achieve a balanced coexistence between traditional values, notably Islam, on the one hand and the requirements of a modern life, notably secularism, pluralism and liberalism, on the other.
 
The emergence of such a regional environment would have added further credibility to the so-called Turkish model and Turkey would have finally found a way to help bring about a new regional order in tune with its national identity and interests.
 
It should not be forgotten that it was Turkey, rather than any other country in the region, to which many Western and non-Western circles pointed as the most promising “role model” in the early stages of the so-called Arab Spring period. Turkey's value on the international stock markets saw dramatic increases while many viewed Turkey as the ideal role model or inspiration for the efforts of emerging powers in the region to become stronger socially, more developed economically and more democratic politically. When Turkey's sincere efforts to further regional integration in the Middle East were seen, especially in accordance with liberal, democratic and capitalist principles, combined with its pragmatic yet cooperative relations with global powers, the picture emerged that Turkey would be the ideal partner for these powers in the region.
 
This positive view of Turkey seems to be the main reason why many observers preferred to give Turkey the benefit of the doubt in the early stages of the Arab Spring, when Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu underlined that Turkey would or should act from this time onwards as the country to guarantee order in the Middle East. Despite Turkey's grandiose aspirations, many continued to hope that Turkey's successes over the last decade might inspire the emerging powers in the region to navigate their way across these uncharted waters.
 
Turkey had succeeded in transforming relations with many of its neighbors to the south from one of conflict into a friendly and cooperative mood over the last decade, mainly owing to the strong political will of the ruling party to make peace with Turkey's past, including domestic social groups and outsiders. Similar to the European Union's neighborhood policies, Turkey increased its efforts to cement interdependent and cooperative relations in its regional environment, the Middle East being the main area. Prior to the Arab Spring, Turkey had been at peace with its neighbors, acted as a credible mediator and facilitator in regional conflicts and talked to different ethnic and religious communities with self-confidence.
 
Transmitter of global values
 
Given the dramatic scale of Turkey's re-engagement with the Middle East, some even wondered whether Turkey was turning away from the West. In fact, Turkey was acting as the transmitter of global norms and values to the Middle East, which would eventually contribute to this area's incorporation as a legitimate entity in the global economic and political system. Dramatic rises in Turkey's trade with Middle Eastern countries, as well as Turkey's increasing international and diplomatic activities in the region, might have certainly contributed to bridging the gap between Ankara and other Middle Eastern capitals, yet this does not suggest that Turkey's rediscovery of the Middle East took place at the expense of its links to the Western world or other global actors. Rather than challenging the legitimacy of the Western-influenced, pre-existing political, economic and security structures in the region, Turkey's efforts seemed to be directed towards the building of sustainable bridges between the Middle East and the rest of the world. Turkey followed evolutionary, rather than revolutionary, transformative policies in the region. Turkey's efforts to help bring about a common Middle Eastern consciousness among different political, ethnic and religious communities were affected positively by Turkey's improved soft power image in the region.
 
Prior to the Arab Spring, Turkey's relations with the established global powers were also promising. Not only did Turkey seek to develop pragmatic and cooperative relations with global powers, irrespective of their strategic orientations and internal characteristics, but those global powers also seemed to be sympathetic to Turkey's efforts to maintain peace and stability in the Middle East. Turkey was not seen as an emerging regional power seeking to revitalize the defunct Ottoman Empire, which would fundamentally challenge global powers' interests in the region. Despite some potential crises in relations with the US, EU and Russia, Turkey's Middle Eastern polices in the pre-Arab Spring era commanded a high degree of respect and admiration. One particular reason for this was the perception that Turkey's regional policies might lighten the burden of the global powers' maintenance of regional peace and stability. Turkey was perceived as a contributor to the solution of regional problems. Turkey's ability to speak to regional actors through “international” values was notable in this period. Rather than being seen as a country that wanted to dominate the Middle East, the perception was that Turkey was aiming to connect this region to global structures in as many ways as possible.
 
Despite the bridge metaphor's occasional exposure to serious domestic criticism, mainly because this conceptualization suggests a passive and introverted policy stance, one of the reasons that Turkey's international profile attracted great respect in the pre-Arab Spring era was its ability to connect regional actors, which was the ideal policy stance dictated by Turkey's geographical location, historical experience and capabilities. The number of countries that might act as connectors and bridge builders are quite few in the international arena, and Turkey is one of those privileged countries.
 
The EU factor
 
Even though the prospects of Turkey's membership in the EU have not increased since the beginning of the formal accession negotiations in 2005, Turkey was perceived in the pre-Arab Spring period as a country wanting to join the EU and complete its ongoing internal transformation process in line with contemporary European values. This perception was important, because one of the main sources of Turkey's positive image and power of attraction in the Middle East was its continuing commitment to the Europeanization process. Many public opinion polls conducted in the pre-Arab Spring era in various Middle Eastern countries revealed that the overwhelming majority in the region supported Turkey's acceptance into the EU.
 
Similarly, the European supporters of Turkey's EU membership process tried to revitalize the dormant membership process by citing the need for Turkey-EU cooperation in the region. The high degree of convergence between the Middle Eastern policies of Turkey and the EU appeared to have encouraged Turkey's friends in the EU to point to this factor as a way of strengthening Turkey's membership prospects.
 
Against such a background, it now seems that Turkey's stance during the Arab Spring process, particularly concerning internal developments in Egypt and Syria, has not paid any dividends for Turkey. That Turkey sided with the domestic parties in these countries demanding more democracy, more representation and more accountability has certainly been legitimate and commendable; yet Turkey's failure to adjust its policies to developments on the ground, as well as its insistence on pursuing an allegedly value-based, moralistic foreign policy course, seems not to have contributed to Turkey's international and regional profile. As of today, not only have Turkey's relations with Syria, Iraq, Israel and Iran soured, but also the way Turkey is perceived by global powers is not at all encouraging.
 
Like it or not, Turkey is now seen as a country that takes sides in the internal problems of regional countries, remains loyal to its original positions and despises readjusting its policies in line with real-time developments on the ground, indirectly contributes to regional polarization, harshly criticizes the positions of major global actors during the process, still encouraged Western actors to adopt more forceful strategies in Syria and support the opposition units with arms after the chemical crisis had come to an end with the agreement of the US and Russia in realpolitik fashion in Geneva, continues to support Mohammed Morsi in Egypt and the offshoots of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) across the region and preaches to regional and international actors on the true meaning of democracy while experiencing strong deficits in democracy at home.
 
Worse, recent trends demonstrate that Turkey is now extremely busy with internal problems, most notably the political and social ramifications of the Gezi Park protests. The ruling government seems to have adopted a critical attitude not only towards the social circles that took part in these protests but also the international circles which incessantly refer to Turkey's lack of democracy and urge the government to make a new push on the democratization process as soon as possible.
 
The results of the transatlantic trends survey of the German Marshall Fund for the year 2013 reveal that the number of Turks and Westerners who are optimistic about Turkey's prospective membership in the EU has fallen below 40 percent, the number of Turks who would like to see their country follow a unilateral foreign policy orientation has also increased and the number of Turks who are against Turkey's involvement in any military operation in Syria has increased to 70 percent.
 
Limited influence
The way in which the major global powers dealt with the Syrian crisis, particularly following the use of chemical weapons by Bashar al-Assad's regime against its opponents, also suggests that Turkey's concerns and priorities are not being given due respect and attention in this context. Unlike in the Libyan situation, Syria demonstrates that Turkey's ability to influence the interests and policies of regional and international actors is quite limited.
 
To the consternation of Turkish decision makers, the latest crisis over the use of chemical weapons has been resolved by an agreement between the US and Russia, which reminded the entire globe that the need to secure the great powers' consent for challenging global problems still exists.
 
In contrast with the pre-Arab Spring era, recent years have increasingly demonstrated that Turkish decision makers now try to legitimize Turkey's position through the invention of new phrases such as “precious loneliness.” What a sea change from the self-confident rhetoric of “zero problems with neighbors” to a last-ditch effort to salvage what remained of those glorious days.
 
If there is one thing that would have shored up Turkey's regional and global standing, it is Turkey's success in helping institutionalize a non-realpolitik regional security environment in the Middle East. This would be possible if binary oppositions, regional polarizations and the zero-sum mentality gave way to inclusive collective identities, win-win policies and region-wide security architectures in the Middle East. Such a regional environment would have been likely to emerge if Turkey had continued its “zero problems with neighbors” foreign policy approach after the Arab Spring began.
 
Preaching morality, speaking authoritatively, running after a new regional order, stalling the democratization process at home with short-term political calculations, defying the international community at each and every turn and bringing back the old-fashioned siege mentality will not help Turkey strike a balance between the need to foster regional integration in the Middle East on the one hand and to adopt cooperative pragmatic relationships with global powers on the other.
 
The Arab Spring and Turkey's response to it have made it crystal clear that Turkey's ability to play the regional game of integration and the global game of pragmatism simultaneously is fairly limited. Loneliness, no matter how precious it is, should not be what Turkey has at its disposal during this time of tectonic changes taking place in the global order.