Ayatollah Sistani and The Future Of Najaf in The Light Of Lebanon’s Experience

Critical statements by Sheikh Subhi Tufayli about Hezbollah's intervention in Syria and Iran's Middle East policy have been followed with interest in Turkey for the last two years. The reason for this interest is that Sheikh Tufayli is one of the founders of Hezbollah and the first person to come to the office of the general secretary, the official leadership of the organization. Yet, he was obliged to leave his office in 1991. In an interview with Gerçek Hayat at the beginning of this year, he explains: "Some figures in Tehran have started to act like “trustees” assigned for Lebanon. Also there were Iranian newcomer counselors assigned in Lebanon beside them. When they came to our country, we looked at their agendas and understood that they were not very interested in our liberation from the enemy. And also, they were unpleasantly bossy. They have started to get involved in the civil war in Lebanon, fighting against all groups for no reason. My relations with them have started to get tenser. I could not take it anymore, I had to leave Hezbollah."

Lebanon Experience: Liquidation of Wilayat al Faqih Opponents

The concept of Wilayat al Faqih (Guardianship of the Jurist), which means the political leadership by the ulama in the name of the Promised Imam al Mahdi of the Twelver Shia (Ithnā'ashariyyah) during his occultation was a judicial opinion (ijtihad) of Imam Khomeini. He had led the Iranian revolution of 1979 in accordance with the theological legitimacy of this concept and after the Islamic Republic was founded, the guardianship of the ulama was institutionalized as “Supreme Leadership.” He became the first Supreme Leader of Iran. Nevertheless, this concept was not accepted by a significant part of the Shiite ulama. The most important name among the opposition was the great Ayatollah of the Najaf scholarly basin (hawza, Abu al-Qasim al-Hoi (d. 1992). Ayatollah Hoi, who endorsed neither a theocratic state system run by the ulama nor a position that is entirely indifferent to political affairs, suffered no prosecution or persecution in Iraq unlike Ayatollah Shariatmadari (d. 1986), his compadre in Iran. Though, he was never regarded as a reputable scholar in the eyes of the Wilayat al Faqih proponents.

Lebanese Shia religious authority has been composed of scholars of Najaf graduates all along. The founders of Hezbollah including Sheikh Tufayli were students of the Najaf scholars. Even though they cooperated with the Islamic Republic of Iran and received their support, they disagreed with it about Wilayat al Faqih, a profound denominational ijtihad. Even Ayatollah M. Hussein Fadlallah (d. 2010), a spiritual leader of the organization who was a pupil of Najaf for 21 years, remained in the background and -so to speak- was condemned to be forgotten in the latter stage of his life due to his opposition to the issue at hand, despite his agreement with Imam Khomeini on matters of Islamism. One year before his death, he told The Wall Street Journal in an interview that Wilayat al Faqih should have no role in Lebanon.

Sheikh Tufayli, the first Secretary General of Hezbollah, was not only removed from his office but also accused of being a puppet of Saudi Arabia and America since then. Sayyid Ali al-Amin, a prominent Shiite marja and the mufti of Sur was also among those removed from their posts. It was even worse for another prominent sheikh Hasan Muhaymech who was arrested in 2010 on charges of spying for Israel. The actor behind this Lebanese experience is of course Hasan Nasrallah. Hasan Nasrallah, the leader of Hezbollah since 1992, had moved to Qum after a short education term in Najaf and returned to his country as a firm believer in Wilayat al Faqih. After his ascendance to the office, Iran has acquired the strings by which to control Hezbollah. The students of Najaf were either pacified or have continued their activities in Amal, another Shiite organization. Hezbollah under Nasrallah has become the most important political actor in the region for fifteen years hence, harboring a total obedience to Ali Khamanei, the successor to Khomeini. Iran has thus acquired the means to influence Syria and Mediterranean via this organization.  

Najaf and Ayatollah Sistani

The School of Najaf struggled for survival during the Saddam era, weakening in comparison to the School of Qum which thrived under the Islamic Republic of Iran. The demise of the Saddam regime in Iraq with the U.S. invasion has given an impetus to the Shi’ah in Iraq. Having assumed the leadership of the Najaf marja after Hoi, Ayatollah Ali Sistani has become the prominent religious figure in Iraq during this process. He has spent commendable efforts for ending the US invasion and founding a democratic system in Iraq. During all these, he has opted to cooperate with Iran, a country with a considerable influence in this period. He has never raised his voice against Iran in any issues including Wilayat al Faqih. It was anyway difficult to deal with political actors such as Nouri al Maliki who was supported by Iran. Yet, he sought to protect Najaf’s reputation and has prevented external interventions against it.

Now, Sistani is 86 years old. His age has forced him to delegate much of his authority to his deputies. He is laying low. The situation in Najaf after Sistani’s death is a hot topic. Iran’s interest toward Najaf is no secret. As a matter of fact, it is unthinkable that Iran, who dominates almost the whole of the Iraqi politics, would be indifferent to Najaf. Ayatollah Hoi’s heritage of opposition to Wilayat al Faqih is what makes Najaf important. This contrast prevents Iraq to be a theocratic state on theological grounds and stands as a political hindrance against Iran to “vassalize” Iraq.

In our opinion, Sistani’s current independent attitude does not please Iran at all. Given the military and the political system is under Iran’s control, Sistani is tolerated for the moment. Even though it was Sistani who provided legitimacy to Hashd al Shaabi by issuing a fatwa for resistance in June 2014 after ISIS invaded Mosul, he is known to harbor a great discontent about the government policies and these groups resembling the Iraqi version of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards. Also well known is his disapproval of Iran’s interventions in Syria and Yemen. It is rumored that he ruled that the foreign Shiite fighters who died in Syria and Yemen are not counted as martyrs. A protectionist policy under the reference of Sistani is also underway in the Najaf schools involving non-admittance of Iranian students.

What will Iran do under these circumstances? While maintaining its immobility against a powerful religious authority such as Sistani for the moment, will Iran manage to devise a strategy for controlling Najaf and Iraq after Sistani just like it did in Lebanon?     

Who will be the Grand Ayatollah of Najaf after Sistani?

Three famous ayatollahs of Najaf are the most likely candidates for succession after Sistani. Among these three, Muhammad Ishaq al Fayyadh (b. 1930) and Muhammad Sa’id al Hakim (b. 1934) are very old. The latter is a scholar from the prominent al Hakim family which is very strong in Iraq in general and in Najaf in particular. The third candidate is Basher Hussein al-Najafi who was born in 1942. It is yet unclear as to how the transition will take place and how long it will take. In addition to the ordinary Iraqi Shiites and southern tribes’ preferences, global networks built by Sistani and his predecessor Ayatollah Hoi will be very important in this process.  

International Imam al Hoi Foundation is a giant body with vast financial resources. Known for its reservations for Iran’s policies, Abd al Majid al Hoi, head of the foundation and son of Ayatollah al Hoi, was stabbed to death by the followers of Muqtada al Sadr while he was visiting the Imam Ali Shrine in Najaf in April 2003. The old conflict between the Sadr family and Hoi-Sistani chiefdom has thus transformed into a blood feud. Muqtada al Sadr, who cannot vouch for the position of Grand Ayatollah due to its insufficient level in the Shiite scholarship, is likely to vie for the future of Najaf benefiting from its political and military power just like the Islamic Da’wa Party currently in power. It is also likely that these interventions will be conducted in a way that Iran desires.

Will Iran put forward Ayatollah Shahrudi?

After these elaborations, we need to mention one more candidate. Muhammad Hashimi Shahrudi, who is a Najafi among the scholars of Kum, has for a long time been put forward as a candidate after Sistani. He is a promising candidate since he is only 68 years old. As a strict proponent of Wilayat al Faqih, Ayatollah Shahrudi owes his fame and reputation to his term as a student of famous scholar Ayatollah Muhammad Baqir al Sadr (d. 1980). Having been granted the authority of ijtihad by Ayatollah Baqir al Sadr himself, Shahrudi moved to Qum after the Islamic revolution and served in the higher echelons of the Iranian judiciary between 1999 and 2009. Ayatollah Khamanei appointed him as the mediator to solve the dispute between President Ahmedinejad and the parliament. He is currently serving as a member of the Guardian Council of the Constitution and also as a professor in Qum. He is one of the most important Marja’ taqlid (authority to follow/imitate) in Iran for the last five years and he has never severed his links with Iraq. He has worked for the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, an anti-Baath opposition party known for its pro-Iranian stance. His decision to open a representative office for himself in Najaf in 2012 is regarded as an important development.

Are Ayatollah Sistani’s hands tied? Dirty plots aimed at pacifying and weakening him do not go unnoticed. The allegations of bribery in 2011 are closely related. The allegations that Sistani received 200 million dollars from America in 2003 for his support or at least non-opposition to the invasion are claimed to originate from Iran. It is stated that the complimentary remarks addressed at Khamanei in the book “Khamanei, My Leader (el-Hamanei Qaidi)” allegedly written by Sistani are fake. All the while, the Sadr group continues its harassments.  

Will Iran postpone its moves by showing consent to the replacement of Sistani by an older ayatollah? Or will it launch Shahrudi in the forefront and take a leap in the dark? If Shahrudi enters the fray, the schools of Qum and Najaf will be unified hence signifying a historic moment for the Shi’a denomination. In Iran’s perspective, the conquest of Baghdad is not complete unless the consent of Najaf is attained. Therefore, the issue at hand is very important. Sistani’s power against Iran and its political lackeys originate ironically from his apolitical stance. For millions of Shiites including some Iranians and some scholars from Qum, Wilayat al Faqih is seen as a troubled political institution harmful to Islam and Shi’a.

The extent of Iran’s intervention depends on the value it attaches to the power in Najaf. It will no doubt be as easy as Lebanon. Will weapons, soldiers and money match the power of Najaf’s thousand years of legacy and tradition? In other words, will Iran dare what Saddam wanted but could not? It will be clearer in the days ahead which Turkey needs to follow closely. Najaf will preserve its political and diplomatic importance when regional politics is reshuffled.