Expectations after the Sochi Deal

Turkey and Russia have a great responsibility for the implementation of the Sochi Consensus reached between Russia and Turkey in Idlib. From Turkish perspective,  the implementation of the consensus poses some risks and challenges On the other hand, Turkey possesses many tools in implementing the Sochi agreement. The biggest challenges for Turkey to realize the Consensus will be propaganda war, the opening of the M-4 and M-5 highways to trade, and the construction of the demilitarized zone.

Propaganda War
The majority of the people in Idlib, civilian and military opposition appreciates Turkey's Syria policy, and especially its efforts to prevent a possible assault on Idlib. The steps Turkey took between Tehran and the Sochi summits brought about a positive atmosphere in the region towards itself. The fact that Turkish flags are used in public demonstrations held every Friday is an important indicator in this respect.

While the consensus reached in Sochi was gladly welcomed in Idlib at first, some rumors and propaganda efforts adversely affected the views towards Turkey and the consensus. Firstly, the rumor that all the Syrian opposition would hand over the weapons in accordance with the Sochi consensus was influential in Idlib though it had no realistic basis. Indeed, the Turkey-backed National Front for Liberation felt obliged to declare in a statement that they would not surrender their weapons. Following the declaration of many similar statements, the rumor of delivering weapons in Idlib was over.

As to the next stage, the rumors that Russia would patrol the areas to be controlled by the Syrian opposition, provide security on the M-4 and M-5 highways, and that the Assad regime would provide control over the institutions in Idlib, led to a new atmosphere of panic. Upon these rumors, negotiations were held between the Turkish authorities and the Syrian opposition, and it was announced to the public that these were not the case.

The final assertion in the context of the Sochi consensus is that the demilitarized zone will be established only in the areas controlled by the opposition. The fact that the boundaries of the demilitarized zone are negotiated between the technical delegations and that they have not been agreed on have prompted this rumor to continue.

It would be a great mistake for Turkey to underestimate the rumors regarding the Sochi consensus. In case of a change of dynamics in the region against Turkey, the steps to be taken by Turkey could lead to a number of risks and threats in the region. Even if the sources of these rumors are unclear, it should not be ignored that they have been intentionally put forward in line with an objective. In this regard, it is possible that the articles of the Sochi Consensus were not delivered to the Syrian opposition and the people of Idlib in a transparent manner.

Opening of M-4 and M-5 highways to trade
Maybe the most challenging article for Turkey to have it implemented within the context of the Sochi agreement is the opening of the M-4 and M-5 highways (Damascus-Aleppo and Latakia-Aleppo lines) to free trade. The M-4 and M-5 highways are of great importance for the Syrian economy.

There are checkpoints controlled by the Syrian opposition and some radical organizations such as Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) on the M-4 and M-5 highways passing through the Idlib region. The passage fees from the checkpoints constitute an important source of income for armed groups. There have been occasional conflicts among the armed groups in Idlib to seize this source of income. In particular, the checkpoints on the borderline where the M-4 and M-5 highways intersect with the regime-controlled territories operate as a ‘border crossing’ within the country. There are ‘border crossings’ in Abu Zuhur, Morek, Kafr Hamra, Rashidin and the Kurdish mountain.

Turkey is expected to remove the checkpoints on the M-4 and M-5 highways and the confiscation and passage fees that are taken at the border crossings in the context of the Sochi consensus. This means that the armed groups in the region would lose an important source of income. This situation can result in crucial problems unless Turkey provides the armed groups in the region with an alternative source of income. If the Syrian opposition is provided with a Turkey-based financial income, Turkey will also expand its sphere of influence in the region.

Another problem is the security problem likely to be experienced following the opening of the M-4 and M-5 highways to traffic. With the increase of the interaction between the regime and the opposition regions, it will be easier for  regime forces, tPKK and DAESH to penetrate into Idlib. In particular, the PKK is likely to attempt to infiltrate Afrin through Idlib. To prevent this, Turkey will need to take security measures.

On the other hand, the terrorist cell structures in the Idlib region may have attacks against those who travel through the M-4 and M-5 highways. Turkey will assume the responsibility for the security of the highways in accordance with the Sochi agreement.

Creation of the Demilitarized Zone
There exist three main obstacles in front of the creation of the demilitarized zone in Idlib in the context of the Sochi consensus. The first obstacle is the boundaries of the demilitarized zone. If the demilitarized zone is established only in the regions controlled by the Syrian opposition as mentioned above, it will be so difficult for Turkey to convince the actors in the region.

Another problem is the withdrawal of heavy weapons from the demilitarized zone. The main lines of defense of the Syrian opposition, even almost all of them, are in the border zone. The defensive lines of the military opposition may collapse rapidly in the event of a sudden regime attack following the withdrawal of heavy weapons. In order to avoid such as a concern, the Turkish Armed Forces must carry out an intensive military deployment to the demilitarized area. The Turkish military should fill the gap that will show up after the Syrian opposition withdraws its heavy weapons.

In the context of the creation of the demilitarized zone, the biggest challenge in front of Turkey are radical groups. Even though the vast majority of frontline is controlled by the Turkey-backed Syrian opposition, the front linein Southern Aleppo, Latakia and the front fromMorek to Surman are controlled by groups that are defined as a terrorist organization such as HTS. According to the Sochi consensus, the entire demilitarized zone should be liberated of such radical groups.

Despite the fact that the military operation against radical groups is likely to be carried out in the future, as a first step, Turkey can provide the withdrawal of radical groups from the demilitarized zone towards the center of Idlib in different ways. With strong public support and its allies in the region, Turkey has the potentiality to persuade radical groups in the region to withdraw from the front line. As a matter of fact, the HTS, striving to strike a balance between its own ideology and ita popular  support, does hesitate to be the scapegoat in case of the collapse of the Sochi Consensus and the launch of a large-scale military operation by the regime forces towards Idlib.

As to the other radical groups in the region, they generally consist of foreign fighters. The foreign fighters who claim to be present in Idlib to protect Syrians are also afraid of the Syrian public reaction if they undermine the Sochi consensus that is to protect Idlib from a possible attack. Foreign fighters who do not have the opportunity to return to their countries and live with their families in Idlib, do not want to lose their last living areas by antagonizing the Syrian people in Idlib.

On the other hand, the Al-Qaeda affiliated Hurras ad-Din and Ansar ad-Din consisting of Chechens announced that they would not comply with the Sochi consensus and that they rejected it. Turkey may have to resort to using of force against such groups that are likely to try to take advantage of the withdrawal of heavy weapons by the Syrian opposition during the creation of the demilitarized zone. Indeed, Turkish troops will have to fight against these groups that could carry out terrorist attacks during the patrol duty of the Turkish troops in the demilitarized areas. In order to accomplish this, Turkey can act in coordination with the National Front for Liberation, which has close relations with Turkey.

Conclusion
Even though the Sochi agreement was welcomed as a successful outcome of the Turkish diplomacy by the US, Germany, France, Britain, the UN and the people of Idlib, there are serious challenges facing Turkey regarding the implementation of the Sochi agreement. Turkey should follow a transparent policy on the implementation of the Sochi Consensus in order to overcome these challenges. Turkey may have to provide the Syrian opposition with opportunities that would let them have new sources of income. Thus, Turkey will be more active in the region and have a stronger position vis a vis the Turkey-backed radical groups. Turkey should, on the one hand, keep the military option against the radical groups on the agenda and, on the other, take the necessary measures to prevent them from taking counter steps against the consensus.