The Russia-Ukraine Crisis: Preliminary Reflections on Turkey’s Policy

The unfolding crisis sparked by Russia’s annexation of Crimea has raised many questions. Participants at the GMF’s ninth Trilateral Strategy Group, held in Washington on May 18-20, debated some of them: What drives the behavior of Russian elites? Can the West contain the resurgent Russia? Have we just entered a new Cold War or returned to the 19th century geopolitics? How can the Europeans bolster their energy security in the wake of this crisis? The answers were preliminary at best, and the discussions gave way to new questions. Turkey often figured in those discussions, but its policy needs to be understood properly.
 
As viewed from Ankara, the current crisis is essentially one that is unfolding at the international level, reminding one of a critical argument often stated by Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu: the structure of the post-Cold War international order has yet to be defined. Notwithstanding its aspirations for regional leadership and quest for proactive foreign policy, Turkey realizes that the Russia-Ukraine crisis has to be dealt with through the involvement of the major powers, and it is acting accordingly.
 
Moreover, the outbreak of the crisis also has been attributed largely to the international community’s failure to bring resolution to the conflict in Syria. This inability and the failure to punish the regime’s violation of various international norms is believed to have given Russia the wrong signals that led to its moves toward Ukraine. As such, the crisis has added further credence to Turkey’s recent criticism of the UN collective security system on the basis of its inadequate conflict resolution mechanisms to address regional crises.
 
To the extent that it affects Turkey’s immediate interests, in other words, the Ukraine crisis stems largely from a leadership void and the incomplete post-Soviet transformation, which left many potential crisis spots in the region. For its part, Turkey has for long been sensitive to those “frozen conflicts,” which have remained an element of instability in its neighborhood to the north, around the Black Sea and the Caucasus. Turkey has warned against the “domino effects” of the Crimean crisis, reflecting its deep fears that the crisis might inflame other frozen conflicts in the region, most notably in Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia, or lead to the emergence of new potential flash points. Just as was the case in the 2008 Russian-Georgian war, consequently, Turkey has had many reasons to avoid a vocal criticism of Russia, formulate its policy within the broader transatlantic framework, and, where necessary, convey its concerns to Russia through bilateral mechanisms.
 
Constraints on Turkey
As much as it is troubled by the steps undertaken by a resurgent Russia, Turkey has walked and will continue to walk a very fine line. Most remarkably, though objecting to the Russian annexation of Crimea, Turkey has stopped short of actions that may lead to severing of the political ties, and it is realistic to expect the same approach to continue to prevail.
 
First, Turkey has refrained from challenging Russia directly because it is inclined to be cautious and risk-averse in volatile situations; this is indeed an essential feature of Turkey’s security culture. In the current crisis, this caution translates into Ankara’s rational calculation and recognition of limits to its power. The government realizes that in a crisis involving Russia as the chief culprit, as a regional actor, Turkey alone will have limited instruments at its disposal; the crisis first and foremost will be within the purview of international actors, most notably the United States and the EU. The trajectory of the crisis so far has laid it bare that the issue of Ukraine has been mismanaged for a long time, and the United States will find it difficult to mobilize a coalition against Russia or issue credible commitments to Ukraine and other actors feeling threatened by Russia. Nor have the Europeans, whose miscalculations were seen as one of the instigating factors of the current crisis, developed a credible response to Moscow. Overall, the sanctions fielded by the United States and EU have been viewed as ineffective to address the root causes of the current crisis. In this environment, Ankara will be further inclined to maintain caution, lest it is drawn into an unwarranted bilateral confrontation.
 
Second, Russia is Turkey’s major supplier of natural gas and oil, which will be difficult to replace in the short term. Overall, Russia has acted as a reliable partner, and even at times of heightened political tensions has not threatened openly to use energy as a weapon. Nonetheless, given its current level of dependence, which is higher than that of many European countries, Ankara cannot invite a bilateral crisis with Moscow that may eventually harm its energy security. As it did in the previous instances of divergence, even in the case of their disagreements over Syria, Turkey will continue to separate this crisis from the broader strategic relations with Russia.
 
Third, beyond energy, however, Turkey sees itself in a complex interdependent relationship with Russia that has been forged around multiple issues. The bilateral trade volume, mutual investments, tourism, partnership in energy, and the need for cooperation on various issues in the shared neighborhoods ranging from the Balkans to Central Asia inextricably tie them together. Ankara again has every reason to act with caution when it comes to joining sanctions against the country that is its number two trading partner and whose cooperation is essential in neighborhood issues. Turkey, in particular, is careful not to undermine the relative stability in the Black Sea formed around the Montreux Convention.
 
Fourth, Turkey continues to warn against a return to the Cold War mentality of polarization and the drawing of new lines of division. This is understandable, given that in the post-Cold War era, Turkey has worked hard to avoid being stuck between the West and Russia. Given Turkey’s recent search for multi-dimensionality and market diversification strategy, it will further distance itself from a coercive approach that intends to isolate Russia. Turkish leadership has continuously argued that their country is part of Europe and Asia simultaneously and needs to maintain a balanced relationship with both. It was largely for these reasons that they sought both membership in the European Union and closer ties with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which occasionally sparked intense debate among observers. As Davutoğlu emphasized in the initial weeks of the crisis, Turkey still subscribes to the same multi-regional perspective, whereby since it will continue to live with Russia in the shared neighborhoods in Asia, it will work to sustain its economic and political ties. Such thinking is shared by Turkish business interests as well, which continue to express enthusiasm for cooperation with Russia in various projects.
 
Lastly, Turkey has worked diligently to revitalize the Tatar presence in Crimea by assisting their return to the historic homeland. Through the work of Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA) and other channels, Turkey has invested heavily in the Tatars’ well-being and regaining of status on the peninsula. Although Turkey, along with the Tatar leadership, has underscored the territorial integrity of Ukraine, it also realizes that any miscalculations may have unwanted repercussions for the Tatars’ cause, undoing their gains. The protection of the Tatars’ rights and status also motivates Turkey to act with self-restraint and leave the doors open to political dialogue with Russia.
 
Turkey’s Room to Maneuver
This, however, does not suggest that Turkey will simply appease the Russian moves. Indeed, when it has a solid argument, Ankara can go to great lengths to defend it, as was the case with forcing the landing of the Russian airliner carrying military equipment to the Syrian regime. In the current crisis, Turkey has repeatedly underscored that it recognizes Ukraine’s territorial integrity, and perhaps it will maintain its position on Crimea in the realm of international law. At the same time, it has demonstrated willingness to use all its leverage within the limits of the Montreux Convention. For instance, Turkey openly refuted the claims coming from Russian officials when they tried to spread confusing messages about Ankara’s adherence to the convention as regards the presence of non-littoral ships in the Black Sea. As a result of Turkey’s determined reaction, Russian officials stepped back from their charges regarding U.S. warships.
 
Second, Turkey, like other Western countries, will undertake steps to bolster its position in the longer term. The projects intended for the diversification of energy supplies, a process that is already under way, might receive a renewed push from the current crisis. There may now be new urgency to the energy projects in Iraq or Eastern Mediterranean, which may also force a rethinking of the Turkish position on the political disputes underpinning them. To the extent that the European actors could demonstrate some strategic action toward the realization of supply diversification projects, the chances for enhanced Turkish-European strategic partnership will be increased.
 
Third, Turkey will coordinate its policy with that of its transatlantic partners, and will go along with measures initiated by the NATO mechanisms, though they may signify the lowest common denominator. Turkey’s contribution to the OSCE’s mission in Ukraine, where former Turkish diplomat Ertuğrul Apakan is heading the mission, bodes well for its transatlantic approach to the crisis through the utilization of cooperative security instruments. For its part, Russia might also be recognizing that Turkey will adhere to the collective decisions of such transatlantic institutions, and that it cannot challenge Turkey’s actions within those platforms.
 
Beyond that, Ankara will be unlikely to subscribe to the unilateral sanctions imposed by some Western countries. Nor will Turkey raise its concerns about Russian actions in international fora. Rather, it will seek to work out its differences through the bilateral channels of strategic dialogue it has forged meticulously over recent years, and also take care to not undermine them in this process. Davutoğlu’s visit to Moscow on May 27, 2014, as part of the consultations for the High Level Strategic Cooperation Council summit meeting later this year demonstrated once again that Ankara will work to preserve and deepen its strategic cooperation with Moscow, a move that has been reciprocated.
 
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