The Trap of “Naive Realism” in Transboundary Water Politics in the Middle East

In 1995, Ross and Ward analyzed a psychological mindset, the so-called naive realism. They concluded that this type of thinking may have implications for broader social life. What Ross and Ward argued was that “naive realism” could become an impediment to cooperation and dispute resolution (For the entire discussion, see Ross, L., & Ward, A. (1996). Naive realism in everyday life: Implications for social conflict and misunderstanding. In T. Brown, E. S. Reed & E. Turiel (Eds.), Values and knowledge (pp. 103–135). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum).
 
The three "tenets" of naive realism, according to authors, are:
“1That I see entities and events as they are in objective reality, and that my social attitudes, beliefs, preferences, priorities, and the like follow from a relatively dispassionate, unbiased and essentially "unmediated" comprehension of the information or evidence at hand.
2That other rational social perceivers generally will share my reactions, behaviors, and opinions—provided they have had access to the same information that gave rise to my views, and provided that they too have processed that information in a reasonably thoughtful and open-minded fashion.
3That the failure of a given individual or group to share my views arises from one of three possible sources—
            i the individual or group in question may have been exposed to a different sample of information than I was (in which case, provided that the other party is reasonable and open minded, the sharing or pooling of information should lead us to reach an agreement);
            ii the individual or group in question may be lazy, irrational, or otherwise unable or unwilling to proceed in a normative fashion from objective evidence to reasonable conclusions; or
            iii the individual or group in question may be biased (either in interpreting the evidence, or in proceeding from evidence to conclusions) by ideology, self-interest, or some other distorting personal influence.”
 
Following this synopsis, Ross and Ward continues to say that this type of thinking appears to be a real barrier against dispute resolution. Although this set of ideas seem to apply for individuals, we may extend it to state behavior which is generally shaped by personified  and rational decision-making processes.
 
I would argue, here, that the cases of transboundary water politics along the banks of a number of rivers on the planet Earth represent, more’s the pity, an exemplar of a paradigm framed by this naive realism. Diverging views of riparian countries appear to never converge. However, there is point in caution. Before reaching a hasty conclusion that all transboundary rivers are prone to dispute, I should emphasize counter examples first. 
 
There are numerous cases of cooperation in transboundary river basins, albeit in varying degrees of success or progress. Examples include Colorado River, Mekong, Zambezi, Rhine, Danube. It is out of question that these have some features which could be emulated by riparian countries of different river basins. But, the trouble is that nearly all examples of “good” are from richer parts of the word, either financially, or water-wise. When one looks at the context of the Middle-East, s/he can easily notice that none of the river basins in this region did reach a level compatible to those of examples of “good”.  Transboundary river basins in the Middle East demonstrate how a fertile ground for naive realism may look like.
 
A prerequisite for greater cooperation in a river basin is the existence of some degree of mutual trust among riparians countries. A report by Strategic Foresight Group found that  all transboundary river basins in the Middle East fall well behind cooperation models that were mentioned above. The report divides the level of trust (and political willingness among riparians) into four: very high, high, medium, low. Out of four river basins concerned (Yarmouk, Jordan, Euphrates-Tigris, and Orontes), only in Orontes we can see the term “medium”. All remaining have low degrees of trust and political willingness. It should also be noted that since this report was finalized in 2013, the trust and political willingness over Orontes may have declined given the prolonged suspension of the construction of the Friendship Dam.
 
It seems plausible to argue that the naive realism has some role in this lack of trust among riparian countries in the Middle East. However, the naive realism is not the root cause, it is the byproduct of the interplay between a number of factual fundamentals. The prevalence of fault lines (ideological, religious, sectarian) which are exacerbated by power (economic, military) asymmetries, and perhaps more critically by lack of water abundance; makes the transboundary rivers in the Middle East perfect for confrontational theaters. Persistent reshuffling in the region would likely create an even more complex scene which might add up some more spice to the already hot dish.