What’s going on around the North of Syria? Autonomy, Syrian Civil War and Turkey

  Controlling of PYD over some areas and towns where are highly populated by Syrian Kurds on 19 July 2012 brought up Syrian Kurds to the agenda of Turkey. After a short while of that discussions about Syrian Kurds began in Turkey however the discussion which flared up was forgotten after 2 weeks. It does not look like a coincidence that starting to discuss of Syrian Kurds after a year in same days. Although issue of Syrian Kurds brought up to the agenda by redounding of conflicts which were occured at Ceylanpinar’s elbow on Turkey, it is seen that the rapid developments related to Syrian Kurds have emerged in the recent time. These developments which are look like closely associated with each other, should be discussed in 3 main grounds on the base:

1. Civil War Stage in Syria and Effects on Kurds:

Locked of civil war in Syria, causes to break into the opposition block. This move of regime forces that made of progress against opponents by support of Hezbollah and Iran affects in a negative way into inner dynamics of opponents and who are asserted themselves as opponents. In this context,the power struggle between opponents and PYD who having been an implicit or open cease fire since January 2013, has blazed up. The oppponents do not believe that PYD has sided with themselves, moreover they thinks that the regime avails PYD to protect critical places notably oil areas in North or to restrain of auditing them by opponents. Although PYD sometimes shows itself with opposition’s side, not declaring a clear position (choosing the 3rd way in its own way) strengthens this suspicion. When the periods that the opponents made a progress against the regime in Aleppo and Damascus, and focused on different areas of their sources and attention, it is seen that they allowed a cease fire with PYD. In a similar way, PYD, sought a settlement with opponents either to access for materials which may ease the life in areas where it controls over and also to resolve that it is having resource trouble because of issues with IKBY (especially KDP). Thus, the cease fire at the beginning of 2013 has a place in the scope of satisfying the periodical needs of either parties. PYD, hypostatised the forces linked to ÖSO in gateways on frontiers of Turkey because of Turkey’s reaction, ÖSO also allows the transition to areas where they controls over to PYD after takings their share from the trade over Turkey. But it is observed that this relation is having interrupted from the end of May (even some problems in April). The groups linked to ÖSO accused YPG on breaking the cease fire and attacking, and also YPG accused ÖSO on the same reason. In this scope large and small conflicts have been had on the areas such as starting from Afrin to Ras El Ayn, Dirbesiye, Tirbesipi from the date of 25th May 2013. The intermittent conflicts to the end of June turned into the testifying process of either parties. But at the end of June, declaring that YPG will purge the highway of Haseke-Dirbesiye and engaging combats with Tevhid Guard after two weeks around Afrin have threatened about upcoming storm. At the beginning of July the tension increased again in Ras Al Ayn and the expectation about arising a combat between the opponents and armed troops allied to PYD has strengthened. At last the fired sparkla on 16th July turned into an exact conflict in Ras Al Ay and the disctrict has completely seized under the control of PYD.But all the more interesting that while these affairs were having, the clashes between the opponents and the troops allied to Syrian army as last year around Haseke stepped up. After a while increasing of these clashes, Ras Al Ayn has completely maintained under control by PYD. This situation reminds of the affairs which was resulted by controlling over some regions by PYD after the last midyear and the early this year. In brief, the clashes between the opponents and YPG in the northern Syria should not be evaluated separately the clashes in rest of Syria. While the opponents would like to focus on assuming an exact control and to increase their domains in north of the country because of the congestion in other front lines , PYD wants to an expecting success of Esad regime or to create their own control areas in the process of reinforcing of the opponents in their own areas.

2. The power struggle among Kurdish parties in the regions predominated by Kurds continues in full flow in Syria:

  The polarisation among Kurdish parties in Syria increased rapidly almost the same period parallel to the period that the tension increased between the opponents and PYDN. Opposing views are increasing in Kurdish High Council which was created by an agreement under the observation of Iraqi Kurdistan Regional Government last year in Erbil. Moreover, some partisans in the structure as known as Kurdish National Council have changed their sides in last six months and they have engaged with PYD more closely in an open or close way. In a sense, PYD would like to become an only authority politically in Kurdish areas where they controlled over the most part of it in the recent year. It is conspicious that there is a serious apathy between KDP in this frame. Thus Syrian Kurdish party leaders who were attended the meeting in Erbil, are arrested by YPG on their entrance to Syria, also some of them are derailed on the other events on the grounds that they were trained in Northern Iraq. However the most important breaking point is arresting of 74 people who are the members of Syrian KDP after they were crossed from Northern Iraq to Syria on 18th May by YPG. Two days after this event, Semalka Border Gate where providing transtions has been shut off by IKBY. From that date it is seen that the apathy between KDP and PYD has reached at peak. Even the discussion between the senior representatives of the organisation allied with PYD and Mesut Barzani in July in Erbil did not decrease completely the tension. The events on 27th June in Amude addition to the events on May pictures the dimension of the political struggle among Syrian Kurds. A short time before that the event occured that YPG intervented during a manifestation over taking custody of some men in the district by YPG on 27th June and as result of that 7 people died and tens of people wounded. This event has condemned vigourusly by most of Kurdish parties. The struggle among parties has tightened after the event with raids into the offices of other parties in the district. In sum, PYD with its political moves has benefitted from the clash of ideas in parties of KUK and reinforced its political force; parallel to this, it took up a force struggle between KDP and their connection parties. In short, on the hand PYD was having a tension with the opponents of ÖSO, on the other hand they have overexerted to triump in the force struggle among Kurds. Even though the relations between PYD and KDP have interrupted at current situation, PYD has become physically an only important political entityamong Syrian Kurds.

3. It should not be think the events related to Kurds in Syria separately from the process having in Turkey.

There exists an very important article regarding Syrian Kurds in “Political Stance Document” which is specified Kongra Gel 9.General Meeting held in a period that the discussions concerning about resolution process in Turkey has densified. Although this meeting has addressed in Turkey as the resolution process and the focused organizational change in PKK, it is also remarkable on the scope of events in Iraq and Syria. Concerning to Syria, it should be pointed out from these expressions ; “To declare the temporary election administration by developping more of sustained policy to now on the base of becoming the third line in Rojava and to convey it to the level of creating the Kurdish local administration” placed in, there will be an important event among Syrian Kurds. It is possible that important events will be having in areas dominated by Kurds in Syria in a short while such as 19th July Events which was occured after a week by the decision of foundating a Kurdish area in the meeting held last year in Erbil. The situation pointed out here is starting a period which paves the way for elections in the areas under control of PYD and the autonomy may be proclaimed. In a sense this is important as an example to the model offered by PKK in recent years. The acceptance of the justification part of this autonomy in Syria or rest of the Middle East will lead to new discussions. However the events after 1990s in Iraq make think that the possibiliy of this proclamation of autonomy will create new factual conditions in future but now. While the discussions are ongoing about Turkey is on which level of the resolution process, it is important that PKK makes an effort to find a strong base in a new geography. This situation should not be assessed concerning on PKK’s terrorists has deported. In one sense, PKK would like to show that they can develop their effect zone to different areas in Middle East in association with its structures. In a similar way, an other article given in the same “document” is also meaningfull regarding the events in Norhern Iraq. “To implement a struggle which shows our difference from the others and democratical modernity line in Basur in an more active way. To win next elections by democratical forces and to make an effort to hold Kurdish National Conference”. It is understandable that they will take a negative attitude against KDP with these expressions during the parliamentary election on 21th September in Northern Iraq. In this context realizing an idea of foundation a new Kurdish region based on “democratical autonomy” in Syria, may gain discoursive,physical,psychological and political advantages to PKK before and during the conference which is aimed to hold in Erbil.