Can “Hezbollah Idea” be Pushed Beyond the Litani River?

Introduction
In June 2024, Israeli military spokesperson Daniel Hagari described one of Israel’s two primary objectives in the war in Gaza as “eradicating Hamas,” a goal he deemed unattainable. He said that “Hamas is an idea; you cannot destroy an idea“. This strong statement garnered significant public attention at the time and sparked criticism from within the government. In fact, Hagari emphasised that Hamas is not merely a military organisation but one with a deeply rooted ideological foundation and significant societal support. Thus, eliminating Hamas would essentially require targeting a large segment of the population in Gaza. The widespread global criticism of Israel’s disproportionate use of force and the resulting humanitarian crisis can be understood in this context. Hagari emphasised that Hamas is not solely a collection of armed groups but a structure deeply rooted in an ideological foundation with significant societal resonance. As a result, it can be claimed that expecting Hezbollah  to withdraw north of the Litani River is as impractical as the idea of ideologically defeating Hamas in Gaza. While Lebanon’s internal dynamics are more fragmented and influenced by complex interests compared to Gaza, the ideological and social entrenchment of Hezbollah makes it equally challenging to push its presence entirely out of southern Lebanon.

The ceasefire agreement brokered on 27^th of November by the United States and France between Israel and Hezbollah marks a temporary pause in one of the region’s most protracted and complex conflicts. While it halts over a year of intense hostility, the agreement leaves fundamental issues unresolved. Structural instability in Lebanon, Hezbollah’s entrenched influence, and Israel’s uncompromising regional strategies suggest that this truce is not a resolution but a postponement of the inevitable. The question of whether Hezbollah can withdraw north of the Litani River, as required by the agreement, underscores the challenges of enforcing its terms. As a group deeply embedded in Lebanon’s political and social fabric, Hezbollah’s influence extends far beyond its visible military presence. This analysis explores whether the ceasefire, built on the framework of UNSC Resolution 1701, can address these challenges or whether it merely sets the stage for the next escalation.

The Scope of the Ceasefire
As of November, negotiations between Israel and Hezbollah, mediated by the United States and France, resulted in a ceasefire approved by the Israeli cabinet. Effective November 27, 2024, it ended fourteen months of hostilities but left questions about whether it enhances Israel’s security. Rooted in UNSC Resolution 1701, the agreement mandates the disarmament of all armed groups in Lebanon, with only official forces allowed to bear.  The 60-day transition includes Israel’s withdrawal from southern Lebanon and the deployment of 5,000 Lebanese troops south of the Litani River, a number expected to increase. Hezbollah must retreat, and its military infrastructure is to be dismantled. A side letter reportedly acknowledges and supports Israel’s right to respond to ceasefire violations, raising concerns about how such guarantees might escalate future tensions.  UNIFIL’s role will be strengthened, despite Israeli calls for its removal. It will work with the Military Technical Committee for Lebanon (MTC4L) and a reformed Tripartite Mechanism, chaired by the U.S. with France’s involvement, to oversee and support the ceasefire. While this framework addresses Israel’s concerns over UNIFIL’s past effectiveness, questions remain about whether these mechanisms can counter Hezbollah’s entrenched influence. Article 4 reaffirms Israel’s and Lebanon’s self-defence rights, but Hezbollah’s integration within the Lebanese Army complicates enforcement of these terms, highlighting the fragility of the agreement.

The Limited Effectiveness of the Ground Offensive
On October 8, 2023, Hezbollah launched a barrage of missiles, rockets, and drones targeting northern Israel, bringing daily life in the region to a standstill. The impact extended well beyond the 4-5 km buffer zone evacuated by Israel, disrupting communities further inland. Officially, Israel framed its northern campaign as an effort to ensure the safe return of border residents to their homes. However, the operation held broader significance for Israel’s strategic posture. It was not merely about restoring a sense of normalcy along the northern border; it was also a critical test of Israel’s deterrence against Iran-backed actors. At its core, the offensive sought to deliver a decisive blow to Hezbollah’s operational capacity, a goal that carried both security and political importance for Israel.

Israel’s military doctrine, which heavily relies on precise intelligence and airpower, inflicted significant damage on Hezbollah, severely weakening the organization. Reports indicate that Hezbollah suffered substantial losses, including much of its leadership, with figures such as Hassan Nasrallah among those reportedly eliminated. Additionally, Israel’s strikes dealt a serious blow to Hezbollah’s arsenal, further degrading its operational capacity.  Despite these setbacks, Hezbollah, bolstered by Iranian support, moved quickly to replace its strategic leadership and relied on its long-established asymmetric strategies to preserve its core structure. Signs of a potential diplomatic resolution began to emerge by late October, following the launch of Israel’s ground offensive on October 1, 2024.

On October 29, 2024, the Israeli military announced that it had achieved critical objectives in its campaign in Lebanon and indicated that the government could now explore diplomatic solutions. A key detail in the statement was the significant destruction of Hezbollah’s military infrastructure along the Lebanon-Israel border. However, at that point, the Israeli army had barely advanced beyond the 3-5 km axis comprising Lebanese towns and villages near the border, leaving around 95% of Hezbollah’s manpower intact aside from its leadership losses. On the other hand, by the 56th day of the ground offensive, the Israeli army reported reaching the Litani River near Al-Khiam, an advance that was both time-consuming and geographically limited. Moreover, even as late as the hours leading up to the ceasefire agreement, Hezbollah retained the capacity to launch severe rocket attacks not only on border towns but also on areas as far as Haifa and Tel Aviv, causing considerable damage.

Will Hezbollah Truly Withdraw North of the Litani River?
A key aspect of the ceasefire agreement is the dismantling of Hezbollah’s infrastructure and its withdrawal north of the Litani River. However, this provision raises significant concerns about its feasibility, as the practical enforcement of these guarantees remains uncertain. Hezbollah is far from a conventional organisation; it operates as a hybrid entity deeply embedded within the state, enjoying broad social support not only from Shia communities but also from other groups across Lebanon. Moreover, an essential challenge of proxy warfare lies in the blurred lines between political, civilian, and combatant elements, making such conflicts particularly difficult to resolve. This complexity casts doubt on whether the proposed measures can effectively neutralise Hezbollah’s presence south of the river.

The organisation wields significant political, military, and social influence within Lebanon. Politically, Hezbollah has forged alliances across a broad spectrum, including with Christian factions, while its primary support base remains concentrated in the Shia-majority regions of northeastern Bekaa, southern Beirut, and southern Lebanon. Hezbollah enjoys widespread popular support in these areas, leveraging this backing to consolidate its influence. The group’s ideological, social, and economic impact is deeply entrenched in these regions, enabling it to maintain its power despite external pressures. Israeli destruction in border villages is one of the visible consequences of this entrenched presence. Furthermore, Hezbollah has used this local support to reinforce its military infrastructure, including its network of tunnels, which remain critical to its operational capabilities. Therefore, even if some of Hezbollah’s visible elements relocate north of the Litani River, the group will likely maintain its military presence in the south through its strong local support and extensive underground infrastructure. Its hidden capacities, which are just as significant as its overt operations, will continue to pose a challenge, raising serious doubts about the feasibility of eliminating or relocating these elements entirely. Moreover, Hezbollah’s considerable influence within the Lebanese Army, which is expected to take over the region, further complicates the situation. In conclusion, Hezbollah is unlikely to fully withdraw from the areas south of the Litani River and will likely remain active both ideologically and through its grassroots presence in some capacity.

The Prolonging Conflict and the ICC Arrest Warrant
The two-month period outlined in the ceasefire agreement remains highly precarious. At the same time, it became evident that Israel itself was in need of a ceasefire. Although the truce provides significant advantages to Hezbollah, its establishment is deeply linked to the clear limitations of Israel’s advance on the ground. As the Israeli campaign entered its second month, which aimed to facilitate the return of residents near the Blue Line, Hezbollah continued to demonstrate its ability to launch attacks deep into Israel’s central regions. Despite suffering heavy losses, Hezbollah showcased its resilience through the destruction caused near Tel Aviv and Haifa between November 18 and 23, 2024. These events highlight the persistent challenges Israel faced, even as it sought to secure a diplomatic resolution to the conflict.

International pressure emerged as another significant factor impacting Israel’s position. By November 2024, Israel found itself in a challenging international position, as its Western allies, particularly the United States and France, adopted differing approaches to the ongoing conflicts in Gaza and Lebanon, placing significant pressure on the Israeli government to agree to a ceasefire, particularly in Lebanon. The International Criminal Court’s (ICC) arrest warrant for Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and former Defence Minister Yoav Gallant, alongside announcements from several Western countries that they would comply with the warrant, further isolated Israel and reduced its ability to resist these pressures. In this context, France initially displayed ambiguity regarding adherence to the ICC decision but announced on November 26 that it would comply. On November 27, immediately after the ceasefire agreement, France issued a statement suggesting that Netanyahu might retain immunity while in office—a notable development.

The Outcomes of the War: A General Assessment
The first and most notable outcome of the conflict is that Israel inflicted a significant blow to Hezbollah, pushing the organisation into retreat. This aligns with what appears to have been Israel’s primary objective in the north. The operation, in this context, seems to have been accelerated due to the prevailing circumstances, as reflected in Israel’s pre-October 7 threat perceptions and operational doctrines. What set the stage for this campaign were the pager and walkie-talkie attacks carried out on September 17–18, as well as strategic operations driven by high-level intelligence targeting Hezbollah’s leadership. These developments catalysed Israel’s decision to launch the operation sooner than initially planned. Nevertheless, on November 26, 2024—the 57th day of the operation—the Israeli military reached the Litani River for the first time from its eastern flanks, while sporadic clashes with Hezbollah continued in various areas along the border. Hezbollah’s resistance on its first lines of defence was notably limited.

Ultimately, Israel’s decision to agree to a ceasefire will likely provide Hezbollah with the opportunity to recover. However, the aftermath in Lebanon, particularly the damage inflicted, will significantly impact Hezbollah’s relations with its support base and broader social groups.  In conclusion, the blows dealt to Hezbollah by Israel appear insufficient to eliminate the group’s threat entirely. Hezbollah’s continued attacks up to the moment of the ceasefire underline this point. Furthermore, the cessation of attacks on northern Israel seems less a result of the damage inflicted on Hezbollah and more a matter of Israeli military decisions. However, it is important to note that the scale of Hezbollah’s attacks during the conflict was substantially lower than pre-war scenarios, and in some cases, even less extensive than during the 2006 war.

On the Israeli side, the government’s narrative of preparing the ground for the return of northern residents is expected to play a prominent role in domestic politics. However, objections have already begun to emerge, with claims that Hezbollah’s pressure on the region’s residents has not truly subsided. Additionally, the opposition’s calls for ensuring freedom of operation in the north are being addressed through consultations with the United States under the framework of the ceasefire agreement. Although this arrangement appears to meet Israel’s demands to some extent, its open-ended nature leaves room for uncertainty. Given the fragility of the agreement, the Israeli government may resort to limited airstrikes periodically. As the trajectory of the war in Gaza becomes clearer, domestic political pressures in Israel, including calls for accountability over the failures of October 7 and the issue of hostages, are likely to intensify. This situation could push Netanyahu to confront renewed tensions in the north as a political strategy.

The next phase will likely see Hezbollah retreating further underground, focusing on both counterintelligence activities and efforts to replenish and expand its missile and rocket arsenal. For both Iran and Hezbollah, addressing the widespread destruction in Lebanon will represent a significant challenge. Moreover, the prospect of similar devastation in a future conflict serves as a pressure point on Hezbollah’s relationship with the local population, a dynamic that plays a key role in Israel’s strategy of targeting civilian infrastructure. Israel, for its part, is expected to increase its pressure on the Tehran-Beirut logistical network and the proxy forces operating on its periphery. It must be emphasised that even if the fragile ceasefire holds, the coming period will likely serve as a preparation phase for the next inevitable round of conflict between the two sides.