Israel’s Campaign in Lebanon: Intelligence Successes Surpassing Military Achievements

Introduction
Following the October 7^th attack, Israel's ongoing operation in Gaza for over a year has yet to meet its declared goals. In contrast, although no significant advances have been observed in Israel’s ground operation targeting Hezbollah in southern Lebanon since it began on October 1, 2024, reports of a potential diplomatic opening between Israel and Hezbollah have been on the rise as of late October. While the Gaza and Lebanon theaters have distinct conditions, there is a considerable difference in capacity between the two organizations Israel is engaging on these two fronts. In southern Lebanon, where Israel has set more limited objectives, its strategy as of mid-September appears largely based on intelligence operations targeting Hezbollah’s leadership and conducting precision airstrikes supported by strong intelligence. Observing Israel’s ground movements, the limited distance covered over the month suggests a restricted advance. The complex security landscape and the multidimensional threats directly stemming from Iran continue to pose significant challenges for Israel. Regardless of any immediate diplomatic resolutions, Israel’s efforts to sever the Tehran-Beirut connection are likely to intensify in the coming years. This shift appears to be a potential preparatory phase for a comprehensive military operation targeting Iran-backed entities that Israel perceives as threats.

Israel’s Engagement with Hezbollah: Phases and Risks
As Israel’s ground operation in Lebanon nears its first month, the strategy to establish a security zone in the north is becoming increasingly evident. Thus far, Israel’s approach toward southern Lebanon appears to have unfolded in four main phases. The first phase, as of October 8, 2023, has focused on targeting Hezbollah’s leadership cadre and intensifying intelligence operations. During this period, Israel demonstrated caution to avoid an all-out confrontation while aiming at the group’s operational capacity. The second phase, which followed the September 17-18, 2024, pager attacks prepared in the initial phase, extended until Israel’s ground operation commenced on October 1. In this phase, there was a marked escalation in targeted assassinations of Hezbollah’s senior leadership, including Hassan Nasrallah, after October 7. Within Israel, the timing of the second phase has become one of the key points of contention in the war cabinet. Former Chiefs of Staff Benny Gantz and Gadi Eisenkot, who are working together politically within the National Unity Party, proposed a plan prioritizing the urgent return of hostages and suggested that the IDF shift its focus northward. In their resignation statements from the war cabinet, Gantz and Eisenkot alleged that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu had intentionally postponed the Rafah operation, which they had urged to begin as early as February 2024, citing political motivations. In line with this view, representatives from the National Unity Party proposed that Israel could comply with Hamas’s demand for a full IDF withdrawal from Gaza, suggesting that the army could re-enter the area if needed. However, Netanyahu dismissed these recommendations. Additionally, it appears that Netanyahu has not only resisted negotiations for the hostages but has occasionally undermined them, seemingly unresponsive to pressure from Eisenkot, Gantz, and even the IDF leadership itself. As Netanyahu pursues his strategy, another reason cited for delaying the Lebanon operation is the need to wait for the most intense period of fighting in Gaza to pass. The control of the Philadelphi Corridor is thus viewed as a critical juncture in this context.

Israel capitalized on Hezbollah’s disarray in the second phase, intensifying targeted strikes. Within approximately two weeks, a series of high-profile attacks were carried out, including the following:

High-Profile Attacks on Hezbollah Leadership from September 17-18 to October 1

The third phase began on October 1, 2024, with Israel’s ground operation against Hezbollah, which was described as having "more limited objectives compared to the Gaza operation”. However, this stated framework does not appear to be final, as the operation's aims may be revised depending on developments in subsequent stages. It remains uncertain whether Hezbollah can be pushed north of the Litani River, given that the group, despite the losses sustained, still retains the capacity to inflict casualties on the Israeli army. Meanwhile, to compensate for the losses within Hezbollah’s leadership, the Iranian Revolutionary Guards is transferring senior command capacity, and logistical support continues through Syria. Consequently, Israel has carried out strikes in Syrian territory, exerted pressure on Beirut Airport, and intervened with certain aircraft arrivals. Nevertheless, these strikes may be insufficient to disrupt Hezbollah’s logistical routes.

Limited Progress in Lebanon and Prospects for a Diplomatic Solution
On the other hand, the fact that the ground operation, ongoing for nearly a month, remains concentrated on the peripheries is noteworthy, with advances limited to around 3-5 kilometers. Furthermore, Hezbollah has not offered substantial resistance in its initial defensive line along the border axis and has largely retreated towards central positions. Consequently, the Israeli army has yet to confront Hezbollah’s core asymmetric capabilities, as it has not made significant inroads toward the center. Additionally, the organization still possesses the capacity to exert pressure over a broad area extending up to Tel Aviv, specifically targeting regions like Haifa and Galilee with its missile, rocket, and drone arsenal. It seems that this context lends greater significance to reports of a potential “diplomatic solution” emerging in late October. On the other hand, for instance, in Baalbek on October 30, Israel’s intensified strikes appeared to aim at pressuring Hezbollah to accept ceasefire conditions. Alongside these military efforts, Israel is likely aiming to fuel societal discontent towards Hezbollah by inflicting damage on civilian infrastructure, thereby seeking to weaken the organization’s standing not only within Lebanese politics but also among the Shia community. Given Lebanon’s severe economic crisis, the additional strain imposed by war will likely become even more pronounced in the coming period.

The Effects of the Israel-Iran Direct Confrontation
The renewed direct clashes between Israel and Iran in October, following their confrontation in April, have dispelled doubts regarding whether Tehran’s rules of engagement have changed. While maintaining escalation dominance is crucial for Israel, examining the mutual destruction caused by these confrontations suggests that Iran has been the side making more significant strides. One of Iran’s key advantages in developing asymmetric warfare lies in its strategy of building its defense on offensive elements, which exposes vulnerabilities in its adversaries’ attacks. Accordingly, Israel’s successful strikes on Iran are not surprising. Additionally, the level of sensitivity to both military and civilian casualties differs substantially between the two societies. Hence, the mutual attacks on October 1 and October 26 had distinct repercussions in Iran and Israel. During Iran’s sophisticated attack in April, while Western countries provided air defense support to Israel, most drones and cruise missiles were intercepted, though ballistic strikes on Nevatim marked the first indication of weaknesses in Israel’s air defense. This attack was a significant reference point in terms of military balance, signaling both Iran’s ballistic missile capability reaching Israel and its partial success in bypassing Israeli air defenses. Politically, it also marked a critical turning point, as Iran’s direct attack on Israel underscored two major points: first, that Israel and the United States could no longer effectively deter Iran from launching direct attacks on Israel, and second, that the capabilities Iran has developed in the region have emboldened it with newfound confidence.

Israel’s intelligence capabilities provided it with a psychological edge over Iran leading up to October 2024. The assassination of Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran on July 31 was one of Israel’s most high-profile operations in this sphere. By October 1, the second phase of the April conflict had commenced, with Iran launching 180 ballistic missiles against Israel. While only a few missiles struck Nevatim Airbase in April, this second wave effectively saturated Israel’s air defense systems, allowing numerous long-range ballistic missiles to impact targets near the Mossad headquarters in Tel Aviv, as well as Nevatim and Tel Nof airbases. Consequently, images showing breaches in Israel’s air defense shield were disseminated worldwide within hours. A critical point here was the adverse impact on the efficacy and reputation of the Arrow air defense systems, revealing Israel’s vulnerabilities against potential future Iranian attacks. In response, Israel’s countermeasure on October 26 was executed with a notably more cautious calculation. Whereas Israel had retaliated within five days following Iran’s April 13–14 attack—a response to Israel’s strike on the Iranian consulate in Damascus—the counterattack to the October 1 assault was delayed by nearly a month. This time, Israel targeted key military infrastructure, including missile defense systems, air defenses, and missile production facilities in Tehran and Ilam, with a focus on missile defense systems. The operation was reportedly conducted with advanced systems, including F-35 fighter jets, and aimed with precision at high-value targets. These developments have reaffirmed Israel’s qualitative military superiority. However, Israel’s capacity in this regard was well-known to all parties even before October 7, and actions such as strikes deep into Iran’s territory were predictable outcomes within the context of the ongoing tension. On the other hand, Iran’s October 1 attack, particularly its ability to effectively bypass Israel’s air defense systems, presents a new reality. A more nuanced assessment of these events could focus on “Iran’s actual capabilities versus its perceived capabilities” or on the “narrowing gap between reality and perception in the balance of power”.

Conclusion
The conflict that began on October 7, 2023, and expanded to include Lebanese Hezbollah, revealing its regional dimension, has highlighted the fragility of the region’s conflict avoidance framework and the strategic vulnerabilities of the involved parties—an aspect not widely recognized prior to October 7. In terms of Israel’s national security, the power dynamics before October 7 indicate that the capacity of Iran-backed non-state actors, particularly Hezbollah, had grown beyond what Tel Aviv could tolerate. Yet, the prevailing conditions at the time had reinforced the view that a comprehensive Israeli operation against these increasingly entrenched actors in the Middle East was not feasible. Statements from Israeli security officials and long-term military preparations suggested that while such an initiative would eventually become necessary, it would not be feasible until conditions matured. However, the October 7 attack and subsequent developments necessitated an accelerated timeline for such actions. Consequently, Israel’s engagement with Hezbollah can be seen as a preemptive move undertaken before optimal conditions had fully developed. Indeed, as of October 28, with Israel’s forces still advancing around 5 kilometers along the Lebanese border, statements indicating “opening space for a ceasefire” further underscore this reality. Israel’s successes have been driven more by sophisticated intelligence operations and the resulting air campaigns than by ground battles. The targeting of Hezbollah’s senior leadership has exerted significant pressure on the organization. Through these capabilities, Israel has notably weakened Hezbollah’s operational capacity in Lebanon. As the first month of the ground campaign concludes, it can be observed that Israel’s primary achievements stem from its intelligence superiority, while its ground forces have made limited advances. However, if a diplomatic solution does emerge, available data suggest it will be insufficient to resolve regional tensions. The post-conflict period is likely to witness follow-up strikes along the Tehran-Beirut axis, indicating the persistence of underlying hostilities in the region.