Gulf countries and the repercussions of Haniya's assassination

The assassination of Ismail Haniyeh, the head of the political bureau of Hamas, in Tehran on July 31st, has elevated the ongoing conflict in the region due to the Israeli war on Gaza to new levels. It has cast deep gloom on the security and political scene, regionally and internationally.

Iran accused Israel of orchestrating the assassination of Haniyeh. Israel officially neither confirmed nor denied this, but it informed the US officials that it was behind the assassination of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran, immediately after Iran announced his death, the Washington Post reported on the 7^th of August. All the narratives that leaked about the assassination scenario indicate that Israel was behind it. Iranian leaders, starting with Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, vowed to launch a wide-scale attack against Israel in response to Haniyeh's assassination.

The assassination of Haniya proved that Israel does not want peace; it is trying in every way to hinder the cessation of the war in Gaza.

Like other Islamic and Arab countries, most Gulf countries condemned this assassination, though the intensity and content of their condemnations varied from one country to another. This aligns with the differing stances of Gulf countries regarding the war in Gaza. Some, like Qatar, have become one of the major actors in the ceasefire negotiations between the warring parties, while others, like Saudi Arabia, have contributed to regional and international efforts to find political solutions to the situation. In general, most Gulf countries have participated in humanitarian efforts, like the UAE, to alleviate the suffering of the people of Gaza facing Israeli oppression.

Since the outbreak of the war in Gaza, Gulf states have been striving to balance their positions, between rejecting the brutal crimes committed by Israel against the Palestinian people and the reservations of Gulf states (except Qatar) about the relations between Hamas and Iran, as well as considerations of Gulf-US relations.

It is expected that the Gulf states' reservations about Hamas will increase after Yahya Sinwar was chosen to succeed Haniya. It could be argued that the Gulf states would have preferred Khaled Mashal because they considered him as close to Arab countries, whereas they saw Sinwar as close to Iran. However, logically closing doors to Hamas will not make it abandon its relations with Iran; on the contrary, it will strengthen its commitment to those relations.

After the assassination of Haniya, most countries in the region have been worried about losing control over the rules of engagement among the parties involved in the Gaza war, and the potential slide into a full-scale regional war that could affect everyone, both those directly involved in the Gaza war and those trying as much as possible to shield their countries from the fallout of that war.

There are now serious international and regional efforts to contain this conflict. However, if these efforts do not succeed, the trajectories of the Gaza war in the post-assassination of Haniya phase are likely to have severe consequences for the region.

As of the time of writing this article, the whole world is anticipating an imminent large-scale attack by Iran against Israel. At the same time, some believe that Iran will not carry out such an attack or that it will launch a limited (symbolic) attack that does not cause significant casualties among Israelis. Each opinion has its logical justifications.

Gulf countries are not immune to these consequences. On one hand, they have strategic security and political partnerships with the US, the international actor that remains the most effective and influential in regional security architecture and the most supportive of Israel. On the other hand, Gulf countries are periodically threatened by Iranian proxies in the region and, at times, directly by Iran. Despite the current condition of Gulf-Iranian relations appearing normalised, the reality is more complex.

Repercussions of an Iranian response
Since the assassination of Haniya, Iranian leaders have shown great determination in asserting the inevitability of their response to Israel with a large-scale attack. This incident has significantly damaged Iran's reputation and shattered its security prestige in the region, as it failed to protect a high-profile guest like Haniya.

Hassan Nasrallah, the leader of Hezbollah, somewhat clarified the contours of the Iranian response in his speech on August 6. He stated that "Iran will respond to the assassination of Haniya, Hezbollah will respond to the assassination of Fouad Shukr (one of Hezbollah's military leaders, killed by an Israeli airstrike in the southern suburbs of Beirut on July 30), and Ansar Allah in Yemen (the Houthis) will respond to the bombing of the Hodeidah port (which Israel targeted  in an airstrike on July 20)." Nasrallah mentioned that the response could either be simultaneous or occur at different times.

This means that we may witness a "composite" and "sequential" attack from Iran and its regional allies against Israel. This would involve waves of missiles and UAVs crossing the region's skies towards Israel, originating from Iran, Lebanon, Yemen, and possibly even from Syria and Iraq.

The Israeli response to the anticipated Iranian retaliation will not depend on the scale of the attack it faces but on Israeli losses due to that attack. If it is significant and impactful, it is expected that Israel will not hesitate to respond more violently to the Iranian retaliation, and there will probably be no one able to stop the possible Israeli recklessness. At that point, it will be difficult to prevent the outbreak of a wide regional war. In his televised address on August 4, Netanyahu said: "We will respond to the strike with two strikes, and our reach extends to Yemen, Lebanon, and any other place."

After the assassination of Haniya, some social media accounts linked to Iraqi militias supported by Iran issued threats against Kuwait, accusing it of hosting U.S. bases from which attacks against Iran and its allies are launched. Similarly, after the Israeli strike on the Hodeidah port, some social media accounts linked to the Houthis accused Saudi Arabia of opening its airspace to Israeli warplanes. Saudi Arabia strongly denied these allegations. Before the Iranian attack on Israel on April 13, Iranian Defence Minister Mohammad Reza Qaraei Ashtiani warned that "any country that opens its airspace to Israel to strike Iran will receive a decisive response from us." This was a clear warning to the Gulf countries.

About this issue, On April 12, the British website Middle East Eye published a report stating that: “Gulf monarchies are urging the US not to use American military bases on their territories to strike in response to any potential Iranian attack on Israel” and “The US's Gulf allies are working overtime to shut down avenues that could link them to a US reprisal against Tehran or its proxies from bases inside their kingdoms, according to a senior US official who spoke with MEE on condition of anonymity.”After the assassination of Haniya, statements were issued at different times by Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Qatar, announcing that these countries would not allow their airspace or territory to be used by any party involved in the ongoing conflict in the region. These positions overall illustrate the extent of the pressures and threats Gulf countries will face if Iran and its allies decide to launch a massive attack against Israel in response to the assassination of Haniya.

Repercussions of Iranian non-response
There is another possible scenario for the developments of this crisis, in which Iran might decide not to respond to the assassination of Haniyeh or to carry out a symbolic response that does not inflict significant losses on Israel, similar to what happened on April 13. Three factors make this scenario possible: First, there are now widespread international appeals from both Iran's friends and its adversaries, urging Iran not to escalate and drag the region into an open war with unpredictable outcomes. Iran might see that responding to these appeals could contribute to improving its regional and international relations.

A few days after the assassination of Haniyeh, Sergei Shoigu, the Secretary of the Russian Security Council, visited Tehran and held talks with Iranian officials. Some press leaks mentioned that Shoigu conveyed a message from Putin to Khamenei, urging him to ensure that Iran's response to Haniyeh's assassination is limited and does not lead to a regional war.

The second factor for the scenario of Iran not responding is the arrival of General Michael Kurilla, the Commander of the US Central Command, to the Middle East after the assassination of Haniyeh, as well as the arrival of more US naval forces to the region. US press reports that Kurilla came to the region with a specific mission, which was to form an international and regional coalition to counter the anticipated Iranian attack on Israel, on a larger scale than what happened on April 13, when several countries contributed to intercepting the Iranian missiles and UAVs heading towards Israel. This American show of force might lead Iran to carefully calculate its military actions according to (cost, losses, and outcomes), and decide not to respond or to respond symbolically.

The third factor is the spread of unconfirmed press reports that the US is now offering Iran (through third parties) incentives and promises to ease pressures and sanctions in exchange for not launching a wide and deadly attack against Israel. Iran might decide to take advantage of this opportunity, as it is well aware that the US is willing to do anything to protect Israel.

Although the scenario of not responding or carrying out a symbolic response would weaken Iran's credibility and popularity in the region, from the perspective of the (supposed) incentives and benefits that Iran would gain, it would lead to enhancing the role and status of Iran and its proxies in the region and advancing its nuclear and missile programs. This means that the Gulf countries would have to deal with greater threats and risks from Iran and its proxies than those currently existing.

In the same context, Gulf-Russian relations have significantly improved after the Russian-Ukrainian war, as well as Gulf-Chinese relations. Both Putin and Xi Jinping, in the last gatherings of GCC-Russia and GCC-China, assured GCC’s positions towards Iran are to be supported internationally, such as the islands crisis between UAE-Iran. This might provide reassurance to the Gulf countries, as they could benefit from the Russian and Chinese influence over Iran to alleviate Gulf concerns about Iran and its proxies.

What if Israel carried out a preemptive strike?
One of the most important elements of winning a war is "surprise." Another possible scenario is that if Israel is certain that a wide-scale Iranian attack is inevitable, Israel might take the initiative to launch a preemptive strike to thwart the Iranian response (as it did in the Arab-Israeli war in June 1967). The Israeli preemptive strike would certainly be strong and impactful to ensure that Iran would not be able to retaliate.

What makes this scenario more likely is the increasing aggressiveness of Israel's policies and its clear desire to ignite an open war in the region, coupled with the unlimited support it receives from the US.

In that respect, concerns for an all-out war in the region are also growing. In a statement by the Jordanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs on August 6, Jordanian Foreign Minister Ayman Safadi warned that "Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu wants to drag the region towards comprehensive escalation on multiple fronts, driven by blatant vengefulness and extreme ideology." Safadi explained that "without effective international action to curb this aggression, the Israeli Prime Minister will impose more wars and conflicts on the entire region."

This scenario would open Pandora's box in the region, as Iran would then face an existential challenge. The regional security environment would then be expected to present challenges, and there would be a possibility that some critical infrastructures in the region may be at increased risk, posing grave challenges to the Gulf states as well.

In conclusion, we can say that the Gulf states' concerns about the repercussions of Haniyeh's assassination arise from a lack of trust in the US' commitment to protecting its allies in the region (excluding Israel) and the fear of sliding into a comprehensive regional war that could devastate the area, during which Iran and its proxies might escalate their threats to the security, stability, and economy of the Gulf countries.