Iran's Reform Movement during Rouhani’s Presidency: Assessing the Impact of Nuclear Talks and Forthcoming Parliamentary Elections

Inside Iran, politics await the outcome of nuclear talks. Without doubt, political crises in Iran's international affairs, be they're resolved or not, directly bear upon the power struggles in domestic politics. In this sense, the prospect of a nuclear deal, lifting up of crippling sanctions and normalization of Iran’s relations with the world will not solely mark watershed developments for foreign policy. These prospects may shift the political tide in favor of moderates in Iranian politics. This article will explore the state of reform movement in Iran during Hassan Rouhani's administration and assess the opportunities and challenges of a possible nuclear deal on Iran's politics of reform. It will also analyze recent developments in Iranian politics and reform movement with the approaching parliamentary elections in 2016. By doing so, the paper hopes to shed light on this rather neglected dimension of Iranian politics and discuss it in the context of latest international and domestic developments.

The Prospects of a Re-Birth in Iran's Reform Movement
Iran's reform movement burgeoned in the 1990s and reached its zenith with Mohammad Khatami's election to presidency in 1997. The reformists then gained a number of successive victories in 2000 with the parliamentary elections and in 2001 with Khatami's re-election to the presidential office for a second term. However, the conservative backlash followed in 2003 with local councils taken over by the conservatives and many prominent reformists vetted from running in 2004 parliamentary elections. Mahmood Ahmadinejad's victory in 2005 sealed the loss of reformist control over elected bodies of the Islamic Republic and led to further consolidation of conservative and neo-conservative control over the political system.

2009 has witnessed the largest mass demonstrations in Iran since the inception of the Islamic Republic. The strong doubt over fraud and irregularities in the tenth presidential elections culminated in street protests which lasted for months. The brutal suppression of the protests by security forces and mismanagement of the political crisis, as Ansari aptly puts, revealed the deepening fault lines in state-society relations. The crisis also put the elites of the Islamic Republic at war with one another. The tumultuous days of 2009 had several important implications for the reform movement inside Iran, one of which was the ban imposed on the Iran Islamic Participation Front (Jebhe-ye Mosharekat-e Iran-e Islami), the major reformist party in 2010. At the time many prominent reformists ended up in jails, while the reform seeking constituency either grew apathetic to politics or fled the country.

Hassan Rouhani's victory in 2013 raised hopes and expectations for normalization of politics and an end to the political isolation of the reformists. Besides taking advantage of shattered votes of separately running conservative and neo-conservative candidates, Rouhani's electoral success deeply owed a lot to support from the reformists. In the elections, former President Khatami played a substantial role by persuading the reformist candidate Mohammad Reza Aref to leave the race and back Rouhani, which helped consolidate votes for Rouhani's campaign on prudence and hope.

The reformists expect the Rouhani government to institute democracy and the rule of law in the country and bring freedom to the leaders of the Green Movement, Hossein Mousavi, his wife Zahra Rahnavard and Mehdi Kerroubi, who have been kept under house arrest since February 2011. Indeed, release of political prisoners, particularly the leaders of the Green Movement has been a persistent demand voiced ever since the first press conference of President Rouhani and intrinsic part of the political slogans. In this regard, Rouhani's pledge to release political prisoners and leaders of the opposition is as important as his promise for normalization of Iran's international affairs. Yet, given regime's concerns, any move for fulfilling domestic reforms and release of political prisoners seem more baffling than taking moves in nuclear talks.

President Rouhani from the outset had to walk a tightrope between his reformist supporters blaming him for acting rather timidly and his hardliner critics accusing and attacking him for serving the "seditionists" (fitnageran). In fact, Hassan Rouhani lacks the vital room for maneuver he could find in nuclear talks, in pursuit of his domestic agenda.  A brief overview of his political record since the 2013 election demonstrates that the bulk of the energy and time of the new administration was directed to nuclear diplomacy because of difficulties in domestic politics, international context and mounting economic problems. Politics in its current form and content, hence is arguably aloof from fulfilling reformist expectations. Still, the Geneva Interim Agreement in 2013, which was followed by the Lousanne Nuclear Framework Agreement in April 2015 created enormous enthusiasm among the Iranians, as it brought the hope of ending sanctions, economic and social deprivation, isolation and restoring the dignity of the country and "value of Iranian passports." Therefore, any success in nuclear talks will affirm Rouhani's determination to keep his promises and boost his domestic struggles.

Latest developments heightened debate as to the implications of a possible nuclear deal on reformist politics in Iran. Back in April 2015, the slogans of the crowds pouring out the streets to celebrate the nuclear framework agreement echoed "the next agreement will be on civil and democratic rights". Likewise some analysts expect that diplomatic resolution of the nuclear crisis and relaxation of political and economic pressure on Iran is likely to create greater political space for President Rouhani to embark on his pending reform agenda. Yet, some observers vehemently oppose the idea that the government has such an agenda on human rights and political freedoms. Within the optimists, some underline the significance of the time factor and call for academics and opinion leaders to exert greater agency and put further pressure on the government to pursue its reform agenda. Among them, Sadegh Zibakalam, a professor from Tehran University foresees greater scope of action in political and cultural space, once a nuclear deal is reached.  

As to the future of the reform movement, hope and despair coexist in Iran.  The persistent plight of political prisoners, increase in the number of executions, reports on human rights violations in prisons and harsh sentences against artists and political activists by the judiciary deepen concerns. However, the fear that despair may weaken chances of reformists' return to politics makes them cling to a guarded optimism for rejuvenation. At this point, parliamentary elections in February 2016 and the prospect of reformist seats in the parliament matter remarkably for balancing out conservative factions. Therefore, reading Iranian politics at this stage requires an eye on the domestic developments shaped by forthcoming Majlis elections as much as a careful scrutiny of nuclear talks.

New Reformist Parties, New Hopes? 
One of the most salient developments in Iran's politics of reform is the formation of two new reformist parties; Nida (The Voice of Iranians) andEttehad Mellat Iran (Iran National Unity Party). The reactions reflect a mixture of hope and suspicion. As Bozorgmehr argues, at the heart of the doubts lies the anxiety that the regime will instrumentalize these parties in order to control politics, particularly re-integration of reformists to the political system. Still, this move for rather limited space for reformists can be conceived as the regime's recognition that it can't keep the reformists out of politics forever, even though the limits of such a reintegration will be set by the regime itself. The fact that most members of the Ettehad Mellat Iran are also former members of the Participation Front resulted in fierce criticism from the hardliners that the party is linked to the 'seditionists'. On the other hand, the fact that the Nida Party is led by the veteran diplomat and Iran's former ambassador to Paris, Sadegh Kharazzi, who has family ties to the Supreme Leader (his sister is married to Ayatollah Khamenei's son) and declared allegiance to Ayatollah Khamenei stirs concerns among the reformists about the party's close links to the establishment. Nevertheless, compared to the political atmosphere in the aftermath of the 2009 elections, recent developments bring sign of hope and may be conceived as the regime's efforts to resolve awaiting disputes in domestic politics.

Whether or not the flourishing hopes will yield concrete political results depends on the success of the reformists in the 2016 parliamentary elections. In this regard, the position of President Rouhani and his cooperation with the reformists is highly substantial. The mounting criticism on the Rouhani government indeed comes at a critical juncture in which both the nuclear agreement and pre-election alliances and bargaining are taking shape. Lately, Rouhani also seems to have stepped up his harsh criticism against the conservatives and struggles to prevent increasing intervention into the cultural space. 

Moreover, while the regime allows for limited scope of action for reformist parties, it also attempts to stifle Mohammad Khatami, who stands as the symbol of reform in Iran and the only free leader of the Green Movement. On February 2015, the Spokesman of the Judiciary Mohsen Ejei announced a ban on Khatami's image or statements on TV or newspapers, which added up to his previous ban on travelling abroad. As reformist newspapers Shargh, Etemad, Qanun, Hambastegi face restraint due to the media ban, the growing reaction from social media users against the ban confirmed Khatami's popularity. Another symbolic development with political significance for the reformists has been Saeed Hajjarian's visit to Tehran University after 10 years and meeting with the students. Hajjarian was one of the most prominent ideologues of the reform movement. As the parliamentary elections draw closer, the position of the university youth, a significant part of reformist politics also matters.

New 'Crossroads' for Domestic and International Politics of Iran 
Crossroads has always been a convenient metaphor to depict Iran's post-revolutionary politics. It's even more so given the approaching deadline for nuclear talks and coming parliamentary elections. Both of them will shape the process of normalization and resolution of Iran's structural problems. Since 2013, it has been mainly the nuclear negotiations that occupied the center stage in domestic politics. However, recently debates abound as to the prospects of a reformist comeback and its implications for domestic power configuration. In this context, the likely growth of the reformists' power, the political and institutional reactions of the conservatives to reformists and how this probable new episode of confrontation will be perceived by the reformist constituency should be watched carefully. Apparently, the post-'Arab Spring' context marked by region-wide chaos and destruction will motivate Iranians to resolve political problems within the existing political system. The direction of change will also be determined by the interplay of reformists, who now possess the essential lessons on the rise and fall of their power and seem to be devising new strategies, and the Principle-ists (Usulgerayan) in search of rebuilding their place in politics. However, the fate of normalization in domestic politics will not be decided by the domestic actors alone. A possible deal in nuclear crisis and its positive outcomes for Iranian economy will deeply impact upon the chances of normalization in Iran's politics. 

* The author penned this article before the nuclear deal on July 14, 2015.

 This article was published in Ortadoğu Analiz journal with the title of "Iran's Reform Movement during Rouhani’s Presidency: Assessing the Impact of Nuclear Talks and Forthcoming Parliamentary Elections ”