Is Turkey Pursuing a Realist or Liberal Foreign Policy During the Course of the Arab Spring?

The developments taking place in the Middle East and North Africa over the last three years seem to have profoundly affected the foreign policies of many countries, including Turkey. The primary difficulty in this regard is how to strike the right balance between interests and values in terms of defining and implementing foreign policy preferences.
 
In this context, some analysts put forward the argument that Turkey's failure to cope with the realpolitik security challenges of the Arab Spring can be attributed to the “zero problems with neighbors” policy of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) governments, which is claimed to have been primarily built on values. Therefore, the argument goes, unless Turkey adopts a more realistic foreign policy, particularly in the context of Syria -- suggesting that Turkey treat its neighbors as they are without engaging in moral argumentation about how they are ruled internally -- Turkey won't be able to ward off dangers to its security.
 
Put differently, Turkey would be well advised to take the existing situation on the ground as a given and establish pragmatic relations with neighbors based on materialistic considerations and prioritizing stability. Developments taking place in other countries are after all their own internal affairs, and Turkey should not attempt to put bringing their transformation in line with liberal democratic values at the center of its regional policies.
 
This short essay argues that a typical realist foreign policy mentality does not problematize how states are ruled internally, whereas liberal foreign policies take issue with the internal characteristics of regimes. Of such liberal approaches, the negative liberal approach holds that the only way to help foster liberal democratic transformations in other countries is “leading by example.” On the other hand, the positive liberal approach presumes that states should take some particular actions abroad to make sure that their values are internalized by others.
 
Negative/positive liberal foreign policies of Turkey
The particular international actor that appears to embody the negative liberal foreign policy understanding best is the European Union. The deepening and widening dimensions of the EU integration process seem to have been premised on the negative liberal approach. The main reason why the European Union appears to have “power of attraction” in the eyes of external actors is that others believe that if they restructured themselves on the basis of the norms and values valid inside the EU, they would prosper and benefit from it. The material successes of the EU integration process and the attractiveness of European norms would suffice for others to redesign themselves along the lines of similar norms and values.
 
The EU does not need to push for others' transformations. It is also one of the foreign policy goals of the European Union that other states, whether major powers or not, gradually adopt the EU's perception of the international system as the EU tries to build strategic partnerships with them. Cooperating under common platforms would gradually make other states feel familiar with EU's way of doing things. The pace of their learning process would certainly accelerate if they benefited from cooperation with the EU.
 
Across the world, the so-called positive liberal approach is most frequently observed in the foreign policy traditions of the United States and France. Looking at it from a historical perspective, one notices that these two countries have long attributed special missions to themselves. In the French and American traditions, these countries are exceptional, chosen by God and bestowed with the duty to civilize other nations. It is part of their national psyche that most French and Americans think their countries set the ideal example for others to emulate. They believe their values are universal and that those values need to be projected onto others for perpetual peace, sometimes at gunpoint.
 
It is argued here that Turkey's “zero problems with neighbors” policy before the Arab Spring was mostly negative liberal in nature, rather than purely realist, with the goal of striking an optimum balance between values and interests so that Turkey could achieve its realpolitik security interests in a liberal environment/context at home and abroad. On the other hand, Turkey's approach to the Middle East has certainly gained a more positive liberal character following the Arab Spring in that Turkey has begun to pay more attention to how its neighbors to the south are governed internally.
 
Legitimization, appropriateness and Turkey's role in the Arab Spring
This is very much related to the question of how values show up in foreign policy. They are either used to help justify/legitimize previously constituted material calculations/security interests or constitute the interests at the very beginning. In the former case, the logic of consequences prevails in that the first question a foreign policy maker asks would be, “What are the expected costs and benefits of adopting a particular course of action?” Behaviors and strategies would be decided on the basis of their potential consequences. Whenever decision makers refer to particular values and norms, one is able to notice that this exercise is an attempt to legitimize otherwise purely material calculations with sweeteners. In the second case, one would be able to talk about the logic of appropriateness, whereby who you are would significantly shape what you want and how you behave.
 
The promotion of values across the Middle Eastern region became a key concern in Turkish foreign policy during the Arab Spring, for Turkey's internal peace and stability has become increasingly tied to external developments. How Turkey's neighbors are governed internally and how the post-Arab Spring regional order in the Middle East and North Africa evolves have now become vital concerns in terms of Turkey's national security. Stated somewhat differently, the transformation of the regional security environment in the Middle East in a Turkey-friendly manner, viz., the strengthening of liberal-democratic regimes in the region alongside Turkey's own liberal-democratic transformation, has become a key national security interest. This thinking is very much in line with the logic of consequences.
 
This positive liberal turn can also be explained by the logic of appropriateness, in that Turkey's foreign policy interests have begun to reflect, and be constructed by, the norms and values that lie at the center of Turkey's transformation process at home. The centrality of norms and values in Turkey's Middle Eastern policy seems to closely relate to the legitimacy concerns of Turkish rulers at home.
 
It is not easy, though, to ascertain with certainty whether decision makers employ a positive liberal foreign policy discourse due to their beliefs in the legitimacy of liberal democratic values or their strategic calculations that referring to those values will bring further material benefits. Turkey's positive liberal approach in the context of the Arab Spring reveals the relevance of both logics.
 
In the pre-Arab Spring era, the AKP governments followed a more negative liberal than realist foreign policy in the Middle East, whereby Turkey increased its efforts to help contribute to the strengthening of an EU-like security community in the region. Turkey tried to do this by simply leading by example. Turkey didn't bother to forge strategic and cooperative relations with the countries in the Middle East that did not share its values. The internal characteristics of those regimes did not become obstacles to forming cordial relations with them. Instead, the assumption was that the more interdependent and cordial the relations Turkey forged with them were, the more leverage Turkey would have in terms of persuading those countries to follow Turkey's way.
 
From balanced to a more active attitude
During this era, Turkey took the utmost care to adopt a balanced and impartial attitude in terms of the solution of perennial regional disputes. Rather than dictating or preaching a particular worldview, Turkey hoped to lead the regional transformation by setting examples and forging interdependent relations in as many fields as possible. Turkish rulers had been very much concerned with internal developments and adopted a particular foreign policy vision that put Turkey's internal concerns at the center of external engagements. Foreign policy engagements had been mainly directed toward the goal of achieving a de-securitized political environment at home so that elected politicians would strengthen their legitimacy vis-à-vis appointed bureaucrats and Turkish rulers would be able to focus their attention on the internal transformation process. Stated somewhat differently, for the successful completion of the de-securitization process at home, Turkey's foreign and security policies needed to be de-securitized. This would only be possible through the adoption of soft-power foreign policy instruments and the eventual transformation of Turkey's neighbors from potential enemies to potential friends and partners.
 
The developments over the last two years show that Turkish rulers have adopted the idea that Turkey should play an active role in helping transform the region in line with liberal democratic values. It would not be an exaggeration to argue that Turkey has adopted a more critical and demanding stance as to how the countries in the region should be governed internally. It is noteworthy that Turkey is now taking sides in Syria by supporting the opposition forces against the oppressive Assad regime. For the first time in Turkey's republican history, Turkey wholeheartedly supports regime change in one of its neighbors. It is now increasingly noticed that the ongoing liberal democratic transition at home is shaping the formation and implementation of Turkey's foreign policy preferences. From now on, it will be difficult for decision makers to ignore or underestimate the primacy of values in Turkey's efforts to forge cooperative relations with external actors. Establishing totally pragmatic relations with regimes that do not share Turkey's values will be difficult to justify in the eyes of public opinion.
 
Change in foreign powers and national security
The difference between the “zero problems with neighbors” policy of the pre-Arab Spring era and Turkey's new foreign policy approach in the wake of the Arab Spring is that the former was a consequence of Turkey's focus on its economic enrichment, democratic consolidation and territorial integrity. The former was more status-quo-oriented and evolutionary, whereas the latter portends to be more revolutionary and visionary. The former aimed at the emergence of regional stability so that Turkey's internal democratization and modernization processes could continue unabated. On the other hand, the new situation that has arisen in the wake of the Arab Spring reveals that how these countries are governed internally affects Turkey's internal security deeply and that it has become harder for Turkey to establish pragmatic relations with them by ignoring regime differences.
 
Upon close scrutiny, it becomes clear that this positive, liberal approach contains both realpolitik and moralpolitik motivations. Even though the idea that Turkey should play a particular foreign policy role in helping bring into existence regimes that prioritize human rights, feel accountable to the public and come to power through elections is value-based, this thinking also embodies a realpolitik security logic in itself.
 
There are three dimensions to this interests-based/realpolitik thinking. First, the Arab Spring has made it abundantly clear that Turkey's feeling of security at home has become very much dependent on the nature of the regional security environment in the Middle East. This particularly relates to Turkey's struggle against ethnic separatism led by the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK). After the Arab Spring spilled over into Syria, Turkish-Syrian relations deteriorated because Turkey sided with the opposition forces. To “punish” Turkey, the Assad regime engineered a fait accompli in the north of Syria by allowing the PKK-affiliated Democratic Union Party (PYD) forces take the reins in areas bordering Turkey's Kurdish-populated regions. PKK attacks dramatically escalated after Ankara and Damascus fell out with each other. This suggests that the faster Turkey's neighbors to the south transform into functioning, plural democracies, the more likely the Kurds living there will feel secure, and this will in turn lessen the pressure on Turkey in its fight against the PKK. Turkey's sense of security at home would be positively affected by the transformation of the regimes to its south in line with liberal democratic values.
 
Second, the Arab Spring also revealed that the foundations of the old security environment in the Middle East are now in the process of change. With the rise of new actors, it is becoming increasingly difficult for the old regimes to maintain their legitimacy. As a new order is emerging in the region, Turkish leaders assume that Turkey should play a leading role in this process.
 
Third, Turkey's increasing material capabilities in recent years seem to have encouraged Turkish leaders to play a more assertive role in the Middle East. The value-based feeling that Turkey has a responsibility to ensure that the emergence of regional peace and security reflect the primacy of liberal democratic values cannot be dissociated from Turkey's increasing material capabilities. Countries in the region are now engulfed in chaos, and external powers such as the European Union and the United States are mired in significant economic difficulties. This may have also emboldened Turkish rulers to feel that it is now Turkey's turn in the Middle East.
 
Emerging questions about EU and Middle East as Turkey's material capabilities rise
One factor in particular that may weaken positive liberal thinking and strengthen realist logic in the Turkish foreign policy mentality in the years to come is the declining appeal of the EU membership process. As of today, it does not matter for a growing number of Turks whether or not Turkey joins the EU in the near future. So, long as Turkey's material power capabilities remain on the rise while those of the European Union are in relative decline, Turkey will likely adopt a more realist than liberal foreign policy mentality. This is important because Turkey's decades-long democratization process suggests that there is a close relationship between the continuation of the EU membership process and Turkey's liberalization. The membership process has undoubtedly offered the most important external dynamic to Turkey's democratic transformation. Absent this, the positive liberal character of Turkey's foreign policy, particularly in the Middle East, may not last long.