Latest Unification of Syrian Armed Islamist Opposition

The first trend, generally formed by Salafi groups, serves the "global jihadist" purposes in line with or close to the ideology of al-Qaeda and involves a large number of foreign fighters. The largest group which represents this trend is the structuring which was previously called al-Nusra. The other trend is almost fully based on local dynamics and is focused only on Syria. Showing itself with its strongest presence in Ahrar al-Sham, this trend also aims at forming an Islamist administration just as the first trend does but it foresees a political program which is more pluralistic and more compromising, which reminds of Ikhwan-ul-Muslimeen or Hamas.

Anti-regime armed opposition in Syria is comprised of tens of small and large groups, which partially have national and local nature. The organizations which will be called Islamist or "jihadist" constitute a large majority of these groups. Putting aside the fact of DAESH and without taking into account the identities of the groups, it is possible to determine the positions of these groups through two separate trends. The first trend, generally formed by Salafi groups, serves the "global jihadist" purposes in line with or close to the ideology of al-Qaeda and involves a large number of foreign fighters. The largest group which represents this trend is the structuring which was previously called al-Nusra. The other trend is almost fully based on local dynamics and is focused only on Syria. Making itself felt with its strongest presence in Ahrar al-Sham, this trend also aims at forming an Islamist administration just as the first trend does but it foresees a political program which is more pluralistic and more prone to find a common ground, which reminds of Ikhwan-ul-Muslimeen or Hamas.

Apart from these trends, there are various organizations, such as the compounds of the Free Syrian Army (FSA), some of which have secular nature or some others follow Islamist trends and which only aim at overthrowing the Assad regime and substituting it with a democratic state. Turkey's choice to carry out the Euphrates Shield Operation with these groups to a large extent revived the FSA which had in fact boomed as an alternative Syrian army but had been dysfunctional for a long time.

The organizations following these trends undoubtedly act together quite often in the fight against the regime. The liberation of Idlib almost dating back to two years ago is the clearest consequence of such cooperation. However, sometimes harsh and bloody conflicts break out between themselves since they have different trends. The developments witnessed since last autumn 2016 led to interesting recovery in the multi-partite Islamist opposition. Several armed organizations following the mentioned trends resorted to unification in compliance with their own trends. Some FSA compounds also took part in the unification.The reasons behind such an important step in Syrian civil war can be enumerated as follows:

Euphrates Shield

The Euphrates Shield Operation launched by Turkey together with the groups under the name of the FSA in August 2016 and the following Astana peace talks were important initiatives that triggered the segregation in the Islamist opposition. Ahrar al-Sham and the units of Faylaq al-Sham, which is known to be on the line of Ikhwan gave substantial support to the important phases of this operation.These two groups putting forth their own principles did not participate in the Astana meetings where Russia-Iran-Regime alliance had a strong say. However, they did not hesitate to declare that they hoped to see favorable developments and they always sided with the FSA.

Sitting at the same table with the regime in Astana and the ceasefire decision were considered as treason against the cause of Syria, especially by the "jihadist" groups. Fatah al-Sham Front, which announced that it abolished the organizational identity of al-Nusra that it had carried before and that it severed its ties with al-Qaeda but which did not give any indications stating that it abandoned its ideology, was the actor that reflected this controversy the most. This issue was even taken into consideration by some Salafi sheikhs in religious terms. Not tolerating the operation carried out hand in hand with Russia against DAESH, Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi called the ulama that allowed the participation in the Euphrates Shield to withdraw these fatwas. Abu Qatada went further, declaring that fighting under Turkish flag meant abjuring and abandoning the religion.

Fall of Aleppo

Full reclamation of besieged Aleppo by the regime forces in December caused a heavy trauma on the side of Islamist opposition. The jihadist organizations especially pointed at Ahrar al-Sham and Faylaq al-Sham and blamed them for neglecting Aleppo in the cause of Euphrates Shield.These tensions were triggered by the conflicts between the groups in Idlib, which is protected and governed with the cooperation of Islamist organizations. Having been attacked by the Fatah al-Sham Front and suffered losses, six groups led by Jaish al-Mujahideen agreed to put themselves under the protection of Ahrar al-Sham on 25 January.In fact, this was the first phase of the unification which constitutes our subject and it also set the end of large but loose alliances. As a large-scale organization which brought together different trends and secured the conquest of Idlib, the Army of Conquest (Jaish al-Fatah) alliance reached its own end as such.

The scholars also took their positions during these new separations and unifications. Istanbul-based Syrian Islamic Council described Fatah al-Sham Front as "extremist and impertinent". It declared that acting together with this community was forbidden by religion and stated that a fight should be conducted against it, as in the fight against DAESH, in order to hinder those malefactors.On the other hand, al-Maqdisi indicated that Ahrar “fought for al-taghut (the Evil)” with reference to its cooperation with Turkey, which was understood as the declaration of Ahrar al-Sham as an unbeliever in many circles.

War between Ahrar al-Sham - Jund al-Aqsa

Another factor can be the large-scale operation that Ahrar launched in October 2016 against the Aqsa group which is notorious for its malefactions such as launching car bombing attacks targeting the other opposition groups, plotting assassinations, abstaining from sharing the spoils of war with its partners. Approximately 60 opposition groups supported Ahrar in this initiative.Fatah al-Sham Front remained impartial and assumed the role of mediator. This initiative was successful, the conflicts stopped, Aqsa declared that it paid homage to Fatah al-Sham Front in the aftermath, except for a relatively small group which continued fighting.

Aqsa group that Ahrar called "tail of DAESH" was still fidgety despite having paid homage. Its abusive acts were understood as the violation of the homage to Fatah al-Sham Front. The group was punished and expelled from the union (late January 2017). The group which had been separated since the beginning called itself Liwa al-Aqsa and intensified its attacks against the opposition in the vicinity of Hama and Idlib. It executed more than 150 hostages who were members of various groups, which was an atrocious incident reminding of the methods of DAESH. After this incident, Liwa already declared that it paid homage to DAESH in order to protect itself.Islamist and jihadist groups, notably Fatah al-Sham Front, completely expulsed Liwa from the region. This incident during which the extremists were eliminated paved a more appropriate and clearer way for the subsequent unifications of the groups following the Salafi jihadist trend. No one wanted to see again such incidents which reminded of the civil war in Afghanistan any longer. Furthermore, a permanent alliance between two major organizations of two main trends, in other words, between Fatah al-Sham Front and Ahrar was intended. As a matter of fact, the ‘Syrian revolution’ started to collapse.

This intended unification did not come true. Saudi Arabian Sheikh Abdullah al-Muhaysini, who is one of the architects of the former Army of Conquest alliance in northern Syria, declared that this initiative was unsuccessful "despite great efforts and sacrifices".Within the process, it was observed that Ahrar was not quite willing and prepared to form such an alliance under current circumstances. The drawbacks to Ahrar were understandable. Firstly, it did not want to be in the same league as Fatah al-Sham Front which kept its position at the top of the terror lists despite having declared that it severed ties with al-Qaeda. There was also a high risk of losing the support of significant groups such as Faylaq and FSA components acting together with it.Its relations with international actors, notably with Turkey and Saudi Arabia and its existing political legitimacy were going to be harmed. However, this abstention of Ahrar cost it seriously.The 'jihadist elements' inside Ahrar kept their leaders responsible for the failure of this initiative which had significant goals. Ahrar's former emir Hashim al-Sheikh nicknamed Abu Jaber announced that he left the organization. This was followed by other breaks.

The Nature of New Unifications

The remarkably rising risk of civil conflicts especially in and around Idlib since the alliance did not come true naturally led to the emergence of a new initiative.Six groups joining Ahrar already took the first step. The polarization gave birth to Tahrir al-Sham at the end of January in the other trend. Beginning with al-Nusra and continuing with Fatah al-Sham Front, the organization declared that it repealed itself and formed a new united structure under the roof of Tahrir. Ahrar's former emir Abu Jaber was brought as the leader of this structuring. Military emir was the founder of al-Nusra and the former leader of Fatah al-Sham Abu Muhammad al-Jaulani.

Several big and small organizations, most of which are close to the jihadist trend, repealed themselves and paid homage to this roof organization. This polarization also showed its effects on the other side. The structures including the FSA groups were involved in Ahrar led by Abu Ammar.Several organizations paid homage successively and a serious organizational recovery was witnessed in the battlefields. The presence of a balanced leader such as Abu Jaber at the head of Tahrir lightened the tense atmosphere.Abu Ammar banned its organization from speaking against Tahrir. Abu Jaber, on his part, emphasized that the main issue was the Syrian regime. He carefully kept away from disintegrative religious and political arguments that were frequently and loudly brought to the agenda by al-Nusra sheikhs and figures such as Maqdisi. The most important gain from this new situation was the end of armed conflicts, to a large extent, between the groups following two trends.

Two separate unifications secured by the polarization constituted two backbones of the Syrian armed opposition in terms of volume.The groups following the first trend mostly joined Tahrir and those following the second trend generally joined Ahrar. Turkistan Islamic Party which is close to the first trend decided to remain independent. The center working together with al-Qaeda and Taliban in Afghanistan made such a preference.

The other group which preferred to be independent was Faylaq al-Sham group following the second trend. This group which is among the powerful organizations did not want to join Ahrar for the moment. By the way, there were also some groups which joined new roof organizations, by being divided into two groups as in Nour al-Din al-Zenki movement.While it is often indicated that Ahrar ended up a loser as a result of this organizational polarization and the significant part of its human resources were lost to Tahrir, independent observers say that this is not true. Ahrar announced that only 955 fighters left it within this process but new participants largely compensated for this loss.

The Future of Unifications

These unifications undoubtedly strengthened the Syrian opposition further when compared to the past. However, the fragility and sensitiveness specific to roof organizations certainly reveal the potential risks. It is in fact possible use the scholars to observe these risks, most of which are based on ideologies and theories but can quickly turn into practice. Not all the sheikhs such as al-Muhaysini welcomed the new situation hopefully and joyfully. One of al-Nusra’s sheikhs, Dr. Sami al-Oraydi refused to join Tahrir structuring from the very beginning. Al-Maqdisi, who initially congratulated this structuring and made a call to join it also changed his position later. According to him, Tahrir reached an unfavorable situation in the détente process which started long ago with its separation from al-Qaeda through these new unifications, it lost its principal nature and started to capitulate its principles of al-Tawheed. Al-Maqdisi believed that détente and moderation was as harmful as extremism. Abu Qatada, on his part, seemed as if he completely lost his hope and indicated that the leadership of a jihadist cause would be captured by unworthy and incompetent people. He stated that the jihadist fighters would be “people who fought at the command of someone like Yazeed ibn Mu’aawiyah and waited for Allah to reward them” from now on.

All these were the reactions to Tahrir’s ‘corruption’.However, we observe that there are backward reactions within Tahrir. This unrest started to be mentioned when Abdurrazzaq al-Mahdi declared that he would leave Tahrir. What alienated Sheikh Abdurrazzaq from Tahrir, the foundations of which were laid by him together with al-Muhaysini, and caused him to turn back to Ahrar was the continuing conduct of some extremist acts inherited from al-Nusra to Tahrir, without even being limited.

The mentioned acts and disappointments of sheikhs also show the tendencies in the grassroots. It is understood that the known nature of Jihadist Salafism is partly felt within Tahrir, the main element of which is comprised of the former al-Nusra. This is necessarily reflected in the words and actions. Some new elements within Tahrir which consider these movements extremist have difficulties in tolerating them. Abu Jaber – Jaulani parts will either manage this controversial situation successfully or things will take their course and everyone will go back home. At this point, we think that Jaulani’s attitude will be more determining. What kind of attitude will the former al-Qaeda supporter Jaulani adopt? Facing the most challenging trouble through DAESH, Jaulani may see a ‘small DAESH’ separating from his organization if he attaches importance to this experience and prioritizes his Syria cause. However, the future alliances with large Islamist opposition groups will be possible. Otherwise, in full contrast to the current situation, he will lead to further internal division and conflicts.