The Expansion of DEASH in Africa: Strategic Impact and Economic Security Dimensions

The factors driving DEASH’s expansion in Africa are closely linked to the continent's geographical, political, and economic landscape. After losing dominance in the Middle East, DEASH identified Africa as a new zone for “jihad and migration.” Weak state structures, instability, poverty, distrust of local governments, and cross-border security gaps in some regions provide fertile ground for “religious exploitation” by groups like DEASH. In areas like the Sahel, West Africa, East Africa, and Mozambique, DEASH-affiliated groups have established “provinces,” exerting pressure on local populations and conducting attacks. Like other groups “exploiting religion,” DEASH represents not only a regional threat but a broader terror network aiming to use Africa as a strategic base for “global jihad.”

DEASH's Operational Strategy and Areas of Influence in AfricaUnlike a hierarchical structure like Al-Qaeda, DEASH’s operational strategy in Africa is based on a horizontal organisation, creating various 'provinces' to exploit security gaps across the continent. This approach is one of the key factors that provide an advantage for DEASH’s spread in Africa. For instance, one of DEASH’s strongest branches, the West Africa Province (ISWAP), has developed a proto-state structure in the areas it controls in northern Nigeria and around Lake Chad by collecting taxes, providing security, and imposing ideological mandates. Considering that
structure operates under an illegitimate authority, it serves as an example of 'racketeering' to gain benefits through coercion.

To fund its African operations, DEASH draws on a wide range of illegal resources. The group exploits natural resources, particularly in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), profiting from the illicit trade of gold, coltan, and other valuable minerals. In the Sahel, the group finances itself through arms and human trafficking networks, benefiting from local conflicts. Kidnapping for ransom is also a common tactic among DEASH-affiliated groups, especially ISWAP in West Africa, which frequently resorts to abductions to generate revenue. Drug trafficking is another key revenue stream for DEASH’s operations in the Sahel and Central Africa, enabling the group to maintain and expand its presence across Africa.

By fuelling regional conflicts and attracting young people to its ranks, DEASH continues to grow. The group employs strategies to gain local support, such as ISWAP’s efforts in certain regions to protect local populations and offer security, thus winning hearts and minds. This approach indicates that DEASH intends to establish a lasting presence in Africa, posing an ongoing challenge to the continent's state security structures.

In Somalia, particularly in the Puntland region, DEASH has been consolidating its position. Formed by 100 fighters who defected from Al-Shabaab, the group has reportedly grown to around 500 members. Having gained control over water and logistics resources and established itself in strategic locations like the Al-Miskaad Mountains, DEASH has strengthened its presence in the region. The group’s Somali operations, coordinated via a regional command centre known as “Al-Karrar,” support DEASH affiliates in East and Central Africa, making Somalia a key node in DEASH’s African network. Through extortion and agricultural trade, DEASH reportedly earns millions of dollars annually, funneling this revenue to other affiliates. DEASH’s presence in Somalia also raises global security concerns as the group aims to use the country as a launch pad to Europe and the Middle East, posing a threat to international trade in the Red Sea. Although the Somali government and international forces continue efforts against DEASH, local political conflicts and security gaps make effective resistance challenging.

In Central and Southern Africa, DEASH’s influence is also on the rise. DEASH’s Mozambique branch, the Islamic State’s Central Africa Province (ISCAP), aims to establish a strategic presence in resource-rich regions by targeting natural gas fields and other economic assets. In Mozambique’s Cabo Delgado province, ISCAP is growing stronger, damaging local infrastructure and leveraging instability to facilitate terrorist activities. In the DRC and Uganda, DEASH-linked Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) contribute to DEASH’s financing networks, expanding revenue sources through human trafficking and ransom demands. Such attacks not only deepen regional instability but also increase global security risks.

Regional Vulnerabilities and Global Impact
The impact of DEASH in Africa worsens humanitarian and economic crises, undermining regional and global security. DEASH attacks in Africa have displaced large populations, exacerbating the humanitarian situation. Exploiting security gaps in the Sahel and West Africa, DEASH displaces communities and heightens human rights violations. These disruptions affect local economies, creating an unfavourable environment for tourism, trade, and investment, particularly in resource-rich regions like Mozambique, where investor confidence has been shaken. Furthermore, DEASH’s expansion in Africa creates a risk of attacks targeting Europe and the Middle East, turning Africa into a potential staging ground for terrorism that threatens global security. Especially in East and North Africa, DEASH exploits strategic locations that facilitate the spread of radical groups to neighbouring regions.

Security measures, military operations, and alliances at regional and international levels play a crucial role in countering DEASH’s activities in Africa. Sahel and West African nations are enhancing border security by establishing regional security forces and developing effective defence mechanisms against DEASH. However, political disagreements following Niger’s July 2023 coup and the formation of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) involving Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger have introduced diplomatic and military fragility in counter-DEASH efforts.

UN and African Union-led peacekeeping forces, as well as regional alliances, provide support to local security forces. From 2013 to 2023, initiatives such as France’s Operation Barkhane and the United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) launched extensive operations against DEASH. Still, France’s decision to withdraw from the Sahel post-AES raises concerns about a security vacuum. To fill this gap, AES countries are now turning to Russia and China for military training, private military contractors, and security equipment, though effective progress against terrorism remains elusive.

Türkiye, on the other hand, has been supporting stability in Africa, notably through humanitarian diplomacy and providing legal and security training. It also backs the Global Coalition Against DEASH, established in 2014, and has actively participated in the coalition’s restructuring efforts since 2019. Yet structural challenges—instability, weak state structures, economic inadequacies, and corruption—complicate an effective defence against DEASH. Intelligence deficiencies and a lack of sustainable military support hinder the effectiveness of international actors, making long-term success more challenging.

Conclusion and Recommendations
Sustainable and long-term countermeasures against DEASH’s influence in Africa require broader cooperation and social programs. Strengthening regional cooperation will facilitate the development of more effective defence and intervention mechanisms against the DEASH threat in Africa. Especially in the Sahel and West Africa, establishing joint security forces and regional intelligencesharing could reinforce border security and limit DEASH’s mobility. Implementing inclusive social programs is also crucial; projects that improve access to education, healthcare, and economic opportunities for local populations can mitigate the poverty and hopelessness that groups like DEASH exploit.

In conclusion, enhanced coordination by the international community in Africa is essential to combat the DEASH threat. Alongside the United Nations and African Union, collaboration with countries like Türkiye, the United States, France, Russia, and China could help fill security gaps in the region. This coordination, combining regional and global efforts in counter-terrorism, could reduce the risk of DEASH expanding from Africa to other continents. An integrated approach such as this would be an effective step toward curbing DEASH’s influence in Africa and establishing long-term stability on the continent.

This opinion piece was published in Turkish on November 2024, on the Kriter website under the title “Afrika’da DEAŞ’ın Yayılımı: Stratejik Etki ve Ekonomik Güvenlik Boyutları”