Turkey’s Response to the Kurdish Spring: Peace Offensive against the PKK

Despite the fact that the so-called Arab Spring has not yet produced any functioning democracies across the Middle East, the Kurds of the region seem to have been buoyed by the positive implications of the changing regional dynamics on their decades-long national aspiration of having an independent Kurdish state.
 
This does not, however, mean that the Kurds of Turkey, Iraq, Syria and Iran are already united around the common cause of establishing a unified Kurdish state to be carved out of the territories of their home countries. What has transpired is that the Kurds of the region, wherever they happen to live, seem to think that the Kurdish moment has finally arrived, and none of the countries mentioned above can stem this tide.
 
Turkey seems to have quickly grasped this reality and in turn set in motion a civil-democratic process to get rid of the negative consequences of the Kurdish awakening. The latest negotiations held with Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) leader Abdullah Öcalan and his comrades in Kandil should be seen as Turkey’s realpolitik response to the Kurdish spring.
 
To me, realpolitik considerations and electoral concerns seem to much better explain Turkey’s latest Kurdish opening than other considerations and motivations, such as facilitating the dormant EU accession process, respect for liberal-plural democracy at home and the feeling of war fatigue.
 
First, the EU seems to have already lost a great part of its power to help shape Turkey’s preferences and policies as the EU is not in a position to offer Turkey credible membership prospects, and the Turkish government and people alike think that Turkey can develop, modernize and get richer without EU membership. One can confidently argue that the Turkish leadership has not initiated the latest democratic opening to the Kurdish problem with the goal of revitalizing the EU accession process, which has remained partially frozen over the last three years.
 
Second, it is difficult to argue that the Turkish government has initiated the latest process out of a sincere devotion to liberal-plural democracy. Despite the fact that the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) governments have proved to be more determined than previous governments to resolve the Kurdish dispute as part of Turkey’s ongoing process of transformation and adopted radically important reforms along this road, one can still observe that the AK Party’s attitude towards the Kurdish dispute has hardened in recent years, particularly following the latest parliamentary elections held in June 2011. Many Kurdistan Communities Union (KCK) members have been arrested, and the talk on removing the parliamentary immunity of the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) deputies dominated the national agenda in the not-quite-so-distant past. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan seems to have reverted to the old policy stance that there is not a Kurdish problem but the problems of Turkey’s citizens of Kurdish origin.
 
Third, one cannot argue that the human losses incurred in the PKK attacks have reached a critical threshold so that Turkey can no longer bear the costs of a military battle against PKK terrorism. Instead, PKK losses have radically increased in recent years, and Turkey’s ability to cope with PKK terrorism through technology and military means has improved.
 
This analysis leaves the realpolitik calculations and electoral concerns as the only alternative explanation for the latest peace offensive against the PKK. Turkey’s ability to have a say on the political future of northern Iraq and northern Syria cannot be assured unless Turkey’s Kurds feel themselves in peace at home. Turkey cannot act as an attractive power in its neighborhood unless it comes to a lasting peace with its Kurds. The question of how Turkey’s Kurds will react to the latest political developments in northern Iraq and Syria seems to have shaped the strategic thinking of Turkish rulers. It appears that Turkey’s ruling government has come to the conclusion that a strategically more powerful Turkey, which would successfully cope with the emerging realpolitik challenges of the Arab winter and Kurdish spring, would only come into being through a historic peace with the Kurds at home and abroad. Turning a blind eye to the Kurdish spring might put Turkey’s internal stability and regional clout into jeopardy.
 
Besides, Turkey will have three elections in the next two years, the local and presidential elections next year and the parliamentary elections in 2015. For the AK Party to secure victories in these elections, the votes of Turkey’s Kurds will be decisive. This is so because the AK Party lost some ground to the BDP in the last municipal and parliamentary elections held in 2009 and 2011. The votes of Turkey’s Kurds will also prove to be critical with respect to AK Party’s efforts to have a new constitution based on the presidential system to be approved in a possible public referendum.