Turkish Foreign Policy in The Middle East, Seeking Stability Through Smart Power

Despite all the arguments that the Ahmet Davutoğlu era has brought transformational dynamics to Turkish foreign policy conceptualization and practices in the Middle East, the word “stability” has continued to preserve its unprivileged status in the lexicon of Turkish foreign policy.
 
Turkey has from the very beginning of its establishment up to date been a stability-oriented/stability-seeking foreign policy actor in the region. Having come into existence out of the ashes of the Ottoman Empire, the number one foreign policy priority of the founding fathers was to mitigate the negative consequences of external developments on Turkey’s internal affairs, most notably the modernization/westernization process and the societal cohesion.
 
Stability in the Turkish context used to mean that Turkey’s internal order should be immune to the negative consequences of regional instability. The manner in which regional stability is formed has been a secondary issue compared to the maintenance of Turkey’s internal order. The need to put its house in order had been more important and urgent than seeking to shape regional order in a proactive manner.
 
For a very long period of time, particularly until the emergence of radical developments shaking the foundation stones of the regional order in the Middle East, Turkish rulers adopted the view that Turkey would have to keep itself away from external entanglements and order in the region should be provided by outside powers. So long as the lines between domestic and foreign affairs were demarcated clearly, Turkey had the luxury of adopting a reactionary and defensive approach to regional stability in the Middle East. The slow pace of the globalization process on the one hand and the Cold War bipolarization of the world on the other seem to have enabled Turkish rulers to preserve internal stability by avoiding external entanglements and allowing regional and non-regional actors to take over the responsibility of external stability.
 
The latest uprisings in the Middle East have profoundly changed such calculations and assumptions. It is now abundantly clear that Turkey no longer has the luxury of maintaining internal stability by showing little interest in regional developments and pursing a low profile foreign policy in the Middle East. The mutually constitutive relationship between internal and external stability has turned out to become crystal clear in recent years. The political future of Iraq and Syria will profoundly impact Turkey’s internal developments. The kind of regional order espoused by Iran, Saudi Arabia and Israel, the most influential regional actors in the Middle East, will strongly affect Turkey’s ability to put its house in order without being drawn into the muddy waters of Middle Eastern politics.
 
It is very logical to presume that every actor in the Middle East longs for a particular type of order in the region that would contribute to its national interests most. This region-wide competition has intensified in recent years. This explains why the so-called Kurdish awakening, an unintended consequence of post-occupation Iraq and ongoing military struggle against the Assad regime in Syria, seems to have led the Turkish rulers to pursue an assertive policy stance. A new order is in the making in the Middle East and Turkey has geared up its regional efforts to make sure that the emerging order reflects Turkey’s priorities and contributes to its internal stability.
 
The reason why Turkey is extremely sensitive about the future direction of Iraq and Syria, as well as the end result of the so-called “Kurdish awakening” concerns the fact that the modern Turkish Republic is still a work-in-progress. For the “Turkish project” to be successfully completed, what is needed is peace and tranquility in the Middle East. All the discussions held on a new constitution and the solution of the PKK terrorism problem through untested methods attest to this undeniable fact. New is that the long cherished stability in the Middle East can no longer be bought on the cheap. Neither influential outside powers nor key regional heavyweights can be trusted in this regard.
 
Three particular factors seem to complicate Turkey’s stability-seeking and order-instituting exercises. First, influential outside powers are extremely reluctant to pay the costs of the emergence of a new order in the Middle East that would somehow satisfy the key concerns of all actors involved. The textbook example of this new reality is the position that the United States under the Obama presidency has adopted in Syria and Iraq. The US seems to have been fed up with playing sheriff in the Middle East. Second, one can now observe a growing assertiveness on the part of regional actors, both state and the non-state kind, to help midwife a new order in the region. The number of players has increased and they do not shy away from using all possible means available to help create their “own” orders. Third, and the most important of all, is that Turkey is a latecomer to the realpolitik security plays in the Middle East despite the fact that Turkish rulers are priding themselves on being the inheritors of the rich Ottoman tradition.
 
The decades-long westernization/Europeanization process on the one hand and the legacy of the introverted security culture on the other seem to have deeply hobbled Turkish rulers’ ability to think strategically and devise a realpolitik security strategy in the face of the Hobbesian character of Middle Eastern politics. Soft power instruments and EU-like regional integration initiatives do not seem to suffice for the aspirations of Turkish leaders who wish to bring into existence a Turkey-friendly order in the Middle East and to prevent regional instabilities from spilling over into Turkey. Turkey would be well advised to develop smart thinking that combines both hard and soft power tools and reflects a harmonious symbiosis between realpolitik strategic calculations and moral politik humanitarian considerations. The crisis in Syria next door is the litmus test of whether Turkey will be up to the task.