Egypt Faces Critical Choices

Throughout the post-war period, Egypt was a good example, along with many other Arab and African states, of an authoritarian regime.
 
The kingdom had been transformed into a republic through a revolution in 1952, which saw the rise of the highly charismatic Gamal Abdel Nasser.
 
The modern Egyptian Republic can be divided into four eras, as it has had only four heads of state in more than 65 years: Nasser 1956-1970, Anwar Sadat 1970-1981, Hosni Mubarak 1981-2011 and Mohammed Morsi 2012-2013. The first three achieved power through their military careers and the last two were deposed by the armed forces.
 
The transition to a civilian government was effectively achieved last year with Egypt becoming the first state to have a democratically elected Islamist head of state: Mohammed Morsi. Whilst Morsi was democratically elected, his year in office far from demonstrated democracy in practice.
 
Morsi represented the Muslim Brotherhood, which was established in 1928 as a pan-Islamic religious and political movement by Hassan Al-Banna. As the Arab world's oldest Islamic movement, it became highly influential and remained one of the largest political opposition organizations in the whole of the Middle East.
 
In many ways, it was precisely due to these qualities that the Muslim Brotherhood was so well prepared for the upcoming presidential elections that took place in 2012. Morsi won that election in a run-off by default because his rival in the second round, Ahmed Shafik, was unelectable -- given that he was the last prime minister of Mubarak.
 
The second round, whilst democratic in terms of its result, however, had an adverse effect on the majority of the electorate. Many Egyptians considered the elections to be a part of democracy; nevertheless, they had difficulties understanding how democracy did not represent the will of the people when the revolutionary candidates -- who supported the central ideas of the revolution -- all were eliminated in the first round. This was due to the fact that the system envisaged a French-style two-round collection.
 
Reasons for intervention 
 
The underlying causes for the mass protests and the armed forces getting involved and ultimately overthrowing President Morsi relate to the Egyptian economy. More specifically, it concerned the subsidies given to fuel and wheat. The Egyptian national budget spent and continues to spend a vast amount of its resources subsidizing these and related goods. The fact remains that the policy pursued, which includes fuel subsidies, accounted for almost 20 percent of the budget.
 
In terms of Egyptian finances, they were and remain a serious problem with the country's foreign reserves falling, the balance of payments remaining in deficit and worsening, and subsidies becoming more costly by the day. All of these naturally lead to bottlenecks and hardships for ordinary people, who made this very clear by gathering in the millions and protesting against the government of Morsi.
 
In its overview of Egypt, the World Bank identifies the economic crisis by considering the country to be “suffering from a severe downturn, and the government faces numerous challenges as to how to restore growth, market and investor confidence. Political and institutional uncertainty, a perception of rising insecurity and sporadic unrest continue to negatively affect economic growth. Real GDP growth slowed to just 2.2 percent year-on-year in October-December 2012/13 and investments declined to 13 percent of GDP in July-December 2012. Foreign exchange reserves have continued to decline and are now less than 3 months of imports.”
 
Finances 
 
During the Morsi presidency, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank proposed an economic model resembling very much what neo-liberal advocates had been professing in the West: reducing the size of the state -- thereby limiting its competencies and responsibilities. Privatization was, quite naturally, high on the agenda as well as supporting big businesses and having a greater role in charity.
 
Certainly, the notion of charity was very close to the hearts of the Brotherhood given its prominence within the Islamic religion. Such an economic reform agenda resulted in privatizing both the causes and solutions to poverty and inequality by reducing structural and societal problems of redistribution and ownership to the level of individual morality. Therefore, a culture of charity was very much preferred to one of a welfare state. Rather than a collective, institutional answer to the problem of inequality in poverty, the solution rested on the shoulders of individuals and their conscience.
 
Public finances and subsidies remained pressing issues throughout 2012. The World Bank accepted that Egypt “needs to reconcile the need for more public spending with the objective of reducing the deficit, which rose to 11 percent of the GDP in [the fiscal year of 2011-12]. A major challenge the government faces is managing the state budget, which includes salaries for [the] public sector and subsidies, items that account for more than half of all public expenditures. … Ongoing political tensions have prolonged Egypt's bid to secure a $4.8 billion loan from the IMF, [which] has been discussing a program of support with the government and calling for stronger fiscal adjustment, full disclosure of underlying measures and broader political support.”
 
In the end, the Muslim Brotherhood's failure to manage the economy was so dire that they felt forced to ask for guidance and assistance from businessmen who were tarnished by association with the previous regime. Those very businessmen were asked to return to Egypt and help out the economy.
 
Constitution 
 
On Nov. 22, 2012, a debacle concerning the constitution began with a declaration giving Morsi authority that had not even been given to Mubarak, including presidential decisions being immune from judicial oversight. These unprecedented presidential powers were a sign of the volatile political time to come, although Morsi did rescind the declaration in December.
 
The constitution was a very divisive document that, while representing a whole gamut of views and wishes of the Islamist faction in Egypt, did not represent all those who opposed Islamism in the country. The effect of adopting such a constitution was an extreme disconnect with much of the Egyptian nation. When one adds the constitution's silence with regard to the protection of women and the Christian minority in the country, it becomes clear how illiberal it was, with very little protection of human rights.
 
The constitution also had several quite controversial provisions, some of which put forward the case that the principles of Islamic law were to be the main source of legislation. Other articles identified the principles of Shariah law as having the primary role within law-making and national jurisprudence. In the eyes of many, the constitution came to be seen as an extension of the Brotherhood, not as something representative of the nation at large.
 
Bearing in mind that the whole idea of a constitution is to bring a nation together, this constitution actually drew the nation apart, further dividing the nation. Given the fact that it did not try to appear inclusive or appeal to a national consensus, the constitution never garnered legitimacy in the eyes of many, even less so in terms of the international community.
 
The Brotherhood's strategy while in power was one of capturing the state. It wanted to possess the institutions and instruments of the state, considering and believing political power to resemble a zero-sum game whereby state institutions in particular need to be under control of the ruling party. If not, they were seen as being under the influence of the opposition. Analysts have argued that there was a huge dissatisfaction that “resulted from what many saw as the ‘brotherhoodization' of the state, the increase of violence and torture, the deterioration of living standards and unjust social and political policies."
 
President Morsi adhered to a strategy of trying to infiltrate and Islamize Egypt's main political institutions, primarily the judiciary and the executive through the control of ministries. While in office, Morsi chose a prosecutor-general whose purpose was to neutralize the judiciary.
 
The Brotherhood tried to completely weaken any and all opposition. There was no strategy of cooperation with the opposition as well as no idea on how to unify disparate sections of Egyptian society. The strategy was completely based upon dividing and increasing tensions within Egyptian society. There was no attempt to build any political short-term coalitions. Therefore, the president and his government did not cater to the whole of Egyptian nation, but instead solely concentrated on the Muslim Brotherhood itself. This was aided and abetted by a controversial constitution written by an assembly dominated completely by Islamists.
 
Armed forces 
 
Mohamed El Baradei noted the possibility of Egypt descending into a civil war and interpreted the army's intervention as preventing such an outcome, halting further violence from taking place. Since the coup, however, violence has not decreased, but actually increased. Incidents of factionalism or sectarianism make the military appear even more important for the future of Egypt, as well as a stable anchor in the region.
 
This was attested to by Eric Cantor, US House majority leader, when he declared that "the Egyptian military has long been a key partner of the United States and a stabilizing force in the region, and [it] is perhaps the only trusted national institution in Egypt today." In this respect, one needs to remember that only a year ago the military was seen as the greatest threat to a democratic Egyptian future, whereas today there are millions who consider it to be the complete reverse: It is the defender of a democratic political system.
 
Morsi, by dismissing Mubarak's commander-in-chief of the armed forces as well as his chief of staff soon after taking office, had created an image of himself as a revolutionary leader intent on cleaning up the establishment and creating a new, more democratic political and administrative system. In the aftermath, the selection and promotion of military officers seen as sympathetic to the Muslim Brotherhood was both unethical and highly costly.
 
Gen. Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, considered to be sympathetic to the cause, was appointed the new defense minister. To be sure, Gen. al-Sisi was conservative, observed by the fact that in June 2011, he had publicly justified giving virginity tests to female demonstrators, something he was later forced to retract. Less than a year after his appointment, it was this general, thought to be a sympathizer, who deposed Morsi.
 
So far, Gen. al-Sisi is under no illusion that the transfer of power can wait. Interim President Adly Mansour's transition timeline consists of four key features: a panel to be formed within 15 days to review the constitution, constitutional amendments to be finalized and put to referendum in four months, parliamentary elections to be held by early 2014 and presidential elections to be called once a new parliament convenes.
 
It seems that the army has learned lessons from back when they held political power after Mubarak. It was during this time that the armed forces and the Muslim Brotherhood were partners, albeit rather uneasy ones. The former had been putting forward a plan to remain in power during the transitional period, within which preparations were being made to hold elections, which the latter welcomed, being that it was the favorite to win due to its superior organization.
 
Experts have underscored the crucial issue of the Muslim Brotherhood's understanding of democracy and legitimacy. Mariz Tadros, a writer on the Brotherhood, published a story on the openDemocracy website emphasizing “that reducing democracy to a ballot box can only produce a majoritarian political order that is tyrannical and oppressive to difference. In order to produce an inclusive political order that is respectful of women's full citizenship rights, the rights of religious minorities and of socially and politically marginal groups, there has to be a disentangling between representation, power and influence, and the electoral process.” This was something that had also been noted earlier by Turkish President Abdullah Gül in the context of Turkey.
 
The popular uprising that took place in 2011, as part of the Arab Spring had three main points of issue, expressed by the slogan of bread, freedom and justice. Egyptians demanded whole-scale economic, political and legal reforms, which amounted to, in effect, systemic change. While the second part of this demand was met in terms of democratic elections, an incredibly blind eye was turned to the first and third demands. Therefore, political reforms were put in place, but the economic and legal reforms simply were not catered to. Of this three-legged chair, only one leg -- the political -- was lengthened, leaving a wobbly base for the government to sit on.
 
The aim of systemic change was never attained. The formal structures of democracy were established, though, in terms of economic changes, more of the same was practiced in regards to greater subsidies being channeled into bread and fuel to assuage the masses. As for legal matters, the constitution was changed, though it contained two major deficiencies. First, there was a very low turnout in the referendum, casting a shadow over its legitimacy. Second, and in relation to that, it was considered to represent only the Islamist notion of a national constitution, and thereby was not viewed as catering to the rest of Egyptian society. Tens of millions of Egyptians and the armed forces concluded that the descent into authoritarianism and chaos needed to stop -- which it did with the military intervention.
 
A week ago, Gen. al-Sisi gave a speech where he defended the decision to remove Morsi from power. He admitted that he had urged the president to hold a referendum on his rule several days before the intervention, but that this idea was totally rejected. Furthermore, the general reiterated that no group would be barred from politics, that each political actor would have the opportunity to participate in political life and that no ideological movement would be prevented from taking part.
 
This message of inclusion and participation was overshadowed a few days later by the freezing of assets of several Islamist leaders and the start of an investigation by Egypt's public prosecutors into the Muslim Brotherhood. The investigation concerns charges of spying, inciting the killing of protesters, attacking military barracks and damaging the economy. Needless to say, this does not lend weight to Gen. al-Sisi's self-declared intentions and political roadmap.
 
Apart from short-term political considerations, a longer-term problem concerns the population of Egypt -- estimated to be 85 million and expected to reach 100 million by 2030. This fact is a major problem for any Egyptian policymaker given that the next decade or two will mean the existence of a more populous new generation that will be looking for jobs and affordable staple goods.
 
This future scenario consists of many more angry young men asking tough questions and demanding simple answers. That would be a difficult test for any policymaker, whether he or she be a democratically elected civilian or a militarily appointed technocrat. In the next election, the participating political parties will have to inform the Egyptians of the very tough choices ahead, and the parties will have to accept the decision of the electorate.
 
The sooner the date of that election is announced, the better it will be for Egypt.