Ending the Syrian Crisis: Five U.S. Military Scenarios

The Middle East continues to grab the attention of the region and the wider world. In Egypt, the deposed president is still held in an undisclosed address by the Army who refuses to bow down to international pressures to release him. The constitution that was adopted under President Morsi began to be examined on Sunday by a panel consisting of ten legal experts, appointed by interim President Mansour to offer amendments to it. They have been given a month to draft changes paving the way for new parliamentary and presidential elections.
 
The plan is for the legal review - composed of four university professors and six judges - to present their proposed amendments to a fifty-member panel which is to comprise of religious officials, politicians, trade unionists as well as senior army officers. Women and youth have not been forgotten in this process with one in five members of the larger committee to consist of young people who were involved in the revolutionary street demonstrations as well as women. This panel is to have 60 days to discuss debate and review the suggestions for amending the constitution before it is put to a referendum, after which a parliamentary election will be held.
 
Syrian Conflict
 
Egypt is not the only country making its way onto the international security agenda. The ongoing civil war in Syria shows no signs of letting up. According to the UN more than 90,000 people have been killed in Syria since the uprising started two years ago with a further 1.7 million forced to seek shelter in neighbouring countries such as Turkey. This worsening human tragedy has led to reigniting questions relating to what the international community can do to defuse the situation and find a solution to this crisis.

An important development in this field took place in the United States when Senators asked the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin Dempsey to offer his opinions in solving the conflict. Dempsey replied in a written letter to Senator Levin, Chairman of the Committee on Armed Services, identifying and evaluating and assessing the available “options for the potential use of U.S. military force in the Syrian conflict”.
 
He noted that the U.S. had five military options available for use in the Syrian conflict:
 
i. Train, Advise and Assist the Opposition
ii. Conduct Limited Stand-off Strikes
iii. Establish a no-fly zone
iv. Establish buffer zones
v. Control chemical weapons
 
The first option would be the least costly. According to General Dempsey “this option uses non-lethal forces to train and advise the opposition on tasks ranging from weapons employment to tactical planning. We could also offer assistance in the form of intelligence and logistics. The scale could range from several hundred to several thousand troops with the costs varying accordingly, but estimated at $500 million per year initially. The option requires safe areas outside Syria as well as support from our regional partners. Over time, the impact would be the improvement in opposition capabilities. Risks include extremists gaining access to additional capabilities, retaliatory cross border attacks, and insider attacks or inadvertent association with war crimes due to vetting difficulties.”
 
Concerning the second alternative this would use “lethal force to strike targets that enable the regime to conduct military operations, proliferate advanced weapons, and defend itself. Potential targets include high-value regime air defense, air, ground, missile, and naval forces as well as the supporting military facilities and command nodes. Stand-off air and missile systems could be used to strike hundreds of targets at a tempo of our choosing. Force requirements would include hundreds of aircraft, ships, submarines, and other enablers.
 
Depending on duration, the costs would be in the billions. Over time, the impact would be the significant degradation of regime capabilities and an increase in regime desertions. There is a risk that the regime could withstand limited strikes by dispersing its assets. Retaliatory attacks are also possible, and there is a probability for collateral damage impacting civilians and foreigners inside the country.”
 
Opting for the third measure would entail using “lethal force to prevent the regime from using its military aircraft to bomb and resupply. It would extend air superiority over Syria by
neutralizing the regime’s advanced, defense integrated air defense system. It would also shoot
down adversary aircraft and strike airfields, aircraft on the ground, and supporting infrastructure. We would require hundreds of ground and sea-based aircraft, intelligence and electronic warfare support, and enablers for refuelling and communications. Estimated costs are $500 million initially, averaging as much as a billion dollars per month over the course of a year. Impacts would likely include the near total elimination of the regime’s ability to bomb opposition strongholds and sustain its forces by air. Risks include the loss of U.S. aircraft, which would require us to insert personnel recovery forces. It may also fail to reduce the violence or shift the momentum because the regime relies overwhelmingly on surface fires—mortars, artillery, and missiles.”
 
As for the fourth selection, force would be used to “protect specific geographic areas, most likely across the borders with Turkey or Jordan. The opposition could use these zones to organize and train. They could also serve as safe areas for the distribution of humanitarian assistance. Lethal force would be required to defend the zones against air, missile, and ground attacks. This would necessitate the establishment of a limited no-fly zone, with its associated resource requirements. Thousands of U.S. ground forces would be needed, even if positioned outside Syria, to support those physically defending the zones. A limited no-fly zone coupled with U.S. ground forces would push the costs over one billion dollars per month. Over time, the impact would be an improvement in opposition capabilities. Human suffering could also be reduced, and some pressure could be lifted off Jordan and Turkey. Risks are similar to the no-fly zone with the added problem of regime surface fires into the zones, killing more refugees due to their concentration. The zones could also become operational bases for extremists.”
 
The fifth and final alternative focused on preventing “the use or proliferation of chemical weapons. We do this by destroying portions of Syria’s massive stockpile, interdicting its movement and delivery, or by seizing and securing program components. At a minimum, this option would call for a no-fly zone as well as air and missile strikes involving hundreds of aircraft, ships, submarines, and other enablers. Thousands of special operations forces and other ground forces would be needed to assault and secure critical sites. Costs could also average well over one billion dollars per month. The impact would be the control of some, but not all chemical weapons. It would also help prevent their further proliferation into the hands of extremist groups. Our inability to fully control Syria’s storage and delivery systems could allow extremists to gain better access. Risks are similar to the no-fly zone with the added risk of U.S. boots on the ground.”
 
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff did suggest however that he did support “a regional approach that would isolate the conflict to prevent regional destabilization and weapons proliferation.” Similarly a moderate opposition should be supported with assistance being given to increasing their military capabilities, all the while continuing to maintain pressure on the Assad regime.
 
General Dempsey was candid over what had been learnt in the past decade “that it is not enough to simply alter the balance of military power without careful consideration of what is necessary in order to preserve a functioning state. We must anticipate and be prepared for the unintended consequences of our action.” He warned that if the Assad regime were to collapse in a heap of rubble then despite all good intentions extremists could gain control and “unleash the very chemical weapons we seek to control.”
 
The use of force in his opinion was “no less than an act of war” and as options would be deliberated one needed to be aware of multiple risk assessments. These related not only to American military forces, but to the country’s overall global responsibilities. Underlining the facts of budget cuts and fiscal uncertainty, certain preferences involved important opportunity costs: “Some options may not be feasible in time or cost without compromising our security elsewhere”.
 
Furthermore, once a decision had been taken, the role of planning would be vital, to avoid being dragged into a quagmire. In this respect he called for multilateral action, indicating his opposition for any unilateral military action and drew attention to financial costs by stating that “working in concert with our allies and partners” would lead to burden-sharing and solidify the outcome.
 
Evaluation
 
The cheapest option would be the first one; training, advising, and assisting the Syrian opposition. This would be the least expensive in financial terms and have the added benefit of not increasing tensions further, compared to the other four identified alternatives. Having said this, however, this policy has been in effect - albeit in a clandestine manner for the past few months, if not longer - and has yet to provide any tangible results.
 
Escalating the crisis would be costly for all concerned, even more costly for those who are the weakest, namely innocent Syrians as well as those communities on bordering Syria. Moreover, it must not be forgotten that this option requires thousands of soldiers as well as support from key regional actors such as Turkey. It is not a risk-free option either, with the possibility of the extremist elements of the opposition becoming militarily stronger and more active.
Concerning the second alternative, for this a considerable amount of financial resources are required as well as having the political courage to defend both civilian deaths as well as holding military funerals for those returning home in body bags. As for the third choice, that would entail air superiority over a wide area, therefore, creating a large financial burden to be borne by the taxpayer.
 
The creation of safe havens in neighbouring countries such as Turkey is the key goal of the fourth preference. This would involve air and ground forces, whilst training and organising the opposition. The benefit of such a strategy is to alleviate some of the pressures on Turkey and other neighbouring countries with the underlying dangers remaining the high financial costs involved, as well as extremists operating outside of these safe havens against both Syria and Turkey.
 
The costliest alternative is the fifth one which foresees air strikes and air superiority over Syrian airspace. Despite costing the most in terms of dollars, it fails to guarantee securing all of Syria’s chemical weapons stock, laying open the possibility of extremists gaining possession of such weapons.
 
Therefore, none of the alternatives offered demonstrate a clear path to end the conflict. They can either escalate the conflict by a few, or many notches. In this respect, one needs to bear in mind that these are choices within the gamut of the military. The Syrian crisis certainly contains a large military dimension, but it would be incorrect to identify it as simply a military conflict requiring a military solution.
 
Choices and Prices
 
Syria is the territory on which great power politics are played out. Furthermore, its domestic dynamics are affected by the ongoing developments of the Arab Spring as well as the unpredictable stability of its eastern and western neighbours: Iraq and Lebanon. When the ongoing dialogue that its northern neighbour is continuing with a terrorist organisation - namely Turkey and the PKK - is added to the equation, the Syrian crisis becomes an almost intractable one. The latter becomes a good opportunity for Damascus to concentrate its efforts on, to extract a high price for Turkish involvement.
 
In that respect, it may appear that Ankara would prefer the fourth option. That would still entail both a large financial and military input by the Turkish taxpayer in terms of contributing soldiers and personnel into safe havens organised on Syrian territory. News regarding casualties in such a venture would not be surprising, and result in Turkish public opinion being sorely tested with the death of each beloved son.
 
In the final analysis, these five military options are only the ones that can be publicly aired. There are most certainly other military as well as political alternatives that are being discussed and debated behind closed doors both within Washington and with their allies. Whilst it is difficult to predict which one of the five scenarios will take place, it is far easier to note that the United States will not act alone: neither in Egypt nor in Syria. It is time for Washington’s allies to either come up with imaginative solutions themselves, or select from the menu provided and face the consequences. These costs are quite naturally much higher for bordering countries than those in the far north.