Military Intervention in Egypt: A First Cut Analysis

The coup d’état which took place last week in Egypt has ended the speculation that had been mounting for several days at the end of June. Quite naturally it has captured the attention of the region and the rest of the world. This came only after five days of mass protests (30 June - 3 July) in the capital city and other cities which was mainly organised by the Tamarod (Rebel) movement. The protesters accused President Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood of having taken two actions: firstly, pushing forward a radical Islamist agenda which went against the wishes of most Egyptians and secondly, of mishandling the economy.
 
The coup deserves to be identified as an important development because a democratically elected yet authoritarian head of state was removed from power by the military. A related second important fact concerns the direct involvement of the military in civilian politics.
 
Throughout the reign of President Mubarak the army had stood behind the scenes having co-opted the National Democratic Party (NDP) as its political partner. Real authority remained with the army although through the facade of a political party, political power was seen to be in the hands of the NDP.
 
In this respect one could argue that the Army was the iron fist and the NDP the velvet glove. Throughout the terms in office of Presidents Sadat and Mubarak the army stood behind the scenes, peering through the political curtain, having co-opted the National Democratic Party as its political partner.
 
Therefore, looking through Egyptian history it is clear to see the military has played a prominent role, albeit not as public as demonstrated by this most recent episode. One needs to remember after all, that it was a revolution led by Colonel Nasser in1952, leading the Egyptian Armed Forces that overthrew the King and declared Egypt a modern republic.
 
After the fall of Mubarak the military had set up a Supreme Council of the Armed forces (SCAF) which had considerable powers. It is highly likely that the new provisional government will be very different compared to the previous SCAF.
 
Thus the recent episode of intervening in politics by the Armed Forces is important in that it highlights the fact that the army has felt it had to play a more prominent and open role - rather than standing by the sidelines or remaining as a back-seat driver. Certainly there were massive protests - in fact the protests the past week have been the largest in Egypt's history, more so than were protesting against President Mubarak two years ago at the height of the Arab Spring.
 
Whilst some political figures such as El Baradei assert that it was such protests that effectively became the last straw, there is no consensus over this interpretation. He has publicly stated that Egypt faced a very difficult choice declaring the country had been stuck "between a rock and a hard place". He criticized President Morsi for trying to increase his personal power, turning himself into a virtual dictator. It was such an act that in El Baradei’s eyes led to the legitimacy of the president to be questioned by millions.
 
His interpretation of the army’s intervention therefore, is to locate it within the context of Egypt’s political polarization. According to El Baradei if the army had not intervened then violence could have broken out leading to a civil war which would have resembled Somalia in terms of its ferocity and loss of life.
 
In the immediate aftermath of the fall of Morsi it looked increasingly likely that the technocratic provisional government would be headed by the Nobel Peace Prize winner Professor El Baradei. In fact just as this was being publicly sounded out, the ultra-conservative Islamist Salafist Al-Nour Party strongly objected and effectively vetoed El Baradei’s appointment.
 
Looking at the potential role of El Baradei may play; it is worth remembering that his prestige has always been much higher externally than internally. He has received much less support domestically when compared to the backing he has received outside of Egypt.
 
ElBaradei has commented that Egypt is an emerging democracy which is a correct observation. Given this truth one must then analyse the situation within that specific context. This is not a coup that has taken place in contemporary Italy or Mexico. Democratic norms, standards and ways of behaviour associated with established democracies should not therefore be invoked to evaluate emerging democracies such as Egypt. Just as one swallow does not a summer make, one should not fall into the trap of thinking democracy has been firmly established after only a single free election.
 
However, when looking at the mass protests taking place against the president over the past week it was clear to see that the liberal and secular groups were leading from the front, in many ways inviting the army to enter the political fora. Whilst there was huge numbers in terms of those opposing the president, it was also plainly obvious that this was indeed a highly divided opposition.
 
The army felt that there was no alternative but to intervene due to the fact that it had to act on its ultimatum. It had expected President Morsi to comply and try to find a negotiated settlement with the opposition. Having said this, in all honesty, that was a near-impossible task. It came as quite a surprise to the military to witness the strong opposition by the Moslem Brotherhood and President Morsi when they did not attempt to conciliate, but aggressively stood their ground rather than accepting the ultimatum.
 
After the gauntlet had been laid down by the president the military felt it had no alternative but to directly intervene as it had initiated this showdown. The army had indeed threatened, although perhaps hoped it would not have to act. One could argue that this was a miscalculation or that all the possible outcomes had not been fully thought through.
 
In the final analysis, the major problem about this recent episode in Egyptian politics relates to the fact that it has set a dangerous precedent. That relates to whether sufficient protests against a democratically elected government or head of state, can be a means to overthrow them through extra-democratic means; via using the military, thereby inviting the military into the political arena.