Saudi-Iraq Relations within the Grip of Tension and Détente

As a result of the pressure of former Prime Minister al-Maliki and other Shiite groups on the government, Baghdad government declared Ambassador Samir bin Sabhan persona non grata in August 2016. In the aftermath, Saudi Arabia withdrew its ambassador in August and downgraded the diplomatic relations to the charge d’affaires level. Despite all these developments, Baghdad visit of Saudi Minister of Foreign Affairs Adel al-Jubeir on 25 February 2017 brought the debates over a détente to the agenda again.

When we look back at the historical background of the bilateral relations between two neighbouring countries of the Persian Gulf, Saudi Arabia and Iraq, it is possible to observe that the tensions between the parties have never ceased and the relations have never been normalized due to regional competition and instability, putting aside the strategic partnership in the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War. However, as of mid-2014, the steps that were taken bilaterally started to reveal the indications of a détente in the relations between Riyadh and Baghdad. Even though there are some disagreements and differences of opinion between two countries on certain matters, the official visit of Saudi Minister of Foreign Affairs Adel al-Jubeir to Iraq on 25 February 2017 has a historical significance for the relations between both countries. Al-Jubeir’s visit to Baghdad brought about two questions concerning what the phase of the relations between Riyadh and Baghdad is and how these relations will be shaped in the future. Within this framework, Saudi-Iraq relations will be taken into consideration in the light of the latest developments after summarizing the relations between both countries primarily from the end of the Cold War until the Arab Spring.

Bilateral Relations from the End of the Cold War until the Arab Spring

Within the period lasting from the end of the Cold War to the Arab Spring, there were three important regional developments which determined the course of Saudi-Iraq relations. These developments were the 1990-91 Gulf War, the 2003 Iraq War and the withdrawal of the US army from Iraq in 2011. It can be said that each regional development reshaped the attitudes of the relevant countries towards each other and the nature of the relations between the parties. The expansionist policy that Iraq followed in the Persian Gulf by invading Kuwait, its southern neighbor, on 2 August 1990 caused Iraq, which was considered as an important regional ally against the expansionism of Iran, to become an imminent regional threat to Saudi Arabia. Riyadh government immediately took measures and launched preparations in order to ensure its security against Iraq’s new potential expansionist/aggressive attitude and to redress the changing regional balance of power. Saudi government first put an end to the diplomatic relations with Baghdad and closed its diplomatic mission in this province. King Fahd of Saudi Arabia demanded military support from the USA in order to ensure the security of the country against a potential attack from Saddam Hussein. Upon this demand, as of 7 August 1990, the USA deployed its land and air forces in Saudi Arabia and its naval forces sent their warship to the Persian Gulf under the name of Operation Desert Shield, in order to ensure the security of the country.

Preparations were initiated afterwards to end Kuwait’s invasion with the purpose of redressing the regional balance of power and an international coalition including Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Syria was formed in the region. Within the scope of this coalition, only the number of US soldiers in Saudi Arabia, together with the troops sent upon the Operation Desert Shield launched in January 1991 in order to repel Iraq from Kuwait, reached 500,000. The coalition forces deployed in Saudi territory in January 1991 launched the Operation Desert Shield and cleared Kuwait from Iraq. Having played a key role in the Gulf War, Saudi Arabia not only opened its territory to foreign soldiers but also took part in the operation. The war cost Saudi Arabia approximately 36 billion dollars. Within the 1993-2003 period after the Gulf War, Saudi Arabia maintained its security cooperation with the USA against Iraq and Iran that followed expansionist purposes in the Persian Gulf. Saudi government which perceived Iran and Iraq as a threat supported the dual containment policy of Clinton administration against these two countries. The US soldiers deployed because of the Iraqi threat did not withdraw until 2003.

Within this period, the second important development shaping the relations between two countries was the US invasion in Iraq in 2003. This invasion did not only change the domestic political balance in Iraq but the regional balance of power also turned upside down. The collapse of Baath regime and the seizure of power by the Shiite groups constituting the majority in Iraq as of 2005 increased Saudi Arabia’s regional security concerns again. Because Iraq which had a Sunni Arab identity served as a buffer zone preventing Iran with Shiite and Persian identity from becoming influential in the Arab world even though it was seen as a serious source of threat. The US invasion in 2003 removed this situation. Indeed, Riyadh government objected to the US invasion in Iraq due to this strategic plan and closed the US military bases built in its country for the Gulf War. What made the situation more complicated was the ties between Baghdad government and Tehran which became closer upon the sectarian solidarity. Having acted as a regional actor in the Middle East until the US invasion in 2003, Iraq turned into a field where the regional powers such as Saudi Arabia and Iran started to clash for influence when the Shiite came to power in Iraq and built closer ties with Iran.

At the same time, the third important development which was effective in the course of Saudi-Iraq relations was the withdrawal of US army from Iraq in December 2011. Before 2011, the military presence of the USA limited Iraq’s initiatives to enter the axis of Iran. However, the decision of withdrawal of Obama administration allowed Iran to become more influential in Iraq. Upon the end of the military presence of the USA, Iran gradually increased its influence in Iraq thanks to its room for maneuvre. This new conjuncture resulting from the increase in Iran’s power in the region led to an increase in Riyadh’s concerns about Tehran and Baghdad. Furthermore, Nouri al-Maliki, the leader of the country since 2006, took opportunity of the US withdrawal and started to follow sectarian policies in the domestic politics and increased the pressure on Sunni groups to such an extent that an arrest order was given by al-Maliki government for Vice-President Tariq al-Hashimi, a significant Sunni politician, after the withdrawal of the USA. Having made use of the discriminatory policies of al-Maliki government against Sunni groups, DAESH took the support of Baathist officers and pushed the country towards a war. In such an environment, the tensions climbed up because of the reciprocal accusations in Saudi-Iraq relations. While Riyadh accused al-Maliki government of carrying out sectarian acts, al-Maliki government blamed Riyadh for supporting DAESH and being responsible for the civil war in the country.

Bilateral Relations under Haider al-Abadi’s Term

Having followed more balanced policies instead of Prime Minister al-Maliki who conducted sectarian acts in the domestic politics and shifted the country towards the axis of Iran in the foreign policy, Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi led to a new era in which the tensions decreased in the Riyadh-Baghdad relations when he came to power in September 2014. Saudi government welcomed al-Abadi as the Prime Minister and sent a congratulatory address to the new government. During this period in which the tensions decreased in the bilateral relations, Iraqi President Fuad Masum accompanied by the ministers of foreign affairs and interiors paid an official visit to Saudi Arabia in November 2014. Within the scope of the talks in Riyadh, President Masum met King Selman and had the opportunity to discuss the mending of the fences between both countries and the regional developments. Furthermore, Riyadh government invited Prime Minister al-Abadi to Saudi Arabia in March 2015. Saudi government decided to restore the diplomatic relations with Iraq by opening the dialogue channels with the new government. In December 2015, the Baghdad Embassy was opened. In January 2016, Saudi Ambassador took office. Having opened a consulate in Erbil in February 2016, Saudi Arabia increased the number of its diplomatic missions to two in Iraq. Therefore, the diplomatic ties which were severed upon Iraqi invasion in Kuwait were rebuilt 25 years later.

Nonetheless, the tensions started to climb up again while such normalization steps were taken. What led to this was the increase in the military presence of Iran in Iraq through al-Hashd al-Shaabi, under the name of fight against DAESH, and the deepening of its political influence, which caused the unrest of its regional competitor Saudi Arabia. As of the moment at which he took office, Saudi Ambassador criticized the military presence of Iran in Iraq in his statements, which caused the rise of tensions that would turn into a low density crisis later. As a result of the pressure of former Prime Minister al-Maliki and other Shiite groups on the government, Baghdad government declared Ambassador Samir bin Sabhan persona non grata in August 2016. In the aftermath, Saudi Arabia withdrew its ambassador in August and downgraded the diplomatic relations to the charge d’affaires level. Despite all these developments, Baghdad visit of Saudi Minister of Foreign Affairs Adel al-Jubeir on 25 February 2017 brought the debates over a détente to the agenda again. Through this visit, a Saudi Minister of Foreign Affairs visited Iraq for the first time as of 1990 when the diplomatic ties were severed.

Minister al-Jubeir held separate meetings with his counterpart Ibrahim al-Jaafari and with Prime Minister al-Abadi during the talks in Baghdad. During the mentioned meetings, opinions were exchanged about the bilateral relations and regional developments and the possible fields of cooperation were discussed. In his statement about the visit, al-Jubeir indicated that Saudi Arabia wished to build high-level relations with Iraq as a brother country. Besides, al-Jubeir who underlined the common threats such as extremism and fight against terrorism and common opportunities such as trade and investment stated that Saudi Arabia was at an equal distance to al the elements of Iraqi society and backed the territorial integrity and political stability in Iraq. On the other hand, in the statement of the Iraqi Prime Minister’s Office, it was registered that possible issues of cooperation, notably the fight against DAESH were discussed between both countries. It is possible to categorize the issues on which Riyadh and Baghdad governments compromised during the visit of al-Jubeir under three headings. The first heading is that Saudi Arabia will support Iraq in the fight against terrorism to be conducted under US leadership. Secondly, the diplomatic relations which were downgraded to the charge d’affaires level by Saudi Arabia in Baghdad in August 2016 will be increased to the ambassador level again. Thirdly, direct flights will start between both countries.

Of course, it comes to mind why Saudi Arabia has made such an important move in a political environment in which the relations have been tense due to the ambassador crisis. It can ba said that there are two separate factors which have led Saudi Arabia to such a move if the regional balances are taken into account. The first factor is related to the potential Middle East policy of Trump administration. Having reshaped the foreign policy of the country, Trump administration describes its priorities in the Middle East as putting an end to Iran’s expansionism and eliminating the DAESH terror. These priorities set by Washington mostly overlap the regional goals and priorities of Riyadh. Besides, Trump administration considers reviving the strategic partnership with Saudi Arabia, its traditional ally, and sharing the economic costs until they reach their goals in the Middle East. The US administration thinks that Saudi Arabia should support the fight against DAESH to be conducted in Iraq and the tension between Riyadh and Baghdad should be removed as a priority in order to downgrade Iran’s influence. Therefore, it is thought that the US administration leads Saudi Arabia and Iraq to act in this way. The visit of US Secretary of Defense James Mattis to Iraq in February and the meetings between him and his Saudi counterpart Mohammed bin Salman makes such an interpretation more meaningful. The second factor can be interpreted as the reflection of the regional fight for influence between Saudi Arabia and Iran. When we take into account the visits of Iranian President Hassan Rouhani to Omman and Kuwait in February, it is understood that both countries try to increase their regional influence by resolving the political disagreements with the countries under the influence of the other. Iraq should primarily go out of the axis of Iran in the domestic and foreign policy and act as a more independent actor so that Riyadh-Baghdad relations can be normalized and reach a stable structure.