The Trump Administration’s Regional Approach in Great Power Competition: U.S. Strategy in the Red Sea and North Africa

During Donald Trump’s second term, U.S. policies in the Red Sea basin and North Africa are likely to be shaped within the framework of regional security, economic dynamics, and great power competition. Among Trump’s priorities could be balancing regional rivals like China and Iran, investing in energy projects, and taking strong steps in counterterrorism. Within this context, the fundamental direction of U.S. policies during the Trump administration could be examined through competition, coopetition and cooperation at the sub-regional systems level, as well as efforts to address conflicts and the threat of terrorism in the Red Sea basin and North Africa.

Dimensions of Competition and Cooperation at the Sub-Regional Systems Level
In Trump’s second term, U.S. policies toward the Red Sea basin and North Africa are expected to be shaped by a strategic framework emphasising competition with rival powers like China, Russia, and Iran while aiming to deepen relations with regional allies as coopetition and cooperation. One of the U.S.’s priorities in this regard would be establishing stronger strategic partnerships with countries such as Djibouti, Saudi Arabia, Israel, the UAE, and Egypt to counterbalance China’s growing economic and military presence in the Red Sea. Notably, the Trump administration might aim to expand military and economic cooperation with these countries, particularly to offset the influence of China’s military base in Djibouti. Additionally, by encouraging the involvement of American companies in regional infrastructure projects, the U.S. might seek to offer alternatives to China’s Belt and Road Initiative and support projects managed by allied regional actors.

Russia’s influence in North Africa, especially in Libya and Sudan, is another critical concern for the Trump administration. While supporting the political resolution process in Libya, where there is currently “relative stability,” Trump’s administration could aim to counterbalance Russia’s influence by establishing closer defence partnerships with countries like Egypt and Algeria and offering them alternatives to Russian arms. Thus, the U.S. may prioritise efforts to deepen military partnerships with regional countries to address their security needs.

Limiting Iran’s influence in the Red Sea basin remains a core component of Trump’s Middle East policy. Iran’s threat to regional maritime security through the Houthis in Yemen is a strategic concern for the U.S. This issue has taken on a new dimension, particularly since the Houthi attacks on Israel-linked commercial vessels during the ongoing Israel-Gaza war that began on October 7, 2023. To counter this threat, the Trump administration may continue close military cooperation with allies like Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Additionally, measures to limit Iran’s influence are expected, such as expanding intelligence sharing and strengthening economic sanctions to cut off support for proxy groups in the region.

The relationships with U.S. allies in the region also occupy an important place in Trump’s strategy. Türkiye, with its increasing influence in the Red Sea and North Africa and as a NATO ally, is expected to remain a strategic partner in the region for the U.S. The Trump administration may look to enhance cooperation and coopetition with Türkiye, considering its military presence in Libya and Somalia and its strong diplomatic and economic presence in Sudan, Egypt, Ethiopia, and Algeria. Such cooperation could encompass areas of mutual interest, including mediation, connectivity, counterterrorism, and energy security.

The UAE is another critical ally, especially given its normalisation process with Israel, which has altered regional strategic balances. By deepening cooperation in defence and intelligence with the UAE, the Trump administration aims to curb Iran’s influence in the region. The UAE’s port investments and military presence in the Red Sea are likely to be acknowledged as long as they align with U.S. strategic interests in the region.

Meanwhile, Israel continues to be a robust U.S. ally in the Red Sea and Eastern Mediterranean. The ongoing Israel-Gaza war since October 7, 2023, however, has complicated the U.S.’s strategic calculations in the region. The Trump administration will likely continue to provide strong support to Israel in the conflict by increasing military and intelligence cooperation. At the same time, the potential for the Gaza conflict to hinder normalisation between Israel and other Arab countries could prompt the Trump administration to support Israel’s security-centred efforts. In this context, Saudi Arabia remains central to the U.S. security strategy in the region, especially against the Houthi threat in Yemen. Following the Gaza conflict, however, Riyadh is expected to approach normalisation with Israel cautiously. To counter Iran’s regional influence, the Trump administration may aim to strengthen defence cooperation with Saudi Arabia and support its port and infrastructure projects in the Red Sea, thereby fostering regional economic development.

Approach to Regional Issues
Donald Trump wins the November 2024 election, his second term could see noteworthy shifts or continuities in U.S. policies toward regional conflicts and issues like the Sudanese civil war, the Eastern Mediterranean, and the Western Sahara. Considering Trump’s previous foreign policy approach, characterised by a focus on domestic priorities and national interests, his policies on these three issues are likely to remain pragmatic, interest-driven, and lower in engagement.

While the Sudanese civil war may not pose a direct threat to U.S. interests, the Trump administration could monitor developments in Sudan closely due to potential instability and the threat of terrorism. Sudan’s strategic location and proximity to the Red Sea render it significant for the U.S. as a maritime security and trade corridor. However, a high-cost policy involving military intervention or direct engagement in Sudan is unlikely. Instead, Trump’s administration could adopt a limited approach through humanitarian aid and economic sanctions. Appointing limited diplomatic representation to the region and issuing statements in support of a swift end to the conflict could form the foundation of this approach. Given the irrevocable stance of the Sudanese factions, it is probable that the Trump administration would opt for a low-engagement policy through economic sanctions, diplomatic calls, and humanitarian aid to limit the regional impact of the civil war and prevent Sudan from directly harming U.S. security interests.

In North Africa, disputes in the Eastern Mediterranean, directly affecting the interests of Egypt and Libya, hold importance for the Trump administration, particularly in terms of energy security and the interests of American companies in the region. The Trump administration’s efforts to secure access to oil and gas resources in the Eastern Mediterranean may bring about an economically driven approach focused on supporting the activities of U.S. energy companies in the region. Trump’s administration may seek to strengthen its economic presence by increasing American investments in regional energy projects, thus advancing a strategy that maintains the U.S. presence without direct involvement in military tensions or competition with other global actors.

In North Africa, Trump’s approach to the Western Sahara issue, a longstanding problem in the Maghreb, could continue to be pragmatic and focused on U.S. interests. In 2020, the Trump administration took a diplomatic step by recognising Morocco’s sovereignty over Western Sahara. Following this step, support for Morocco’s control over Western Sahara could be maintained, aiming to enhance trade and strategic cooperation with Morocco. While an increased U.S. military presence in Western Sahara is unlikely, strengthening trade and investment relations with Morocco is a probable policy. Accordingly, the Trump administration may contribute to regional trade programs designed to support Morocco’s economic growth and development efforts in Western Sahara. This approach implies that an economically stable Western Sahara under Moroccan sovereignty could contribute to overall security from North Africa to the Sahel and align with U.S. interests.

In summary, U.S. policies toward the Sudanese civil war, Eastern Mediterranean, and Western Sahara under Trump’s second term are likely to focus on protecting U.S. interests through a low-engagement approach. The Trump administration could adopt a pragmatic approach in the Eastern Mediterranean, prioritising energy interests and supporting the operations of U.S. companies. In the Western Sahara, Trump’s administration may aim to maintain policies recognising Moroccan sovereignty and expanding economic cooperation with Morocco, supporting a regional stability framework that aligns with U.S. interests. Through such a low-cost and interest-driven strategy, the Trump administration may prefer to respond to these regional challenges with policies centred on local dynamics.

Conclusion
Under Donald Trump’s second term, U.S. policies in the Red Sea basin and North Africa are expected to centre on limiting the influence of global rivals like China, Russia, and Iran, safeguarding energy security, and pursuing a low-cost strategy. This strategy is likely to prioritise economic interests, support existing alliances, and ensure access to energy resources through a pragmatic approach rather than military interventions.

In conclusion, U.S. policies toward the Red Sea and North Africa under Trump’s second term are anticipated to be shaped by a low-cost, interest-driven, and indirect influence strategy through regional allies. This strategy suggests that the Trump administration is likely to safeguard its interests by leveraging economic and diplomatic tools, seeking sustainable influence through local dynamics rather than direct military interventions.