During the first days of March 2026, following the U.S.-Israeli strikes on Iran, Iraq experienced one of its most tense periods in years, politically, economically, and socially, after a relatively calm phase, within a regional environment witnessing an unprecedented escalation in the conflict between the US and Israel on one side and Iran on the other. Following the military strike that targeted the Iranian leadership and the assassination of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, the region entered a sharp wave of escalation, and Iraq once again found itself at the center of the regional conflict equation, first because of its geopolitical location and second because of the presence of armed forces linked to interconnected regional axes ultimately tied to Iran.
Iraq witnessed a rapid series of political and security developments that underscored the fragility of its internal environment and the growing risk of being drawn into an indirect regional confrontation on its own territory. On March 1, unrest broke out near Baghdad’s Green Zone, while reports also indicated that several Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) members had been killed in an airstrike inside Iraq, further heightening tensions between armed factions and U.S. forces stationed in the country. On March 3, controversy deepened over the meaning of the “largest parliamentary bloc” after Supreme Judicial Council President Faiq Zaidan argued that it referred to the bloc that wins the elections rather than a coalition formed afterward, reviving a sensitive debate that has shaped Iraq’s political balance since 2010 and again exposing constitutional ambiguity. On March 4, Iraq suffered a near-total electricity blackout across most provinces, highlighting the fragility of an energy system tied to Iranian gas supplies, while security authorities announced the downing of two drones near Baghdad International Airport and explosions were reported in Erbil. By March 5, security concerns escalated further as counterterrorism forces launched sweeping operations in the Najaf and Karbala deserts following reports of unusual aerial movements and soldiers landing on Iraqi territory, while Iraqi leaders warned against the country being pulled into wider regional confrontation and stressed the need for a balanced policy.
These developments confirmed that Iraq remains a key arena of regional competition and were quickly followed by protests in Baghdad, Basra, Najaf, and Karbala after the strike on the Iranian leadership, with demonstrators condemning the U.S. and Israel and demanding a tougher Iraqi stance toward the U.S. military presence. The largest protests took place in Baghdad near the Green Zone, where crowds tried to move toward the U.S. Embassy before being blocked by security forces with reinforced deployments, tear gas, and road closures, while protesters in Basra gathered outside the U.S. Consulate and some foreign companies and solidarity vigils were held in Najaf, Karbala, and several universities. Politically, the protests reflected Iraq’s internal divisions, as Iran-aligned actors defended them as a response to repeated violations of Iraqi sovereignty, while others urged restraint to avoid direct confrontation with the U.S. The government tried to contain public anger without allowing attacks on diplomatic missions or foreign bases, highlighting how quickly regional conflict can activate the Iraqi street and reaffirm Iraq’s vulnerability as a theater of broader confrontation.
Motives behind the protests
The outbreak of protests in Iraq on the same day Khamenei’s death was announced, March 1, was not accidental but reflected several political dynamics. Wilayat al-Faqih is a political theory in Twelver Shia jurisprudence which holds that the jurist should lead the state during the occultation of Imam al-Mahdi. It was politically developed by Ruhollah Khomeini, and it constitutes the foundation of the Iranian political system, in which leadership is held by the Supreme Leader, the late Ali Khamenei. The doctrine has explicit supporters in Iran, as well as among certain currents in Iraq and Lebanon (especially within Hezbollah), in addition to groups in Yemen and Bahrain. Strong supporters of Wilayat al-Faqih are estimated at around 80-100 million people.
The speed with which protests emerged reflected the organizational capacity of Shia armed factions and Iran-aligned currents in Iraq, which possess ready-made mobilization networks, popular constituencies, and the ability to bring supporters into the streets on short notice. This helps explain why demonstrations appeared within hours of the announcement of Khamenei’s death.
The protests were not broad popular protests, but rather specific political-ideological protests. They were aligned with the Axis of Resistance and involved supporters of the PMF, Shia currents close to Iran, and ideologically committed youth, many of whom raised Khamenei’s pictures and Iranian flags. The protests were not revolutionary in nature, but symbolic, aimed at expressing anger and pressuring for the expulsion of U.S. forces. Some demonstrators attempted to reach the U.S. Embassy, but security forces prevented them by using tear gas, confirming that the protest was directed against the U.S. The protests also carried a predominantly Shia character, with participants coming from Shia-majority areas such as Baghdad, Najaf, Karbala, Basra, and southern Iraq, while Sunni and Kurdish participation was absent. This indicates that the event was tied to a Shia geopolitical framework linked to Iran. Even so, the motives behind the protests were more regional, political, and military than purely sectarian.
What to expect from the protests?
The scale of the protests under these circumstances remains uncertain, but a comparison with earlier episodes suggests that participation has so far remained more limited than in previous major moments of confrontation. After the assassination of Qassem Soleimani in 2020, demonstrations reached tens of thousands, while the 2019 embassy protests drew thousands to tens of thousands. By contrast, the protests following Khamenei’s assassination in 2026, including those linked to the current crisis in Baghdad, appear to have involved only hundreds or at most a few thousand participants. Although the present crisis is in many ways more dangerous and more complex, since it concerns the assassination of the Supreme Leader himself, these lower numbers still suggest hesitation and perhaps a deliberate policy of self-distancing by Iran-linked actors during this period.
The weaker turnout in Baghdad can be explained by several factors. Iraq is economically exhausted, which reduces the public’s capacity and willingness to sustain large-scale mobilization. Iraqi society is also less prepared for sectarian mobilization than it was in 2020, when the regional and domestic atmosphere was different. In addition, the factions themselves appear to be avoiding full escalation for now, which limits both the scope and intensity of street action.
The recent protests in Iraq following the assassination of Iranian Supreme Leader Khamenei point to three main possibilities. The first is an escalation by factions against U.S. bases, whether through rocket fire or drones, as well as possible attacks on oil companies and institutions linked to foreign interests in Iraq. The second is renewed political pressure to expel U.S. forces through the reintroduction of legislation calling for the withdrawal of foreign troops. The third is that Iraq may increasingly serve as an arena for proxy conflict; if the regional war expands, Iraqi territory could become a platform for missile launches and a field of operations for armed factions. At the same time, Iraq was not the only country to witness demonstrations after the U.S.-Israeli attack on Iran and the killing of Khamenei. Beyond 28 February 2026, protests also emerged internationally, although their character varied from one country to another, ranging from condemnation of the war to support for the strike and even celebration of the weakening of the Iranian regime.
