The impact of the war between the U.S./Israel and Iran that began on Feb. 28 quickly reached Iraq. In addition to U.S. and Israeli airstrikes on certain targets in Iraq, attacks by Iran-backed militias on American forces and strategic locations such as Erbil Airport have made the war’s Iraqi dimension more visible. However, the its effects in Iraq were not limited to these reciprocal attacks. The situation has also highlighted areas of institutional competition within the country. In this context, tensions have risen particularly among the Counter-Terrorism Service, the Iraqi National Intelligence Service, and other security agencies, with this rivalry becoming one of Iraq’s main agenda items. The competition between the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), also known as the Hashd al-Shaabi, and other official security structures has even increasingly taken on the character of open conflict.
After the war began, tensions grew between certain militias under the umbrella of the Islamic Resistance in Iraq and the Counter-Terrorism Service. By March 14, some militias had implicitly threatened the service’s headquarters in Mosul, citing alleged cooperation between the Counter-Terrorism Service and U.S. forces around the Mosul Dam. For the first time since the war, the tension between the PMF and official institutions became pronounced, taking a new turn on March 21, when a drone attack targeted the Iraqi National Intelligence Service’s compound in Baghdad’s Mansour district.
The official statement by Abu Mujahid al-Assaf, the security chief of Kataib Hezbollah, is striking because it marks one of the largest militias within the PMF directly targeting Iraq’s official intelligence agency. The statement accused all Kurdish personnel within the Iraqi National Intelligence Service of being linked to Mossad and the CIA, while claiming that Sunni personnel were cooperating with Jordan, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and the U.S. Another critical aspect of the statement is its explicit assertion that “no new government can be formed in Iraq without the permission of the Islamic Resistance in Iraq.” This rhetoric indicates that the situation has moved beyond mere inter-agency competition and is approaching a level that could trigger direct institutional conflict. Moreover, considering that the PMF, to which Kataib Hezbollah is affiliated, are officially under the Iraqi prime minister, the country now faces a scenario where different elements of its security apparatus are effectively pitted against each other. This situation not only exposes Iraq to the influence of militias and U.S.-Iran regional tensions but also creates a deeper vulnerability capable of sparking internal conflict among state institutions.
One day after the drone attack on the Iraqi National Intelligence Service, rocket attacks targeted the Iraqi Counter-Terrorism Service on March 22, 2026. Ashab al-Kahf, a shadow militia operating under the umbrella of the Islamic Resistance in Iraq, accused the Counter-Terrorism Service of “protecting enemy elements.” The attack indicates that militias are now directly targeting certain state institutions in Iraq, viewing them as linked to the U.S. In this context, the Iraqi National Intelligence Service and the Counter-Terrorism Service have emerged as the two state security bodies most clearly under fire from other official institutions.
Historical background
The history of inter-agency competition in Iraq goes back much further. At the center of this rivalry is the Iraqi Counter-Terrorism Service, an elite unit established after the 2003 invasion that operates independently of the Defense Ministry’s conventional military forces and reports directly to the commander-in-chief of the armed forces — that is, the prime minister. From its inception, a significant portion of the unit’s personnel participated in training programs in the U.S., Australia, and Jordan, and underwent intensive instruction from U.S. military trainers. This has set the service apart from other security units in terms of both capacity and institutional culture. The Counter-Terrorism Service has also become a key arena of political competition in Iraq. Between February 2007 and May 2020, during the tenure of General Talib Shaghati, a Shia officer considered close to Iran, debates frequently arose in Iraqi public discourse over claims that the unit was being staffed with personnel loyal to the Dawa Party in line with Nuri Maliki’s policies. At the same time, figures such as Abdul-Wahab al-Saadi, who was known for close ties to the U.S. and served as the service’s deputy chief, played a crucial role in maintaining the unit’s relationship with American forces.
Another institution targeted by militias within the PMF, is the Iraqi National Intelligence Service, which was established in 2004 after the U.S.-led invasion, with Sunni officer Mohammed Abdullah Shahwani, known for his close ties to the U.S., appointed as its head. During the period when Iran, alongside the Dawa Party and Nuri al-Maliki’s administration, was expanding its influence in Iraq, pressure on Shahwani increased noticeably, with many observers noting Iran’s significant role in that rivalry. In fact, when Shahwani stepped down in 2009, he accused Iran of carrying out bomb attacks in Iraq and targeting personnel of the National Intelligence Service. That same year, Maliki appointed Zuheyr al-Sabawi as the agency’s new head. Under Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi, Mustafa al-Kadhimi, known for his close ties to the U.S., was appointed to lead the National Intelligence Service. During Kadhimi’s tenure as intelligence chief, before he became prime minister, groups like Kataib Hezbollah accused him of collaborating with the U.S. in the killings of Qassem Soleimani and Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis. As prime minister, Kadhimi increased pressure on the offices of certain PMF brigades through the Counter-Terrorism Service, reigniting tensions between the service and militias, which once again became a central issue in Iraqi politics.
New risks and political balance amid war
At this point, the war has evolved in Iraq from a matter of inter-agency tension into a situation that produces direct conflict. In other words, the long-running, largely covert rivalry has now escalated into open clashes. The attacks on the headquarters of the Iraqi National Intelligence Service and the Counter-Terrorism Service provide clear evidence of this shift. The increase in airstrikes targeting the PMF, coupled with the perception among militias that these agencies are linked to the U.S., could further fuel their aggressiveness toward official security institutions. Militias may intensify and expand attacks around Baghdad and its surroundings in an effort to weaken the capabilities of the agencies they associate with operations against them. Such a scenario would place even greater strain on the current Iraqi government’s ability to maintain balance among its security institutions.
A shift in this balance in favor of the PMF represents one of the greatest risks Iraq currently faces. Given the already weak oversight of PMF groups, gaining explicit or tacit approval from the government could push their actions against official institutions onto an even less controlled path. How the new government manages this balance will therefore be critical. At the same time, strong government measures aimed at tipping the balance in favor of the Iraqi National Intelligence Service or the Counter-Terrorism Service could provoke retaliatory moves by PMF groups that further distance themselves from the state. In this context, one of Iraq’s most serious challenges is the potential for certain PMF factions to adopt an increasingly anti-state security posture.
Groups that won a significant number of seats in the last parliamentary elections and are seen as the political extensions of the PMF have further strengthened the group’s influence in the political arena. This indicates the presence of a substantial political force that limits the government’s maneuverability against the PMF. Consequently, as long as the PMF maintains its military deterrence on the ground in Iraq, governments may be compelled to adopt a more cautious and measured approach when managing inter-agency balance.
In conclusion, the situation in Iraq following Feb. 28 shows that the war has not only introduced external security risks to the country but has also sharply exposed vulnerabilities within the state’s own security architecture. The fact that militias affiliated with or linked to the PMF have begun directly targeting official institutions such as the Iraqi National Intelligence Service and the Counter-Terrorism Service indicates that a long-standing, largely covert rivalry has now reached a far more dangerous threshold. This underscores the structural problem created by the PMF’s ambiguous position within the Iraqi state. On one hand, it is formally a security entity reporting to the prime minister; on the other, some of its components are capable of targeting other official state institutions. Moreover, considering the PMF’s political extensions, which can influence parliamentary and government formation processes, the issue is not limited to security alone but directly affects Iraq’s decision-making capacity and institutional cohesion. Going forward, the key challenge will not only be managing tensions between militias and official security agencies but also determining the extent to which the Iraqi state can maintain its institutional authority under this multi-layered pressure. If institutional authority cannot be upheld, the risks for Iraq will extend beyond regional threats and externally driven conflicts to an increasingly likely internal confrontation. While there is a possibility that such a scenario could evolve into an externally supported civil conflict, the process, which has already escalated into open clashes, appears unlikely to be contained or transformed into a stable Iraqi reality in the near term.
