The attacks launched against Iran on the morning of Feb. 28 as part of what the United States and Israel described as a preventive strike carried out in cooperation and coordination between Washington and Tel Aviv have evolved into a conventional war following Iran’s response under its right to self-defense. Israel described the war as “Lion’s Roar,” while the United States called it “Epic Fury.” In contrast to these aggressive expressions, Iran preferred the code name “Conquest of Khaybar,” which carries a more ideological connotation. The initial wave of attacks by the U.S. and Israel and Iran’s first response raised the question of whether the war would remain limited to military engagement between the parties. In this context, the increasingly deepening and intensifying scope of the clashes has brought to the forefront the possibility that the conflict could spread beyond the territorial borders of the parties. In this regard, the speed at which attacks between the U.S., Israel and Iran intensify, potential strikes on U.S. bases in Gulf countries, the position of proxy forces, and possible moves by the Houthis toward Bab al-Mandab are of particular importance.
- Positions and military strategy of the parties
The U.S. and Israel became the side that initiated the war through coordinated and joint strikes. Although the U.S. president — due to domestic legal constraints — preferred to use the term “operation” instead of “war,” this does not change the current situation. In his statement declaring war, President Donald Trump sought to legitimize the attacks by recalling the 1979 seizure of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, the 1983 bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut and the 2000 attack on the USS Cole. Regarding the scope and objectives of the operation, he stated: “We will destroy Iran’s missile industry and its navies, and we will no longer allow its terrorist proxies in the region to destabilize the world. Iran will never be allowed to possess a nuclear weapon. That is why last June, with Operation ‘Midnight Hammer,’ we struck its nuclear facilities in Fordo, Natanz and Isfahan. Now is the time to act against this regime, which refuses to abandon its nuclear ambitions.” Despite these comprehensive goals and indirect language, it was notable that he did not set regime change in Iran as an explicit objective.
With the attacks, Israel openly articulated regime change in Iran and concentrated its strikes on Tehran for that purpose. While Israel primarily targeted Iran’s political and military leadership, the U.S. struck military facilities, missile depots and nuclear sites in Tehran, Isfahan, Qom, Karaj and Kermanshah. Although approximately 1,500 sorties were carried out against Iran during the 12-Day War, the fact that nearly 1,400 airstrikes took place in just two days highlights the difference between the two processes and demonstrates the intensity with which the current wave of attacks began.
Despite Israel’s highly ambitious objective of regime change in Iran and the U.S.’ goal of destroying Iran’s military capacity, Iran’s primary objective is not to win the war but to survive. Compared with the U.S. and Israel, Iran has a significantly lower threshold. This places Iran in a relatively advantageous position despite its military weakness.
Given its existing military capacity, Iran is unable to directly confront the U.S., a global military power, and Israel, its closest ally. Under these circumstances, Iran has moved to diversify its instruments of war. In addition to responding directly to U.S. and Israeli strikes, targeting U.S. bases in Gulf countries and closing the Strait of Hormuz have emerged as Iran’s principal tools. Although proxy forces are not currently active on the battlefield, there are reports that, following the killing of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, certain proxy groups, particularly in Iraq, have carried out limited attacks. Months of U.S. military reinforcement of bases in Gulf countries, along with deployments to Jordan, Iraq and the Gulf, as well as Israeli territory, have become targets of Iranian strikes. In addition, disruptions to oil shipments through the Strait of Hormuz as a result of the war have added a political-economic dimension to the conflict. These factors have caused the war’s impact to extend beyond military engagement, expand territorially and affect the global economy.
On the second day of the war, the deaths of several senior military and political decision-makers, including Supreme Leader Khamenei, were officially confirmed by Iranian statements. Iran acknowledged that, in addition to Khamenei, Defense Minister Aziz Nasirzadeh, Secretary General of the Defense Council Ali Shamkhani, Chief of Staff Abdurrahim Mousavi, and Commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Mohammad Pakpour had been killed.
The death of Khamenei prompted a recalibration within Iran’s leadership. Under Article 111 of the constitution, until a new leader is selected, the powers of the office of the Supreme Leader are to be assumed by a three-member Interim Leadership Council composed of the president, the head of the judiciary, and a jurist chosen by the Guardian Council from among its members. As a result of this provision, the council is composed of President Masoud Pezeshkian, Judiciary Chief Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Eje’i, and jurist Alireza Arafi. Arafi’s membership in the Guardian Council, the Assembly of Experts, and the Expediency Discernment Council gives him significant influence within the Interim Council.
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Regional repercussions of the war
Gulf countries
Unable to mount a deterrent counterattack due to its limited capabilities, Iran has resorted to alternative methods to escalate the war. Exposed to coordinated airstrikes by Israel and the U.S., Iran retaliated the same day by targeting U.S. bases in the Gulf. As a result, a total of five Gulf countries — Qatar, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Kuwait, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia — became the focus of the attacks. These strikes caused casualties in some regional countries, such as the UAE, while inflicting significant material damage in others. In the short term, the targeted countries face a dilemma: on one hand, supporting U.S. intervention against Iran to curb Tehran’s actions and manage the risks of a potential regional power vacuum; on the other, being directly targeted by Iran against their national security. The direction of these choices will be shaped by each country’s capacity to bear costs, internal political balances and public pressure.
The main reason Iran prioritized strikes on U.S. bases in Gulf countries is that the bases are relatively easier targets and Iran seeks to avoid drawing a larger attack by directly targeting U.S. power in the Gulf. It is also plausible that Tehran aims to exert pressure on the Gulf states to influence U.S. policy. Although the missiles that struck Riyadh, Abu Dhabi, Manama and Doha did not cause significant casualties, the attacks exposed the fragility of these countries and threatened their long-standing ambitions to establish themselves as financial hubs. At the same time, Iran’s choice of targets carries the potential to broaden the front opposing it. Despite the Gulf states’ security ties with the U.S. and defense agreements worth hundreds of billions of dollars, being the first targets of the attacks may prompt a strategic reassessment in the region. In the medium term, the resulting political and security parameters could compel Trump to push for more comprehensive defense arrangements with these countries and closer alignment with Israel under the Abraham Accords framework. In short, the intensity of Iran’s strikes on U.S. bases in the Gulf will shape the trajectory of Iran-Gulf and U.S.-Gulf relations.
- Energy geopolitics from Strait of Hormuz to Bab al-Mandab
The Strait of Hormuz holds geoeconomic significance because it serves as the main export route for Gulf countries and facilitates a flow of trade with global economic implications. Thirty-four percent of seaborne oil trade and 20% of global LNG trade pass through the strait. Saudi Arabia is the largest oil exporter via the Strait of Hormuz, while Qatar leads in natural gas exports. Although this provides a short-term revenue boost for giants like Saudi Aramco, whose profit margins have been narrowing for 11 consecutive quarters, any logistical bottleneck could evolve into a structural crisis for all producers over the long term.
Eighty-four percent of the oil and crude passing through the strait is headed to Asian countries, while 20% of LNG goes to Europe and 80% to Asia. A potential closure of the Strait of Hormuz would put 20% of the global oil supply at risk, driving prices higher. Currently, Saudi Arabia’s East-West Pipeline, the UAE’s routes through Fujairah, and Iran’s Goreh-Jask Pipeline can together handle only about 15% of total shipments. This limited capacity would be insufficient to absorb the economic shock in the event of a closure.
The Bab al-Mandab Strait is a critical link between the Suez Canal and the Indian Ocean. A significant portion of global energy and container trade passes through this narrow maritime corridor. An attack on Iran would target not only Tehran’s military capabilities but also its regional deterrence architecture. While this may limit Iran’s ability to respond directly, it increases the likelihood of asymmetric retaliation through proxy actors.
At this point, the Houthis in Yemen are a key actor. During the Gaza conflict, they already disrupted maritime security in the Red Sea with attacks on commercial vessels. Framing attacks on Iran as an “assault on the regional resistance axis,” the Houthis have raised the prospect of a new engagement threshold. This means the Bab al-Mandab Strait could again be targeted with hybrid methods such as drones, ballistic missiles, unmanned maritime vehicles, and port sabotage. In the short term, the greatest risk is a disruption of commercial shipping and an increased military presence in the region as international navies expand their protection missions. This, in turn, raises the risk of miscalculations and the potential for direct conflict.
Proxy forces equation: Hezbollah, the PMF and the Houthis
Another tool Iran could use in response to a U.S. or Israeli attack is the network of allied groups: Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), also known as Hashd al-Shaabi, in Iraq, and the Ansarullah movement in Yemen. These groups’ ties to Iran are not solely ideological but are also shaped by strategic partnerships. Therefore, in the event of an attack on Iran, these forces would be expected to take action against Israel and the U.S. However, during the first 36 hours of the conflict, these groups remained inactive, contrary to expectations.
A few days before the attack, Israel reportedly issued a stern warning to the Lebanese government regarding Hezbollah. It emphasized that if Hezbollah became involved in a potential Iran-Israel conflict, Israel would target not only military facilities but also infrastructure and superstructure. Moreover, the Lebanese government was concerned that if Hezbollah launched attacks against Israel from Lebanese territory, Israel might respond with large-scale strikes or even expand its occupation south of the Litani River. Indeed, in the early hours of Feb. 28, simultaneously with U.S. and Israeli attacks, the Israeli military announced troop deployments to the Lebanese border to strengthen its positions.
Since November 2024, in what has been referred to as a “unilateral ceasefire,” Hezbollah members have not responded militarily to Israel, despite assassinations carried out with armed drones and the bombing of Hezbollah’s arsenals and facilities by warplanes. Although Hezbollah’s announcement that it would remain neutral hours after the conflict began surprised many analysts, the decision aligned with its policy of refraining from attacks on Israel under the ceasefire between Lebanon and Israel that has been in place since November 2024. Even in the first 36 hours of the conflict, there was no military engagement between Israel and Hezbollah.
The attacks on Iran launched by the U.S. and Israel have the potential to affect Iraq politically, economically, and in terms of security. Although integrated into the central armed forces, the Hashd al-Shaabi remain a vulnerable element within Iraq’s security structure, drawing attention as a factor that could extend the conflict into Iraq. The first military incident on Iraqi soil occurred in the Jurf al-Sakhar subdistrict (officially Jurf al-Nasr) of al-Musayab district in Babil governorate. While not officially confirmed, the attack was reported to have targeted Kataib Hezbollah. Despite striking the heart of the militia groups, the Jurf al-Sakhar attack was limited in scope and can be interpreted less as an effort to sideline the Hashd al-Shaabi and more as a warning to keep them from entering the conflict.
Statements from the Iraqi government reflect efforts to prevent the conflict from spilling into Iraq. The first high-level comments came from the Iraqi Foreign Ministry. Foreign Minister Fuad Hussein held phone conversations with his counterparts in Iran, France, and Türkiye. The common emphasis of these statements was that Baghdad does not view the crisis as a “military file to take sides in.” The ministry characterized the developments as a conflict that threatens Iraq’s sovereignty, internal stability, and citizen security, while carrying the risk of regional escalation. Key elements of the Iraqi Foreign Ministry’s discourse include “rejection of escalation,” “preventing Iraqi territory from becoming a conflict zone,” and “keeping diplomatic channels open.” In his discussion with Iranian counterpart Araghchi, Hussein used language rejecting military expansion in response to the “right of self-defense” discourse, clearly signaling Iraq’s desire to remain outside the tensions. This approach by the central government serves as a message to Iran, the U.S., and the Hashd al-Shaabi aimed at preventing the conflict from spreading into Iraq.
After Jurf al-Sakhar, Iraq’s second area to be directly affected by the conflict was Erbil. An Iranian attack on Harir Air Base, which hosts a U.S. military presence, was reported publicly. Meanwhile, U.S. air defense systems have intervened in response to Iranian counterstrikes. In this context, Iranian missiles and drones targeted by the U.S. over Erbil have been reported in the media as “explosions in Erbil.”
Continued tensions between the U.S., Israel, and Iran could mean that Erbil remains a target. For Iran, Harir Air Base is not seen solely as a military deployment site. Its relative proximity to the Iranian border makes the base an advanced position that could pose a direct security threat. As a result, Iranian attacks on Harir Air Base could serve not only military purposes but also political propaganda.
In this context, the targeting of Jurf al-Sakhar can be read not only as a tactical military strike but also as a deterrent message to Iran-affiliated armed groups in Iraq. The area has long been considered strategic due to its militia networks, logistics routes, and armed mobilization capacity. Meanwhile, the targeting of Harir Air Base in Erbil, which hosts U.S. military personnel, demonstrates that this message was not left unanswered. Thus, even if Iraq does not become a direct battlefield, it has become a zone for reciprocal strikes and symbolic displays of power. The base’s proximity, just 60 kilometers as the crow flies from the Iranian border, adds symbolic and strategic weight to the attack. On March 1, 2026, a convoy belonging to the Asaib Ahl al-Haq militia in Wajihiya subdistrict of al-Muqtadiya district in Diyala governorate and a target linked to the Babylon Movement in Tel Kaif district of Nineveh were also attacked.
In this context, the vulnerability in the security sector reflects not so much Iraqi actors entering the conflict as the transformation of Iraqi territory into a space for various actors to send messages, create deterrence, and conduct indirect retaliation. On the other hand, if the regional conflict spreads, nonstate armed groups in Iraq may show a tendency to become involved, potentially turning Iraq into a theater of conflict. In this regard, the effectiveness of political actors’ policies to control or pressure nonstate armed groups will determine the limits of vulnerability in the security sector.
Immediately following the attacks, the Houthis escalated their rhetoric and declared Israeli and U.S. targets legitimate, increasing the likelihood of a new wave of attacks in the Red Sea. While Iran’s direct retaliation is likely to concentrate along the Gulf corridor, proxy responses targeting maritime security emerge as a lower-cost but high-impact strategy. In this context, cautious stances from actors such as Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Egypt can be expected, as prolonged instability in the Red Sea would carry economic costs across a wide spectrum, from Suez Canal revenues to energy security.
In conclusion, the U.S. and Israel’s attacks on Iran are not merely a bilateral military tension; their effects are triggering a regional security chain that could quickly spread to the Red Sea, Bab al-Mandab, and the Gulf of Aden. The nature of the Houthis’ response will determine whether these waterways remain viable commercial arteries.
A striking point regarding the position of proxy forces is that they have not engaged in the conflict at the level expected of them. The question now is whether this inactivity will remain permanent or shift in Iran’s favor if the regime begins to falter. An even more important issue is whether these groups are adopting a survival strategy that involves distancing themselves from Iran. If the conflict continues, it will become easier to find clearer answers to these questions.
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Global repercussions of the war
The joint U.S.-Israeli attacks on Iran, which began Feb. 28 and have so far continued for three days, have the potential to shape the course of the global power struggle. So far, the positions of major international actors have not deviated significantly from their pre-conflict stances: the U.S. and some Western allies emphasize “deterrence” and the “nuclear threat,” while China and Russia are calling for restraint and questioning the intervention in terms of international law. European countries are pursuing a cautious diplomatic balance. However, the duration and scope of the conflict, as well as the nature of Iran’s response, could produce significant shifts in these positions. This potential change can be evaluated through five key dynamics.
First, the war has made the global order’s legitimacy crisis more visible. The erosion of liberal rules and institutions has paved the way for a power-centered order susceptible to selective interventions. The attacks on Iran have reignited debates over the U.N. Security Council’s ineffectiveness and the instrumentalization of international law. If the intervention cannot be grounded in an international legal framework, its impact will extend beyond Iran, potentially triggering regional fault lines and legitimizing similar uses of force in other parts of the world. This, in turn, would further erode the global normative order.
Second, in the context of U.S.-China competition, the struggle for control over energy and trade routes deepens the conflict’s geoeconomic dimension. The Gulf, the Strait of Hormuz, and the Eastern Mediterranean are central to global energy security. Considering China’s long-term energy agreements with Iran and its strategic investments under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the war could become a structural issue for Beijing. The U.S. bolstering its military presence in the region can also be seen as an effort to limit China’s economic influence. This situation carries the risk of pushing global competition onto a more lawless and bloc-oriented trajectory.
Third, the functionality of international institutions is undergoing a serious test. The U.N., the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and regional security mechanisms are facing scrutiny over their crisis-management capacity. If diplomatic channels cannot be activated and multilateral mechanisms fail to operate, the role of international institutions in resolving crises will be further weakened. In particular, suspending negotiation processes related to the nuclear issue could increase the fragility of the global nuclear regime.
Fourth, the war’s economic and political dimensions are having a direct impact on global markets. Sharp fluctuations in energy prices could increase inflationary pressures and impose significant costs, particularly on vulnerable economies. Global supply chains, already fragile after the pandemic and the war in Ukraine, could face a new wave of economic shocks if the conflict expands from Iran. This would deepen global economic uncertainty and heighten the risk of financial instability for developing countries.
Fifth, the erosion of security guarantees and the rise of a hard hegemonic rhetoric are noteworthy. The U.S.’s direct military intervention signals a redefinition of security assurances provided to regional allies. At the same time, it blurs the line between deterrence and escalation. Iran’s response, whether through proxy actors or directly, could expand the geographic scope of the conflict. This, in turn, could strengthen a “wild hegemonic” security discourse based on raw power rather than established norms.
Conclusion
The war triggered by the U.S. and Israeli attacks continues to show signs of escalation and territorial expansion. Despite differences in objectives between Washington and Tel Aviv, the intensification of their strikes and Iran’s retaliatory actions suggest this trend will continue for some time.
At this stage, it is difficult to interpret Trump’s contradictory statements about the war’s duration or his remarks hinting at possible negotiations as clear indicators of the conflict’s trajectory. A more accurate approach is to focus on the strategic calculations of the parties. From this perspective, the key dynamics that will shape the course of the war are: potential divergence between the U.S. and Israel on strategic objectives despite operational cooperation, and Iran’s capacity and duration of resistance.
Meanwhile, the way countries hosting the U.S. bases targeted by Iran perceive these attacks, along with the choices proxy forces make between entering the war in Iran’s favor or acting autonomously, will influence the conflict’s regional spread and intensity. The continuity of energy and commercial flows through the Bab al-Mandab and the Strait of Hormuz could also become a mechanism of pressure between the parties.
While the U.S.-Israeli strikes on Iran do not fundamentally alter existing global power balances, they have exposed the fault lines of an already fragile international order. The trajectory of the conflict may prompt global actors to recalibrate their positions. For this reason, the unfolding situation must be closely monitored not only for its military implications but also for its normative, economic, and geopolitical consequences.
