Assad’ S-300 Procurement Plans: Implications for Turkey and Israel

Recent news concerning a possible transfer of Russian S-300 surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems to Bashar al-Assad’s Baathist regime ignited more debates on the Syrian turmoil, which has already claimed tens of thousands of lives and displaced large numbers of Syrians.
 
Recent news concerning a possible transfer of Russian S-300 surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems to Bashar al-Assad’s Baathist regime ignited more debates on the Syrian turmoil, which has already claimed tens of thousands of lives and displaced large numbers of Syrians.
 
First chemical weapons, now the S-300s: devils that bring us together
 
Following the first Lebanon War in 1982, the Syrians had to face up to their conventional weapon shortcomings vis-à-vis the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) and stopped trying to maintain military strategic parity with Israel; instead Damascus focused on building a formidable and robust strategic deterrence. This shift fostered strategic weapons systems such as chemical (and allegedly biological weapons) and ballistic missiles on one hand, along with menacing air-defense capabilities on the other. Open-source military intelligence suggests that the Syrian Air Defense Command, which is a separate branch within the armed forces, possesses some 25 air defense brigades with several types of Russian manufactured 150 SAM batteries and overall aging air-defense systems, except the Pantsir-S1 (a combined short to medium range surface-to-air missile and anti-aircraft artillery weapon system) and some modern man-portable air-defense systems (MANPADS) (i.e., SA-18, SA-24). The Assad regime’s latest attempt to procure the S-300s should be seen in the light of the aforementioned military paradigm of “strategic deterrence,” particularly at a time when prospects of foreign intervention are being voiced by some experts and political figures.
 
The S-300 SAM system (NATO reporting name SA-10 Grumble) is a modern air and missile defense system produced in Russia. The system’s latest version, S-300 PMU-2 Favorit, is known as the SA-20 Gargoyle in Western military terminology.
 
The first and foremost problem with the Baathist dictatorship’s possible S-300 procurement, which puts Turkey and Israel on the same page, is the fact that this weapons system would make any military intervention deep within Syrian territory harder than ever. From a military standpoint, maintaining air superiority is a prerequisite for nearly all incursions, and suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) remains one of the most important missions when gaining dominance over the skies. Open-source military surveys (IISS and Jane’s) suggest that the Turkish Air Forces (TAF) possess one SEAD squadron (the 151st Squadron) with F-16Cs, while the Israelis have two squadrons of F-16Ds that are commissioned for suppressing enemy air defenses in a military operation. Both of the air forces, the TAF and the Israeli Air Force (IAF), use AGM-88 anti-radiation missiles for SEAD missions, which is an advanced armament, but can be overmatched by the S-300 SAMs’ operational range. Moreover, many “political analysts” are mistaken when reducing this possible procurement to a “solely S-300” debate. Clearly, in the event Assad’s tyrannical regime snatches up this SAM system, it would help the regime to create an overlapping network of air defenses by having the S-300s in the long-range tier along with the Pantsir-S1s at lower altitudes and shorter ranges (up to 20 kilometers) for protecting point-targets and the nearby S-300 batteries, as well as mid-tier systems such as the Buk-2M. Although this would not be tantamount to an integrated C4I structure for air and missile defense, as Israel aims to establish via Iron Dome–David’s Sling–Arrow systems, such a dense and various altitude and range air defense would definitely be bigger trouble than it is now.
 
In that sense, it should be noted that the more Turkey’s problematic neighbors assert greater control over their airspaces, the more Turkey’s power projection capabilities would be crippled. For instance, Turkish air superiority in northern Iraq via the 2nd Tactical Air Force Command (TAFC) is an essential factor for supporting further deployed units in and around the Bamerni airfield.
 
Secondly, due to their effective engagement range and radar capabilities, the S-300s would pose a serious threat to both Turkey and Israel’s commercial and military aviation activities. On Turkey’s end, depending on various deployment locations in northern and northeastern Syria along with the Mediterranean coasts, the S-300s can threaten the tanker/transport squadron based in İncirlik, civil aviation and the airspace between Turkey’s southern coasts and northern Cyprus. Due to its geopolitical handicaps, Israel’s situation would be even worse. The SAM system can track targets up to 300 kilometers and can operate within a 200 kilometer range, which would be enough to threaten flights over David Ben Gurion Airport along with many other air force units and airline aviation. Besides, the S-300s would maintain a permanent air-defense umbrella for Syrian ground units in case of a military buildup in the Golan Heights, and lessons learned from early stages of the Yom Kippur War, especially on the Sinai front, would definitely remind Israeli strategists that such a threat would be unacceptable. Thirdly, military balance assessments show that F-22 Raptor super-maneuverable stealth aircraft can overcome the S-300 and possibly the S-400 air defense systems, while F-35 multi-role aircraft would have a “good chance” vis-à-vis the S-300s. However, both Turkey and Israel lack F-22s, and they have to wait for the delivery of their new F-35 procurements, albeit in small numbers for the initial phases of the deal, while the S-300s can be deployed by the Baathist dictatorship in the forthcoming months.
 
Limits of the Russian engagement
 
On the other hand there are also some problematic issues that Assad’s forces might face in the event the Russians decide to deliver the S-300s. The most important problem would be absorbing this advanced weapons system. When talking about the S-300s, we should understand that it is not simply an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) being delivered to the 4th Armored Division, but a complicated system, the most advanced in Moscow’s inventory after the S-400, with complex radar and operational engagement parameters. At this point, the limits of “Russian involvement” come into the picture. Assuming that the procurement takes place in the coming months, then the Russians will have to decide whether they would just train Syrian officers or directly operate the weapons system. In other words, the S-300 issue is critical not only for its military outcomes but also its political reflections that would determine how “deep” Moscow wants to get into the Syrian turmoil.
 
Another important parameter with respect to the S-300 case is the “Hezbollah factor,” and game-changer arms transfer from “Assad to Nasrallah.” Israel’s game-changer weapons list contains M-600 Tishreen missiles (Syrian version of Iran’s Fateh-110), Yakhnot anti-ship missiles due to the system’s ability to threaten Israeli naval and offshore assets in the Mediterranean and advanced MANPADS and anti-tank guided missiles (ATGM). If Moscow delivers the S-300s to Assad, then the Israelis would need to add another game-changer to their long list. More or less, the same concern is relevant to Turkey. Even if the opposition successfully topples Assad, most likely Ankara would not like to see the next regime possessing strategic weapons as well as anti-access and area denial capabilities.
 
In sum, even in “post-Assad” scenarios, it would be fair to say that Turkey and Israel would desire a lesser Syrian military posture. Put simply, Patriot deployments under the NATO umbrella, which cover some key military and civilian population centers in Turkey, showed how significant Ankara’s risk calculations are. Likewise, the situation in the Golan Heights is a pressing danger for the Israelis, and the IAF has had to strike at weapons transfers to Hezbollah several times so far. Then again, during the current tense situation neither Israel nor Turkey can afford their “neighbor” Assad, who has been busy with butchering a nation for the sake of one more day in office, to arm himself with a serious SAM capability that would challenge TAF and IAF air superiority. Therefore, in the event the Russians insist on delivering this advanced system to the tyrannical Baathist regime, we may see the Turks and the Israelis complementing their “chemical spring” with an “air defense” one, again emanating from the Syrian turmoil.