Strategic Weapons and Missile Defense in Middle East: Assessing China's T-Loramids Project

Turkey's decision to acquire missile defense capabilities is a result of major military trends in the Middle East -- ballistic missile and weapons of mass destruction proliferation, to be precise -- and Ankara's regional leadership assertions.
 
Iran's aggressive push to enhance its strategic weapons inventory and lessons learned from the Syrian civil war, which showed Turkey's absolute dependence on the North Atlantic alliance for protection against ballistic missiles, have especially proven the very fact that as long as Turkey remains vulnerable to strategic weapons systems, its military capabilities will not match the nation's political dominance objectives in the Middle East.
 
Theoretically, strategic weapon systems (ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction [WMDs]) give Turkey's regional competitors, such as Iran and the Baathist dictatorship of Syria, the utmost capability of intra-war deterrence. In War Studies theory, intra-war deterrence can be defined as the ability to control escalation even within an ongoing war through strategic weapons systems. In other words, strategic weapons would enable a nation to gain critical capabilities to bargain, compel others or maintain a formidable deterrence against potential aggressions. The most recent example of intra-war deterrence via strategic weapons systems can be seen in the chemical weapons deal in Syria. By carefully escalating the civil war from light infantry operations to tactical level chemical weapons in about two years, the Baathist dictatorship managed to create room for bargaining with the West thanks to its WMD arsenal. In tandem, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad's forces also exploited the deterrence emanating from their notorious capabilities to prevent any further Turkish unilateral involvement.
 
In the 2000s, having seen the regional military trajectory and strategic weapons threat, which could foster Turkey's competitors' intra-war deterrence capacity, Ankara changed the Turkish Air Forces' (THK) “Turkish Armed Forces Air Concept” with the “Aerospace and Missile Defense Concept” that commissions the THK branch with defending against strategic weapons and gaining advanced aerospace capabilities. The long-range air and missile defense project, or T-Loramids, is envisaged within this very framework. Although Ankara has not openly labeled a specific nation as the primary reason behind the T-Loramids project, there is a solid ground to keep Turkey seriously concerned with the threat posed by Iran's ballistic missile program.
 
In the last decade, Tehran has aggressively increased its missiles' range and accuracy and developed solid fuel propulsion, which reduces the launch-cycle time and causes increasing unpredictability. These developments pose a significant challenge to Turkey's military superiority in the region. In addition, the Syrian civil war has shown that without adequate NATO protection, Turkish strategic assets and major population centers remain under constant threat from ballistic missiles. Furthermore, despite the chemical weapons deal, there is no good reason to disregard ballistic missile threats and potential biological weapons capabilities of the Baathist dictatorship.
 
In sum, while ballistic missile proliferation has been skyrocketing for years at Turkey's doorstep, Ankara cannot tolerate remaining vulnerable, especially in the Middle East. And the T-Loramids project comes into the picture right at this point. However, it is not the project itself but the decision to run the project with the Chinese that has put Turkey under the spotlight.
 
HQ-9 air and missile defense system: a military assessment
 
In accordance with the anti-access and area-denial strategy, Beijing has built up its air and missile defense capabilities in the last decade. China has a relatively diverse air and missile defense system that includes a mix of Russian systems and domestically produced assets. More advanced systems include the S-300 PMU-1, S-300 PMU-2, and the Chinese HQ-9/FD-2000. The HQ-9 system is believed to have similar capabilities to the S-300 PMU-1. Thus, it cannot be rated as the “highest-end possible,” but available military data suggest that it could be potent, especially against aircraft.
 
The HQ-9/FD-2000 system is road-mobile on an 8X8 Transport Erector Launcher (TEL) for vertical, cold-launch (with the exception that the HT-233 engagement radar is carried by a 10X10 truck). The system is highly mobile, and this could be its biggest advantage under real war conditions as it fosters flexibility and unpredictability. In this regard, if the T-Loramids project ends up with the final procurement of the Chinese system, Turkish military planners will have to deal with constant relocation concepts in order to foster active air defenses. Moreover, deployment locations, probably major population centers and strategic assets, would give a hint about Turkey's exact threat calculations.
 
Jane's Defense reports that the HQ-9's operational range (against air assets) is around 200 kilometers with an altitude threshold of some 30,000 meters. The system is also reported to be capable of intercepting ballistic missiles and low-flying cruise missiles, as well as some stealth assets. However, without a viable combat record, the data would only reflect military technical assumptions. Moreover, the HT-233 fire-control radar's resiliency against jamming has also never been tested in combat.
 
The lack of a real combat record is the first and foremost military caveat when assessing the HQ-9 system. Furthermore, the People's Liberation Army's (PLA) procurement policies bring about more doubts about the combat-reliability of the HQ-9. So far, Beijing has clearly continued purchasing the Russian SA-20 A (PMU-1) and SA-20 B (PMU-2). This suggests that security planners are intent on procuring systems to bolster their indigenous air defense systems. Moreover, it has also been reported that the PLA is interested in procuring the more advanced S-400.
 
Turkish defense economics and T-Loramids preferences
 
Ankara's choice of the Chinese system cannot be fully understood without getting a good grip on Turkey defense economics and military strategic imperatives.
 
Clearly, Ankara has to act with relatively humble resources to support ambitious projects and policy goals. According to the Undersecretariat for the Defense Industry (SSM), the nation's top procurement body chaired by Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Turkey's $13-15 billion defense expenditure capacity should be managed by a careful calculation of “cost-effective” projects. At this point, the British think tank International Institute for Strategic Studies' (IISS) flagship survey, “Military Balance 2013,” states that Turkey's total defense spending has remained at 2.2-2.4 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) between 2010 and 2012. On the other hand, geopolitical imperatives have forced Turkey to foster its military capabilities to remaining a deterrent. Put simply, what we are talking about is a country bordering Iran, Iraq and Syria at the same time.
 
In other words, while Ankara has to procure and develop a robust military posture, it still has to do it through cost-effective solutions. China's bid is reported to have been some $600 million to $1 billion less than its closest competitor. The cost-savings account for slightly less than 10 percent of the Turkish annual defense expenditure budget and some 25 percent of the funds set aside for the T-Loramids project. Thus, it is likely that one of the factors that contributed to the decision was Ankara's emphasis on cost-effectiveness.
 
Another reason behind Ankara's decision is China's flexibility with the technology transfer. During the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) era, Turkey's defense industry has graduated to a whole new level. Following a series of successful projects, Turkey is now producing its own corvettes (MİLGEM Project) and main battle tanks (the Altay tank project). In tandem, domestic participation in defense projects has become a first and foremost priority for Turkey in the last decade. This trend brings about a strong tendency towards co-development options in foreign procurements, which played an important role when deciding on the T-Loramids.
 
Furthermore, Turkey has always had a strong preference to run the deal that offered the most favorable technology transfer terms. In this regard, the China Precision Machinery Import-Export Corporation (CPMIEC) is reported to have offered generous technology transfer terms, including the building of a new technology park next to Turkey's Sabiha Gökçen International Airport in İstanbul.
 
Technical caveats: interoperability, integration, friendly fire risk
 
Although the Chinese option can be seen as a viable way forward in terms of defense economics, some important military technical caveats should be taken into consideration. First, the Chinese anti-air and missile defense system will most probably not be able to be fully integrated with NATO early warning radars. Moreover, Ankara will not be able to integrate the HQ-9 with NATO's missile defense shield. Such a caveat would both hinder Turkish air and missile defenses' network-based detection and tracking capabilities, and also deny Ankara a fully integrated, layered missile defense.
 
Furthermore, the lack of interoperability between NATO's missile shield and the HQ-9 systems would possibly bring about disunity in exoatmospheric and endoatmospheric follow-on missile interception capabilities. For starters, the NATO missile defense shield is designed to track a missile from the boost phase up until the final homing terminal via satellite capabilities, X band radars and naval-based radars. If the missile cannot be intercepted until the homing terminal phase, the NATO equivalents of the HQ-9, namely the Patriot PAC-3 and the Aster 30, are seen as the last layer of defense in the North Atlantic alliance's integrated missile defense umbrella.
 
Another issue that might emanate from the integration and interoperability questions concerns the Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) systems. The two systems (NATO-territorial and domestic-theater) will necessarily have different software for determining friend and foe. Such a caveat could cause “friendly fire” incidents should Turkish or allied aircraft pass through HQ-9 systems' corridors. Recent combat records of even compatible IFFs prove this fear right, as Patriot interceptors have fired on friendly pilots several times up until now.
 
Political caveats: Turkish-American and Turkish-NATO ties
 
Apart from its military technical caveats, the decision to opt for the Chinese system has come at a political price for Ankara. The conclusion of the T-Loramids deal with Beijing is likely to have political repercussion for Turkish-US and Turkish-NATO ties. Ankara has already been criticized for its selection of a non-NATO system. A US State Department spokesperson, Jen Psaki, indicated that the United States had “conveyed [its] serious concerns about the Turkish government's contract discussions with the US-sanctioned company for a missile defense system that will not be interoperable with NATO systems or collective defense capabilities.”
 
Dealing with a non-NATO nation in a multi-billion dollar project is not the only political caveat for Turkey. It is dealing with a US-sanctioned firm. The United States has sanctioned China's CPMIEC because it has cooperated with Iran and North Korea. Thus, close cooperation with the CPMIEC would inevitably harm Turkish-American bilateral relations and defense cooperation. Moreover, the selection of a non-NATO supplier, especially when Turkey had received bids from MBDA and Raytheon/Lockheed, is likely to have negative consequences for Turkey's standing in the North Atlantic alliance.
 
On the other hand, Turkey might still be keeping other options in mind and the deal could end up in a different way. In this regard, President Abdullah Gül stated that the project has not been finalized yet. Although the president is not involved with the SSM's decision-making board directly, such cautious rhetoric at the highest level may show us that Ankara might still be keeping its options open.
 
Moreover, the prospects of further cooperation between Turkey and China can also harm Turkish-NATO ties. If Turkey procures such an advanced system from a non-NATO nation, it is likely that the cooperation would include further modernization and the development of integrated air defense systems (IADS), including command-control-communications-computers-intelligence (C4I) and other systems.
 
For instance, a naval variant of the HQ-9 system is available for the PLA Navy's Type 052C air defense destroyers (NATO reporting name: Luyang II-class). In tandem, it is known that the SSM has been overseeing the acquisition of equipment for the TF-2000 Project. Ankara had expressed some interest in American or European missile systems, but the selection of a Chinese missile defense system could embolden Ankara to select a Chinese supplier for its proposed missile defense ships. For example, if Ankara succeeds in the coproduction of an HQ-9 missile interceptor, it may have an incentive to use vertical launch cells for the HHQ-9 (the naval version of the HQ-9) missiles for the TF-2000 Project.
 
In sum, Turkey opting for the Chinese system reflects positive and negative factors together. It is cost-effective, which is strongly needed in Turkish defense economics, but its lack of combat record and ill-operability with the NATO systems still remains a problem. However, rather than the deal itself, we should look into the very need behind the T-Loramids project in order to better understand the current and future Middle East military landscape.