Can Israel, Saudi Arabia Agree on Getting Tough on Iran?

Since the rule of King Fahd, instead of the traditional “His Majesty” address, Saudi kings carry the theological and royal title of “Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques,” referring to the two most holy mosques in Islam --Masjid al-Haram in Mecca and Masjid al-Nabawi in Medina. This historic title, which could also depict the post of a caliph as well as a monarch, reflects the theological and political stance of the most influential gulf state, Saudi Arabia. On the other side, we have another state in the Middle East referring to different religious roots, the State of Israel. Its national anthem, Hatikva -- the hope -- was adopted well before the founding of the State of Israel, when the First Zionist Congress saluted Naphtali Herz Imber's strong “an eye still gazes toward Zion” line by the end of the 19th century.
 
From a highly normative standpoint, having these two states and two different paradigms on the same page in a vital regional political-military issue would be hard to imagine. However, realpolitik of the Middle East proves that power politics and national interest calculations can take precedence over values. Clearly, the significant similarities with regard to Saudi and Israeli threat perceptions vis-à-vis the Iranian nuclear program and the recent Geneva nuclear deal deserve attention. Thus, instead of focusing on the merits and details of the nuclear deal, or the “first step” as some experts claim, this work takes a sort of “red team analysis” by looking at the issue through the prism of “key actors other than the P5+1 and Iran.”
 
Saudi Arabia-Iran competition in Middle East
The first and foremost parameter of the nuclear deal is Saudi-Iranian competition in the region. Riyadh's nemesis, Tehran, has long been threatening the security of the kingdom in various aspects ranging from sectarianism to military affairs. The limits and potential for escalation in Saudi-Iranian tensions became clear especially following the Saudi intervention in the Shiite uprising in Bahrain in 2011, which was allegedly instigated by Tehran. More importantly, although the two regimes' characteristics are depicted as Islamic in general, Iran is a revolutionary actor while Saudi Arabia is a status quo-oriented, oil-rich kingdom.
 
Following the deal, some analysts spoke about the prospects of an axis shift by Riyadh. For a status quo-oriented power, this is no easy feat to accomplish. However, the Saudis can still place their weight on their Western allies. For instance, France was the most diligent of the P5+1 in voicing its concerns over the nuclear deal and Iran's commitments. The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) area is a major arms market for Paris and the French can take advantage of their stance in the talks. This wouldn't necessarily be an axis shift for the Saudis but an alteration within the axis. As a matter of fact, in October, the top intelligence figure in the kingdom, Prince Bandar bin Sultan, hinted of a possible shift to closer cooperation with Paris instead of Washington in arming and training Syria's rebels.
 
Following the fall of Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq and the collapse of the Iraqi Armed Forces as a formidable military machine in the Middle East, the main state-led threat to the kingdom remains Iran. Notably, from a military standpoint, it would be fair to say that Saudi military modernization, especially the Royal Saudi Air Force (RSAF), has been predominantly shaped by the Iranian threat, mainly emanating from Tehran's missile forces. For instance, the Saudi efforts to upgrade its air fleet and its procurement of Eurofighter Typhoon multirole fighter jets are clear signs of Riyadh's design of its air power to counter the Iranian threat. According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies' (IISS) Military Balance 2013 survey, the Saudis remain the top military spender in the Middle East by an impressive share of 31.6 percent of the region's total.
 
Unlike the Saudi regime's defensive paradigm, the Israeli military has been designed considering future offensive missions against Iran if needed. This very fact is critical to understanding the prospects and feasibility of a unilateral Israeli action.
 
Could Israeli military option actually be on the table?
Both during and after the Geneva nuclear negotiations, top Israeli officials kept voicing that a unilateral military option could be on the table. Predicting a military effort in the short-term would be speculative. Yet, two simple but key questions should be raised to get a good grip on the Israeli options available. First, could the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) answer Benjamin Netanyahu administration's operational demands if ordered? And second, would the Netanyahu administration initiate such an order?
 
From a solely military standpoint, a unilateral Israeli operation has to deal with several determining parameters such as combat radius, munitions of choice, airspace options, operational risks and retaliation aversion.
 
For one, distance is a problem. Put simply, Israeli air squadrons would need multiple air-refueling on their way to Iran and back to Israel. The Israeli Air Force (IAF) has long concentrated its efforts on improving its long-range strike and air-refueling capabilities. There are three possible routes for such a mission. The first route passes through Jordan and Iraq. Baghdad's inability to exert control on its airspace could be an advantage but the pro-Iran stance of the Nouri al-Maliki administration could bring about diplomatic problems. The second route is through Syrian and a small part of Turkish airspace. Despite the advanced electronic warfare capabilities of the Israel Air Force (IAF), the dense Syrian air defenses could still be a problem, especially for air-refueling assets. Furthermore, an ejected-pilot saving mission in a country at civil war could turn out to be a catastrophe in less than a few hours. Besides, the political tensions between Turkey and Israel would be another problem.
 
At this point, the third route comes into the picture. Flying about 2,000 kilometers through Saudi airspace could enable IAF assets to hit Iran. Among the actors on the possible routes list, it is only the kingdom who would have a particular interest in seeing Iranian nuclear assets crush and burn. Thus, witnessing Riyadh turning a blind eye to the IAF could be a possibility.
 
The second caveat would be platform-munitions limits. In case of an operation, F-15I Ra'am ground-attack aircraft would probably be the backbone of the strike force due to its payload and range advantages. Jane's Defence Weekly reports some 25 F-15I Ra'am variants in the IAF's inventory. In case of an operation, it would be these F-15I variants that would carry the GBU-28 bunker buster bombs that can penetrate hardened Iranian targets. Yet, the F-15Is can carry a limited number of GBU-28s. And even if the numbers are enough, robust targets such as the Fordo uranium enrichment plant, which is constructed on a mountain, could still necessitate GBU-57 line massive ordnance penetrators, which Israel does not have and Israeli air assets cannot carry (the GBU-57 can be carried by B-52 and B-2 bombers).
 
Israel attacked and destroyed the Iraqi Osirak nuclear reactor in 1981 and the Syrian al-Kibar nuclear reactor in 2007. However, the Iranian case seems to be much more complicated.
 
What next?
Iran managed to shift from Mahmoud Ahmadinejad-era aggressiveness towards the West to a charm offensive under new President Hassan Rouhani. Rouhani is not a reformist but a top figure of the regime who has held both clerical and national security posts for years. In the past, Rouhani also ran previous nuclear talks with the EU-three (Germany, France and the United Kingdom) which then failed upon Tehran's violations. Thus, the Geneva “nuclear deal” cannot be guaranteed as a final end to Iran's nuclear journey. Rather, it could be a promising first step if everything goes as expected. This time, the Iranians might be either more willing to honor their responsibilities or breach the agreement in the longer term, so to speak, in order to relieve the pressing effects of the sanctions. Given the current geopolitical and military parameters of the region, the mutual discomforts of the House of Saud and the Netanyahu administration emanating from the Geneva deal might introduce a new game changer in the Middle East. Clearly, a possible Saudi-Israeli covert cooperation against Iran has the potential to create a new security relationship because those who have to live with the bomb if the deal does not work will remain worried in the foreseeable future.