Iran's Missile Proliferation Threatens the Entire Middle East

Last week Iran held a parade to mark the anniversary of the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War. Normally, a picture of top-rank officers from several branches of the Iranian military and Revolutionary Guards standing before top religious and political figures is quite unremarkable for both Iranians and the region.
 
However, this time Tehran displayed around 30 Ghadr-1 and Sajjil-2 ballistic missiles. Without a doubt, this is an alarming indicator of a dangerous trend towards ballistic missile proliferation and modernization.
 
For starters, the Ghadr-1 and especially the Sajjil-2 weapon systems are different from the Iranian Shahab line and shorter-range ballistic missiles such as the Fateh-110. Both the Ghadr-1 and Sajjil-2 types fall under the medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBM) category, which is assumed to cover target distances of between 1,000 and 3,000 kilometers. Both of these missiles are estimated to carry conventional warheads with a payload of about 1,000 kilograms, and theoretically nuclear warheads or chemical submunitions as well. The Ghadr-1 is believed to be an improved version of the Shahab-3 missile. Although there is little open-source information about the Iranians' missile capabilities, there is a good chance that the Ghadr-1 MRBM has reduced the Shahab line's circular error probability (CEP) from around two-and-a-half kilometers to one kilometer, something that hindered the Shahab family's accuracy on point targets. Notably, some sources even claim that the Ghadr-1 could be operated with 300 meters of expected CEP. Besides, this liquid-fueled MRBM probably enjoys an improved design that boosts the stability of its re-entry vehicle. Such a modernization would grant the missile greater accuracy.
 
On the other hand, the solid-propellant Sajjil-2 is a recently developed MRBM that can be employed via road-mobile transporter erector launchers (TEL). Its range, some 2,000-2,500 kilometers, is a significant threat to Turkey and the region. Put simply, the system gives Iranian military planners and decision-makers the ability to strike any of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) member states, all of Turkish, Israeli and Iraqi territory, the island of Cyprus, as well as anywhere in Syria and Lebanon. In addition, the Sajjil-2 would have high survivability in case of military escalation. First, it is road-mobile. Road-mobile TELs can be constantly relocated to avoid potential adversaries. Furthermore, from a military standpoint, solid-fuel missiles significantly reduce the launch cycle, enabling high readiness during wartime. Combined with its road-mobile character, a solid fuel Sajjil-2 arsenal could be quite resilient to first and preventive strikes in a potential war situation. Besides, they require fewer personnel to operate and are harder to detect thanks to their mobility. This will mean an additional deterrent factor for Iran and greater uncertainty for its neighbors.
 
Threat of ballistic missile proliferation
In a broader context, the design and production of the Sajjil-2 system is more bad news for peace and stability in the Middle East, as it shows a potential future threat. It requires a much harder effort to design and manufacture solid-propellant engines and fuels, especially if its longer-range systems have largely been liquid propellant until now. Furthermore, in the Sajjil-2 case, it is believed that the Iranians produced the solid-fuel missile domestically with some foreign support. In this sense, it is likely that some features of the shorter-range Zelzal missile line's technical features were used to develop a solid-propellant system for the MRBM. In other words, the Iranian missile proliferation trend and increasing technical skill should be taken as a more pressing threat than their actual capabilities for now. Last but not least, the Sajjil-2 case is an important sign of the Iranians' tendency to focus on solid-fuel missile systems and expertise. Therefore, it gives a good idea of what the region could face in the coming decades if Tehran remains unchecked.
 
Another problem with the Iranian missile proliferation is its open-ended objectives. For instance, Tehran's efforts to improve its satellite launch vehicle capabilities and secretive space program are seen as evidence of an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) program in spite of a ban from the UN Security Council (UNSC). Progress on the Simurgh and Safir systems can give an idea of Tehran's increasing familiarity with several aspects that a missile program requires. In this regard, some experts claim that Tehran could begin serious ICBM tests by 2015. Likewise, Iranian military planners' decision to maintain missile silos along with road-mobile TELs also poses an important threat to the West and the region. Clearly, while road-mobile TELs have greater survivability and operational elasticity, silos can support heavier and more destructive missiles.
 
Strategic targets
At this point, the threat emanating from Iran should not be reduced to its rogue nuclear program. Tehran's ballistic missile proliferation is becoming a pressing danger in terms of accuracy, range, fuel preferences, numbers and national expertise. The complex threat landscape of the Middle East presents a large number of strategic targets to Iranian longer-range missile systems. For instance, a strike against the desalination plants and oil infrastructure of the GCC states, US bases in the region, Turkey's economic core around İstanbul and metropolitan areas of Israel by conventional warheads with sufficient accuracy could be much more devastating than a limited, tactical nuclear weapon strike against second-tier targets. The catastrophic results of these scenarios would not only be regional but also worldwide in terms of the energy market and global economy. Moreover, along with its proxy war capabilities, Iran uses the trend of missile proliferation as an effective way to compensate for its conventional shortfalls. Thus, as long as it maintains its steady missile proliferation, it can continue to be a major military threat even if it fails to go nuclear. Such a trend would inevitably necessitate more defense expenditure by nations under Iranian pressure. For instance, looking at current missile defense expenditure and costly projects in some GCC states, Israel and Turkey can give an idea of the billions of dollars allocated because of the Iranian threat.
 
However, although today's ballistic missile defense (BMD) technologies cannot be compared to those of the 1990s, still, BMD is not a magic panacea for the missile threat. Firstly, no BMD is 100 percent reliable in terms of successful interceptions. Second, while a few misses against conventional warheads would be tolerable, the same cannot be said for nuclear, chemical, biological and radiological submunitions. And third, the launch of an overwhelming number of ballistic missiles could saturate missile defenses. In this regard, the operational concepts of missile strikes enter the picture. Launching ballistic missiles in volleys is an effective tactic to saturate BMDs. Importantly, military indicators show that Tehran has been working on this concept. For instance, the Noble Prophet-6 military exercises in 2011 saw multiple salvo launches.
 
We should also understand that having the largest ballistic missile arsenal in the Middle East serves as a symbol of potency and prestige for Iran. Especially given the current ethno-sectarian tensions in the region fueled by the Syrian civil war, Iran is able to “use” its missile arsenal without actually launching it.
 
In conclusion, Iran's missile proliferation should be taken more seriously. For now, Tehran has poor accuracy on point targets, lacks nuclear warheads, the majority of its arsenal is liquid fuel and it is not able to hit Western Europe. However, given current trends and Iranian ambitions, there is no good reason to ignore the possibility that in one or two decades Tehran may create an ICBM, and thereby its WMD efforts may become a true global problem if they are not already the biggest threat to regional stability.