Pakistan’s Arab Spring policy has been shaped within the context of priority pragmatic national interests. Islamabad’s relations with Iran and Saudi Arabia, the denominational tension within its borders and its relations with Afghanistan have played an effective role in shaping this policy. In this context, the factors shaping Islamabad’s attitude towards the conflicts in Bahrein and Syria have been to facilitate the access of the country to oil and natural gas resources and prevent Iran from having a ‘dangerous’ influence in the region.
When uprising broke out in February 2011 in Bahrein, President of Pakistan Asif Ali Zardari stated that the uprising should be denounced since it unsettled the political and social order and indicated that he continued to support the house of Khalifa which dominated over Bahrein. Pakistan also showed concretely its support and added that it would provide police and military assistance to Bahrein. Some 2.500 Pakistanis had started to work in the national security organization of Bahrein before May 2011.
Pakistani’s active role in the developments was based on its energy policy. Bahrein’s oil and natural gas reserves were one of the most important factors affecting the Pakistan’s attitude. An element that increases the importance of Bahrein for Pakistan in this field is that Bahrein was one of the first ten countries where Pakistan exported oil before the Arab Spring. Bahrein was the fifth oil resource of Pakistan in 2010 and 2011. Bahrein oil was sold for 106 US$ per barrel in 2011 and this was a reasonable price compared to the OPEC oil giants, which increased the efforts of Islamabad to maintain the political balance in Bahrein.
Another element that pushed Pakistan to protect the status quo was to prevent the Shiite to gain power in the region as a Sunni force. After the Shiite uprising in Bahrein, King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia feared that the situation of the al-Khalifa would be out of control, so he came to terms with the Shiite leaders and enfranchised them. Since the Shiite in Saudi Arabia was settled in the east wing which was the border region with Bahrein and hosted the oil fields, King Abdullah had concerns that they might get affected by ‘the victory’ and start an uprising.
This situation also led to the possibility that the Gulf region of Iran and the Central Asia may gain power. Saudi Arabia couldn’t neglect the possibility of exploiting the conflicts shaped ‘on the Shiite-Sunni axis’ for its own interests. That is why, any kind of assistance to Bahrein from Saudi Arabia should be considered as an ‘investment’ indirectly made against the rise of Iran.
So, would it be true to infer from this situation that Pakistan pursues a Saudi-indexed foreign policy. As far as the political platform of the Pakistan Peoples Party led by the President Zardari is considered, it becomes clearer that such an allegation is false. One of the most important factors about the Pakistani involvement in the conflict in Bahrein was the view that Iraq’s fate to be sealed in 2011 would seal the fate of Afghanistan in 2014. Afghanistan needed to be led by a Sunni government in order not to be a bordering country which follows a policy contradictive to the priorities of Pakistan. In this sense, it wanted to ensure the support of Riyadh.
This initiative got strong reactions from several media channels in Pakistan. The reflection of Pakistani soldiers into the international press as the foot soldiers of anti-Shiite violence in Bahrein intensified the Shiite-Sunni conflicts in Pakistan. Increased violence caused fear in a country like Pakistan where denominational conflicts are seen every day. The reason for Pakistan’s involvement in the incidents in Bahrein despite the risk of a denominational conflict, was that it wanted to protect its geopolitical priorities in the region. Accordingly, Islamabad had concerns about the effects of revolutionary movements which unsettled Bahrein and followed a foreign policy with a defense-indexed status quo. In addition, there has been an effective perception that the predominance that will be gained in a short time in Bahrein won’t have a negative return for Pakistan in this context.
The reason for Pakistan’s involvement in the incidents in Bahrein despite the risk of a denominational conflict, was that it wanted to protect its geopolitical priorities in the region. Accordingly, Islamabad had concerns about the effects of revolutionary movements which unsettled Bahrein and followed a foreign policy with a defense-indexed status quo.
Pakistan is Unsteady in the Face of Assad
Islamabad remained impartial in the face of Syrian civil war that broke out in 15 March 2011 and abstained from engaging in a military intervention in Syria in the light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2043. It is necessary to evaluate the relations between the Syrian leader Bashar al-Assad and Tehran in order to understand the importance of Syria for Pakistan. While debates had continued between Iran and Pakistan since December 2003 concerning the pipeline construction which would transmit natural gas from Iran to Pakistan, this project was expected to be started in October 2012 and completed in December 2014. This agreement had an importance in the light of the embargoes laid especially after the capture of Al-Qaeda emir Osama bin Laden in May 2011.
Disturbed by the Sunni world in Saudi Arabia and its influence in Pakistan, President Zardari used the pipeline project also as part of a balance game between Saudi Arabia and Iran. This agreement was also a solution to the energy shortage in Pakistan after Riyadh suspended its low-price oil sales following the election of Zardari government.
This project was later cancelled under the regime of Pakistan Muslim League led by Nawaz Sharif which follows a Saudi leadership in political sense. Another important point is that the development followed a three-day visit paid by the Minister of Defense of Saudi Arabia of that time, Salman bin Abdulaziz to Pakistan in February 2014. Following the meetings held to measure the cooperation potential in the field of defense, it has been stated that Saudi Arabia will buy weapon and equipment (JF-17 Thunder and ANZA) in order to enforce the anti-Assad opposition in Syria and it employed trainers from Pakistan for its own army. Sharif changed his position in Syrian civil war by retreating from the oil pipeline project and defended that Assad should be overthrown.
It is possible that the Muslim League followed such a policy in order to mend the fences that damaged after the five-year Zardari government, between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. In addition, Pakistan feared that Iran have influence in Afghanistan especially after December 2014. Iran could make ‘contributions’ to the creation of a Shiite Axis extending from the Gulf region to the Mediterranean by cooperating with Syria, Iran and Lebanon after it successfully quelled the anti-government revolutionaries. Having gathered forces in the East Mediterranean wing, Iran posed a bigger threat in Kabul against Pakistan.
Another factor was the energy problem of Pakistan. In 2004, when Iran and the USA didn’t compromise about mass destruction weapons, the USA stated that international embargoes would be laid again on Pakistan in the event that the project continued. This possibility conduced Islamabad and Riyadh to converge. While the agreement with Iran threatened Pakistan to exclude from the international community, the alliance with Riyadh promised Pakistan both to give oil and natural gas assistance and provide military support in post-NATO Afghanistan.
Yemen and ‘Decisive Storm’
The Shiite community in Yemen, the Houthi rose against the Hadi government supported by Saudi Arabia, in March 2015. Having been gathered over Riyadh and formed by Sunni countries, the military unit launched air attack in Yemen on the last days of March/first days of April. This operation called ‘Decisive Storm’ also pushed Iran to take sides with the Shiite in the conflicts in Yemen. While Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif indicated that he would contribute to the counter-terrorism efforts, he remained silent about logistic assistance. Islamabad also rejected the idea of replacing the embassy from Sana’a to Aden, which led to the impression of that it wouldn’t abide by every decision that the Saudi-led coalition would make.
Involvement of Pakistan in the conflict in Yemen was going to be a wrong decision in several aspects. First of all, Pakistani army took responsibilities that it didn’t have enough capacity to discharge. While never-ending conflicts continued in Afghan-Pakistani and Kashmir, Balochistan region shared with Iran was still crawling with denominational conflicts as well. The conflict which has continued with Taliban in North Waziristan since July 2014 shouldn’t be forgotten either.
Shaping the political structure of Afghanistan and concerns on this axis will push Riyadh and Islamabad to approach the foreign policy. Nevertheless, Iran may rise as an economic power which can appease the energy ‘hunger’ in Pakistan, which make the Iran-Pakistan relations reach a more pragmatic dimension.
Differently from the other conflicts on the axis of Arab Spring, the conflicts which broke out in Yemen substantially got reactions from non-governmental organizations. Complaining that Pakistan is manipulated in Saudi operations, they claimed that Pakistan would violate the essential formation principle by joining the Sunni military units. Pakistan gained its independence from India in order to provide ‘settlement’ to Muslim people in Central and South Asia rather than defending a certain understanding of Islam. That is why sending reinforcing unit to Yemen jeopardized the safety of the Shiite in Pakistan.
Even though the reactions of international community showed that Pakistan couldn’t stand up to the Saudi demands, Parliament of Pakistan rejected involving in the conflict after day-long debates. Loosening the embargoes against Iran and resorting to solution was efficient in the decision of Islamabad. Pakistan even expressed that it leaned to restarting the pipeline negotiations with Iran after positive negotiations with Tehran and P5+1 leaders. This became one of the most striking indicators that Pakistan wanted to make Iran from an enemy mostly into a profitable partner. However, absolute conclusions shouldn’t be drawn.
Balancing between Iran and Saudi Arabia will force the PM Sharif in the following years. Shaping the political structure of Afghanistan and concerns on this axis will push Riyadh and Islamabad to convergence in their foreign policies. Nevertheless, the possibility of Iran’s rise as an economic power which can appease the energy ‘hunger’ in Pakistan, may make the Iran-Pakistan relations reach a more pragmatic dimension. Although it is still highly possible that the two countries will disagree with each other in order to have influence in Afghanistan, we can suggest that economic cooperation will reduce the level of tension to great extent.
The developments within the framework of ‘Decisive Storm’ revealed that Pakistan followed a foreign policy in the light of its own priorities. Although Saudi Arabia is an important political and economic partner for Pakistan, the path Pakistan set for itself emphasized that the foreign policy would be designed supportively.
Pakistan’s Pragmatic Arab Spring Policy
Pakistan’s Arab Spring policy has been shaped within the context of priority pragmatic national interests. Islamabad’s relations with Iran and Saudi Arabia, the denominational tension within its borders and its relations with Afghanistan have played an effective role in shaping this policy. In this context, the factors shaping Islamabad’s attitude towards the conflicts in Bahrein and Syria have been to facilitate the access of the country to oil and natural gas resources and prevent Iran from having a ‘dangerous’ influence in the region. The parliament’s decision in Yemen crisis underlined that Pakistan couldn’t be forced into an international conflict against its interests.
That is why Pakistan evaluated every case in itself and adopted an attitude accordingly instead of following a comprehensive policy against the developments within the framework of Arab Spring. Therefore, it was for its interests to resort to a military mobilization or remain impartial. It has not yet been answered if Pakistan will reach the conclusion it wanted to, in on the shaky ground of Arab Spring.
This article was published in Ortadoğu Analiz journal with the title of “Pakistan and Arab Spring”
