As the war incited by the United States and Israel against Iran rages on, it may seem surprising that the war is testing China’s diplomatic and geostrategic standings. Nevertheless, a closer examination of the war and its impact on Beijing’s diplomatic and economic fronts lends weight to this assessment.
From Beijing’s perspective, its influence on the war’s direction and intensity remains relatively modest, even as it maintains deep political and economic interests in — and partnerships with — most, if not all, of the states directly or indirectly involved.. As a result, China is facing a risk management scenario in which it is tactfully crafting its position abroad to remain coherent, address partners’ needs and cope with new uncertainties in important bilateral relations, while building economic resilience at home.
Trans-Gulf balancing?
To be sure, China’s diplomatic position has been relatively coherent. In U.N. meetings, China condemned the murdering of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei by the U.S. and Israel, as well as their aggression against another sovereign state. On March 8, during his annual press conference of the Two Sessions, the most important meetings of China’s legislature and political consultative body, foreign minister Wang Yi articulated that China’s position is “stop fighting, end the war.” In the meantime, China’s Special Envoy on the Middle East Issue, Ambassador Zhai Jun, has engaged in shuttle diplomacy, focusing on coordinating with the Gulf Arab states.
Yet, as the war escalates, the difficulty for China in striking a balance in its diplomatic posturing has been smoldering. The nub of the dilemma is Iran’s attack on targets in the Gulf Arab states and its blockade of Strait of Hormuz. On the former issue, aside from the disputed U.S. and Israeli use of essentially civilian facilities such as data centers, hotels and civil airports, the U.S. has continuously used military assets deployed in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states to launch attack on Iranian targets, ranging from its use of Prince Sultan Air Base as a staging ground for support aircraft to HIMARS rocket missions in Bahrain.
The blockade of the Strait of Hormuz is a more precarious issue. From the Iranian perspective, as the Islamic Republic is now engaged in a war for survival, blocking this critical maritime corridor is its trump card to create direct pressure on its Gulf neighbors, the U.S. in a way that holds regional and world economy hostage. Its military commands sufficient capacity to maintain or “manage” the blockade, in contrast to American inability to forcibly reopen the strait.
In face of such a reality, China’s diplomatic gestures thus far have chiefly served to address the Gulf Arab states’ concerns. On March 11, China and Russia abstained from voting of the resolution titled “Condemning Iran’s ‘Egregious Attacks’ against Neighbors as Middle East Violence Rapidly Escalates,” which was then passed with a vote of 13 in favor. On March 19, the spokesperson of Chinese Foreign Ministry reiterated Beijing’s position as “the sovereignty, security and territorial integrity of the GCC states should be adequately respected, non-military targets should not be hit, and waterway safety should not be disrupted.” While these moves may appear to overlook Iran’s distress and subsequent response, China has also announced plans to provide Iran, Iraq, Jordan and Lebanon with emergency humanitarian assistance.
Washington Dimension: China-US relations in play
It should also be noted that Beijing’s calculus must take its relations with the U.S. into account. The war has already affected bilateral exchanges, as U.S. President Donald Trump said on March 17 that he was postponing a “highly anticipated trip” to Beijing. He has also called on China to help resolve the blockade. Meanwhile, the war has impacted the military balance in Western Pacific. As the war in the Middle East intensifies, Washington has relocated the THAAD and Patriot batteries deployed in the Republic of Korea, reportedly to offset losses. On March 10, the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU),the intended quick response force in Western Pacific, left the port of Sasebo in Japan as it was ordered to support missions in the Middle East.
While China has acknowledged that “the Chinese and U.S. sides will continue to maintain communication on Trump’s visit to China,” its response to Trump’s pressure on the Strait of Hormuz question has been a reiteration of the basic position against escalation and appeal for a halt in all military actions. Therefore, the March 19 statement carries an additional dimension of addressing U.S. pressure. As for the redeployment of forces, it can be argued from a teleological perspective that China is receptive to such developments, as this could render the strategic balance in Western Pacific more favorable to Beijing. However, China’s decision not to obstruct the repositioning of U.S. military assets in part suggests that it does not wish to openly disrupt Washington’s actions against Iran.
Economic home front: Resilience test
The final aspect of China’s risk management concerns the domestic front. The war coincides with the roll out of the 15th Five-Year Plan, which officially recognizes supply chain security as “barriers of national security.” Statistically, the outflow of crude oil and liquified natural gas (LNG) through the Strait account for roughly 39% and 27%, respectively, of China’s total imports in 2025, while the country also relies heavily on a stable inflow of vital materials such as urea, sulfur and basic industrial chemicals through the Strait. In this context, China has responded to the economic fallout of the war by regulating market prices for various materials and bolstering domestic industrial chain resilience. At the same time, it has imposed export controls on products such as nitrogenous fertilizer and jet fuel to ensure domestic supply. While the economic impact of the war on China will be significant, it primarily serves as a test of the country’s economic resilience.
Weighing the response
In the press release on March 23 concerning his shuttle diplomacy, Ambassador Zhai Jun summarized China’s position as a six-point statement, which affirmed that the U.S. and Israel “abruptly started a war” albeit the ongoing round of Iran-U.S. negotiations, affirming that “the ins and outs of the crisis are clear” as “the U.S. and Israel attacked Iran without the authorization of the U.N. Security Council.” The status on the GCC states was deemed as “suffering a disaster not of their own making.” While this marks China’s using of an uplifted tone, the tilt in position remains in diplomatic statements rather than actions.
As Israel has officially broken the taboo of targeting energy and electricity infrastructure, the war has further escalated and a viable way out remains seemingly remote, even in spite of recent claims by the American administration regarding “negotiations underway” between Washington and Tehran. Within such a context, China has been, and will continue steering a delicate course in the diplomatic arena with the aim of preventing adverse impact in its foreign relations and safeguarding its interests. Beijing’s tightrope walking in the diplomatic arena is a way which it preserves leeway for future scenario in which it may be obliged to take concrete actions or a more clear-cut position. With major diplomatic events to take place, ranging from the China-U.S. presidential meeting to the China-Arab States Cooperation Forum, in addition to the development and the eventual end of the war, such a scenario may then become reality.
