With the fall of Kabul on Aug. 15, 2021, the Taliban’s so-called “2.0” era of governance began; similarly, with the fall of the Damascus regime on Dec. 8, 2024, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) effectively seized power. These two developments clearly demonstrate that violent nonstate actors (VNSAs) are not only effective on the battlefield but also possess the potential to build state mechanisms and assume political authority. Although these two entities have distinct social, cultural and political experiences, a common feature they share is the adoption of localization strategies aimed at gaining societal legitimacy and establishing sustainable governance. These two developments have also become part of the strategic agenda of terrorist organizations, particularly by being integrated into al-Qaida’s expansion efforts in Africa, further deepening this strategic direction. Facing operational obstacles in Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan, the group shifted its focus to Africa, leveraging its capacity for rapid movement.
Al-Qaida’s origins in Africa and JNIM
Al-Qaida’s presence in Africa has deep roots, dating back to the group’s early years. The activities carried out by Osama bin Laden in Sudan between 1992 and 1996 played a critical role in building the organization’s ideological, financial and military infrastructure on the continent. The structural foundations laid during this period not only provided an operational base but also paved the way for Africa to become a central region for al-Qaida’s recruitment and cadre development in the years that followed.
Following the Arab uprisings in 2011, al-Qaida restructured its presence by adopting a strategic approach that skillfully exploited political, economic and security vacuums across the African continent. In particular, the group intensified its operations in the Sahel region through Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), which was formed in 2017 through the merger of several groups, including Ansaru, al-Murabitun, the Macina Liberation Front and al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), the group’s North African branch. In doing so, it extended to Africa its strategy of building state-like structures, a model it had previously attempted to implement in Iraq and Syria. The DAESH carried out this structuring process through its West Africa Province (ISWAP), shifting from territories where it had lost ground to regions where it could gain a foothold. Naturally, the localization strategies pursued by al-Qaida and the DAESH — both aimed at expansion — are likely to come into conflict due to competing interests, making the possibility of this turning into armed rivalry highly probable.
JNIM in the power rivalry of external actors
In Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, JNIM has taken advantage of weakened state authority — undermined by the international power struggle between the U.S., France, China and Russia — and the chaos caused by ethnic conflicts to form pragmatic, interest-based alliances with local tribes. In areas under its control, the group has established local governance models. The central element here is JNIM’s pragmatic strategy of expansion and settlement, adopted out of necessity. This process illustrates that al-Qaida is evolving beyond merely being an armed group, emerging particularly in the Sahel region as an actor with state-building potential. The region’s ethnic and sectarian structure is, in fact, in a dialectical relationship with JNIM’s ideological framework. In areas where JNIM is active, Sufi traditions such as Tijaniyyah and jurisprudential schools like Maliki — both far removed from Salafism — are widespread. What emerges here is essentially an accidental relationship with radicalization. In other words, support has been extended to a group that is not ideologically aligned, either out of necessity or due to overlapping interests.
As of 2025, JNIM is estimated to have between 6,000 and 8,000 operational members. Considering that al-Qaida-affiliated groups had fewer than 1,000 members in total prior to the Arab uprisings, JNIM’s current capacity and potential become much clearer. These members of the organization are advancing by filling porous areas in the Sahel region — particularly in Gao, Kidal and Timbuktu in Mali; Soum and Oudalan in Burkina Faso; and Tillabéri in Niger. In this region, JNIM has moved beyond rigid ideology and is pursuing a strategy of Africanization, embedding itself into Africa’s cultural codes. As part of this approach, the group follows an open-door policy toward individuals or tribes that, for any reason, find themselves in conflict with the central government, offering itself as a third-way alternative. This is, in fact, a recruitment strategy frequently employed by al-Qaida-style movements in civil war and conflict zones. For example, in Mali, Fulani herders have faced marginalization due to the government’s favoritism toward sedentary farmers and the arbitrary detention of Fulani youth by security forces during a 2023 operation in Mopti. This created an opening for JNIM, which implemented a policy of outreach to Fulani youth who felt excluded due to their ethnic identity. Ultimately, the group succeeded in recruiting members from the Fulani community in Mopti. This demonstrates JNIM’s ability to integrate with local populations.
JNIM’s governance and legitimacy strategies
JNIM’s state-building efforts have begun to materialize through the establishment of alternative governance models and justice mechanisms in the areas it controls. This phase closely resembles the period before the DAESH declared a state-like entity in Iraq and Syria. As will be recalled, following the U.S. invasion of Iraq, a dialectical process emerged in which Shiites came to dominate the political order. Although elements of the former Saddam regime adhered to Baathist ideology, feelings of exclusion and political marginalization ultimately pushed these groups toward joining the DAESH. On the other hand, the power vacuum that existed prior to the Arab uprisings — and the deepening of regional fault lines in their aftermath — triggered structural fractures that created the conditions for the DAESH to construct a quasi-state model.
Emerging in the Middle East as a rebellion-based ideology, al-Qaidaism is now pursuing a similar expansion strategy in Africa, grounded in comparable social and political foundations and aligning with the continent’s historical and cultural codes. In particular, JNIM’s actions — challenging core state powers such as the monopoly on the use of force and taxation — position the group as an alternative governing actor in the eyes of marginalized tribes. In Mali, for instance, the Tuaregs and traditional authorities in the Azawad region, who have long had strained relations with the central government, have cooperated with JNIM — at times even conducting joint armed attacks against the Malian army. Another example occurred in 2024, when JNIM began collecting monthly taxes of 100,000 CFA francs from marketplaces in the town of Djibo, Burkina Faso, in exchange for providing security guarantees to traders. In the same area, the group also opened a health clinic, stepping in to meet basic public needs in the absence of functioning state hospitals. In Mali’s Menaka region, JNIM established alternative desert courts in 2023 and reinforced its authority by sentencing a thief to amputation, a punishment meant to demonstrate its control.
The practices implemented by JNIM in the Sahel region reveal that the group is not merely an armed faction but is also positioning itself as a governance alternative seeking legitimacy among local populations. However, the strategy that al-Qaida is pursuing through JNIM is based more on pragmatism than ideology. For example, Tuareg leader Iyad Ag Ghaly has supported JNIM’s operations in Mali while drawing on the historical legacy of Tuareg rebellions, giving the group an ethnic appeal rather than a strictly religious one. The Tuareg recruitment into JNIM in Kidal in 2024 demonstrates the effectiveness of this strategy. In parallel, the alliance formed with the Songhay tribes in Niger’s Tillabéri region has facilitated JNIM’s control over areas near uranium mines. In one instance, the group targeted Chinese workers in an attack on the Imouraren mine.
In the meantime, France’s long-standing presence in the Sahel was reinforced by Operation Barkhane in 2013. However, over time, tensions between the U.S. and France over NATO’s role extended into Africa, leading to growing local resentment. As a result, French forces were compelled to withdraw from Mali in 2022. The power vacuum created by France’s strategic retreat was subsequently filled by the Russian private military company Wagner Group. Operating in Mali since 2021, Wagner tarnished its image following an operation in the village of Moura, where civilians were killed. JNIM seized on this incident to strengthen its image as the “protector of the local population.”
In conclusion, al-Qaida has embarked on a process of expansion in the Sahel region through JNIM by focusing on local tensions and structural issues, as well as opportunities arising from the power struggles reflected in the international system. The first phase of this process involves developing a localization strategy that aligns with Africa’s cultural codes. In implementing this strategy, al-Qaida has effectively leveraged its historical and global networks and past experiences. The second phase highlights efforts to offer an alternative “third way” in response to existing local unrest. The final phase draws attention to attempts to build a portable model of an alternative state mechanism at the local level. Al-Qaida is in the process of reviving — and even state-building — its organizational capacity, which it partially lost in the Middle East, through its activities in the Sahel.
The key question at this point is: Has JNIM’s growing capacity in the Sahel reached a level that necessitates an international military intervention? If such an intervention were to be considered, which international actor would lead the operation — the U.S., France, or China? Given China’s significant infrastructure investments and economic interests in the region, would Beijing resort to military force in response to a direct attack on these assets? Or, as seen in past cases like Afghanistan and Iraq, would China prefer to maintain a pragmatic, non-confrontational relationship with such groups?
