A new phase appears to have begun in the resolution of the long-standing conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia. On Aug. 8, 2025, the two sides unexpectedly signed a joint declaration in Washington, expressing their intention for peace under the mediation of U.S. President Donald Trump. Subsequently, a 17-article peace agreement initialed by both parties was published. These developments carry significant weight not only for the post-Soviet region but also for the Middle East. A peaceful resolution to the conflict could open new opportunities across the region for political and diplomatic relations, economic and trade cooperation, and functional security arrangements. However, it is important not to overlook the serious risks that remain in implementing the provisions outlined in both the declaration and the agreement.
The issues outlined in the two documents can be grouped under three main headings. First, the parties recognize the 1991 borders, acknowledge each other’s territorial integrity and political sovereignty, and pledge to permanently renounce any territorial claims against one another. They also state their intention to establish diplomatic relations based on mutual respect and good neighborly ties by the end of the process. The United States has witnessed this agreement. Second, both sides have agreed that external actors will no longer be involved in the conflict. In this context, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe’s (OSCE) Minsk Group, which had played a mediating role, will be dissolved. Moving forward, bilateral relations between Baku and Yerevan will be managed through joint commissions, and disputes will be resolved peacefully through direct dialogue. Third, the two parties have pledged to cooperate in economic matters, the reopening of transport routes, and other areas. The clearest and most tangible outcome of the process is the strong commitment to making the Zangezur Corridor operational — a route, dubbed the “Trump Route,” which will reconnect Azerbaijan with Nakhchivan via Armenian territory. According to the agreement, the U.S. will support the operation of the Zangezur Corridor. In this regard, while the Trump administration may appear isolationist, it also seems eager to take on a greater role in global economic projects — reminiscent of the U.S. approach during the interwar period.
The peace to be established between Azerbaijan and Armenia holds the potential to create new opportunities and grounds for cooperation, not only across the post-Soviet region but also for key actors in the Middle East — including Türkiye, Iran and several other countries. In fact, this peace has the potential to produce beneficial outcomes for nearly all regional players. First and foremost, the peaceful resolution of the conflict will significantly reduce security risks in the region, enhance interactions among countries, and facilitate the region’s economic integration with its surrounding geographies. The reopening of transportation routes, including the Zangezur Corridor, will accelerate this integration. Azerbaijan, positioned at the intersection of major transport networks, will become a key hub between east and west, as well as north and south. The construction of rail and highway lines through the Zangezur Corridor in the first phase, followed by possible energy infrastructure, will strengthen Baku’s strategic hand and allow it to act with greater independence. For its part, Armenia will gain the ability to transport goods more efficiently and sustainably, establishing rail connections to Iran via Nakhchivan and to Russia through Azerbaijan. It is also evident that Russia, Iran, and Central Asian countries will benefit from a new logistics corridor and diversified transport routes made possible by Zangezur. Regardless of the corridor’s initial capacity, it is foreseeable that Russia’s access to Armenia (currently lacking a direct rail link) and Iran’s access to the Black Sea will be considerably eased. Middle Eastern countries, particularly Syria and Iraq, are also likely to benefit from the economic and political dividends of this regional realignment. Notably, Azerbaijan’s launch of natural gas exports to Syria this year underscores this trend. Given their geographical and cultural proximity, Gulf countries are also expected to show interest in regional construction projects and new investment opportunities. In this context, the fact that the final round of talks between Azerbaijani and Armenian leaders took place in United Arab Emirates (UAE) capital Abu Dhabi shortly before the Washington meeting is no coincidence.
Given the widespread belief that Türkiye will be the country to benefit most from peace between Azerbaijan and Armenia, this issue warrants a separate assessment. If the process unfolds smoothly, Türkiye stands to gain more than any other actor in political-diplomatic, economic-commercial, and socio-cultural terms. Peace between Azerbaijan and Armenia, in effect, also means peace between Türkiye and Armenia, as the past quarter-century has shown a direct correlation between the state of Ankara-Yerevan relations and Baku-Yerevan ties. Following this peace, the establishment of political and diplomatic relations between Ankara and Yerevan, and the reopening of the long-sealed land border, appears imminent. In doing so, Türkiye will be able to contribute to the Armenian economy not only indirectly but directly. Through the Zangezur Corridor, Türkiye would also gain a new overland route to access Azerbaijan and the Caspian Basin, in addition to the existing ones through Georgia and Iran. As a result, both the economies and societies of the South Caucasus will become further integrated with Türkiye. That said, it must not be overlooked that the implementation of the U.S.-brokered agreements between Azerbaijan and Armenia entails serious risks on the ground. These risks can be grouped under three main categories: First, there are certain ambiguities in the texts themselves, as well as questions regarding the scope of the U.S. guarantee. Specifically, it remains unclear by what procedures the Zangezur Corridor will be operated, through which mechanisms its security will be ensured, and what concrete role the U.S. will play in this process. Likewise, should threats arise to the existing agreements or the corridor, it is still uncertain how the U.S. will act as a guarantor. Second, there are still unresolved tensions between Baku and Yerevan — such as the demand to amend the Armenian constitution — as well as a volatile political atmosphere within Armenia. If the anticipated constitutional referendum fails to yield the desired outcome, the path forward remains uncertain. Moreover, if Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s government loses ground or is forced to hand over power to the revanchist opposition in the parliamentary elections scheduled for June 2026, it would mean the process could collapse before it even begins. Third, and perhaps most importantly, are the risks stemming from the potentially disruptive stances of certain regional powers — namely Iran and Russia. Iran’s initial response to the Washington accords is especially telling. Ali Akbar Velayati, senior foreign policy adviser to Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, issued a scathing statement on the Zangezur Corridor, vowing that Iran would block the corridor — either in coordination with Russia or independently — and warning that it would become “a graveyard for Trump’s mercenaries.” Although Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian has since offered a more moderate tone following assurances that no U.S. military forces would be stationed along the corridor, it would be premature to conclude that Iran’s concerns have been fully allayed. In truth, Iran’s frustration largely stems from its exclusion from the entire process. Tehran is uneasy with the prospect that, through the peace deal, Baku and Yerevan will gain access to alternative transport routes, thereby reducing their relative dependence on Iran. More unsettling for Iranian leaders is the growing likelihood that Baku, with Türkiye’s full backing, will emerge from this process in an even more critical and powerful regional position. Indeed, it appears that Iran’s leadership has never fully reconciled itself with the independent existence of Azerbaijan since 1991.
It can also be said that Russia has a strong potential to obstruct these processes. The first reactions from Moscow served as a reminder to both parties of the ongoing Russian military presence in the region and of the agreement reached in 2020 regarding the Zangezur Corridor. In fact, the strip of land the corridor passes through, along the Armenia-Iran border (and also the Türkiye-Armenia border), can essentially be regarded as the final frontier of the former Soviet Union. Since the Soviet collapse in 1991, Russian border guards have never fully withdrawn from these areas. If responsibility for operating the corridor is handed over to the U.S., it remains unclear what role Russian troops will play in this new arrangement. Furthermore, the ceasefire declaration signed on November 10, 2020, which ended the Second Karabakh War, explicitly stated that Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB) would oversee control of the corridor. It is also worth recalling that peace negotiations between Baku and Yerevan — including agreements on passage through the Zangezur Corridor — were initially mediated by Russia. After the outbreak of the Second Russia-Ukraine War in February 2022, the European Union took over the mediation efforts, with the U.S. eventually stepping in. Given Russia’s exclusion from the process and the post-imperial mindset of its decision-makers, it is not difficult to anticipate what actions they might take — especially considering the devastation they have caused in their “brotherly” Ukraine over the past three and a half years. In conclusion, while peace between Azerbaijan and Armenia clearly holds the potential for positive outcomes across the region, serious risks remain regarding the implementation of the agreements. For this reason, maintaining cautious optimism is advisable.
