Armed clashes between the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and the M23 rebel group, backed by Rwanda, have persisted for more than a decade. In July 2025, a declaration of principles signed in Doha marked a new phase in the conflict. Hosted by Qatar and driven by U.S. diplomatic pressure and economic incentive mechanisms, the two sides reached their first formal and direct ceasefire agreement. This development signals a pivotal moment that could reshape both the balance of power on the ground and the trajectory of regional diplomacy across Africa.
Negotiation dynamics: Qatar’s role, US strategic calculations
Since April 2025, Qatar had been trying to bring the parties to the negotiating table through indirect contacts, ultimately managing the process successfully with a “declaration agreement” signed on July 19, 2025. Qatar’s diplomatic success in this case can be seen as an extension of its mediation capacity, previously demonstrated in Libya, Yemen, Sudan and Afghanistan. However, just as crucial as Qatar’s facilitative role was the diplomatic pressure applied by the U.S. and its framing of the process within a broader regional economic integration plan. In June, the U.S. signed separate security and investment framework agreements with both the DRC and Rwanda, making peace with M23 a prerequisite for implementation. In this sense, the Doha Declaration is not merely a bilateral ceasefire agreement, but a foundational element of a broader, U.S.-centered multilateral framework.
Although the signed agreement falls short of ending the conflict entirely, it is significant in that it has, for the first time, compelled the parties to engage in open and direct negotiations. Under the terms of the agreement, all sides pledged to halt attacks and territorial expansion efforts, allow the ceasefire to be monitored by a neutral mechanism, and implement confidence-building measures such as prisoner exchanges and humanitarian access. However, most of these commitments lack an enforcement mechanism. Even Qatar, in its official statement, emphasized that the success of the agreement rests solely on the “intentions” of the parties involved. This dynamic suggests a potential repeat of the strategic pattern seen in previous peace efforts, in which the parties seek to translate battlefield gains into leverage at the negotiating table. On the other hand, the economic incentive mechanisms integrated by the U.S. into the DRC–M23 mediation process go beyond conventional diplomacy. They link the peace process to broader goals of regional development, investment strategies, and global geopolitical competition. The U.S.-backed agreements signed in June 2025 with the DRC and Rwanda are not limited to security arrangements. They also outline a comprehensive economic partnership framework that supports Western-led regional integration projects in East Africa — most notably the Lobito Corridor. Against this backdrop, reports that Washington is nearing a strategic mineral supply deal with the DRC suggest that the process is driven not only by diplomatic aims, but also by geo-economic calculations centered on resource security. In particular, DRC President Felix Tshisekedi’s efforts to curb China’s dominance in the country’s mining sector — and his proposal for a minerals partnership with the U.S. — highlight Africa as the newest front in the U.S.-China rivalry.
Viewed from another angle, progress in this potential partnership depends on numerous variables. On one hand, Donald Trump administration’s cautious stance on the green energy transition raises questions about how much the U.S. is willing to invest in critical minerals such as cobalt and coltan — resources essential for green technologies. On the other, political circles in Washington that seek to curb China’s influence over these supply chains see the agreement as a geopolitical opportunity. Adding further complexity to the process is the DRC’s request for U.S. security assistance — and even potential support for a military base. These demands may create a diplomatic impasse, given Washington’s traditionally cautious approach to direct military engagement in Africa. Meanwhile, the security crisis in eastern Congo, particularly the Rwanda-backed M23 insurgency and the dominance of non-state actors, continues to raise investment risks for American companies and limits the practical impact of economic incentives on the ground.
In this context, the economic tools the U.S. has embedded in the peace process serve not only as incentives but also as instruments of direction — aimed at keeping the parties engaged at the table while aligning regional geo-economic projects with broader anti-China strategic objectives. However, the success of this strategy depends on improved security conditions on the ground, the DRC’s institutional capacity, and the U.S. administration’s commitment to policy continuity in Africa. Absent these conditions, promises of foreign investment and strategic partnerships may remain confined to short-term diplomatic gains for local actors, while long-term goals for structural transformation will once again be postponed.
Parties’ positions and challenges in Doha Declaration
The Doha Declaration can be seen as a significant source of diplomatic legitimacy for both the M23 rebel group and its backer, Rwanda. Until 2024, the DRC officially labeled M23 a terrorist organization and refused to enter direct negotiations. However, M23’s seizure of the capitals of North and South Kivu in the first quarter of 2025 shifted the balance of power on the ground, effectively forcing the DRC to recognize the group and engage with it directly. For Rwanda, the process has served to reinforce its status as a regional actor by securing a seat at the table with the U.S., while also creating space to maintain its military influence through M23 — without committing to a timeline or obligations for the group’s disarmament. M23’s refusal to withdraw from the territories it currently occupies, along with its efforts to establish administrative structures, raises concerns that a de facto “autonomous region” is being diplomatically tolerated.
From the DRC’s perspective, the Doha Declaration represents a bold but risky step toward peace. The government’s limited control over militias in the eastern provinces and the absence of state authority in many areas threaten the sustainability of the ceasefire. While the declaration formally includes state-aligned militias such as Wazalendo, the fact that these groups are not direct signatories represents a major structural weakness. This suggests that the declaration may not function solely as a “state-to-state ceasefire,” but rather as a limited instrument within a highly fragmented internal conflict involving multiple actors.
The most significant point of contention between the parties centers on the status of territories currently occupied by M23. The DRC views the restoration of state authority in these areas as a non-negotiable precondition, while M23 refuses to withdraw and instead positions itself as “a contributing actor in the restructuring of the state.” This fundamental contradiction has led to diverging interpretations of the declaration immediately after its signing. M23 argues that the text contains no explicit clause mandating a withdrawal, whereas DRC officials interpret the agreement as implying that withdrawal is inevitable. This divergence in interpretation highlights the fragility of the process and poses a serious risk to the future of peace efforts.
The declaration sets a deadline of Aug. 18, 2025, for the completion of a final peace agreement. However, reaching lasting solutions within such a short time frame to “deeply rooted issues” such as the refugee crisis, ethnic divisions, territorial disputes, and the status of M23 appears highly unlikely. In past negotiations, these topics triggered months of disagreement. Expecting concrete progress on all fronts within just two weeks is widely seen as unrealistic.
As a result, the DRC-M23 declaration signed in Doha marks a significant milestone for regional peace. However, it rests on a fragile foundation shaped by deep structural weaknesses and mutual distrust between the parties. While the U.S.’ push to accelerate the process through economic incentives and Qatar’s role as a diplomatic facilitator have added momentum, several critical obstacles remain. These include M23’s continued armed presence and refusal to withdraw from occupied territories, as well as the DRC’s inability to control its allied militias. For sustainable peace in the long term, the establishment of a robust multilateral monitoring and enforcement mechanism is essential. Equally important is the effective disarmament of armed groups and their inclusion in meaningful social reintegration efforts. Institutional capacity must also be strengthened to restore state authority in the DRC’s eastern provinces. Meanwhile, Rwanda must assume a more transparent and accountable role within the regional security architecture. Otherwise, as with similar initiatives in the past, the Doha declaration is highly likely to remain merely a “ceasefire document” — falling short of structural transformation and allowing power centers on the ground to trigger yet another cycle of conflict.
This opinion piece was originally published on July 26, 2025, by Anadolu Agency under the title “ABD ve Katar arabuluculuğunda KDC-M23 ateşkesi: Fırsatlar ve zorluklar. “
