As U.S. airstrikes against Houthi targets in Yemen intensified after March 15, speculation over a potential follow-up ground operation has grown. Reports suggest that while the U.S. is unlikely to leadsuch a campaign, it is consulting with anti-Houthi Yemeni factions and may provide air support for a coordinated offensive aimed at seizing strategic strongholds like the Red Sea port of Hodeidah. The logic behind this momentum is clear: capitalize on recent gains from airstrikes, exploit Houthi disarray, and drive the group out of key coastal territories. However, while the military dynamics may seem aligned, the political consequences of such a move could be deeply destabilizing for Yemen and the broader region —if it fails. With ongoing U.S. negotiations with Iran and Israel’s persistent role in fueling regional instability, this development risks further unsettling the military landscape, particularly if it slips beyond the bounds of control.
The escalation of the U.S. strategy against the Houthis is not solely driven by the group’s increasing activity toward Israel; other underlying factors are also at play. U.S. Africa Command has cited a growing nexus between the Houthis and the al-Shabaab in Somalia—particularly involving weapons transfers and training—as one of the factors reinforcing Washington’s resolve. As a result, dialogue between the U.S. and key actors within Yemen’s anti-Houthi bloc has notably intensified. The deepening nature of this coordination was also underscored by U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) Commander Gen. Michael Kurilla’s meetings in April with Saudi and Yemeni officials in Riyadh, aimed at finding a solution to the Houthi problem.
At the same time, growing signs of military mobilization on the ground in Yemen suggest that preparations for a potential ground operation are already underway. Defense Ministry delegations, led by Chief of Operations Maj. Gen. Khaled Al-Ashwal, have conducted readiness inspections along the Hudaydah and Al-Barh axes. Units such as the 1st Tihama Brigade and the 3rd Commandos Brigade appear poised for deployment.
In an interview for this op-ed, Yemeni Journalist Mohammed Algarawi told me:
“Talking about the possible ground operation against the Houthis mainly appears in American media outlets, but not in the local media. Militarily, to achieve the goals of any airstrikes, ground operations must follow to ensure the intended damage on the enemy’s side and secure any achievements gained by the airstrikes. So, talking about a ground operation is common sense in this case. Considering the U.S. commitment to cause some damage to the Houthis’ military forces, the ground operation could be limited to the coastal area in Hodeidah to deter the Houthis from attacking ships in the Red Sea. [It is difficult to confirm] the number of troops on the anti-Houthi side, but if the operation gets support from the coalition and the U.S., the number of troops might be closer to [the speculated number of 90,000].The success of any ground operation against the Houthis depends mainly on the support of the U.S., Saudi Arabia, and the UAE, but I still believe that the operation is going to be very limited in terms of goals and area. We should consider the ongoing separate talks between the U.S. and Iran, and the talks between the Saudis and Iran too. A ground operation is likely to happen if the Houthis continue to target Israel and ships in the Red Sea.”
This excerp clearly indicates that the possibility of a ground operation is being discussed primarily in American media, rather than in local outlets, and is framed through a military logic as a necessary complement to airstrikes. Based on primary sources, such as operation is likely to be limited in scope, focused on coastal areas, and its success would largely depend on support from the U.S., Saudis and the Emiratis.
At the political level, influential commanders are also recalibrating their positions. Tariq Saleh—vice president of the Presidential Leadership Council and head of the National Resistance Forces—struck a notably balanced tone in a recent speech marking the coalition’s anniversary. While calling on the Houthis to lay down their arms and submit to the Republic, he also implicitly criticized regional inconsistencies, remarking, “We had a coalition.” His appeal for a renewed international coalition to defeat the Houthis and dismantle Iran’s “Revolutionary Guard project” in Yemen underscores an urgent reality: the burden cannot rest on Yemenis alone. This shift in rhetoric aligns with Saleh’s broader call for a revitalized international coalition—not just to militarily confront the Houthis, but to restore constitutional governance and counter Iranian influence in Yemen.
At this point, the more urgent question is not whether a ground offensive will take place, but what contingency plans exist if it does and fail since such an outcome could allow the Houthis to consolidate their position and rally greater popular support.
And that is precisely the danger. Even if an offensive succeeds in retaking Hodeidah or pressuring the Houthis along the western coast, what comes next? Who will govern these reclaimed areas? How will a fragmented anti-Houthi bloc maintain cohesion in post-conflict administration? At this stage, it should be clear to all actors that military feasibility does not guarantee strategic sustainability. On the contrary, past experiences in Yemen have shown that territory seized by force often breeds new instability unless embedded in a broader political vision. Without a consensus on post-operational governance among the anti-Houthi stakeholders—both local and regional supporters, any victory risks swiftly unraveling into renewed conflict.
Moreover, the regional stakes are enormous. A ground operation could corner the Houthis—radicalizing their discourse, intensifying their retaliation, and dragging Gulf states deeper into asymmetric threats. This is not a hypothetical risk. The Houthis have already begun casting the current phase of conflict as part of a broader war in defense of Gaza, linking their struggle directly to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. A major offensive could bolster their populist narrative, portraying them as the only Arab force “resisting” American and Israeli aggression. The ideological and regional resonance of such messaging across the Arab street should not be underestimated.
On the diplomatic front, a ground campaign would almost certainly derail the fragile, ongoing U.S.-Iran talks. Tehran views the Houthis as a vital node in its regional deterrence network, and any aggressive escalation against them could collapse already-precarious negotiations. Rather than isolating the Houthis, a ground operation could inadvertently entrench their legitimacy within the “so-called Axis of Resistance” and invite a more committed response from Iran.
What is clear is that the military case for a ground operation is not the same as a strategic one. Yes, the Houthis have been weakened. Yes, coordination between Yemeni factions, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and the U.S. appears to be improving. But war is not won by momentum alone. Without a defined political endgame—without guarantees on governance, humanitarian protection, and regional de-escalation—any success on the battlefield risks becoming a fleeting illusion.
There may still be time to rethink. As Saleh implied, the solution must not rely solely on firepower. It must be anchored in international responsibility, institutional rebuilding, and a credible path toward state restoration. Otherwise, Yemen may witness not a breakthrough, but yet another chapter in a long war with no exit.
