In the days after the Iran’s nuclear agreement known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), focus switched toward Iran's ballistic missile program, particularly after the Revolutionary Guards tested some ballistic missiles with estimated 2000+ kilometer range at early March 2016. The missiles reportedly can carry different types of ‘Blast’ and ‘MRV’ (Multiple Reentry Vehicle) payloads to destroy a range of targets.
Additionally, on April 20, Iran also launched a rocket known as Simorgh in the Dasht-e Kavir desert ostensibly designed to send satellites into orbit but it was identified by defense officials as a cover for intercontinental missile research. The Simorgh is assessed as having enough lift to carry a nuclear warhead, a throw-weight greater than the 220-pound payload capacity claimed by Iranian officials. While the Simorgh reportedly is designed as a satellite launcher rather than a ballistic missile, it does appear to use ballistic missile-relevant technology. Additionally, not carrying a satellite is likely to make the launch look yet more problematic with respect to Annex B of UNSC Resolution 2231. Another report indicates that the Guards tested another missile with 2000+ kilometer range at apparently early May which its type is not revealed yet, all of which called by critics provocative and destabilizing.
Needless to say, the testing of the ballistic missiles by Iran provoked a negative reaction. The media pointed out to the slogan painted on the missiles and quoted the head of the Air and Ballistics Branch of the Revolutionary Guards stating that the missiles were designed to reach Israel. Commentators suggested that the hardliners in Iran did not abandon their dream of vanquishing the Jewish state. For those familiar with the highly charged discourse on Iran, it was clear that the Likud government scored an important point.
In spite of considerable criticism Iran claimed that it has a right to develop defensive missile capability. But many analysts and policy makers argued that Washington should respond by imposing new round of sanctions on Iran. Some argue that the best way for the U.S. to stop Iran from developing its ballistic missile program is by maintaining a defensive edge, boosting its ballistic missile defense capabilities and shoot down Iran’s missile. According to these analysts such a credible threat by the United States would force Tehran to give up testing ballistic missiles.
In the long negotiations between Iran and the P5+1, the parties had avoided negotiating on Iran’s ballistic missiles in the belief that resolving the nuclear issue was the top global security priority and including other issues could jeopardize achieving any agreement. The position of Iranians was that the talks were only limited to the nuclear program and not about its ballistic missile capabilities, so that a deal on the nuclear issue should not impose any restriction on its ballistic missile activities due to the fact that they are intended for defensive use.
Therefore, in the final weeks of negotiations, Iranian officials sought to soften the Security Council Resolution 1929 which “dictated that Iran shall not undertake any activity related to ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons.” The UNSC Resolution 2231 of July 20, 2015 which endorsed the nuclear pact was more permissive: “Iran is called upon not to undertake any activity related to ballistic missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons.” Essentially, the new resolution, which is not as legally binding as the JCPOA, created a loophole for Iran to exploit and complicated the effort to define of what kind of missiles are capable of carrying a nuclear payload.
The Iranians claim that their missiles are for defensive purpose only, but there is areason to disbelieve. Iran's efforts to develop its ballistic capabilities may reflect its willingness to continue pursuing nuclear weapons program, a justifiable suspicion given Iran’s record of cheating the international community. The memory of final assessment of the IAEA of outstanding issues regarding Iran’s nuclear program is still fresh which concluded that Iran has carried out the activities relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device until 2003, and nonetheless pursued enrichment with a view of stockpiling enough fuel for potentially fabricating a bomb until 2009. These findings refuted the Iran’s claims of pursuing a peaceful civilian nuclear program.Similarly, in the ballistic missile program, it is almost impossible to achieve an absolute certainty on Iran’s intentions due to the fact that missiles could be intended for both defensive and offensive purposes.
However, there are many indicators supporting Iran’s claims that its ballistic missile production could be for defensive purposes.First, to understand Iran’s motivation it is important to see the issue within historical context. The regional tension between Iran and other powerful countries in the region goes a long way toward explaining why Iran feels the need for greater defense capabilities. Iran was forced to consider ballistic option because of the long and bloody war with Iraq which had a profound role in shaping Iran’s strategic thinking. The history of this bloody war between the two countries is well known. Known as the second longest war encounter of the twentieth century, it was frequently compared to the World War I because of its reliance on trench warfare, human wave attacks, indiscriminate attacks on civilian population and, most importantly, Iraq’s use of chemical weapons against Iranian soldiers and civilians.
The war left a deep psychological scar on the Iranian collective psyche, imbuing it with a deep sense of insecurity and vulnerability. As a result, Iranian leadership concluded that Iran would need a powerful deterrent of same kind. With few options for conventional defense and morale badly shaken, there was a broad popular support among the Iranian leadership for acquiring nuclear and ballistic missile capability. Since then, missiles have been essential part of Iran's defense system to deter its adversaries from any potential attack.
Second, although Iran has the largest ballistic missile arsenal in the region, both Israel and Saudi Arabia, two of the Iran’s regional rivals have large missile programs and had deployed longer-range missiles before Iran. Additionally, the massive purchases of advanced military equipment by Iran’s rivals in the region have resulted in serious concerns and distrust in Tehran. For example, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) recently announced that Saudi Arabia spent 87.2 billion dollars in 2015. Washington’s policy of arming Iran’s rivals with long-range ballistic missiles, advanced fighters, and other military equipment will only prompt Iran to expand its defense capabilities. Adding to these, Israel is believed to arm its ballistic missiles with nuclear payloads, a greater concern for the Iranians. With its weak defense due to its outdated air force in the face of the threats Tehran sees from its regional rivals, it is rational for Iran to become even more determined to expand its missile arsenal, particularly after Iran’s given up its nuclear program. Seen within the context, Iran’s determination to continue development of ballistic missiles might be an attempt to dissuade its rivals from exercising too much power in region, particularly when Tehran’s interests is threatened.
The refore, the regional countries should understand that the decision to expand their military arsenal could make an already dangerous situation much worse, encouraging Iran to expand its missile program accordingly. The Iranians should also understand that due to their support of violence in the region, namely in Syria and Yemen, it is difficult for other regional countries to trust Tehran when it claims it will only use its ballistic missiles for defensive purposes.
This article was published in Ortadoğu Analiz journal with the title of “Iran’s Ballistic missiles program: An overlooked Threat or Part of Its National Defense? ”
