For the Syrian revolution, Jan. 18, 2026, marks a new turning point. In the aftermath of the revolution, the Ahmad al-Sharaa administration, recognized by the international community, has faced significant challenges: while working to rebuild Syria, it has also had to contend with serious threats to the country’s territorial and institutional integrity. One of the most critical issues has been the Syrian Democratic Forces, or SDF, established with U.S. support and armed during Washington’s campaign against DAESH. Although the SDF includes both Kurdish and Arab elements, it is widely known to be under the control of the YPG. In the post-revolution period, one of the key efforts by the Damascus administration, mediated by the U.S., to address this issue without resorting to force was the March 10 Accord.
The March 10 Accord recognized Syrian Kurds as an integral part of the country and called for the integration of all civil and military institutions in northeastern Syria under the Syrian state. It also envisioned transferring control of border crossings, airports, and oil and gas fields to the government. Committees tasked with implementing these principles were expected to complete their work and effectively manage the process by the end of 2025. However, the SDF’s interpretation of the agreement as a basis for “autonomy,” combined with its insistence on this framework, its increasingly aggressive actions, including attempts to form an alliance with Israel, and efforts that ultimately undermined the process, prevented the accord from being fully implemented.
Israeli attacks directly targeting Syrian security forces, possibly anticipating that the al-Sharaa administration might stumble amid uprisings in Latakia and Suwayda, may have contributed to the SDF pursuing its own agenda instead of implementing the accord. During this period, it was no coincidence that some Alawites and Druze aligned rhetorically with the SDF on “autonomy.” At the same time, the al-Sharaa administration’s growing international recognition and legitimacy over a ten-month period signaled that momentum was shifting in Damascus’s favor. In this context, al-Sharaa’s invitation to the UN as president, his direct meeting with U.S. President Donald Trump, and, perhaps most importantly, the temporary suspension of all sanctions imposed on Syria during the Bashar Assad era and the civil war, demonstrated that the Damascus government had managed to regain control over the challenges stemming from Latakia and Suwayda, even after a difficult process. These developments serve as key indicators of the current administration’s strengthened international legitimacy and domestic political resilience.
Road to the Accord
By the end of 2025, the deadline set for implementing the March 10 Accord, the SDF had not only failed to carry out the agreement but had also launched attacks in the Aleppo neighborhoods of Bani Zaid, Ashrafieh, and Sheikh Maqsoud, which were under YPG control. These attacks prompted the Damascus government to launch a security operation on Jan. 6. By Jan. 11, the operation had cleared these neighborhoods of YPG forces, but it did not stop there. Operations continued against YPG groups entrenched in eastern Aleppo’s Maskanah and Deir Hafir. What was expected to be a localized security operation eventually expanded to Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor—cities under the control of the PYD-backed SDF with U.S. support. The defection of Arab tribes from the SDF and their alignment with Damascus allowed the government to take control of these two major cities. Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor are significant not only because of their size and demographics but also because they contain a large portion of Syria’s oil and natural gas reserves. Furthermore, the SDF’s claim to represent Arabs within its YPG-dominated structure was effectively discredited.
The military gains in favor of the Damascus government made a political outcome increasingly inevitable. As a result, negotiations conducted during the ongoing security operation culminated in a new accord, crafted in a context where the government held a strong hand.
Key provisions of Jan. 18 Accord
Although the accord mediated by the U.S. bears similarities to the March 10 Accord in terms of content, it differs significantly in several respects. The most notable distinction is that it was signed following a security operation that achieved the Damascus government’s objectives. In this sense, even though it was negotiated with U.S. mediation, it naturally reflects the perspective of the victorious side.
The 14-article text emerged as a new legal framework for Damascus-SDF negotiations. Grounded in Syria’s territorial, institutional, and identity integrity, the accord clearly translates the territorial and institutional arrangements of the March 10 Accord into a more concrete framework. The provisions address key issues related to security, administrative arrangements, and the establishment of sovereignty.
On the security front, the accord calls for an immediate and comprehensive cease-fire across all fronts and contact lines, the withdrawal of all SDF-affiliated military units to the east of the Euphrates, and the full administrative and military transfer of Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor provinces to the Syrian government. These provisions serve to secure the military gains achieved through the security operation. Another security-related article stipulates that SDF military and security elements—previously proposed under the March 10 Accord to be integrated into the Syrian army in three divisions—will now be individually absorbed into the ministries of defense and interior under the new agreement. A provision of particular significance for the spirit and objectives of the Syrian revolution requires the SDF leadership to prevent former Assad regime elements from joining its ranks and to hand over lists of former regime officers in the region to the government. The SDF’s acceptance of this article implicitly acknowledges its prior collaboration with remnants of the old regime.
The accord includes two articles concerning Hasakah, which remains under SDF control and is outside active conflict zones. The first calls for the integration of all civil institutions in Hasakah into the Syrian state’s administrative structure. The second stipulates that a presidential decree will appoint a candidate for the governorship of Hasakah. These provisions give the SDF a say in the selection of the governor while confirming that ultimate authority rests with the Damascus government. Similarly, the measures concerning the Ayn al-Arab region are notable. According to the agreement, the area will be cleared of heavy weapons, a local security force composed of residents will be established, and the police will be placed under the authority of the Ministry of Interior.
The most significant provision regarding Syria’s sovereignty and access to economic resources stipulates that border crossings, as well as oil and natural gas fields, will be fully transferred to the Syrian government, with their security ensured by the regular army. Management of camps holding DAESH detainees and their families will also be handed over to the government, along with the relevant security forces. The primary purpose of this article is to neutralize the threat posed by DAESH and to prevent the SDF from leveraging detainees as a bargaining tool.
Given the military conditions under which the accord was reached and its content, it is clear that the SDF has lost a significant portion of the territory it controlled, along with its economic resources. Moreover, the inclusion of provisions concerning Ayn al-Arab and Hasakah, areas outside the security operation, signals that the group has also lost initiative in regions where it had previously consolidated control. This situation, combined with the cooperation of a significant number of Arab tribes with the Damascus government, indicates that the SDF has effectively fragmented, even if it has not been formally dissolved.
If the SDF fails to comply
The SDF’s conduct during the March 10 Accord raised legitimate doubts about whether it would adhere to the Jan. 18 Accord. In such a scenario, the group is likely to face far greater risks. It is evident that many of the gains it could have secured under the March 10 Accord were lost through conflict. Furthermore, the security operation that began on Jan. 6 demonstrated the SDF’s irregular, fragile structure, and lack of international legitimacy on the battlefield. Returning once again to conflict as a party that violates the accord would likely intensify internal divisions within the SDF. Its narratives, built since 2011, would lose their effectiveness, and the group would inevitably lose its areas of de facto control.
This analysis was published on Jan. 19, 2026, on the Anadolu Agency website under the headline, “Suriye’nin toprak ve kurumsal bütünlüğünde yeni bir dönüm noktası: 18 Ocak Mutabakatı.”
