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Reflections Of The Nuclear Deal On The Domestic Politics Of Iran

Even though there have been different reactions to the nuclear negotiations within Iran, it is possible to classify them into three: The ones who support the framework deal and consider it as a great achievement, the ones who oppose the deal that are limited in number, but have a weight in Iranian politics and the ones who are prudent about the deal and remain impartial.

Iran-P5+1 framework deal was concluded on the first days of April after of long-lasting negotiations which had been held in Lausanne, Switzerland and followed by the world public opinion for months. The deal was announced as ‘a historic moment’ by a number of global media organs. Appearing before the cameras after the late night negotiations, Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs Javad Zarif said “Mission completed” about the deal and expressed his appreciation of the developments while the US President Barack Obama identified these developments as “a historic deal.” Having been announced as 'concluded' or 'achieved' by the parties to the public, the deal was preliminary to a second course which would cause more heated debates. In fact, the parties had different interpretations on the articles even immediately after the signing of the framework deal, which not only confirms the situation, but also indicates that the dimension of the debates will be much greater than it seems to be.

The most important variables which will cause the process before the final agreement, which is to be signed in June, to be more demanding or run its course, will manifest themselves in the perspectives and reactions of the people who can be interpreted as the secondary actors apart from the primary actors which undoubtedly execute the process and are the main interlocutors. For this reason, the domestic policy of the countries which are the interlocutors of the deal, witnessed the debates between those who has wrongly evaluated and opposed the negotiations from day one and those who support the negotiations and are pleased with the process. It seems that this debate will be intensified with the signing of the framework deal. In this sense, the polarization of the parties in the domestic politics manifests itself more clearly in Iran. Even though there have been different reactions to the nuclear negotiations within Iran, it is possible to classify them into three: The ones who support the framework deal and consider it as a great achievement, the ones who oppose the deal that are limited in number, but have a weight in Iranian politics and the ones who are prudent about the deal and remain impartial. 

The Happily Welcomed Deal and Victory of the Reformists
When the framework deal, which was a turning point in the relations between the parties, was announced on the evening of 2 April 2015 Thursday, the streets of Tehran witnessed the celebrations of many Iranians. Those who took part in the celebrations showed their content by shouting slogans and carrying posters in the videos they shared in the social media. In addition, those who use social networking sites like Twitter and Facebook thanked the President Hassan Rouhani and the Minister of Foreign Affairs Zarif and underlined the economic profit that the deal will provide in the writings and the short interviews that they shared about the deal. For example, one of the people taking part in the celebrations said “Now we can normally live like the rest of the world” and another person thanked Rouhani and stated that “we will be rich, too.”

Even though the number of the people who took part in the street celebrations in the evening of and the day after the signing of the framework deal mentioned above was considerably high, it is difficult to measure the exact number. However, it can be inferred from the survey results and contradictive surveys about the nuclear negotiations before the deal that the majority of the population is in favor of the deal. For example, according to the results of the survey that Gallup survey company conducted about the negotiations before the deal, the proportion of those who positively evaluated the nuclear negotiations increased to 72% at the end of 2013. According to the survey conducted by the pro-government IRNA News Agency which is assumed to exaggerate the figures, it is claimed that 83% of the participants were hopeful about the nuclear deal. Gallup’s survey results in the context of nuclear negotiations and the estimates of IRNA give us the impression that those who are pleased with the nuclear deal most likely constitutes the majority of Iranian population. Similar figures are given in the news of domestic and foreign media organs as well.

This positive atmosphere that the public has about the deal is also felt in the political environment. But what should be underlined here is that those who perform a positive approach towards the deal have various expectations after the deal. Weighing in Iran’s politics and evaluated to be in the moderate camp, the chairman of Expediency Discernment Council of the System, Hashemi Rafsanjani is one of the most important actors who are on the positive side in both senses. What most clearly reflects the reaction of Rafsanjani about the deal is his statement that the anti-agreement hardliners in Iran’s politics play along with Israel. This harsh attitude of Rafsanjani also reflects the general opinion of Iranian reformists. The reformists spoke highly of the works of Rouhani, Zarif and the other negotiators and qualified them as hero in the media organs on the day after the signing of the nuclear deal, which shows their content with the deal.

Besides, some reformist activists and politicians think that the success of the nuclear deal will also strengthen their hands in the other fields. These people assume that the success that Rouhani reached by winning the 2013 elections in his fight against the hardliners continues with the nuclear deal and this will bring great support for the victory of the reformist and moderate alliance in 2016 parliamentary elections. In other words, the reformists hope that any success reached at the international arena creates a large room for maneuver for the Rouhani government in domestic politics against the opposition and this will provide the opportunity to be better organized around the collective actions for the upcoming elections. In short, Iranian reformists welcome the nuclear deal happily and are hopeful about the course of the deal in addition to their expectations that this process will strengthen them in various terms.

There are some circles that can be identified to have 'partially positive' reactions in Iran even though they do not defend the deal as much as the reformists do. Commander of the Army of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution, Mohammad Ali Jafari, Chief of Staff of the Iranian Armed Forces, Hassan Firouzabadi and Iranian Parliament Speaker, Ali Larijani are prominent among these circles and known as hardliners. Those who are involved in this camp generally make explanations supporting the deal, but also state continuously that the negotiators should be prudent about the future of the deal. Besides, constantly warning that the deal should not cross the red line, this circle makes strident statements concerning the controversial topics of the deal. They also feel the need to remind occasionally in their statements that the USA and the West are unreliable. In short, despite adopting a positive approach to the deal, this camp gives the impression of being vulnerable in terms of defending the deal. Besides that, they continuously repeat their concerns about the future.

Minority Reactions
Since the Islamic Revolution, Iranian streets are used to witnessing protests against the West and the USA. However, this time hardliners/anti-reformists in Iran used the streets to react against the rapprochement between Iran and the West. It is remarkable that the degree of participation in the protests by hardliners, which mainly took place in the vicinity of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Parliament buildings, is low compared to the participation in the previous protests by the hardliners and also in the celebrations of the deal. Indeed, the protestors lack several supporters from the political circle. Many bureaucrats, notably the religious functionaries, members of the parliament and commanders of the Army of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution who used to support them and have a reactive attitude against the West, can said to have left them alone this time. In short, it is evident that the number of those who react against the deal is quite a low compared to those who have a positive approach.
On the other hand, the presence of those who think alike and are involved in the influential media organs, political circles and have the status of religious functionary made their voices sound strong. Regarding what the prominent hardliner newspaper Kayhan and some other media organs write about the deal, it is seen that this camp asserts that the deal is to the disadvantage of Iran. For example, the editor of the newspaper Kayhan and advisor of Ali Khamenei, Hossein Shariatmadari has described the situation as Iran has exchanged its “ready-to-race horse for a broken bridle”. The hardliner bureaucrats and the parliamentarians, who have an important role in the judiciary in addition to the media, have stated that the deal contradicts with the Iranian values and interests. In order to hinder the deal, they have even claimed that the deal should be approved by the parliament, the majority of which is composed of the hardliners. In short, the hardliners, who are few in number and have been left alone by several prominent politicians, can voice their criticism of the deal strongly. This situation shows that they still maintain their power to a certain extent in the opposition against the deal.

“I neither back nor reject.”
Having the authority to have the final word about the nuclear deal like in many other fields in Iranian politics, Khamenei gives the impression that he does not want to assume an explicit attitude in his statements about the issue. These interpretations have come out from the statement by Khamenei as: “There is no guarantee of final nuclear deal. I neither back nor reject for the time being.” in his hotly-anticipated speech. For example, Press TV has interpreted that the religious leader has not assumed a certain attitude in his speech since there has been no final agreement.
Khamenei’s breaking his silence about the deal and stating “I neither back nor reject” can be interpreted as a pro-negotiation stance even if it seems to be impartial. Indeed, this opinion can be said to reflect the reality by going beyond the allegation, because it remains impossible to come to terms with the USA, which is said to be the biggest enemy for years in Iran, without the permission of the religious leader who has a powerful authority. Rouhani’s statement that they followed the instructions of Khamenei at each stage of the nuclear negotiations as a response to the reactions about the deal justifies this interpretation. In short, even though the religious leader tries to give the impression that he is impartial in his statements about the deal or expresses that the USA is unreliable, it can be said that his attitude is mostly close to the pro-negotiation group.

This article was published in Ortadoğu Analiz journal with the title of “Reflections Of The Nuclear Deal On The Domestic Politics Of Iran ”

 

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