The Course of the War in Sudan – August 2025

Introduction: New Threshold in the Sudan Civil War: Pressure on Civilians and Regionalizing Conflict

The month of August 2025 in the Sudan War was marked by rising civilian casualties and attacks on humanitarian aid routes, particularly in the Darfur and Kordofan regions. This monthly analysis series, prepared by ORSAM’s North and East Africa Studies Coordination Office, aims to track the course of the conflict both geographically and by actors involved, visualize developments on the ground, and provide policymakers and researchers with a reliable reference.

In August, the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) intensified attacks on civilians in Al-Fasher, targeted UN-backed humanitarian convoys, and escalated violence in rural areas — indicating that the war is taking on an increasingly destructive character. The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), relying heavily on air power to respond, have been forced to spread their resources across multiple fronts due to the widening scope of the conflict.

The Extent of Geographical Expansion and the Intensity of the Attacks

Throughout August 2025, the fighting was not limited to areas around the capital but also spread to various states across the country. As shown in the infographic, at least 15 major attacks were documented during the month, resulting in the deaths of hundreds of civilians. In this context:

• Darfur: More than 89 civilians were killed in a series of consecutive attacks in Al-Fasher, including over 30 children.
• Al-Jazirah: Clashes in the city of Tumbul resulted in the deaths of more than 70 civilians.
• Kordofan: Attacks on villages in North Kordofan revealed that the RSF continues to pursue a strategy of exerting pressure in rural areas.

Actors in the War: Tactics, Alliances, and Foreign Support

Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF):

• Carried out intense airstrikes in Al-Fasher to halt RSF advances.
• Repelled several paramilitary attacks in North Kordofan.
• Achieved partial superiority on the front lines using unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAV).

Rapid Support Forces (RSF):

• Conducted heavy attacks against civilians in and around Al-Fasher.
• Targeted UN and humanitarian aid convoys, drawing international condemnation.
• Continued transporting weapons and ammunition via Libya.

Other Actors:

• Clashes broke out with the Sudan Shield Forces in Al-Jazirah.
• Reports indicated that mercenaries from Chad and Libya were fighting alongside the RSF.

Civilian Casualties and Humanitarian Situation

Throughout August, attacks on civilians reached a critical level:

• The attacks in Al-Fasher, which resulted in the deaths of 89 civilians, highlighted the high number of child casualties.
• The assaults in Tumbul demonstrated the spread of the conflict to other states.
• Targeting of aid convoys belonging to the UN World Food Programme deepened the humanitarian crisis and increased the risk of famine.

These developments reveal that the dynamics of the conflict have escalated into a humanitarian disaster, affecting not only military fronts but also the lives of civilians.

Assessment and Outlook

• The RSF’s attacks on civilians indicate that their military gains are limited and that they are trying to increase pressure through violence.
• Although the SAF’s air superiority provides temporary advantages on the fronts, the multi-front nature of the war is stretching the army’s resources.
• Continued logistical support to the RSF through Libya and Chad raises the risk of regionalization of the conflict.
• Attacks on humanitarian aid routes will accelerate hunger and mass displacement.
• The inability of either side to gain a decisive advantage on the ground weakens the likelihood of a short-term end to the conflict.
• Based on the August 2025 conflict data, in the short term it can be expected that, within the context of SAF’s ground operation, RSF positions will be targeted via Kordofan, with an advance toward Al-Fasher from this region.

In conclusion, as of August 2025, the Sudan war presents a deepening picture of instability marked by increasing civilian casualties, targeted attacks on aid routes, and the involvement of regional actors. This situation confirms that the July trend of “spreading to rural areas and targeting civilians” intensified further in August. ORSAM will continue to closely monitor this process in the coming months, focusing on both its military and humanitarian dimensions.